Rhetoric and public speech in English republicanism, 1642-1681 by Tahvanainen, Antti
ANTTI TAHVANAINEN
RHETORIC AND PUBLIC SPEECH
IN ENGLISH REPUBLICANISM
1642-1681
Academic dissertation to be publicly discussed, by due permission of 
the Faculty of Arts at the University of Helsinki in auditorium XIV, 
on the 21st of January, 2012 at 10 o’clock.
Helsinki 2012
Copyright Antti Tahvanainen
ISBN 978-952-10-7580-3 (paperback)
ISBN 978-952-10-7581-0 (PDF)
Helsinki University Print
“For his opinion touching the gouernment of the State, it is manifest 
that he least of all liked the Democracy. And vpon diuers occasions, hee 
noteth the emulation and contention of the Demagogues, for reputa-
tion, and glory of wit; with their crossing of each others counsels to the 
dammage of the Publique; the inconstancy of Resolutions, caused by 
the diuersity of ends, and power of Rhetorique in the Orators; and the 
desperate actions vndertaken vpon the flattering aduice of such as de-
sired to attain, or to hold what they had attained of authority and sway 
amongst the common people.”
- Thomas Hobbes, “Of the life and history of Thucydides,” in 
Thucydides, Eight Bookes of the Peloponnesian Warre, London: 1629.

Contents
Acknowledgements      vii
Abbreviations      ix
Introduction       1
PART I  CIVIL WAR WRITINGS TO 1649  
1. John Milton      29
2. Marchamont Nedham     55
PART II COMMONWEALTH 1649-1653
3. Return of Milton     65
4. John Hall of Durham     78
5. Nedham’s fall and rise     96
PART III PROTECTORATE 1653-1655
6. Hall and John Streater at odds    109
7. Streater’s Observations     124
8. Nedham and Milton for the Protectorate  141
v
CONTENTS
PART IV  PROTECTORATE IN 1656
9. Nedham, his Excellencie     153
10. James Harrington and his Oceana   162
PART V  PROTECTORATE 1657-1660
11. Reception of Oceana – Nedham in 1657   196
12. Harrington’s Prerogative     205
13. 1659       212
14. Milton’s Ready and easy way    225
PART VI POST-RESTORATION ERA 1661-1681
15. Exeunt – Harrington and Streater   238
16. Milton – epic and education    241
17. Nedham’s last works     250
18. Epilogue: Henry Neville    256
Conclusion       269
Appendix       278
Bibliography      279
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Over the years spent writing this study I have accumulated debts of 
gratitude to many people. Markku Peltonen has been my supervisor 
at the University of Helsinki from the beginning, and has ever since 
encouraged me to work hard and to find my own voice as an author. 
Martin Dzelzainis and Jason Peacey served as the external examiners, 
and in the process gave important insights and made invaluable cor-
rections to this study. Many added thanks go to Martin Dzelzainis for 
agreeing to act as the official opponent in the viva voce. 
I would like to thank Angus Gowland for his kind help and patience 
during my sojourn in University College London, Richard Serjeant-
son for helpful comments on various occasions, and the organisers of 
all the conferences, seminars and symposia I have participated in – in 
particular, Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner for their convegni 
on the history of liberty, and Kari Palonen for the biennial European 
workshops. I am grateful for the many travel grants I have received 
from the coffers of the University of Helsinki.
Also, many thanks to the editors of the following books, where parts 
of this study can be found published as articles: Christophe Tournu 
(Milton in France), Rosalind Crone, David Gange and Katy Jones (New 
Perspectives in British Cultural History), and professors Skinner and van 
Gelderen (Freedom and the Construction of Europe: New Perspectives on Philo-
sophical, Religious, and Political Controversies). 
One of the highlights of postgraduate studies is the opportunity to 
meet gifted and intelligent colleagues, such as Theo Christov, Rosanna 
Cox, Felicity Green, Tomasz Gromelski, Chloe Houston, Jaska Kai-
nulainen, Susan Karr, Lovro Kuncevic, Avi Lifschitz, Adriana Luna, 
vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Reidar Maliks, Eric Nelson, Ere Nokkala, Christian Preusse, Antoi-
nette Saxer, Freya Sierhuis, David Thorley, Christopher Warren and 
Márton Zászkaliczky. Dumitru Kihaï helped me with the intricacies 
of page layout – merci, cumatru. At the alma mater, old friends Mikko 
Tolonen and Jaakko Tahkokallio are keeping alive the spirit of the 
‘Pengerkatu School’. 
I am also happy to have a large family to thank, but above all, the 
greatest thanks must go to my wife. In the words of James Harrington, 
“To be learned requires leisure and income.” My greatest debt of grati-
tude is to Bianca, who earned the income that gave me the leisure to 
work on becoming learned. Part of that leisure was lost to our children 
Erik and Julia, but the trade was infinitely better.
viii
ABBREVIATIONS
CPW John Milton, Complete Prose Works of John Milton, general ed. Don 
M. Wolfe, 8 vols., New Haven: Yale University Press 1953-82.
MP Marchamont Nedham, Mercurius Politicus (March-April 1657) 
352-356, pp. 7641-7720.
PL John Milton, “Paradise Lost” [1667] in The Complete Poems, 
John Leonard (ed.), Penguin Classics 1998.
PR Henry Neville, “Plato Redivivus” [2nd ed., 1681] in Two Eng-
lish Republican tracts, Caroline Robbins (ed.), Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 1969.
PW James Harrington, The political works of James Harrington, John 
Greville Agard Pocock (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 1977.
The year is considered to start from January.
ix

1Introduction
This is a study of the role of public speech and rhetoric in late-sev-
enteenth-century English republicanism. It will analyse the ambiva-
lent relationship republicanism, as a form of self-government free from 
domination, had with the ideal of participatory oratory and non-dom-
inated speech on the one hand, and with the danger of unhindered 
demagogy and its possibly fatal consequences to that form of govern-
ment on the other. Although previous scholarship has delved deeply 
into republicanism as well as into rhetoric and public speech, the in-
terplay between those aspects has only gathered scattered interest, and 
there has been no systematic, comprehensive study considering the va-
riety of the republican approaches to rhetoric and public speech. The 
rare attempts to do so have been in the field of English literature, and 
these works, while commendable and useful studies in their own right, 
do not analyse the political philosophy of republicanism vis-à-vis public 
speech, but rather concentrate on republicanism as a literary culture – 
of prose and poetry rather than theory.1
The basic premise of this study is that we can legitimately argue 
for the existence of English republicanism, considering the extent of 
the shared frame of references by the authors under study. However, 
this study will show that within the tradition of classical republican-
ism individual authors could make different choices when addressing 
the problematic topics of public speech and rhetoric, and the variety 
of their conclusions often set the authors against each other, resulting 
in the partial development of their theories through internal debates 
1 Most notably: David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: poetry, rhetoric and poli-
tics, 1627-1660, Cambridge: 1999; Nigel Smith, Literature and Revolution in England, 
1640-1660, New Haven: 1994.
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within the republican tradition. The authors under study have been 
chosen to reflect this variety and the connections between them: the 
similarities between James Harrington and John Streater, and between 
John Milton and John Hall are shown as well the controversies between 
Harrington and Milton, and Streater and Hall, respectively. In addi-
tion, by analysing the writings of Marchamont Nedham the study will 
show that the choices were not simply limited to more, or less, demo-
cratic brands of republicanism. 
By means of this analysis, the study will show that the previous at-
tempts to assess the role of free speech and public debate, through the 
lens of modern, rights-based liberal political theory, have resulted in 
an inappropriate framework for understanding early modern English 
republicanism. By approaching the topics through concepts used by the 
republicans – legitimate authority, leadership by oratory, republican 
freedom – and through the frames of reference available and familiar 
to them – roles of education and institutions – this study will present 
a thorough and systematic analysis of the role and function of rhetoric 
and public speech in English republicanism. The findings of this analy-
sis will be shown to have significant consequences to our current under-
standing of the history and development of republican political theory.
Historical background
Rhetoric and republicanism shared a common heritage, as humanism 
was a necessary background to republicanism, and similarly rhetoric 
was a crucial part of humanism. However, rhetoric, seen specifically as 
the art of public speaking, has historically been controversial in the re-
publican tradition. It has been often viewed as conducive to democratic 
values and ideals, yet it has also been condemned, as the art of sedition 
and treachery, undermining political order and rational decision-mak-
ing.2 The study starts from a perspective that the political use of rheto-
2 Literature on the subject is abundant, for a recent contribution: Benedetto Fon-
tana, Cary J. Nederman, Gary Remer, eds., Talking democracy: historical perspectives 
on rhetoric and democracy, University Park, PA. 2004. 
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ric can be seen as aiming for a similar golden mean as republicanism: 
instead of demagogy, with its allusions to anarchic democracy and mob 
rule, or fawning flattery in a tyrannical oligarchy, an ideal rhetoric in 
an ideal republic would lie between these two extremes.
We can trace the origins of this approach to ancient Greece, and 
Aristotle’s description of the role of abusers of rhetoric in a tyranny, that 
“tyranny fauoureth the wicked, in as much as tyrans take a pleasure 
to be flattered, which neuer would any man of free and noble heart 
doe.” This quote in Aristotle’s Politics is a part of a double-pronged cri-
tique of political forms. The other target is “the people,” who “desireth 
to be a Monarch.” The “flatterer is in estimation with both of them”; 
that is “with the tyrans,” but also “with the people.” It is “the Popu-
lar captaine, who is a flatterer of the people.”3 If we would speak in 
neo-Roman terms, or in terms of republican liberty, the problem with 
tyranny is the loss of liberty through the arbitrary power of the ruler, 
the problem of popular rule is the loss of liberty through the arbitrary 
power of the mob.4 
However, there would seem to be an incompatibility between the 
Aristotelian approach, and the theory of republicanism as a form of 
government. If liberty means living in a state of non-domination in a 
self-governing society – that is, a society where all who are affected by 
decisions have a say in them – how can that freedom be lost by the very 
act of establishing a state of popular rule?5 It cannot, if we assume that 
3 Aristotle, Politiques, Louis le Roy transl., London: 1598, 1313b-4a. In the seven-
teenth century the ‘Popular captaine’ began to be translated with the neologism 
demagogue, and in its contemporary usage the word assumed quickly a negative 
sense, removed from the semantically innocent meaning of ‘leader of the people.’
4 For neo-Roman liberty as not being a slave, i.e. being free from domination, from 
arbitrary power, see Quentin Skinner, Liberty before liberalism, Cambridge: 1998. 
Skinner makes a valid point that ‘neo-Roman’ would be less unhistorical as a label 
than ‘republican’ liberty, but since along with most others, he has also adopted 
the ‘republican’ terminology, it is used in this study as well: cf. Quentin Skinner, 
Hobbes and republican liberty, Cambridge: 2008, p. ix. 
5 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. 2: Renaissance Virtues, Cambridge: 2002, 
p. 6. See also Skinner, Hobbes and republican liberty, p. 64, 76. The most influential 
modern exposition of republicanism as a political philosophy is in Philip Pettit, 
Republicanism: a theory of freedom and government, Oxford: 1998.
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all decisions should be made by majority rule. In practice, most histori-
cal, present or imaginary republics have not made such an assumption: 
the rule of law and constitutional arrangements have usually prevented 
full-blown applications of democracy as pure will of the people. As will 
be shown, this was the case for the authors under study, and this study 
will show their various ways of addressing the crucial theoretical ques-
tion about the source of republican authority: while trying to avoid the 
extremes of pure democracy and absolute monarchy, what was to be 
the basis of legitimate power? And how would public speech and rheto-
ric fit into a republican form of government? 
In an appropriate and often used Roman definition of republic, it is 
said to be a ‘society gathered together in one consent of law, and in one 
participation of profit.’6 This definition leaves out the political arrange-
ments that give neither: both a lawless tyranny and popular anarchy 
are without rule of law or common interest. At the same time, it puts 
under suspicion any monarch claiming to rule lawfully and strive for 
the public good, as well as demagogues putting claims of public opinion 
above law or with regard to a merely factional interest – even if on be-
half of a majority. While the anti-monarchical aspect of republicanism 
has been under much scrutiny, the other side of the loss of liberty has 
not garnered as much interest in the history of early modern political 
thought. 
These two extremes are the essential reference points in much of re-
publican tradition, yet in order to understand the role of public speech 
for English republicans, a simple assertion that they also tried to avoid 
demagogy, while technically correct, would be uninformative. For a 
fuller picture of the republican approaches it is necessary to analyse 
their variety. My study will show how different emphases on the ‘one 
consent of law’ – especially as pertains to legitimate authority – and on 
the definitions of ‘one participation of profit,’ – and its connections to 
early modern interest theory – led republicans into different approach-
es to the role of public speech. 
6 As put in St. Augustine, Of the citie of God vvith the learned comments of Io. Lod. Viues, 
London: 1610, p. 82, quoting Cicero, De re publica, 1.39.
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On rhetoric
Rhetoric is a loaded and contentious term, and it is thus imperative to 
define what is meant by rhetoric in this study. First of all, as this work 
belongs to the field of intellectual history rather than literary studies, 
the main interest is on primary rather than secondary rhetoric.7 That 
is, rhetoric is considered in its primary, political sense, as a theory of 
persuasion in public discourse, for the purpose of deliberation and col-
lective decision-making. The secondary sense of rhetoric, as being a 
technical analysis of the means of persuasion, is of lesser importance. 
All of the authors under study were well drilled in the techniques of 
rhetoric, as it was a part of their studia humanitatis, and accordingly the 
assumption in this work is that their use of rhetoric was intentional, 
rather than being merely accidental, reflecting a systemic aspect of hu-
man language. Or in other words, my aim is to refer to rhetoric, as those 
early modern authors would have understood it.8 Since the purpose of 
this study is not to engage in a modern equivalent of an early-modern 
school exercise of listing all the various tropes and figures used, the only 
mentions of the secondary sense of rhetoric, the technical issues, are 
made at instances where the rhetoric used is considered relevant to the 
analysis of the authors’ intentions.9 What individual authors, at various 
instances, presented as their preferences for the study of rhetoric will be 
examined in due course, but the onus of the study is firmly on the pri-
mary sense of rhetoric as a theory of public persuasion. We may begin 
to consider the background to this topic by asking why rhetoric should 
be studied at all: why should there be orators? 
The classical view of a wielder of rhetoric can be found in the works 
of Cicero and Quintilian, where the ideal of citizenship is that of a per-
7 George Alexander Kennedy, Classical rhetoric and its Christian and secular tradition 
from ancient to modern times, 2nd ed., Chapel Hill: 1999, pp. 2-3.
8 For an example of this approach, see Quentin Skinner, Reason and rhetoric in the 
philosophy of Hobbes, Cambridge: 1996, pp. 5-6.
9 Unless mentioned otherwise, the references to rhetorical terms follow Richard 
Alan Lanham, A handlist of rhetorical terms, Berkeley: 1991.
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fect republican orator. Through the mastery of rhetoric, a citizen could 
discharge his most important duties: arguing in courts of law, or ad-
vocating policies in assemblies. Without rhetoric, even a well-meaning 
man of impeccable morals would fail at these duties. Besides the means 
that rhetoric provided, the classical ideal also assumed that an orator 
can be great if, and only if, he is a good man as well. In the most elevat-
ed claims of the Roman rhetoricians about their own kind, the orator is 
not just the ideal citizen, but the embodiment of humanity in its highest 
form, and the pinnacle of human virtue: he is the founder of societies, a 
discussant of civil science, accommodator of the voice of reason, justice, 
equity and truth – or, if situation so requires, a combination of those as-
pects. It is the orator’s skill at accommodating to his audience in order 
to get his message across, which makes him so necessary in a society, 
where not everyone is necessarily wise and learned.10
An education that would allow one to master the art of oratory was 
a common interest to the early modern republicans. Although the ideal 
rhetor should be a good man, and a bad one could therefore not be a 
masterly rhetor, it was clear from both ancient and recent history that 
even less than great rhetors could cause immense troubles. Education 
was seen as the key factor in the quest to create such soothing orators 
instead of inflammatory demagogues, wise counsellors instead of vi-
cious courtiers. For a pertinent example, Marchamont Nedham and 
John Milton were even named by Samuel Hartlib in 1647 as prospec-
tive commissioners of educational reform.11 
While the connections between education in the humanities and 
the use of political rhetoric are well known and studied, there are some 
elements in the republicans’ political thought that relied also on other 
elements of early modern political and social theories. Although they 
were related to classical rhetoric, topics that were not solely governed by 
it included: counsel, petitions, and civil conversation. A common factor 
is that they have all been influenced by rhetoric to some extent, or used 
in conjunction with rhetorical modes, but they have also been presented 
10 Skinner, Reason and rhetoric, pp. 87-106. 
11 Blair Worden, “Milton and Marchamont Nedham,” in Milton and Republicanism, 
eds. David Armitage et al., Cambridge: 1995, p. 160.
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as alternatives to rhetoric or modes of political action, distinct from and 
even untainted by rhetoric. Accordingly, in earlier studies these topics 
have been somewhat simplistically presented as being either mere rhet-
oric, or against rhetoric. As each of these topics represents a large field 
of study in its own right, my reflections here are necessarily tentative. 
In the context of this study these topics, while relevant, are considered 
as borderline issues: they lie somewhere between rhetoric defined as 
eloquent persuasion, and a view of politics free from rhetoric.
The difficulty of presenting political forms of action that would rely 
on speech, and yet somehow be arhetorical, can be found in the views 
presented by Cicero concerning counsel.12 Against the view that socie-
ties had been founded by the efforts of eloquent men in gathering and 
convincing the people to renounce their old ways and unite in the pur-
suit of common good, the character of Scaevola in De Oratore argued 
that they were “convinced by the reasoning of the wise” rather than 
“snared by the speeches of the eloquent.” For Scaevola, Romulus was 
an example of founding a commonwealth by “good counsel and singu-
lar wisdom” rather than through eloquence. Scaevola’s role is, as often 
in Cicero’s works, the interlocutor whose views are refuted: his defini-
tions were artificial, as content could not be separated from the form. 
Nevertheless, this goes to show that as a paradiastolic trope the dis-
tinction between wisdom and rhetoric has a long history, remaining to 
our day.13 The opponents use deceitful rhetoric, flattery, and have a hid-
den agenda, whereas proponents give plain, honest, transparent advice. 
Of course, the proponents could be accused in turn of false frankness. 
The intricacies of this issue have given birth to a whole genre of litera-
ture on ‘How a man may discerne a flatterer from a friend.’14 In the 
12 De Oratore, 1.36-38.
13 In what follows on the question of counsel, I have benefited greatly from David 
Colclough, Freedom of Speech In Early Stuart England, Cambridge: 2005.
14 To quote the title of Plutarch’s contribution in Morals – fittingly, even Plutarch’s 
work was essentially a job application in order to become a councillor. Cf. Troels 
Engberg-Pedersen, “Plutarch to Prince Philopappus on How to Tell a Flatterer 
from a Friend,” in Friendship, flattery, and frankness of speech: studies on Friendship in the 
New Testament World, ed. John Fitzgerald, New York: 1995.
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seventeenth century context, this had a particular political relevance in 
the counsel for princes. The language of counsel could rely on a number 
of ideas: on who should be a councillor, there was competition between 
– as well as combination of – the feudal ideas of becoming a councillor 
through noble birth, and humanist ideals of choosing the best council-
lors (unsurprisingly, those educated in humanist curriculum).15 Simi-
larly, the justification for a plenitude of advice could be argued from 
biblical injunctions, classical works or renaissance humanist books on 
education among other sources. 
A similar inclusion of rhetoric in traditional modes of politics can 
be seen in petitions. Unlike counsel, which was limited to the elite in 
a republic as well as in a princely polity, petitions were officially and 
traditionally meant as a way for the lower classes to air their griev-
ances. Their content and form were regulated by custom and tradition, 
requiring them to be spontaneous and politically neutral complaints. 
This ruled out the use of rhetoric, as that would have implied premedi-
tation and thus a hidden agenda.16 But as with counsel, spontaneity 
could be feigned in order to give an appearance of truthfulness. As 
a rhetorical scheme, this was as old a strategy as false frankness, or 
feigned parrhesia. Similarly, with skilful use of rhetoric political causes 
could be hidden within a professedly arhetorical petition.
The civil war era saw new developments in the uses of petitions. 
Besides becoming more organised, they were published in increasing 
numbers and often presented with added political harangues. Thus 
they became more openly a form of political oratory, blatantly uns-
pontaneous, rhetorical, undeferring to authority, and often without any 
notions of secrecy or precedent.17 Of course, this was abuse that did not 
necessarily imply that they had become useless outside the parliamen-
15 John Guy, “The rhetoric of counsel in early modern England,” in Tudor political 
culture, ed. Dale Hoak, Cambridge: 1995. 
16 On petitions I have relied on David Zaret, Origins of democratic culture: printing, 
petitions and the public sphere in early-modern England, Princeton: 2000 (esp. pp. 59, 
93-5, 220). Although Zaret’s work can be criticised for its historical lapses, it 
nevertheless provides a useful compendium on petitions.
17 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 100. 
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tary framework: both republicans and their antagonists included peti-
tions in their political theories.18 
The main criteria in allowing petitions at all were of course that 
they had to be of non-controversial character, and deferential. For 
those aiming at something more than mere propaganda in writing pe-
titions, it was possible to use the language of deference and intend to 
do something completely else. This led to constant doubts and suspi-
cion of the use of rhetoric in petitions. Nevertheless, for the purposes of 
this work the study of formal petitions is of lesser importance, precisely 
because as soon as petitions enter the realm of politics – that is, when 
aiming at any higher political aims than simply asking for grace – they 
are ipso facto no longer petitions but public ‘speech’, texts with political 
character which can then be studied on their own merits. 
As with counsel and petitions, civil conversation was a concept with 
a long history, but which went through significant changes in the early 
modern period. In one reading it is seen to have connection to changes 
in republicanism, caused by the culture of politeness. In this ‘civilizing’ 
view classical republicanism transforms into polite republicanism as 
England becomes a colonial, commercial and financial power, and ac-
cordingly, the ideals of public debating turn into ideals of polished and 
sophisticated conversation between well-mannered gentlemen in closed 
circles.19 What renders this interpretation problematic is its inconsider-
ate approach to rhetoric. For example, the role of Cicero should not be 
joined to the culture of politeness without taking into account the dif-
ferences between public speech (oratio) and conversation (sermo), which 
were pointed out by Cicero himself, and certainly known to his seven-
18 PW 225, 251. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Com-
mon-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, London: 1651, 2.23 “those that are appointed 
to receive the petitions or other informations of the people, and are, as it were, the 
public ear.”
19 Iain Hampsher-Monk, “From virtue to politeness,” in Republicanism: a shared 
European heritage. Vol. II. The values of republicanism in early modern Europe, eds. Martin 
van Gelderen, Quentin Skinner, Cambridge: 2002; Lawrence Klein, “Politeness 
and the Interpretation of the British Eighteenth Century,” The Historical Journal, 
45(4), 2002, pp. 869-898.
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teenth century readers.20 Civil conversation as a mode of speech was 
new to the early modern era, but it was derived from and relied on Cic-
ero’s distinction in De Officiis (1.132) between speech in an assembly and 
speech in a circle of friends. But whereas Cicero had assumed that the 
rules of rhetoric applied for both styles despite the different situations, 
the early modern era saw approaches to conversation where the use of 
rhetoric did not accord well with some ideals thought of as more ap-
propriate to conversation, such as spontaneity and inclusiveness. Con-
comitantly, the Ciceronian view of politics as one of the main topics of 
conversation became unappealing, due to its conflict-prone character.21
The common factor to all of the above topics, which I have called 
borderline issues, is that at some level all of them purport to be trans-
parent and honest ways of speaking. In more straightforward public 
speaking, the figure of parrhesia is the claim to speak frankly and hon-
estly – if not completely without rhetoric, at least not in excess. Never-
theless, a claim is just a claim until proven otherwise, and mistrust of 
feigned parrhesia was a commonplace worry in the seventeenth century, 
yet it has not gathered much interest hitherto.22 Dealing with that is-
sue is a problem for methodology, but before moving on to questions of 
method, it is necessary to consider the republican framework of rhetoric 
– that is, republicanism itself.
20 Gary Remer, “Political Oratory and Conversation: Cicero versus Deliberative 
Democracy,” Political Theory 27, February 1999.
21 Scholarship on the issue is vast, of which a sample: Daniel Javitch, Poetry and Court-
liness in Renaissance England, Princeton: 1978, ch 1, for the notion of civil conversa-
tion as dissembling courtly rhetoric. Anna Bryson, From courtesy to civility. Changing 
codes of conduct in early modern England, Oxford: 1998, ch 5 for civil conversation as 
a relatively straightforward continuum from Ciceronian rhetoric. Jennifer Rich-
ards, Rhetoric and Courtliness in Early Modern Literature, Cambridge: 2003, intro., for 
civil conversation as s a new mode of speech, which was derived from Cicero 
but underwent changes in sixteenth century. Markku Peltonen, The Duel in Early 
Modern England: Civility, Politeness and Honour, Cambridge: 2003 pp. 24, 159-60 and 
Peter Burke, The art of conversation, Cambridge: 1993, p. 92, for the notion that some 
aspects of rhetoric did not accord well with the ideals of conversation. 
22 Important exceptions include Colclough, Freedom of Speech, Richards, Rhetoric and 
Courtliness. 
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On republicanism
Much ink has been spilled over what counts as republicanism, and a 
common method to this end has been to recover republican ‘creden-
tials’ in the authors of the era under study. Historiographically this 
tradition dates back to Zera Fink23 and it has been interpreted both 
widely and narrowly, to the extent where asking whether an author was 
a republican has become acceptable, not just as a research question but 
even as an article title for journals.24 This study aims to make a partial 
break with this tradition. Although teasing out incipient or hidden re-
publicanism is undoubtedly a worthy subject, the risk is that the formal 
characteristics of republicanism become more important, and subse-
quently the subjects of study become suffused solely by it. 
To give an example, in a recent study John Hall is presented as ‘es-
tablishing his Royalist credentials’ with a text called A true account, an 
argument which by itself is quite plausible. Nevertheless, when consid-
ering the somewhat chaotic situation of 1646-7, the lack of an explicitly 
republican party or movement to support, and the ease with which nu-
merous authors under study changed their allegiances, there are a few 
conclusions to be drawn. First, that republicanism was not an obvious 
or unstoppable development, but a second, more important point, is to 
question the whole notion of ideological screening for authentic repub-
licanism. If such commitment for supposedly accurate description of 
authors were to be followed, we could be easily left with anachronis-
tic monster-terms with questionable analytical value: Hall would be a 
‘proto-republican Royalist’.25 
23 Zera S. Fink, The Classical Republicans: An Essay in the Recovery of a Pattern of Thought 
in Seventeenth Century England, Evanston: 1962.
24 Warren Chernaik, “Was Marvell a republican?” Seventeenth Century, 20:1 (April) 
2005, pp. 77-96.
25 John Hall, A true account and character of the times, historically and politically drawn 
by a gentleman to give satisfaction to his friend in the countrey, London: 1647. Nicholas 
McDowell, Poetry and Allegiance in the English Civil Wars: Marvell and the Cause of Wit, 
Oxford: 2008, pp. 91-3, Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 101.
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In this study, republicanism is taken to be a political tradition aris-
ing from the studia humanitatis, that was malleable enough to allow the 
authors under study to both agree on the aptness and propriety of re-
publican approaches to the political questions of their time, and, never-
theless, to reach very different conclusions as to what the exact political 
solutions should be. Thus when considering their views on the role of 
public speech in society – real or ideal – we need not bother with con-
siderations whether at the moment of writing down a particular argu-
ment in a particular book they were committed to republicanism with 
burning idealism, but rather how those arguments would fit into the re-
publican tradition, and how that tradition would then develop and bi-
furcate in the course of their writings, and within the events of history.
In this study, I will make a distinction between civic humanism and 
classical republicanism, and my definitions will have slightly different 
bents from some earlier research. The term civic humanist is used to 
refer to a political view, which shares common classical background in 
ideals of civic activism, Stoicism, and natural law with classical repub-
licanism. The two terms are often considered interchangeable, but my 
claim is that they are rather partially overlapping terms than synonyms. 
Civic humanism differs from classical republicanism in the significant 
respect that it is not necessarily anti-monarchical. Obviously there are 
authors who, in various contingencies, have straddled the fence, but 
from the perspective of political philosophy this division points out a 
crucial heuristic difference in the arguments. One can be a fervent be-
liever in active life in politics characterised by humanist virtues, values, 
learning – and not be a republican. One could believe in the value of 
counsel to a king, rather than deferring ipso facto to a republican form 
of government. Of course, as the career of someone like Seneca shows, 
this was far from an easy thing to do. Within political theory, a strong 
argument could be – and was – made that civic humanism in a mon-
archy is inherently so difficult, as to be practically unfeasible. Indeed, 
with a certain generosity of spirit, even James I could be said to be a 
civic humanist, but hardly a republican. In turn, a classical republican 
by strict definition cannot be a monarchist, although in practice many 
were willing to admit a temporary, pragmatic or compromise approach 
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of having a monarch with legally limited powers. Nevertheless, for a 
classical republican the points of reference and ideals of government 
were taken from the non-monarchical ancient republics. 
However, it is also important to note how the use of the classical 
references was as various as the intentions of the author(s). This is un-
derstandable, but it can create problems in scholarly literature. For 
example, Marchamont Nedham can be seen as promoting Athenian 
democracy over the aristocratic republic of Sparta. This has been seen 
to make him more democratic than Milton, as he then seems to prefer 
a “fundamental transition of power in the people’s favor.”26 At the same 
time, Nedham’s view of Athens is argued to be “in a more authori-
tarian spirit” than Milton’s: Nedham is seen to use the Areopagus as 
an example of “an enlightened executive which prevented power from 
coming into the hands of the people.”27 Between these views, it is point-
ed out how from the late 1651 onwards Nedham emphasised Athenian 
instability, while until few months earlier (and during mid-1640s) he 
was praising the popular liberty of Athens.28 All of this just goes to 
show that our understanding of Athens and Sparta do tend to get in the 
way of our understanding of early modern authors. Ultimately we must 
recognise that classical examples were used by republicans to make 
contemporary points, with the knowledge available to them. It is beside 
the point to try and re-enlist them into a rerun of the Peloponnesian 
war – did they prefer Athens or Sparta – when we can analyse what 
their actual political arguments were.
The point that the republicans were not completely bound to their 
predecessors’ battles also means that, when considering the republicans’ 
writings on rhetoric, especially as pertains to institutional arrange-
ments, we can see that classical republicans had no need to pay con-
stant and unrelenting respect to civic humanist conceptions of learning 
and virtue. Accordingly, I will also put a slightly different emphasis on 
26 Blair Worden, “Marchamont Nedham and the Beginnings of English Republi-
canism,” in Republicanism, Liberty and Commercial Society, ed. David Wootton, Stan-
ford: 1994, p. 67.
27 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 222.
28 Smith, Literature and Revolution, p. 186.
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the concept of civic virtue than in some of current scholarship. This 
does not mean that I consider it unimportant – on the contrary, as will 
be shown, for many writers rhetoric was a way of exercising virtue: the 
virtuous task of engaging in politics, in law-courts, or promoting the 
republic abroad. What I aim for, is a conception of virtue that does not 
do away with utility, or interest. There is a strand of scholarship that 
perceives the notion of private interests as antithetical to virtue, so that 
any talk of interests can be interpreted as a desertion from the republi-
can cause.29 Similarly, liberal theorists have seen interests as a develop-
ment towards broader democracy – giving everyone a stake through 
their legitimate interests.30 
However, the mid-seventeenth century saw many attempts by re-
publicans, who acknowledged the role of private interests, to try and 
ensure the supremacy of virtuous politics and public interests in the 
republican mode. My claim is that for most republicans not only was 
rhetoric in the pursuit of the common interest a virtuous task, but that 
self-interested rhetoric was not necessarily against the common interest 
or morals. The way rhetoric could be harmful, was when it was short-
sightedly self-interested and against common utility and/or morals. For 
many of the republicans, self-interest and common interest need not be 
incompatible, and there was room for a conception of objective moral-
ity as well. 
Printing revolution and free speech
Interest theory has also been seen as part of an early modern effort at 
getting rid of rhetoric. In this strand of interpretation interests repre-
sented the unconcealed truth, independent from the forms of speech, 
thus making interest theory into a form of rhetoric-free political theo-
29 E.g. Jonathan Scott, “The rapture of motion: James Harrington’s republicanism,” 
in Political discourse in early modern Britain, eds. Nicholas Phillipson, Quentin Skinner, 
Cambridge: 1993.
30 Stephen Holmes, “The secret history of self-interest,” in Beyond Self-interest, ed. 
Jane J. Mansbridge, Chicago: 1990, pp. 284-5.
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ry.31 This is seen to have taken place concomitantly with the printing 
revolution,32 which made rhetoric obsolete due to the durability of the 
printed word, and the growing amount of referable texts, which then 
ensured the subsequent displacement of most symbolic forms of speech, 
such as rhetoric.33 The advent of printing has been depicted as the main 
culprit behind this decline of rhetoric, especially in the works of Walter 
J. Ong, where the change from oral to printed word is seen as one of the 
most significant changes in the history of modernisation.34 
However, as pertains to the forms of public speech, written or spo-
ken, it is interesting to compare the views of different republicans. To 
Milton, “writing is more publick then preaching; and more easie to 
refutation, if need be” (CPW 2:548). Ong would have probably agreed, 
but James Harrington saw the matter differently: “that what a divine 
will have to be true, is no less public than if it were printed, but more, 
for he will preach it; and preaching communicates unto more than can 
read.”35 In turn, Marchamont Nedham’s oft-repeated opposition to se-
ditious sermons has been seen as a troubling inconsistency: how can a 
performed oration such as sermon, be more dangerous than journal-
ist’s texts?36 For these aforementioned republicans it was the argument 
at hand, and especially their enmity towards the clergy, which shaped 
their views on the means of delivery. The difference between written 
and spoken word did not mean as much for seventeenth century politi-
cal writers as issues defined by rhetoric: who speaks/writes, to whom, 
31 Niklas Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives,” 
in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, ed. Diego Gambetta, Oxford: 
2000, p. 101; more on interest theory: J. A. W. Gunn, Politics and the public interest 
in the seventeenth century, London: 1969; Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the 
Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph, Princeton: 1977.
32 Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing press as an agent of change: communications and 
cultural transformations in early-modern Europe, Cambridge: 1979.
33 Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust.”
34 Walter J. Ong, Ramus, method and the decay of dialogue: from the art of discourse to the art 
of reason, Cambridge, Mass., 1958; and Rhetoric, romance, and technolog y; studies in the 
interaction of expression and culture, Ithaca: 1971. 
35 James Harrington, “Pian Piano” [1656] in PW 371.
36 Smith, Literature and Revolution, pp. 33-34.
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and where. This does not invalidate Ong’s thesis as such, but as Hobbes 
wrote in chapter 4 of Leviathan, printing was a clever invention, but not 
as great as speech.37 
Undoubtedly, it needs to be recognised that it would have been 
extremely difficult for the sheer volume of pamphlets and texts of all 
kind, which circulated in the Civil War England, to have escaped the 
republican authors’ notice. It may even be “the overwhelming truth” 
that the “theory of republican government was one made entirely with-
in the framework of a society experiencing the intense circulation of 
information.”38 Yet as will be demonstrated, the authors under study 
were very flexible and pragmatic in accusing and ignoring in turns the 
printing revolution. Many were prolific writers who relished attack-
ing opposing views, so any consistent vituperation of the print culture 
would have been self-defeating. An example of an attack on republican 
writings, by Roger L’Estrange, asking “whether more mischief then 
advantage were not occasion’d to the Christian world by the Invention 
of Typography,”39 should be seen in a similar context of manipulation 
and rhetorical persuasion. L’Estrange represented the authorities and 
made his living by regulating print products, so it was sensible for him 
to amplify its dangerous powers. 
The regulation of printing, and outright censorship are topics that 
must be taken into account when studying public speech. However, 
since this study deals with political arguments related to regulation of 
speech rather than that regulation itself, references to existing legisla-
tion on, and circumstances of, censorship will only be made when con-
sidered relevant. And as this study will consider arguments for regula-
tion, it will also consider the arguments against it – that is, arguments 
for free speech.
There has been a lot of interest in writing the history of the freedom 
of expression – that is, free speech and free press – and accordingly nu-
merous histories of the practice have been made. But historians of that 
ilk have been at pains to find early modern writers who would have un-
37 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 12.
38 Smith, Literature and Revolution, pp. 186-187.
39 L’Estrange, A rope for Pol, London: 1660, “An Advertisement to the Reader.”
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reservedly defended freedom of expression to all.40 Despite the will to 
find such founding fathers, legal history professes that the right of free 
speech only comes to existence after the First World War.41 The early 
modern gap, between the professed statements supporting freedom of 
expression and the unwillingness to support it as an unalienable right, 
has created puzzlement among historians. A more productive approach 
is to bring in the role rhetoric plays: this study aims to contribute to 
other recent studies that have demonstrated how freedom of speech 
was not so much an abstract principle or a universal right, but a flexible 
ideal related to the rhetorical culture of debate and counsel.42
The difference between free speech as a rhetorical approach and as 
a right is a crucial feature of this study. While the seventeenth century 
is undoubtedly an unfailing source for anyone looking for great quotes 
to argue for free speech as an unalienable right, and it certainly was a 
crucial period in the development towards such a conception, neverthe-
less free speech was not necessarily perceived as a right – especially not 
as a relativist right, which would have been described as licence, rather 
than liberty. Appeal could be, and was, made to classical principles for 
listening to both sides of an argument, and rhetoric as a school subject 
trained pupils into arguing in utramque partem. Yet this mildly sceptical 
approach should not be confused with the liberal approach advocating 
the inherent value of various opinions, and the right to air them without 
official repression. The republican idea of liberty can give strong argu-
ments against the dangers of self-censorship and for the instrumental 
value of holding rulers accountable, but this is not exactly the same as 
the aforementioned liberal right to free speech – which does not neces-
sitate a republican form of government.
It is a central argument of this study that the republicans’ willing-
40 Leonard Levy, Emergence of a Free Press, Oxford:1985; Robert W.T. Martin, The 
Free and Open Press, The Founding of American Democratic Press Liberty, 1640-1800, New 
York: 2001.
41 David Kairys, “Freedom of Speech,” in The politics of law: a progressive critique (3rd 
ed.), ed. David Kairys, New York: 1998, pp. 190-212.
42 David Colclough, “Parrhesia: The Rhetoric of Free Speech in Early Modern 
England,” Rhetorica, xvii, 1999, pp. 177-212; and Colclough, Freedom of Speech.
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ness to debate did not imply that they were accepting free speech as a 
universal right, even if they were asserting a right, or a privilege of free 
speech to themselves. The seventeenth century context of these debates 
has been described aptly as one “which grew not from the desire to 
create an environment of free and open communication, but from the 
desire to manipulate and rhetorically persuade.”43 The intention in this 
study is not to limit the analysis solely to the positive conceptions of 
freedom of speech. The reason for this is the risk of turning the study 
into an exercise of teleological history, where the republicans had found 
the good and right arguments, but failed to follow the truth to its logi-
cal and inevitable conclusion. It is just as important to analyse the role 
and consequences of limitations to freedom of speech in the political 
theories of the republicans. The essential question is not about freedom 
of expression as such, but about political consequences involved44: what 
good, and bad, would come out of free public speech?45 
Questions of method
As I mentioned earlier, interest theory has been seen as an effort to 
purge language of rhetoric. In this respect, it has been seen in the con-
text of a period of great anxiety in the seventeenth century, about the 
43 Joad Raymond, “The newspaper, public opinion, and the public sphere in the 
seventeenth century,” in News, newspapers, and society in early modern Britain, ed. Joad 
Raymond, London: 1999, p. 129.
44 The omission of the political dimension from discussions of free public speech 
is notable in Stanley Fish, There’s no such thing as free speech, Oxford: 1994, p. 103, 
where following the accurate claim that Milton does not allow all speech without 
consequences, Fish asserts that “all affirmations of freedom of expression are like 
Milton’s.” As will be shown in this study, free speech can be, and was promoted 
precisely from the perspective that the resulting consequences are of little impor-
tance when weighed against the costs of censorship. Such cost-benefit analyses 
had little interest in the meaningfulness of the expressions or the intentions of their 
makers.
45 As a result, my work deals with issues, such as of libel and blasphemy, only as they 
have a bearing on the political analyses of rights, interests and their conflicts.
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ambiguities of language, and rhetoric in particular. The rise of mod-
ern science during this era has been claimed as one of many historical 
developments, which made rhetoric obsolete. Further interpretations 
have seen scientific pursuits as deliberate attempts at getting rid of the 
ambiguity and uncertainty of rhetoric. The History of the Royal Society 
(1667) by Thomas Sprat opposed rhetoric;46 John Wilkins’ attempts at 
developing a universal language had an anti-rhetorical foundation;47 
the educational ideas of John Locke were against ‘false rhetoric’;48 and, 
in more general terms, argumentation based on legal thinking49 and 
mathematics50 could to a point be presented as languages free from 
rhetoric. However, as the studies referred to in notes 46-50 also show, 
the attempts to cast rhetoric off were often only ostensible – rhetorical, 
even – and the alternatives functional and, at least in the short term, 
unsuccessful.51 
46 Brian Vickers & Nancy S. Struever, Rhetoric and the pursuit of truth: language change in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; papers read at a Clark Library Seminar 8 March 1980, 
Los Angeles: 1985.
47 Mary M. Slaughter, Universal language and scientific taxonomy in the seventeenth century, 
Cambridge: 1982. 
48 Sami-Juhani Savonius, “Jean Leclerc’s and John Locke’s Assault upon ‘False 
Rhetoric’, c. 1688-c. 1701,” in Ennen & nyt, Vol. 1: The Papers of the Nordic Conference 
on the History of Ideas, eds. Tero Karasjärvi, Jouko Nurmiainen, Helsinki: 2001.
49 Barbara J. Shapiro, A culture of fact: England, 1550 – 1720, Ithaca: 2000.
50 Peter Dear, Discipline & Experience: The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution, 
Chicago: 1995; Giovanna C. Cifoletti, “Mathematics and rhetoric: Peletier and 
Gosselin and the making of the French algebraic tradition,” Dissertation Abstracts 
International, 53: 4061-A, 1993.
51 This is obviously quite a laundry-list and accordingly these topics have involved 
scholarly efforts of vast scale. A recent contribution showing the pervasive effects 
of these linguistic problematics is Hannah Dawson, Locke, Language and Early-mod-
ern Philosophy, Cambridge: 2007. (Nevertheless, missing from Dawson’s analysis is 
the crucial aspect of rhetoric not as an invention, but as a collection of working 
techniques taken from and relying on psychological insights. Admirably Dawson 
abstains from conflating rhetoric and linguistic theory, yet perhaps the disjunc-
tion between philosophical discussions on uses of authority, passion or reason in 
an argument, and persuasion through ethos, pathos and logos seems not to be 
so great. It is noteworthy that during 3000 years of developments and diverging 
views in rhetorical theory, there is a heuristic ‘mean’ around these three notions. 
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Despite all these attempts, fundamental difficulties remain in any 
attempts to take the writers’ claims at face value – especially in any 
work including attempts of political persuasion (admittedly a broad cat-
egory). While this should be obvious for anyone who has ever witnessed 
a political campaign, it is imperative to notice the tendency to take at 
face value what is convenient in academic scholarship as well. Some 
scholarly studies transpose our contemporary positions to the seven-
teenth century: depending on the scholar’s own political position, anti-
defamation and libel laws are perceived as either methods of repressive 
state or as legitimate answers to hate speech. Correspondingly, texts 
against immorality or for free speech are presented as either “educat-
ing” or “manipulating” their readers.52 This is repeated in relation to 
rhetoric, where – ironically enough – it is essentially a reuse of early 
modern rhetorical techniques: supportable parts are truthful, unsup-
portable mere rhetoric.53 
There are clearly inherent difficulties in the topics of free speech 
and rhetoric, which would be helped by having a methodology that 
would lessen the risk of turning the study of political thought into mere 
propaganda. In an effort to better understand the arguments of the 
writers, the method adopted in this work is to firmly keep politics in the 
study of political thought. It might seem an obvious approach, but it is 
often the obvious that is most easily forgotten. To give two examples 
of this approach: first, the historical context of moving from dissent to 
establishment. Before the English republic, the republican position was 
fairly straightforward: the claim was one of oppressed freemen resist-
What could be a fruitful contribution to scholarship is a psychological – ‘human 
nature’ – approach to the topic, in addition to the existing epistemological and 
methodological approaches. Or to put it more bluntly, there are studies on early 
modern theories of how language works and what kind of language is persuasive, 
but not so much on why persuasion through language is possible. That task is out-
side the scope of this footnote, but has been recently tackled in Philip Pettit, Made 
with words: Hobbes on language, mind and politics, Princeton: 2008).
52 Debora Shuger, Censorship and Cultural Sensibility: The Regulation of Language in Tudor-
Stuart England, Philadelphia: 2006.
53 Annie Mitchell, “A Liberal Republican ‘Cato’,” American Journal of Political Science, 
vol 48 (3), 2004. 
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ing with brave rhetoric the tyrannical monarchs and their flattering 
courtiers. Having gained power, the republicans had to deal with the 
same ‘flatterers’ etc., who would still argue against the republic, but 
could now claim the mantle of dissenters. And in addition, opposing 
strands of republicanisms often came in conflict, leading to different 
solutions by different authors. The second point concerns critical in-
terpretation. During the period opposing works could both claim to 
be without rhetoric while being blatantly rhetorical, and both claiming 
to represent the public interest. For early modern readers and writers 
this was a well-known tactic and it was accordingly common to point 
this out in further discourse. It is doubtful whether there are any good 
reasons for modern scholars to read the same works any less critically. 
The important point to be kept in mind from all this is to acknowl-
edge the prevalence of the – technically false – dichotomy between 
argument and rhetoric in political discourse, as well as in the schol-
arship about it. It is crucial to make the distinction between rhetoric 
as a method of public speaking, and rhetoric as a pejorative term for 
any argument not following the ‘true’ – that is, the preferred – argu-
ment. All of the republicans accused their opponents of using sophisms, 
specious arguments, preaching sedition, and so forth, but we cannot 
read into this that they were simply against rhetoric. That would mean 
a claim that any, but the Official Truth, is mere rhetoric. It is likely 
that someone like Thomas Hobbes would have agreed with such an 
interpretation,54 but the claim in this work is that it would make any 
kind of political debate an oxymoron from the very beginning: there 
is no debate in government by imposition. Furthermore, it can be seen 
that this was not the approach of republicans: they may mock their op-
ponents – for whatever motives – and they may question their right to 
air their grievances, but the suggestion that there should be an end to 
debate is, if not unfathomable, at least against their own self-interest as 
participants.
What sometimes makes the distinctions between rhetoric and ‘mere 
rhetoric’ so troublesome is that rhetoric already includes the idea of 
proofs from logos, pathos and ethos. It is thus technically correct to refer to 
54 Pettit, Made with words, pp. 42-54.
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an author’s ‘rhetoric,’ when referring to the logos-based rational argu-
ment.55 Yet confusion arises easily if we choose to refer to everything as 
rhetoric, without bothering to make the distinctions between the differ-
ent proofs. It might be presented otherwise, but when anyone claims to 
be abstaining from rhetoric when his or her reputation speaks for itself, 
then we are actually in the presence of the rhetorical proof from ethos. 
Similarly, it is often the pathetic argument that is pilloried as mere rhet-
oric, when being simply devoid of ethos and/or logos. Therefore, in this 
study any reference to the arguments of an author is considered to be 
rhetoric based on rational argument, and arguments based on passion 
or character are similarly considered as rhetoric founded on pathos or 
ethos, respectively.56 
To appreciate how deeply ingrained the three proofs of rhetorical 
argumentation were ingrained in the rhetorical culture of the time, 
a contemporary example can be useful. During the summer of 1657 
Henry Oldenburg engaged in private correspondence with John Mil-
ton. Discussing their common enemy, Alexander More, Oldenburg ar-
gued how “the eloquence of his mouth bedaubed and disguised the 
ugliness of his life.” Similarly, Oldenburg’s view on the French was that 
“These people are of such a nature that whoever knows how to titillate 
their ears and soothe their passions with ornate language can easily 
win favor among them, even if his life should be entirely the opposite 
of his teaching.” He continued to blame the audience, when “they are 
more easily captivated by accomplished speaking than by manner of 
living” (correspondence in Latin, translations from CPW 7:499). What 
we can see is that the correspondents put such weight on ethos, that pa-
thos-based speech alone could simply not be counted as very effective.
In the end, all three aspects were necessary for an effective speech. 
Even a well-reasoned argument can fail if coming from a person of 
bad reputation, and similarly, without reason, rhetoric is severely de-
55 Lee Ward, “Rhetoric and Natural Rights in Algernon Sidney’s Discourses 
concerning Government,” Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy, 28:2 (2001), 
pp. 119-45.
56 In the interests of conciseness, the term of rhetoric is also used when referring to 
the details or style of the text in question.
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ficient in its efficacy to move people to action. Marchamont Nedham 
described this last aspect well:
The Pen it is which manifest’s the Right of Things; and when that is once 
cleared, it give’s spurs to resolution, becaus men are never raised to so 
high a pitch of action, as when they are perswaded, that they engage in a 
righteous cause.57
This quote is also an apposite reminder of the seventeenth century Eng-
lish republican view that rhetoric, while efficacious, was not a relent-
lessly domineering force, and it was not detached from the realities of 
the needs, wants, and ideals of its audience: the persuader cannot go 
arbitrarily against commonly shared notions of right and just, which 
limits his powers severely. One should not confuse the rhetoric of mar-
keting the skills of an orator, with the actual powers of that oratory.58 
This study will show the various approaches that the republican au-
thors took in their attempts to deal with the powers of an orator: on 
the one hand, orators clearly had powers, which could be used well or 
badly, yet on the other, those powers were strictly limited by the re-
sponse of the audience. This latter point is one worth bearing in mind, 
when coming across contemporary assertions that rhetoric as such is a 
controlling or dominating force over people. 
The aim in this study is to avoid any such transfers of our own incli-
nations about the rightness of our own beliefs to the past, whether it is 
about our current preferences for freedom of speech, or notions of being 
trapped in the structures of language and rhetoric, or needs to find phil-
osophically coherent political solutions from the authors under study. It 
is perfectly reasonable to hope to gain an intellectual coherence to our 
political philosophies, and equally reasonable to assume that previous 
57 Marchamont Nedham, “The Epistle Dedicatorie,” Of the dominion, or ownership, 
of the sea two books:.. writen at first in Latin, and entituled, Mare clausum, seu, De dominio 
maris, by John Selden, Esquire ; translated into English, and set forth with som[e] additional 
evidences and discourses by Marchamont Nedham, London: 1652 November), sig. b1r-v.
58 Wayne A. Rebhorn, Emperor of men’s minds: literature and the Renaissance discourse 
of rhetoric, Ithaca: 1995, presents many examples of such strong claims by early 
modern rhetoricians, although the book can be criticised for taking the claims too 
easily at face value.
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political thinkers have attempted the same. If for nothing else, it would 
have been a plausible attempt to avoid being mocked for lack of consist-
ency. However, if we assume that the combinations that have become 
to seem natural to us have been as lucid and obvious to earlier thinkers, 
we risk reading into their theories inconsistencies, confusion or disorder 
which might not be there at all. A relevant example of such problems 
can be found in the study of interest theory.
An important factor in interest theory is the relation between what 
can be termed as the opposing poles of interests: public interest (as in 
republicanism) and the interest of state (as in reason of state). Thus us-
ing the language of interest could be seen as an indicator of an author’s 
political standing: for example, since the name of an important treatise 
by Duc de Rohan was titled [O]f the interest of the princes and states of Chris-
tendome, it has been seen to have close connotations with royalism. For 
John Gunn the result was clear: “If the champions of the Parliament, 
and later of the Commonwealth, were more reluctant than Royalists 
to cite Rohan’s maxim, this was surely because it smacked of that very 
prerogative against which they had rebelled.”59 However, another con-
temporary to Rohan was Christopher Besold, who wrote in his theories 
about mixed government.60 It has been argued that on that topic Be-
sold aimed away from indivisible sovereignty, tilting the scales towards 
more republican direction.61 The point here is that there is nothing 
fundamentally republican, nor monarchical in interest theory as such.62 
Most importantly, the ‘reason’ in reason of state was a term like liberty 
and justice, in the sense that many authors insisted on separating be-
59 J. A. W. Gunn, “’Interest Will Not Lie’: A Seventeenth Century Political Maxim,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas, (29) 1968, p. 555.
60 For more on which see Julian Franklin, “Sovereignty and the mixed constitution: 
Bodin and his critics,” in The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, eds. J. 
H. Burns, Mark Goldie Cambridge: 1994, pp. 37-41.
61 Martin van Gelderen, “Aristotelians, Monarchomachs, and Republicans: 
Sovereignty and respublica mixta in Dutch and German Political Thought, 
1580–1650,” The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450-1700, eds. J. H. Burns, 
Mark Goldie, Cambridge: 2002, pp. 211-12.
62 For example, cf. Geoff Baldwin, “Reason of State and English Parliaments, 1610–
42,” History of Political Thought, (25) 2004.
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tween true and false reasons.63
As the example of reason of state shows, there are risks in assuming 
that true republican could not toy with reason of state. For example, 
I will argue in the course of this study that if we analyse how James 
Harrington’s conceptions of interests interact with his views on author-
ity without suffusing either of them with our own, we will see that the 
unclearness and inconsistencies are of our own making.64 Similarly, we 
must abstain from smuggling in our hopes that what republicans aimed 
for was some form of our present-day canon of individual rights, rule of 
law, and democracy, in proto-, pseudo-, semi- or any other suffix-laden 
forms. In the end, in order to write meaningful historical studies of 
republicans, we are forced to return to their texts, their contexts, their 
ideas, if we hope to understand and learn from them.
Presentation of the work
The form of presentation aims to facilitate the aforementioned goals of 
this study. This means that this is a work of intellectual history, where 
the interrelation of both history and political philosophy is shown. It 
is thus not a work of pure political theory, but neither is it a chronicle 
of antiquarian textual curiosities. A crucial goal is to show the con-
nections, continuities and changes in the various authors’ works, even 
if this means sacrificing the customary poring over quotes from the 
whole oeuvre of an author, in order to argue for a conceptual point at 
the expense of context. My emphasis is on the historical nature of the 
63 Peter Burke, “Tacitism, scepticism, and reason of state,” The Cambridge History of 
Political Thought 1450-1700, eds. J. H. Burns, Mark Goldie, Cambridge: 1994, pp. 
481-2. Cf. also Hans Blom, Causality and Morality in Politics. The Rise of Naturalism in 
Dutch Seventeenth Century Political Thought, Rotterdam: 1995, p. 169. 
64 Frank Lovett, “Harrington’s Empire of Law,” APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, 
( June) 2010, p. 15n19, also shows the problem of assuming otherwise. To Lovett, 
Harrington has no interest in normative legitimacy, although as will be shown, 
that is the whole point of his use of interests. The omission is so glaring that the 
generous assumption must be that the problem is in seeing interests as something 
that necessarily must lack normative powers. 
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texts, in order not to have the analytical display obscure the political 
nature. By this I mean that I will present the texts in order of their ap-
pearance, which allows me to both tie their writings into a coherent 
narrative within the historical context, and also to keep the focus on 
the primary sources. Within this presentation, individual analyses of 
the texts will be according to the questions and themes presented here 
in the introduction. This is done in order to avoid the anachronistic and 
dispositional confusion sometimes apparent in more purely theoretical 
approaches to the history of political theory.65
To give an example of what is aimed for, we can consider the case 
of James Harrington. Much of the scholarship on Harrington has been 
characterized by a tendency to see his work as a coherent whole. While 
this is not an approach without validity, it does cause problems in that it 
tends to obscure the role of the conjunctures: not only does it obfuscate 
the role that the criticism of other political writers had on his work – a 
fact already important in appreciating his political theory (what was ar-
gued against, for, or left out) – but it also leaves out the ways Harrington 
adapted and changed his theories and their presentation, when faced 
with the political changes and other writers’ works of the time. As I will 
show, these changes had effects on his theory, which, while remain-
ing mostly stable, did undergo subtle realignments. These realignments 
would be easily lost, if we approach his oeuvre as a philosophical whole, 
detached from history. 
However, my intention is not to claim that works of more strictly 
thematic analysis of political concepts on the one hand, and more bio-
graphical studies of individual authors on the other are without merit. 
The mere fact that this study has benefited greatly from several such 
studies already proves otherwise. Admittedly this study could have also 
been divided into chapters on individual authors, or into conceptual 
themes, but at the loss of losing the emphasis on what the context and 
intentions behind an individual work were. However, since the chrono-
logical approach pur et dur could easily make any work into a some-
what dull chronicle, so when deemed necessary, the narrative will take 
65 For example, Gary Remer, Humanism and the rhetoric of toleration, University Park, 
PA: 1996. 
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into account what authors had written before or after a single historical 
event. This bending of formal chronology will also facilitate the goal of 
those readers, who are more inclined to focus on an individual author 
alone. Nevertheless, the main focus remains to show the development 
of the theories, and the choices made by the authors, in relation to the 
changing circumstances and between each other’s works. The guiding 
line is that, the works are neither caused by the exigencies of political 
events alone, nor are they ivory tower philosophy completely removed 
from mundane affairs (whether such activity is even possible is another 
matter completely).
In practice, the book is thus divided into six parts, each covering 
a short period of time. My aim through this is similar to David Nor-
brook’s: to “place the reader in the uncertain position of the contem-
poraries for whom the political horizon was bafflingly open and the 
meanings of new political formations were constantly uncertain.”66 The 
first chapter begins with Milton, the most studied of the authors, and 
his debut also works as a presentation of the humanist upbringing of 
the contemporary writers. A few words of explanation are probably in 
order on the historical terms used. The first part deals with Civil War 
writings, ending in 1649, although it could be argued that the English 
Civil Wars continued all the way until 1651, in the form of the Third 
English Civil War. However, for the purposes of this study the most sig-
nificant historical change was brought about by the regicide of Charles 
I on January 30, 1649, followed by An Act declaring England to be a 
Commonwealth and a Free State on May 19, 1649. Therefore in the 
second part the texts published after that event are considered as being 
writings from the Commonwealth, rather than the Civil War era. This 
is not to claim that the authority of the new regime was henceforth 
uncontested and firm, rather the aim is to shift the focus on the unques-
tionably new political context of writing in a post-regicide, formally 
republican environment. For similar reasons, the third part will refer to 
the Protectorate – although technically still a Commonwealth, the as-
cendancy of Cromwell in 1653 had a similarly defining influence on the 
political context of works under study. The fourth part deals with the 
66 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 15.
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texts published during the Protectorate’s troubled period of 1656, and 
since that time includes Harrington’s magnum opus, Oceana, considera-
tions of space require the part to stand on its own. The fifth part deals 
with the last years of the Protectorate, ending in the Restoration. In a 
logical conclusion, the sixth, and last, part is about the post-Restoration 
era.
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PART I Civil War writings to 1649
1. John Milton
John Milton’s Arepagitica is one of the canonical works in the history 
of free speech. It has been scavenged for uplifting sentences to adorn 
places of learning worldwide. Accordingly, it has become almost a com-
monplace to view Areopagitica as one of the foundational works of liberal 
democracy and human rights – even free market ideology.67 A repre-
sentative view of the text is to see it as “the very imitation of Athenian 
oratorical sound in print which communicates effectively the ideal of 
political life as it should be – supposedly democratic, liberal, able to 
comprehend more than one point of view.”68 In general, the work is 
seen as a representative of a republican approach to a “political public 
sphere which might not be fully democratic but was broader than any-
thing traditionally tolerated under monarchy.”69
While Milton can hardly be held responsible for later applications of 
his work, I will present my reasons for thinking that Milton did not in-
tend his work to be either liberal, democratic, rights- or market-based. 
Indeed, some of those values would have been diametrically opposite to 
his views about public speech in an ideal republic. In addition, as Areop-
agitica enjoys such an exceptional status in Milton’s oeuvre (and indeed 
67 Blair Hoxby, Mammon’s Music: Literature and Economics in the Age of Milton, New 
Haven: 2002, p. 40.
68 Nigel Smith, “Areopagitica: voicing contexts, 1643-5,” in Politics, Poetics and Herme-
neutics in Milton’s Prose, eds. David Loewenstein, James Turner, Cambridge: 1990, 
pp. 117-8.
69 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 319.
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in the political literature of the time), I will begin my presentation from 
Milton’s previous works in order to show that Areopagitica was not an 
extraordinary break from his political philosophy. 
It has been well documented that the early-seventeenth-century 
humanist curriculum drilled schoolboys in classical works of rhetoric, 
dialectic and ethics. Milton, as well as all of the other republicans under 
study, was well versed in rhetorical skills (use of commonplaces, tropes, 
figures, etc. but also techniques of imitation, disputation, dialogues, 
etc.), history and ethics using classical and renaissance text-books.70 
This much can be taken as given, but more important for the purposes 
of this study is the role of those skills in political philosophy and prac-
tice. An essential question then concerns the qualities that a politically 
ideal rhetor should profess.
In his youthful Prolusions, Milton presents an ideal orator with attrib-
utes similar to those of Crassus in Cicero’s De Oratore.71 The orator must 
possess skills of the highest calibre - “nothing common or mediocre can 
be tolerated” – and a “thorough knowledge of all the arts and sciences” 
(CPW 1:288-9). Similarly, the ideal of vir bonus dicendi peritus was present 
in the “integrity of life and uprightness of character.” At the same time, 
Milton was aware that even “men eminent for learning” could be “of 
bad character” and slaves to “evil passions” (CPW 1:292).72 Education 
was a necessary but not a sufficient criterion.
The antithesis of humanistic education, and what Milton had been 
taught to despise, was scholastic education: the “absurd doctrines of 
drivelling monks” (CPW 1:293) They had ruined the useful and noble 
arts: “how many despicable quibbles there are in grammar and rheto-
ric!” (CPW 1:300) and even “mathematicians too are afflicted with a 
longing for the petty triumph of demonstrative rhetoric” (CPW 1:301). 
Of course, this was a commonplace in the humanist learning of the 
time. Scholastic learning did not necessarily indicate a hatred towards 
70 Peter Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric.Theory and Practice, Cambridge: 2002, pp. 1-47.
71 Cicero, De Oratore (1.45-68).
72 A summed up reiteration of this view can be found in An Apolog y for Smectymnuus as 
“how he should be truly eloquent who is not withall a good man, I see not” (CPW 
1:874).
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logic, grammar or rhetoric - all parts of the medieval university curric-
ula.73 Rather, Milton inveighed against studies that “promote neither 
delight nor instruction, nor indeed do they serve any useful purpose 
whatsoever” (CPW 1: 241): i.e. studies that serve neither the duties of 
oratory nor any sense of utility. 
The evils of the “drivelling monks” were not limited to bad school-
ing, but they and other members of the clergy were to blame for the 
abuse of oratory: demagoguery. In the Commonplace Book Milton quotes 
Luther against sedition, in its religious aspects. It is noteworthy how 
the part Milton quoted included also Luther’s warning that “under the 
pretext of evangelism Satan has stirred up in these days many seditious 
and bloodthirsty teachers.” Such persons are to be distinct from politi-
cal rebellion as such, on which Milton attests to a positive, if qualified 
view following Machiavelli: tumults and disturbances are often nec-
essary to keep a commonwealth free, and can result in good legisla-
tion (CPW 1:504-5).74 Also, an indication of Milton’s recognition of the 
power of rhetoric in a republic can be found as a quote from Machi-
avelli reads “to cure the ills of the people, words suffice” (CPW 1:456). 
For Milton, the effects depend on who speaks what to whom.
These topics of situations and audience relate to an important is-
sue to the ideal citizen-orator and his education: besides the ‘why’ of 
rhetoric, there was the question of following decorum. In early modern 
times, the new-found ideals of polite, civil conversation were in some 
ways running against the orator’s ideals: for example, rhetorical, orna-
mented speech did not fit in well with some of the ideals of conversation 
– supposed spontaneity, inclusiveness and equality.75 Milton recognised 
the problem of how the learned could be seen, as “it is often asserted 
73 Mordechai Feingold, “The Humanities,” in The History of the University of Oxford: 
Vol. 4, Seventeenth Century Oxford, ed. Nicholas Tyacke, Oxford: 1997, pp. 211-357.
74 As is noted in Worden, “Milton and Marchamont Nedham,” pp. 173-4, these ar-
guments are not to be found in Milton’s public writings, yet the claim of Paul Rahe 
that Milton “nowhere” adopted the doctrine of Machiavelli on the relationship 
between liberty and political turbulence is clearly too all-encompassing: Paul A. 
Rahe, “Classical republicanism of John Milton,” History of political thought, (25/2), 
2004, p. 246.
75 Peter Burke, The art of conversation, Cambridge: Polity Press 1993, p. 92.
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that the learned are as a rule hard to please, lacking in courtesy, odd in 
manner, and seldom gifted with the gracious address that wins men’s 
hearts.” Nevertheless, there was no reason to embrace modern civil 
conversation. The question was rather about the limitation of speakers 
in conversations: as conversations went, classical examples would show 
that there was nothing “more delightful and happy than those con-
versations of learned and wise men.” Inclusiveness was required only 
among the learned – as for the rest, they could enjoy conversations “in 
spell-bound silence.” (In Prolusions, CPW 1:295). 
The crucial aspect was ethos: truly good rhetoric is performed by 
good people, and courtesy had suspect connotations. These points are 
on display in Milton’s Comus (A Masque Presented at Ludlow Castle, 1634).76 
In the play the lady trusts the shepherds 
honest offer’d courtesie, 
Which oft is sooner found in lowly sheds 
With smoaky rafters, then in tapstry Halls 
And Courts of Princes, where it first was nam’d, 
And yet is most pretended (322-6). 
This assumption, in addition to being a jibe at the flattery intrinsically 
present at courts, turns eventually against the purportedly virtuous na-
ture of the ‘common courtesy’ as well, since the shepherd is in reality 
the villain Comus.
Taken to captivity, the lady acknowledges the problems created by 
eloquence in ill use, when Comus attempts 
to charm my judgment, as mine eyes, 
Obtruding false rules pranckt in reasons garb (758-9). 
Rhetoric by itself does not prevent its abuse: 
I hate when vice can bolt her arguments,
And vertue has no tongue to check her pride (760-61). 
76 Edition used: John Milton, The Complete Poems, John Leonard (ed.), Penguin 
Classics 1998.
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Milton presents in Comus his vision of rhetoric that is inseparable from 
the personal ethics and disposition of the speaker as well as the audi-
ence. For the lady, 
this pure cause would kindle my rap’t spirits
To such a flame of sacred vehemence, 
That dumb things would be mov’d to sympathize (794-6). 
As for Comus, the lady tells him to 
Enjoy your deer Wit, and gay Rhetorick 
That hath so well been taught her dazling fence, 
Thou art not fit to hear thy self convinc’t (790-2). 
As is shown in this last passage, proven ethos has an essential impact 
on the possibility of persuasion. Bad people cannot persuade good, and 
neither can bad be convinced by the good. The lady is explicit: 
To him that dares
Arm his profane tongue with contemptuous words
…
Fain would I somthing say, yet to what end?” (780-3). 
Comus shows the importance of distinguishing between criticism of 
abuse of rhetoric and rhetoric as such. This distinction bears directly 
on the issue of ‘plainness’ in Milton’s first overtly political prose works. 
In Of Reformation (1641-2), Milton repeatedly refers to ‘plain style’: “the 
sober, plain, and unaffected stile of the Scriptures” and “a sound Truth 
at the hand of a plain upright man” (CPW 1:568). This has raised 
the issue whether Milton was setting plain, as in unrhetorical, speech 
against rhetoric. Such an interpretation assumes that plain style can be 
separated from rhetoric, yet beyond the face value there is little doubt 
that plainness can have significant persuasive effect.77 
77 Kenneth J. E. Graham has put this point persuasively: “humanists associated the 
apt, the decorous, or the comely with plainness in stylistic prescriptions that look 
back to Cicero’s “correct, lucid, ornate and.. appropriate” (De Oratore 3.10.37) for 
a model of plain, ordinary speech that is nonetheless quintessentially rhetorical.” 
The performance of conviction: plainness and rhetoric in the early English Renaissance, Ithaca: 
1994, p. 18.; Smith, Literature and Revolution, p. 38.
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Another question concerns plain style as rhetoric without the flour-
ishes. In Of Reformation, as in later works, Milton did not object to rheto-
ric or its flourishes, but rather to their abuse – in forms such as “knotty 
Africanisms,” “pamper’d metafors” and so forth (CPW 1:568). In An 
Apology Against a Pamphlet (1642) when Milton professed that “true elo-
quence I find to be none, but the serious and hearty love of truth,” he 
was not dismissing eloquence in favor of truth.78 The main point was in 
the immediately preceding words: “although I cannot say I am utterly 
untrain’d in those rules which best Rhetoricians have giv’n, or unac-
quainted with those examples which the prime authors of eloquence 
have written in any learned tongue,” by which Milton was setting out 
his own ethos as a well-trained orator (CPW 1:948-9).79 Milton has been 
previously misinterpreted as rejecting rhetoric as inherently deceptive, 
but that interpretation relies on a false dichotomy between plainness 
and persuasive speech, and overall it has been shown that Milton never 
turned his back on rhetoric.80 
Milton’s advocacy of rhetoric and ethos-setting is evident in the Ani-
madversions (1641), when he ridiculed the “green practise in the lawes of 
discreet Rhetorique” shown by his opponent (CPW 1:667). And abuse 
of rhetoric is accordingly presented as “that deceitfull, and close coutcht 
evill of flattery,” brought forward by the untrustworthy and disloyal 
“Parasites, and Sycophants.” Against such abusers the Animadversions 
sets “free utterances of privat brests, and amongst them find out the 
78 Examples to the contrary are numerous, but a representative one can be 
found from Colasterion (1645): “Certainly to teach thus, were no dishonest 
method: Christ himself hath often us’d hyperbolies in his teaching; and gravest 
Authors, both Aristotle in the second of his Ethics to Nichomachus, [2.9] and Seneca in 
his seventh De Beneficiis, [7.22] advise us to stretch out the line of precept oft 
times beyond measure, that while wee tend furder, the mean might bee the 
easier attain’d.” (CPW 2:643).
79 Helped by the repetitive use of litotes, on the uses of which see: Susanne Woods, 
“Elective poetics and Milton’s prose,” in Politics, Poetics and Hermeneutics in Milton’s 
Prose, eds. David Loewenstein, James Turner, Cambridge: 1990, pp. 200-202.
80 Derek N. C. Wood, “’That divine spirit of utterance that moves them’: John 
Milton and the power of rhetoric,” in Rhetorica Movet: Studies in Historical and Modern 
Rhetoric in Honour of Heinrich F. Plett, eds. Peter L. Oesterreich et al., Leiden: 1999, 
pp. 263-266, 283. 
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precious gemme of Truth.” In this early intimation of free speech spon-
taneous truth is shown to arise from the “vulgar concourse” of the gen-
eral public. It would similarly be served by “permission of free writing” 
that would bring benefit to the society as a whole (CPW 1:670). 
This last point, the utility of “liberty of speaking,” of which “noth-
ing is more sweet to man” (CPW 1:669), is crucial to the understanding 
of Milton’s republican view of free speech. In Reason of Church-government 
Urg’d against Prelaty (1642) the difference between free speech as parrhe-
sia and the right to free speech is present again in Milton’s “honest lib-
erty of free speech” (CPW 1:804). ‘Free speech’ is a function of true lib-
erty, wielded by good, honest men for the embetterment of society – not 
an abstract right for despicable ideas or thoughts. We shall return to the 
difficulties inherent in this position later when dealing with Areopagitica.
The Reason of Church-government also presented Milton’s vehement at-
tacks against a distinct source of demagoguery: the clergy.81 Milton sets 
“the Athenians,” who “made their small deeds great and renowned 
by their eloquent writers” against the “monks and mechanicks” whose 
“unskilfull handling” has demoted the “noble atchievments” of Eng-
land (CPW 1:812). Here Milton juxtaposes the two humanist common-
places, the learning of classical Greece against the scholastic influences. 
His longer diatribe is worth analysing in detail, as it presents well his 
views on the role of education. 
Milton proposes that “many of the Gentry, studious men,” with 
“honest and ingenuous natures” would actually go “to the Universities 
to store themselves with good and solid learning.” This noble purpose 
is thwarted by their being “unfortunately fed with nothing else, but 
the scragged and thorny lectures of monkish and miserable sophist-
ry.” If they were not “sent home again with such a scholastical burre 
81 Jonathan Scott, Commonwealth principles: republican writing of the English revolution, 
Cambridge: 2004, p. 52. At this stage Milton was still a committed Presbyterian, 
and his invectives are against the episcopacy. This situation would change towards 
the end of civil war: Martin Dzelzainis, “Milton’s classical republicanism,” in 
Milton and Republicanism, eds. David Armitage et al., Cambridge: 1995, pp. 9, 14-
15. On late 1640s also David Loewenstein, Representing Revolution in Milton and His 
Contemporaries: Religion, Politics, and Polemics in Radical Puritanism, Cambridge: 2001, 
pp. 175-190.
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in their throats, as hath stopt and hinder’d all true and generous phi-
losophy from entring, crackt their voices for ever with metaphysical 
gargarisms,” then there would be a chance for the “unchast’nd and 
unwrought minds” to be “initiated or subdu’d under the true lore of 
religion or moral vertue, which two are the best and greatest points ot 
learning.” Otherwise they would continue to be “either slightly train’d 
up in a kind of hypocritical and hackny cours of literature to get their 
living by, and dazle the ignorant, or els fondly overstudied in uselesse 
controversies.” (CPW 1:854) 
The polemical nature of this diatribe should be reaffirmed: Milton 
himself managed to become a humanist despite universities suppos-
edly mired in scholasticism. It is difficult to assume that he would have 
claimed that education alone sets people on their moral trajectories. 
This is not to claim that the rhetoric involved is just that, ‘mere’ rheto-
ric. Nevertheless, Milton’s proposals for a more humanist curriculum 
should not be unnecessarily conflated with his understanding on the 
role of education in creating good citizens: learning could happen out-
side formal schooling as well. This was made apparent in Milton’s pro-
motion of rhetoric to increase the chances of persuasion in Reason of 
Church-Government.
Milton used Plato as an authority to promote the use of rhetoric 
in a society – a role rarely attributed to Plato.82 According to Milton, 
Plato saw that “persuasion certainly is a more winning, and more man-
like way to keepe men in obedience then feare.”83 This persuasion fol-
lows the ideals of rhetoric “there should be us’d as an induction, some 
well temper’d discourse,” “utter’d with those native colours and graces 
of speech, as true eloquence the daughter of vertue can best bestow 
upon her mothers praises.” The purpose of this epideictic oratory is to 
“incite, and in a manner, charme the multitude” by giving a purpose: 
82 Annabel Patterson has pointed out how although Milton used Plato’s authority, it 
was to serve notions incompatible with Plato’s: Annabel Patterson, Reading between 
the lines, Madison: 1993, pp. 33-34. 
83 This bears close resemblance to Jesus’s words in Paradise Regained (1.222-3)
By winning words to conquer willing hearts,
And make perswasion do the work of fear.
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“how good, how gainfull, how happy it must needs be to live accord-
ing to honesty and justice.” Not in the service of just anything, but to 
be persuaded “into the love of that which is really good” (CPW 1:746-
7). Nevertheless, persuasion again depends on the audience. Milton 
does not address the multitude, but those to whom “that which is really 
good,” would not need to be spelled out. It is to “the elegant & learned 
reader, to whom principally for a while I shal beg leav I may addresse 
my selfe,” or in a more explicated social category: “I shall petition to 
the gentler sort” (CPW 1:807-8). 
After writing his antiprelatical tracts, Milton wrote several pam-
phlets arguing for the legitimacy of divorce. These divorce tracts, while 
not so explicitly about rhetorical issues, do nevertheless contain mate-
rial keeping in line with his earlier strands of thought. In the first of 
these tracts, Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce (1644) Milton’s preface pre-
sents a view of liberty embedded with qualifications of ends and means 
that apply to public speech as well. Milton refers to “the draff of men84, 
to whom no liberty is pleasing, but unbridled and vagabond lust with-
out pale or partition.” Such liberty literally is no liberty, since Milton’s 
view of liberty entails restraints, as “honest liberty is the greatest foe to 
dishonest license” (CPW 2:225). In addition, this ‘honesty’ should not 
be unduly confused with ‘plainness’ as mentioned earlier, since honesty 
also had connotations of being honorable and exercising self-restraint – 
capacities again designating only parts of the populace.85 
Nevertheless, while such restraints on speakers, audience and de-
livery may seem counterintuitive to the idea of free speech, there are 
three important facets to be kept in mind. The first is the well-asserted 
‘republican’ nature of Milton’s view on liberty – that is, only arbitrary 
and unforeseeable constraints are incompatible with liberty.86 Accord-
ingly, Milton’s considerations arguing for free speech concerned “undue 
restraint” (italics mine) of some “just” and “lawfull liberty,” and they 
84 I.e. pomace: ‘scum’ would probably be the most appropriate term nowadays.
85 Richards, Rhetoric and Courtliness, p. 2.
86 The scholarship is abundant, but for a few examples, Dzelzainis, “Milton’s 
classical republicanism,” and Quentin Skinner, “John Milton and the politics of 
slavery” in his Visions of Politics, vol II.
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were not about restraints being unneeded per se. Secondly, there is of-
ten a pragmatic edge to republican writing:87 when Milton considers 
such a liberty “which ought to be giv’n men, and is deny’d them” (CPW 
2:278), the argument is also about costs and benefits – restraints can be 
undue if they cause more trouble than they are worth. 
The third aspect, following partially from the republican mode of 
liberty, and existing side by side with the pragmatic considerations, is a 
less studied one. Milton’s republican free speech is essentially a ‘positive 
liberty’ of public speech – that is to say, free public speech as not merely 
a function of what is allowed and not forbidden, but rather including 
positive views on what is it exactly, that should be considered in public 
debate and counsel. As we shall see, this positive view has many sources 
– ranging from biblical to natural law – but the overall goal is to present 
public speech as something essentially instrumental rather than a good 
in its own right. 
This positive view also explains why ascribing to Milton a role of an 
avant la lettre propagator of the concept of marketplace of ideas cannot 
be accurate. The opposition between monopolies and free markets is 
facile as such, and does not exist for Milton. Monopoly of information 
may imply tyranny, but Milton’s solution lies not in what ‘sells best’ – 
rather, it is included in what is here called the ‘positive public sphere.’ 
Nowhere does the antagonism to ideas merely popular show better than 
in Milton’s exposition of “civill prudence” as resistance of the righteous 
few against the erroneous many, a dichotomy that will be repeated of-
ten in Milton’s work. 
Milton begins by asserting how in general “any man reputed wise 
and constant, will neither doe nor permit others under his charge 
to doe that which hee approves not” (CPW 2:314) This definition from 
qualities is refined and made even more important as it comes to duties 
of high office: “But for a Judge, but for a Magistrate the Shepheard of 
his people to surrender up his approbation against law & his own judg-
ment, to the obstinacie of his heard, what more un-Iudge-like, more 
un-Magistrate-like, and in warre more un-commander-like?” (CPW 2: 
87 And which is not necessarily incompatible with moral considerations, as will be-
come apparent throughout my work – especially in the case of James Harrington.
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314-5). Giving in to pressure from others was to lose part of one’s free-
dom, and for people in high positions it would mean becoming a slave 
to the whims of the masses.
Milton proceeds to give four examples of such problems from an-
tiquity: two on “the undoing of the Roman State,” by Pompey and 
Marcus Brutus, and the other two about “the saving of two the greatest 
Common-wealths in the world, of Athens by Themistocles at the Sea fight 
of Salamis; of Rome by Fabius Maximus in the Punick warre.”88 The first 
two “had not magnanimity anough but to make so poore a resignation 
of what they approv’d,” and the other “two matchlesse Generalls had 
the fortitude at home,” “to withstand the doing or permitting of what 
they could not approve in their duty of their great command.” What all 
of them were set against were “the rashnes and the clamours of their 
own Captains and confederates” and “what the boisterous Tribunes 
and Souldiers bawl’d for” (CPW 2:315). Popular oratory was one step 
away from pernicious demagogy.
The cure for the ills of demagoguery lay partly in education, as Mil-
ton presented in a pamphlet he wrote around the same time as the 
divorce tracts. In the acutely named Of education (1644) Milton could 
present his set of civic humanist ideals and learning. It has been argued 
that Milton’s conviction is that genuine education (and especially high-
er education) must be largely self-motivated and self-directed.89 This 
would accord well with a view of Milton’s disdain of the contemporary 
universities, promotion of loose curriculae, seeming neglect of method-
ology, and despairing over the capabilities of the rabble. 
However, as mentioned earlier, associating universities with scho-
lastics was a humanist commonplace. Secondly, Milton’s despair of the 
88 These quotes are most likely from Plutarch’s Lives: Pompey 67, Brutus 7-10, (al-
though 21 seems more fitting) Themistocles 11-15, Fabius Maximus 5-13; in 1579 
edition: p. 712, pp. 1058-9, (1064), pp. 129-131, pp. 194-199, respectively. On the 
early modern view of ancient Roman history, as received through the Greek histo-
rians, see Eric Nelson, “Republican visions,” in Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, 
vol. I, eds. John S. Dryzek et al., Oxford: 2008.
89 Barbara K. Lewalski, “Milton and the Hartlib Circle. Educational Projects and 
Epic Paideia,” in Literary Milton: Text, Pretext, Context, eds. Diana Benet & Michael 
Lieb, Pittsburgh: 1994, p. 208.
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rabble did not extend to his educational propositions, since they were 
not the subjects of learning in the first place. The ability to fully benefit 
from study is not a commonly shared attribute: the studies are such as 
“wherein our noble and our gentle Youth ought to bestow their time 
in a disciplinary way.” (CPW 2:406) Milton’s academies were merito-
cratic, yet mainly for the aristocracy.90 Accordingly, the content of the 
“right path of a vertuous and noble Education” (CPW 2:376), aiming at 
the “encrease of Learning and Civility every where” (CPW 2:381) was 
to a great extent the curricula for an ideal orator – yet mainly in a pa-
trician environment. The outcome of Milton’s educational project was 
the creation of able governor-orators, to whom “honour and attention 
would be waiting on their lips,” no matter “whether they be to speak in 
Parliament or Counsel” (CPW 2:406). 
Thirdly, Milton does argue for the value of rote learning, in “forcing 
the empty wits of Children to compose Theams, Verses and Orations, 
which are the acts of ripest judgment and the final work of a head fill’d 
by long reading and observing, with elegant maxims, and copious in-
vention” (CPW 2:372). In addition, the curriculum was quite detailed: it 
included “famous Political Orations,”91 which, after being read, memo-
rised and “solemnly pronounc’t with right accent, and grace,” could 
endue the students “with the spirit and vigor of Demosthenes or Cic-
ero, Euripides, or Sophocles.” They were followed by “those organic 
arts which inable men to discourse and write perspicuously, elegantly, 
and according to the fitted stile of lofty, mean, or lowly” (CPW 2:401). 
And finally, the “gracefull and ornate Rhetorick taught out of the rule 
of Plato, Aristotle, Phalereus, Cicero, Hermogenes, Longinus” (CPW 
2:402). 
90 Lewalski, “Milton and the Hartlib Circle,” p. 209. Also, Patterson, Reading between 
the lines, pp. 55-56, pointing out that although access to this education was never 
explicitly restricted, social distinctions were affirmed implicitly by the terms used. 
91 This would most likely include such democratically oriented speeches as Pericles’ 
funeral oration, although as Hobbes had showed, opposing allusions to Thucydides 
could also be made. It can also be assumed that Milton did not share Hobbes’s 
view, as the depiction of London in “Areopagitica” (CPW 2:554) as an imitation 
of ancient Athens, was “a pointed counter to Hobbes’s doubts about Athens in his 
Thucydides”: Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, pp. 60, 130. 
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Plato and Cicero also feature in the list of “morall works” (CPW 
2:396) discussing vices and virtues, but it is notable that of the two of 
them, only Cicero is raised as an example of the aforementioned “spirit 
and vigor.” By omission, it can be argued that although Plato’s works 
were suitable for learning morality and rhetoric, on the political level 
he did not represent the republican ideal as well as Cicero. Indeed, as 
Milton later attested in Areopagitica, Plato was “a man of high authority 
indeed, but least of all for his Commonwealth” (CPW 2:522).92
Besides the creation of orators, Miltonic education would arm them 
against the dangers of abused rhetoric. If those who “betake them to 
State affairs,” do it “with souls so unprincipl’d in vertue, and true gen-
erous breeding,” then “flattery, and Court shifts and tyrannous Apho-
risms93 appear to them the highest points of wisdom” (CPW 2:375-6). 
Therefore, children should be won “early to the love of vertue and true 
labour, ere any flattering seducement, or vain principle seise them wan-
dering” (CPW 2:383). 
There was another danger that Milton presents ever more vehe-
mently in the course of the 1640s, that of firebrand priests.94 In Of 
Education, Milton continued the critique of old ways familiar from 
Prolusiones: “for the usual method of teaching Arts, I deem it to be an 
old errour of Universities not yet well recover’d from the Scholastick 
grossness of barbarous ages” (CPW 2:374). An added aspect to arguing 
against pupils growing “into hatred and contempt of Learning, mockt 
and deluded all this while with ragged Notions and Babblements, while 
92 Jonathan Scott has argued for the influence of Plato’s Laws in Of Education, but 
from the political viewpoint it is notable that the work itself does not appear in 
Milton’s list of “grounds of law” (CPW 2:398), although many figures from the 
republican canon do. Scott, Commonwealth principles, p. 173. 
93 Paul Rahe has used this part in an argument that Milton opposed Machiavelli’s 
ideas, as these ideas were “the sort first propagated by the author of The Prince.” 
Yet it could be also argued that similar examples, or “points of wisdom” could 
have been found from many classical authors as well, e.g. Tacitus or Sallust. Rahe, 
“Classical republicanism of John Milton,” p. 260.
94 Those of presbyterian denomination especially: however, in general I will abstain 
from detailed discussions of theological issues, as they are of secondary importance 
to my topic per se. 
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they expected worthy and delightful knowledge,” is that the pupils are 
thus in danger of joining the ranks of “an ambitious and mercenary, or 
ignorantly zealous Divinity” (CPW 2:375). Miltonic education aimed 
to bring into “Pulpits other Visages, other gestures, and stuff otherwise 
wrought then what we now sit under” (CPW 2:406) – an educational 
policy more inclined to crowd control than to free speech. 
After Of Education Milton re-entered his divorce campaign with the 
Judgement of Martin Bucer Concerning Divorce (1644). Advocating divorce 
was a contentious affair, and Milton asserted in the preface, addressed 
to the parliament, “that what I formerly presented to your reading on 
this subject, was good, and just, and honest, not licentious.” The obvi-
ous question is, of course, how is it known what is good, just and honest 
– what is a legitimate authority on knowledge? Milton’s answer is clear: 
“the authority, the learning, the godliness of [Martin Bucer] is able to 
outbalance all that the lightness of a vulgar opposition can bring to 
counterpoise” – the gravitas of one can beat the mere opinions of many. 
(CPW 2:439).
Milton’s conception of this authority, with its close affinities to the 
Stoic sage, is followed-up by ever more forceful argumentation upon 
the remaining two parties in his division of society: the virtuous few 
and the almost unredeemable many. Among the few are the addressees: 
“if any thing generous, any thing noble, and above the multitude, were 
left yet in the spirit of England; it could be no where sooner found, and 
no where sooner understood, than in that house of justice and true lib-
erty, where ye sit in council” (CPW 2:435). It is against this background 
that we must understand the defense of free speech in the post-script of 
the Judgment, seen as ‘a direct anticipation of Areopagitica.’95
In the post-script, Milton conjures a positive image of the era as 
“a time of reformation, a time of free speaking, free writing” which 
nevertheless remains “in danger of new fetters and captivity after all 
our hopes and labours lost.” However, these freedoms are pointedly 
asserted towards the “wisest men” and “Parlament.”96 Among them 
95 Editor Arnold Williams, note CPW 2: 479.
96 The text gives no reason to assume that these would not be overlapping categories.
43JOHN MILTON
can “truth be suffered to be truth, or liberty to be liberty.” Such ‘free 
speech’ lets those able few “to inform themselvs rightly in the midst of 
an unprincipl’d age.” Milton bids “this Kingdom beware”97 to accept 
the validity of the royalist argument against popular republicanism: 
“whether learning be not (which our enemies too prophetically feared) 
in the way to be trodden down again by ignorance” (CPW 2:479). Free 
speech is a blessing and privilege of the few rather than a common 
right.
It is such a view of free speech that is often repeated in Areopagitica 
(1644), “by priviledge to write and speak what may help to the furder 
discussing of matters in agitation” (CPW 2:561). Due to its major role in 
the history of free speech, my study will peruse this work at length and 
in detail. Starting from even the name Areopagitica, the allusions to Are-
opagus of ancient Athens have showed both democratic and conserva-
tive connotations to scholars.98 Much depends already on how Athenian 
democracy and parrhesia itself is perceived,99 although it should be kept 
in mind that undoubtedly most of Milton’s perception of Athens (and 
much of ours) comes from Athenian political writers and playwrights of 
the classical age, who were not necessarily the most enthusiastic propo-
nents of the democratic polity.100 To this must be added the effect of the 
later commentaries on classical works, which further affected the way 
seventeenth century authors read and interpreted them.101 
Despite the vast amounts of scholarship, there is one aspect in Mil-
ton’s usage of classical references that has remained hitherto quite 
unstudied. The title-page of Areopagitica includes a quote and Milton’s 
translation from Euripides’ The Suppliant Women. While the quote and 
97 At this stage of the Civil War, Milton does not (yet) present his republican argu-
ments excluding monarchy on principle – the reasoning is pro-Parliament and 
anti-tyranny, not democratic nor anti-monarch. 
98 Thoroughly compiled in Eric Nelson, “’True Liberty’: Isocrates and Milton’s 
Areopagitica,” Milton Studies (40) 2002: 201-21.
99 Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens, Cambridge: 
2006, pp. 11-16.
100 Josiah Ober, Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule, 
Princeton: 1998.
101 Nelson, “True Liberty” presents an example of such reading. 
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its translation by Milton have garnered much attention in Milton stud-
ies, the rest of the play has not. Keeping in mind the thorough literary 
scholarship of Milton and his various adversaries, a reasonable assump-
tion can be made that the rest of the play did not present arguments 
completely at odds with Milton’s views – in such a case it would have 
surely led to some sort of conflict within the community of writers. 
For the purposes of this study, the most significant parts of The Sup-
pliant Women are in Theseus’ speech to Adrastus, where Theseus ex-
plains the tripartite division of citizenry. The middle class is the one 
“which keep cities safe,” the rich are “useless, always greedy for more,” 
and the poor are “dangerous, because they are guided for the most part 
by envy and, deceived by the tongues of unscrupulous demagogues.”102 
Then, when Theseus deliberates with his mother, Aethra, he asserts his 
powers as a leader: “The people of Athens will agree if I want it, but 
they’ll be more amenable if I give them a share in the discussion.”103 
The Suppliant Women fits well with Milton’s philosophy of public speech: 
denouncing the dregs of populace in their willingness to follow dema-
gogues, and praising the righteous rule of a single worthy – even if he 
has to go through the motions of addressing the assembly for pragmatic 
purposes. 
Read in this context, the free speech in The Suppliant Women is free 
speech as counsel, which is “the true Liberty when free born men,/
Having to advise the public may speak free,” as translated my Milton 
for the title page of Areopagitica. Freedom of speech here does not imply 
any mode of expression, but only those with a purpose. In addition, it 
entails a notion that such liberty of counsel is a privilege - in the sense 
that it should be given only by those who are able. Such a man “who 
can, and will, deserv’s high praise;/Who neither can, nor will, may 
hold his peace.” The giving of counsel is a commendable action that 
allows for distinctions to be made, yet it is considered an equitable po-
litical arrangement: “What can be juster in a State than this?” Milton’s 
translation of these lines 437-442 of The Suppliant Women highlights the 
102 Robin Waterfield translation, Orestes and other plays, Oxford, 2001: 238-245. To be 
exact, Euripides did not use the word ‘δημαγωγόν’’, but ‘προστατῶν.’ 
103 Ibid. 350-2.
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issues of equality and ‘true liberty,’ that are easily succumbed under the 
notion of free speech as simply unhindered speech. 
In the exordium of Areopagitica, Milton prefaces his counsel to the 
Parliament with a captatio benevolentiae. As one of the abuses of rhetoric 
involved the degeneration of epideictic rhetoric into sycophantic fus-
tian, when “all praising is but Courtship and flattery” (CPW 2:487), 
Milton professes how his praise of the wisdom of parliamentarians is 
not flattery since it is well deserved. Accordingly such wise men would 
know that public criticism from a well-intentioned source has benefi-
cial effects. Such an audience would be “better pleas’d with publick 
advice” rather than being “delighted.. with publicke flattery” (CPW 
2:488). This meant being ready to hear unpleasant things from those 
brave enough “in publick to admonish the State.” Such brave orators 
were “men who profest the study of wisdome and eloquence,” as those 
in “the old and elegant humanity of Greece” of “polite wisdom and let-
ters” (CPW 2:489) – criteria, that would certainly not give an unlimited 
right of expression to all.
From the beginning, Milton sets qualifications for the speaker and 
audience. As the arguments against the Parliament’s licensing order are 
put forward, the content of the ‘free speech’ are laid bare. The Licenc-
ing Order would inhibit the learning and development of the worthy 
orators, as “it will be primely to the discouragement of all learning, and 
the stop of Truth, not only by disexercising and blunting our abilities 
in what we know already, but by hindring and cropping the discovery 
that might bee yet further made both in religious and civill Wisdome” 
(CPW 2:491-2). The argument for open discussion was for learned 
discussion with a purpose: the function is teleological rather than 
deontic.
The power of the textual content is explicit in Milton’s presenta-
tion of books:104 “they do preserve as in a violl the purest efficacie and 
extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they are as 
lively, and as vigorously productive, as those fabulous Dragons teeth; 
104 Literally ‘texts’ would be more accurate, but since in our contemporary usage that 
word has gained other connotations, I have chosen to follow Milton’s usage and 
will refer to ‘books’ or ‘writings’ throughout.
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and being sown up and down, may chance to spring up armed men” 
(CPW 2:492). It was possible that “best books to a naughty mind are 
not unappliable to occasions of evill” (CPW 2:512). Clearly, depending 
on the reader, books can bring useful or harmful things to the world, 
yet that should not be a reason for banning them all outright. This is 
an approach that can be applied to the art of rhetoric itself, as in Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric: “If it is argued that one who makes an unfair use of such 
faculty of speech may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies 
equally to all good things except virtue, and above all to those things 
which are most useful.”105 
Besides the unintended uses of books, there are intentional abuses of 
propriety: licence, libels and blasphemy. The Licensing Order was not 
a well-working method of suppressing those: “this Order avails nothing 
to the suppressing of scandalous, seditious, and libellous Books, which 
were mainly intended to be supprest.” (CPW 2:491). Milton does not 
disapprove the intentions, and explicitly steers himself clear of such 
abuses, “lest I should be condemn’d of introducing licence, while I op-
pose Licencing,” referring to the authority of classical examples of “an-
cient and famous Commonwealths” (CPW 2:493). The most significant 
example is that of Athens, where “Books and Wits were ever busier then 
in any other part of Greece, I finde but only two sorts of writings which 
the Magistrate car’d to take notice of; those either blasphemous and 
Atheisticall, or Libellous” (CPW 2:494).
Milton did not disapprove the principle of suppressing books based 
on their contents as such, but rather his aim was to point out the risk of 
‘throwing the baby out with the bathwater’ – that harmless and even 
useful learning would be lost as well as the harmful and useless. As a 
classical example of this happening, Milton recites an anecdote from 
Plutarch’s Life of Cato the Elder: 
when Carneades106 and Critolaus, with the Stoick Diogenes comming Em-
105 1.1.1 (1355b) J. H. Freese translation in Loeb edition Aristotle, Vol. 22, 1926. This 
part was left out of the 1637 translation, which has been attributed to Thomas 
Hobbes.
106 On Carneades as the symbolic rhetorical hero: Skinner, Reason and rhetoric, 9-10, 
98. The editor of CPW 2, Ernest Sirluck neglected to note that Milton refers clear-
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bassadors to Rome, tooke thereby occasion to give the City a taste of their 
Philosophy, they were suspected for seducers by no lesse a man then Cato 
the Censor, who mov’d it in the Senat to dismisse them speedily, and to 
banish all such Attick bablers out of Italy. (CPW 2:497) 
This was due to the Romans being “so unacquainted with other learn-
ing” (ibid.) that they could not make the distinction between philoso-
phers and “seducers.” The point of this anecdote was to show how even 
the most virtuous of men could make bad decisions without the help of 
learning – just as learned men without virtuous upbringing could suc-
cumb to flattery or demagogy.107
Furthermore, we should consider the meaning of this passage in 
relation to the republican commonplace on the decline of Roman elo-
quence concomitantly with its republican mode of government. Milton 
duly refers to the Tacitean view, where a dominating power inhibits all 
from writing: “From hence we shall meet with little else but tyranny 
in the Roman Empire, that we may not marvell, if not so often bad, as 
good Books were silenc’t” (CPW 2:499-500).108 The fault of tyranny is 
to proscribe good books through blanket silencing, yet the conclusion 
to be drawn is not, that in a republic the promotion of good books re-
quired a general negligence of the contents of publications. Quite the 
contrary, as was the case of Cato, whose principles and intentions were 
noble, but he nevertheless erred in his judgement. 
Milton presented some mitigating factors that should give pause to 
over-enthusiastic erring on the side of caution. One is the possibility 
of persuasion: as befits the republican view on the relations between 
law and rhetoric,109 Milton asserts how “there were but little work left 
ly to the story of Carneades as told by Plutarch in Life of Cato the Elder - and not to 
Cicero’s De re publica. 
107 This applied to the contemporary Italy as well, as it were none “the better, the 
honester, the wiser, the chaster, since all the inquisitionall rigor that hath been 
executed upon books” (CPW 2:530) and where “nothing had bin there writt’n now 
these many years but flattery and fustian” (CPW 2:538).
108 Locus classicus in Tacitus’ Dialogus de Oratoribus, (“A dialogue on oratory”): cf. 
Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, pp. 12, 135.
109 This is a theme of a further study, more of which in the conclusion.
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for preaching, if law and compulsion should grow so fast upon those 
things which hertofore were govern’d only by exhortation” (CPW 
2:514). Instead of rigorous legislation, efforts should be concentrated on 
“those unwritt’n, or at least unconstraining laws of vertuous education, 
religious and civill nurture” (CPW 2:526). Not everything needed to 
be ruled by legislation, since an essential part of that virtuous educa-
tion and civil nurture, the art of rhetoric in proper hands, provided for 
means to alleviate possible damages. 
Rhetoric also lies behind Milton’s view on presenting conflicting 
viewpoints.110 This can be seen as connected with the reasoning in 
utramque partem: “what wisdome can there be to choose, what conti-
nence to forbeare without the knowledge of evill?” (CPW 2:514) One 
must listen to both sides, since “Truth may be on this side, or on the 
other” (CPW 2:563). Examples abound, as books are the means “both 
to the triall of vertue, and the exercise of truth”; and “our faith and 
knowledge thrives by exercise” (CPW 2:528). It should be emphasized 
that although Milton’s approach requires a certain amount of tolera-
tion of differing viewpoints during the ‘trials’, these debates are not by 
their nature open-ended – eventually, the judgment does come.
The open battle to find the winning arguments seems at first glance 
to favour our current, but historically much later, analogy of a free 
market-place of ideas, and some of the analogies in Areopagitica seem 
enticingly favourable to such reading – e.g. when Milton describes “the 
incredible losse, and detriment that this plot of licencing puts us to, 
more then if som enemy at sea should stop up all our hav’ns and ports, 
and creeks, it hinders and retards the importation of our richest March-
andize, Truth” (CPW 2:548). However, the analogy here is not about 
truth being a commodity for sale, but about a blockade, as in blocking 
110 I am deliberately omitting the term ‘skeptical outlook’ in the description, since the 
mild Academic skepticism behind classical rhetoric does not as such give grounds 
to see the uses or practices of rhetoric as proofs of skepticism as a full-blown credo, 
pace Randy Robertson, Censorship and Conflict In Seventeenth century England: the Subtle 
Art of Division, University Park, Pa.: 2009. Further elaboration of this stance will 
become evident in the course of this study.
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access to information.111 Truth in this analogy has the role it always has 
for Milton, as something of the highest imaginable value – priceless (as 
it were). 
To get to the “Truth” there has to be some amount of open debate, 
which will not always be amiable. Milton acknowledged how “where 
there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, 
much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge 
in the making” (CPW 2:554).112 The crucial point is to find the middle 
road between licence and demagogy, and similarly harmful arbitrary 
censorship. This point is put most succinctly when Milton describes the 
sheer unfeasibility of controlling all forms of potentially harmful public 
speech, where the pragmatic recognition is that “These things will be, 
and must be; but how they shall be lest hurtfull, how lest enticing, here-
in consists the grave and governing wisdom of a State” (CPW 2: 526).
At the end of Areopagitica, Milton returns to this question of political 
turbulence, retaining the qualified, positive view as it pertains to results 
as “when God shakes a Kingdome with strong and healthfull commo-
tions to a generall reforming.” This is the occasion for demagogues: 
“’tis not untrue that many sectaries and false teachers are then busiest 
in seducing,” but what is then needed are the “men of rare abilities, 
and more then common industry” – humanists of Milton’s educational 
ideals. It is their role “not only to look back and revise what hath bin 
taught heretofore, but to gain furder and goe on, some new enlighten’d 
steps in the discovery of truth” (CPW 2:566). With the help of rhetoric 
and other humanist learning, the aim was for the virtuous governors to 
make an informed decision, especially necessary in the field of govern-
ment: “errors in a good government and in a bad are equally almost 
incident; for what Magistrate may not be mis-inform’d, and much the 
sooner, if liberty of Printing be reduc’t into the power of a few” (CPW 
2:570).
111 What this analogy says about Milton’s views on monopolies, free trade, etc. is 
beyond the scope of this study.
112 My italics, to emphasise the importance of the interlocutors to the debate.
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Despite the positive effects of free speech, it should be borne in 
mind that Milton’s arguments for mitigating the negative effects also 
had limits. Not everything could or would need to be censored, but 
if the ‘wars of truth’ had yielded their winners, the losing side could 
and should be banned from the public sphere. Explicitly nominated 
candidates include “Popery and open superstition” (CPW 2:565). In 
addition, Catholic faith shows the dangers of religious demagogues, 
as it “will be hard to instance where any ignorant man hath bin ever 
seduc’t by Papisticall book in English, unlesse it were commended and 
expounded to him by some of that Clergy” (CPW 2:519). 
Milton’s approach to Catholics shows in a nutshell his approach to 
public speech. His lack of toleration includes a proviso: “provided first 
that all charitable and compassionat means be us’d to win and regain 
the weak and the misled” (CPW 2:565), to show the possibility of per-
suasion. Similar ways are promoted when dealing with “schismaticks”: 
“give them gentle meeting and gentle dismissions,.. debate.. and ex-
amin the matter throughly with liberall and frequent audience” (CPW 
2:567). Nevertheless, in the end there is no question of assumption that 
they might be right – those battles have been had and the answers are 
clear. Miltonic toleration reaches all who are willing to see the errors 
of their ways.
These ‘wars of truth’113 serve to explain why there cannot be a con-
sistently liberal reading of Areopagitica, yet also why the republican read-
ing of Milton needs further qualification. The tension between the need 
to allow open discussion on the one hand and the management of the 
debate on the other has led to scholarly entrenchment, so presenting the 
oppositions between these two readings serves not only to illustrate the 
enticing nature of Milton’s arguments, but it turns out that the tension 
itself is indeed a fundamental aspect in Milton’s political thought. 
Bearing in mind what has been presented above on Milton’s privi-
leges and restrictions on speakers and speech, it is difficult to match 
his views with a general right of free expression. As for a republican 
Milton, the claim is much stronger: if looked from the perspective of 
113 To paraphrase the title of Herschel Baker, Wars of Truth: Studies in the Decay of Chris-
tian Humanism in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, Cambridge, Mass: 1952.
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a republican freedom in rule of law, there is nothing inherently unfree 
in accepting regulation of public speech and even censorship based on 
accepted and non-arbitrary legislation.114 
Nevertheless – if we press the argument a bit – the next question 
would be whether the republican argument against self-censorship can 
be accommodated with the argument in Areopagitica for prevention of 
pre-censorship, but not the banning of books afterwards. If one is free 
to publish without prior licensing, yet can still be held accountable for 
publishing material that the republic does not approve of, there is a 
risk of encouraging the writing of non-threatening texts. Such an es-
sentially slavish approach, favouring “flattery and fustian” is one that 
Milton rails against, so how can it be accommodated with republican 
censorship? 
One argument for accommodation is to note that in order to be 
valid, such a presentation of republicanism largely assumes a debate, 
where there are many truths and all opinions are of equal value. For 
Milton, such a situation does not exist. Milton aims to find the right 
reason, and contradicting arguments cannot both be true. In Areopagit-
ica, differing arguments need to be sifted in the public arena, but when 
truth will out, it means that those who are lying, spreading false claims, 
etc. should pay the price. The battle should not be so much suppressed 
as won for the right side, not just the most popular.
For the last argument on behalf of a republican reading of Milton, it 
is useful to consider yet another counterpoint from the liberal reading. 
If non-arbitrary censorship can be allowed why does Milton simply not 
state avowedly what he considers as licentious texts? One qualifying 
element has been already touched upon, namely that for Milton much 
depends on who speaks what to whom.115 Nevertheless, it is worth not-
ing how simply arguing that for Milton the opposite of liberty is licence, 
is a somewhat facile argument, which also risks reintroducing the ac-
cusation of arbitrariness. Unless an exact equilibrium point between 
114 Martin Dzelzainis, “John Milton, Areopagitica,” in A Companion to Literature from 
Milton to Blake, ed. David Womersley, Oxford: 2000, pp. 151-8. 
115 Eric Nelson has usefully named this as Milton’s ‘Isocratean republicanism’. Nel-
son, “True Liberty.”
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licence and liberty can be ascertained, simply postulating its existence 
as such does not quite remove the accusation of arbitrariness. If some-
one has the power to make a choice what is licence and what is not, the 
power by definition is arbitrary.
The seeming unwillingness on Milton’s part to fully embrace either 
unhindered freedom or full-blown arbitrary censorship could lead us 
to assume his intentions from what he must have wanted, but could not 
say, due to the constraints of his epoch. Nevertheless, if there are to be 
made any postulations on what Milton thought, but could not say, then 
the claim should be more plausible when made from the perspective 
of works available to Milton. Accordingly, the last point of my analysis 
brings us back to the heritage of classics.
From classical literature we can easily find a certain high-ranking 
Roman trained in Greek philosophy professing how, That in a free state, 
folke ought to have both tongue and thought free.116 This man, who in addition 
set up many claims for free speech along the lines of those found in Are-
opagitica, was Tiberius – the bête noire of any classical republican. Later 
on in the “Life of Tiberius,” Suetonius gives a vivid description of the 
‘dark side’ of allowing freedom of speech: it allows the spotting of ones 
enemies more easily.117 Milton was certainly aware of Suetonius’ work, 
since he even included a quote from the “Life of the Deified Claudius” 
in Areopagitica (CPW 2:504).
Accordingly, it is difficult to argue that Milton would have been 
completely unaware of this cruelly pragmatic argument for free speech. 
What I want to propose is that Milton deliberately left the argument 
non-explicit, because this pragmatic argument had been presented by 
authors whom it would not have been propitious for a republican to 
quote. Furthermore, the simultaneous omission of any counterargu-
ments to this view adds further proof – one does not argue about what 
one agrees with. And finally, this thesis fits comfortably into the ‘the 
governing wisdom of State,’ so eagerly promoted by Milton. For Mil-
ton, the management of the public sphere required openness, but not 
116 Suetonius, “Life of Tiberius,” 28 (Philemon Holland tr.), London: 1606.
117 Suetonius, “Life of Tiberius,” 61. Similar arguments can be found in Tacitus, 
Annales.
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negligence. And if malefactors were to freely reveal their positions, all 
the better for the censors.
As mentioned, Areopagitica has become a hugely influential fons et ori-
go for arguments on behalf of free speech, but at the time of its writing 
it was not recognised as such. In the preface to his next work, Tetrachor-
don (1645), Milton again inserted four lines of Greek, from Euripides’ 
Medea, which have not gained as much scholarly attention as those in 
Areopagitica. Nevertheless, they present a somewhat contemptuous view 
of Milton’s seeming anger in failing to persuade others of his superior 
knowledge: “For if thou bring strange wisdom unto dullards/Useless 
thou shalt be counted and not wise/And, if thy fame outshine those 
heretofore/Held wise, thou shalt be odious in men’s eyes.”118 The sig-
nificance of Milton’s frustration should not be exaggerated, though. 
After all, the fact of his continued publication until very mature years 
is evidence of continuing participation in the public sphere. Signs of 
exasperation may work also as exhortation (even if in practice, Milton’s 
did not). 
The importance of the lines from Medea is rather in Milton’s con-
tinuing attempt to guide policy-making in the direction of singular wis-
dom, no matter how strange it may seem to the wicked or uninitiated. 
In the exordium, ‘To the Parlament’, Milton presents one example of 
this argument, through that “which I knew to be the part of a good 
magistrate, aiming at true liberty through the right information of reli-
gious and civil life” (CPW 2:578). As before, ‘true’ and ‘right’ are quali-
fiers requiring “the deep and quiet stream of.. direct and calm delibera-
tions,” and the parliament Milton exonerates is exceedingly “different 
from the rash vulgar” in that respect (CPW 2:579).
In one way, Tetrachordon shows an important aspect of Milton’s ar-
gument for free speech, due to the text being a counter to attacks on 
his earlier works. This personal aspect shows how Miltonic free speech 
works out in practice, and as will become apparent, Milton’s arguments 
remain consistent to what has been argued in the study so far: Milton 
argued for some leeway in order to fight the battle for truth in a level 
118 Euripides, Medea, lines 298-301 (Loeb translation).
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field, – “learned debatements are privileg’d with a due freedom under 
equal Moderators” – but not to argue against just constraints, “any just 
censure,” as such (CPW 2:579). 
It should come as no surprise that in this particular case Milton 
argues for the justness of his own case and defence, which requires for 
him to “take licence by the right of nature, and that liberty wherin I 
was born, to defend my self publicly against a printed Calumny” (CPW 
2:580). Reciprocity does not follow for his opponents, as “why I should 
be subject, in such a notorious and illegal manner, to the intemperan-
cies of this mans preaching choler” (CPW 2:581). 
Nevertheless, there is an added dimension to the argument that Mil-
ton likes freedom of speech for himself, but not for others. However cor-
rect – if facile – that argument might be, it is very difficult to promote 
such a wish into a generally accepted rule. At least, there should be 
some arguments as to why public speech is laudable, welcome, accept-
able, or unacceptable. In Tetrachordon, Milton provides such arguments 
in his plea for the justification of his battles, worth quoting in extenso:
For if sound argument and reason shall be thus put off, either by an un-
dervaluing silence, or the maisterly censure of a rayling word or two in the 
Pulpit, or by rejecting the force of truth, as the meer cunning of eloquence 
and Sophistry, what can be the end of this, but that all good learning and 
knowledge will suddenly decay (CPW 2:583).
Areopagitica covered the dangers of suppressing the wars of truth preven-
tively, and in turn Tetrachordon presents the consequences of suppression, 
due to desertion by the participants.
After the exordium, the main text of Tetrachordon provides some 
elaborations on the theme familiar from Areopagitica, how the abuse of 
something does not prevent its proper use. Granted that the topic is 
actually divorce, but the argument for divorce – the abusus non tollit 
usum argument – is consistent with that made on behalf of free speech: 
“although it could not be avoided, but that Men of hard hearts would 
abuse this liberty, yet doubtless it was intended, as all other privileges 
in Law are, to good men principally, to bad only by accident” (CPW 
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2:620-1).119 The essential criterion is again the presence of good men, 
which differentiates liberty from licence. It was not “reasonable to talk 
of honest and conscientious liberty among them, who had abused legal 
and civil liberty to uncivil licence” (CPW 2:643).
The importance of the argument that only properly educated good 
men can enjoy privileges such as free speech was brought out most suc-
cintly in Milton’s Sonnet 12,120 written after the publication of Tetrachor-
don: 
this is got by casting Pearl to Hoggs; 
That bawle for freedom in their senceless mood, 
And still revolt when truth would set them free. 
Licence they mean when they cry libertie; 
For who loves that, must first be wise and good; (ll. 8-12). 
My earlier argument about why Milton published works seething with 
disdain applies to this sonnet as well, but it should be acknowledged 
that after 1645 – for whatever the reasons may have been – Milton did 
retire from publishing political tracts until the end of Civil War, during 
which time other authors rose to prominence, including Marchamont 
Nedham.
2. Marchamont Nedham
Marchamont Nedham was born in 1620, in Burford, Oxfordshire and 
studied at All Souls College in Oxford, obtaining his B.A. at the age of 
17. He then left for London to become an assistant teacher at Merchant 
Taylor’s School. After four years Nedham changed employers, becom-
ing a clerk at Gray’s Inn. With the advent of civil war journalism Ned-
119 A theme reiterated in Colasterion, a text published simultaneously with Tetrachordon, 
“that this Law is a pure and wholsom national Law, not to be with-held from good 
men, because others likely anough may abuse it to thir pleasure” (CPW 2:723).
120 Edition used: John Milton, The Complete Poems, John Leonard (ed.), Penguin 
Classics 1998.
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ham began his career as a political writer.121 During his career Ned-
ham changed sides several times, which naturally created problems not 
only for his contemporaries, but also for later scholars who have had to 
draw their own conclusions whether the man was a serial turncoat and 
a hack, or did he hold on to some principles – republican or otherwise 
– throughout his career. 
As mentioned in the introduction, this study steers away from neat 
political categorisations. However, when the writings in question do 
show explicit adherence to and promotion of, for example, classical re-
publican tradition, then it is judged valid to refer to a republican mode 
of writing (conviction aside). In addition, the study of an ambiguous 
character such as Nedham can actually be very fruitful in relation to 
public speech, since it allows for a comparative analysis: i.e. through 
reflecting the changes in Nedham’s political thinking to those in his 
views on public speech, we gain valuable information about the inter-
relations between the two. 
What is apparent in 1645, when Nedham was writing for the par-
liamentary side in Mercurius Britanicus, is how far removed his stance 
was from promoting any universal right of free expression. At this time 
in his newsbooks – where besides news there were often a few lines of 
commentary in the beginning and the end on topics the author/editor 
added – he wrote how persons found to “maliciously utter any things 
against parliament” should be charged with “high treason.” To Ned-
ham, the “licentiousness in common discourse” led to the “seduction 
of the ignorant, with the disheartening of the well-affected people.” At 
this stage he was ready to award informers with the subsequently con-
fiscated estates of such “malignants.”122 
121 Biographical information from Worden, “Marchamont Nedham,” p. 60; Blair 
Worden, “’Wit in a Roundhead’: the dilemma of Marchamont Nedham,” in 
Political Culture and Cultural Politics in Early Modern England: Essays Presented to David 
Underdown, eds. Susan D. Amussen, Mark A. Kishlansky Manchester: 1995, p. 
305, Blair Worden, Literature and Politics in Cromwellian England: John Milton, Andrew 
Marvell, Marchamont Nedham, Oxford: 2009.
122 Worden, “Wit in a Roundhead,” p. 313; [quotes from Mercurius Britannicus, 30 
June 1645, p. 800]. “Malignant” was a stock term by which the Parliamentary 
party designated its opponents: cf. CPW, 2: 488n.
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It should be stressed that Nedham’s argument, while clearly biased 
in favour of his employers, was only aimed at the public level. Nedham’s 
goal was not the reformation of man, to whom then liberty of speech 
could be allowed, but rather freedom of thought without uninhibited 
freedom to express those thoughts. To Nedham, there was “no reason 
why mens consciences should be burdened” or bound by ordinances 
and opinions “which they cannot be perswaded of.” Nevertheless, such 
freedom of conscience did not imply a freedom to prozelytise. Temper-
ance was more important than “liberty of tongue”: “were there but 
any Christian moderation, there would be neither cry nor groan for 
Liberty.” What was said and how mattered, and accordingly Nedham 
could counter the argument for liberty of speech in service of truth, by 
retorting that “Truth gains nothing by ill language.”123
There are at least three possible explanations of Nedham’s strict 
separation of inner and outward freedoms. First is the interests of 
peace: Nedham promotes the management of public discourse in order 
to maintain political peace. The argument for peace, under various 
guises – social harmony, etc. – is indeed one of the commonplaces in 
the source materials and accordingly has found its way to the research 
literature as well. However, this commonplace has become a somewhat 
banal answer, precisely since it was a widely shared aim of the period 
– not many authors would advocate a constant war for its own sake. 
Concentrating on this point alone would simply leave us with a platitu-
dinous description of an author A, e.g. Nedham, being different from 
author B, e.g. Milton. 
Second, and a more fruitful answer is to point out Nedham’s anti-
clericalism, which, as will become apparent in the course of this study, 
is constant throughout his long career. Whether in his parliamentary 
or royalist modes, Nedham vehemently opposed puritan values: his re-
publican writings show the fullest flourishing of his anti-puritanism, 
but his royalist writings also show the same tendency. And neither did 
123 Marchamont Nedham, Independencie No Schisme. Or, An Answer to a Scandalous Book, 
entituled, The Schismatick sifted: Written by Mr. John Vicars, London: 1646, July 16, pp. 
2-3.
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Nedham promote the Church of England in his royalist writings.124 
This animus does not seem to have come as a consequence from his 
political theory, and is usually seen to have come from his subjective 
preferences to his personal morals – or, in the case of drinking and 
debauchery, lack of them. Eventually, for the purposes of this study we 
may take Nedham’s anti-clericalism as given, but one that should be 
kept in mind in order to understand his political thought.
The third explanation proposed in this study is to claim that Ned-
ham’s political theory relies on a general attempt to restrict political 
participation, one aspect of which is to curtail freedom of speech. In 
such a view, individual freedom of conscience can indeed be tolerated, 
but it would not create a contradiction to concomitantly deny open de-
bate. At this stage, the source material is too limited to fully test this 
hypothesis, but later stages of this study will show whether the anti-
participation thesis can hold water. 
In 1646 the first Civil War was going well enough for the parliamen-
tary side that a decision was made to stop publishing Mercurius Britani-
cus. Whether this caused Nedham to fall out with his previous employ-
ers due to him being a loose cannon, or whether he considered that the 
new political agenda was not to his liking, may be questions without 
definitive answers. What matters most for this study, is that the sources 
show us a quick but gradual, rather than a sudden change of allegiance. 
In June 1647 Nedham published A case of the Kingdom Stated, where he 
proposed ways to peace, accommodating the interests, among others, 
of both the Royalist and the Parliamentary sides. 
Before going further in analysing Nedham’s changing allegiances, 
we must take stock of his use of the term ‘interests.’ It has been argued 
that in the history of political theory, the adoption of interest theory 
– under which ragione di stato, reason of state and other variations on 
the theme can be jointly labelled – has played a significant part in the 
theory of republicanism by abandoning the ideal of a citizen as a rhetor. 
As mentioned in the introduction, concomitantly with rhetoric made 
obsolete by the printing revolution, interest theory is thus seen to have 
124 Worden, “Wit in a Roundhead,” p. 304; Worden, Literature and Politics, pp. 29-30.
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replaced symbolic forms of speech, such as rhetoric.125 The role of in-
terest theory has been seen as especially essential in interpreting the 
thought of Marchamont Nedham.126 For Blair Worden, “in his theory 
of interest, Nedham found another mean of penetrating the exterior 
falsities of political behaviour and language.”127 Similarly, Alan Hou-
ston has quoted Nedham in an attempt to show how “the language 
of interest cut through the confusing and hypocritical cant of political 
life, providing a clear and unambiguous guide to human conduct.”128 
In this interpretation, interests represent the unconcealed truth, inde-
pendent from the forms of speech, thus making interest theory into a 
form of rhetoric-free political theory. 
Although the larger issue of the decline of rhetoric is outside the 
bounds of this study, there are a few problems in emphasising the role of 
interest theory, by making rhetoric obsolete in general and in Nedham’s 
relation to it. The first problem concerns interests as a rhetorical tool: 
not only that asking cui bono was hardly a novel invention in political 
writing, but the language of interests was also used as a way of setting 
ethos, or to use the technical term, as the captatio benevolentiae. Giving the 
impression of a dispassionate, disinterested observer is what Nedham 
often did, as in the exordium to the Case of the Kingdom Stated: “none can 
take just offence, since I state the Interests of all indifferently.”129
Obviously, it would hardly be a strong argument to criticize the view 
of interest theory as purely an anti- or arhetorical tool, by claiming 
that it was purely rhetorical. My claim is simply that the language of 
interest could be used rhetorically, notwithstanding the authors’ claims 
125 Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust.” 
126 Prominent works include Gunn, “Interest Will Not Lie,” and Gunn, Politics and the 
public interest.
127 Worden, “Wit in a Roundhead,” p. 317.
128 Alan Houston, “Republicanism, the politics of necessity, and the rule of law,” in 
A nation transformed: England after the Restoration, eds. Steven Pincus, Alan Houston, 
Cambridge: 2001, p. 255. 
129 Marchamont Nedham, The case of the kingdom stated: according to the proper interests 
of the severall parties ingaged, 1st ed., London: January 1647, sig. A1v. Cf. [Nedham] 
Mercurius Pragmaticus, A plea for the king and kingdome: by way of answer to the late 
remonstrance of the army, London: 1648, sigs. A1v-2r.
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otherwise. Taken at face value, the possibility of this tactic has been 
sometimes neglected in earlier studies on interest theory. In fairness to 
Alan Houston’s assertion on Nedham above, he did note on the same 
page that the role of interests in political thought has yet to be written. 
In order to do that properly, facile portrayals of political writers as mere 
rhetoricians or advocates of early modern Realpolitik must be avoided. 
The analysis of interest theory will continue more fully at later stag-
es of this study, but already in the Case of the Kingdom Stated it is possible 
to view some of the aspects that disabuse us of the notion of interest 
theory as an apolitical and unambiguous method of political theory. As 
was mentioned earlier, the stating of disinterestedness was a rhetorical 
commonplace, but in addition, what Nedham in the pamphlet presents 
as ‘interests’ are mostly his own political aims dressed as objective in-
terests. The pamphlet advocated peace, parliamentary process, “ just 
Liberty,” and is hostile to the Presbyterians.130 A representative example 
is in the conclusion as to the “true Interest of the city,” which was “to 
leave the Presbyterian Cause to stand or fall, by Reason and sober debate in 
Parliament.”131 Not to put too fine a point on it, but Nedham is rather 
using the rhetoric, than the language of interests.
In July 1647 Nedham published another pamphlet, which showed 
a further step towards accommodation with the royalist party. When 
still writing for the parliamentary side in Mercurius Britanicus, Nedham 
attacked the king’s flattering advisers, whose evil ways were to blame 
for the civil wars.132 Nevertheless, in An Apology for the Army – which 
Nedham had continuously supported even at the expense of the parlia-
ment – Nedham continued the critique of flatterers, but this time in a 
much more positive way towards the king, “whose wisdome I doubt not 
is proofe against all flatteries tending to his ruine.”133 Crossing to the 
other side is easier when one is already straddling the fence.
130 Nedham, Case of the Kingdom, sigs. A2r-v. 
131 Nedham, Case of the Kingdom, p. 16.
132 Worden, “Wit in a Roundhead,” p. 309.
133 Marchamont Nedham, The Lawyer of Lincolnes-Inne Reformed: Or, An Apolog y for the 
Army, London: 1647 July 17, p. 6.
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Furthermore, Nedham’s switching of sides was certainly helped by 
his way of writing, which – as befits the rhetorical culture of the epoch 
– presented pro et con arguments followed by a judgment. Nedham used 
the style to such an extent, that he would often use long excerpts from 
earlier works verbatim, add a few lines to give emphasis to some issues 
and downplay others, and accordingly changing the judgement to suit 
his current needs. The use of this technique and the shameless cut-and-
pasting also serve to explain Nedham’s impressive output of text over 
the years. A good example is A Paralell of Governments, from August 1647, 
which used classical examples, Machiavelli’s works and other texts of 
the republican canon in order to put forward an explicitly pro-royalist 
argument.134 The following month Nedham began as the editor of a 
royalist newsbook Mercurius Pragmaticus.
In his new royalist mode, Nedham quickly appropriated the division 
between positive, wise eloquence and negative sophistry and demagogy 
to a non-republican purposes – which goes to show that the connection 
between rhetoric and republicanism is far from obvious. Towards the 
end of 1647, when Nedham wrote against the Levellers, he compared 
their ideas to the astrologist William Lilly, who deceived “the credu-
lous world, by making them believe strange things” and how by his 
“Sophistrie” he deluded them, although his writing was “made up of 
tautologies and barbarisme.”135 A better example of positive eloquence 
was “Sir Thomas” – in all likelihood, Sir Thomas Fairfax – who “hath 
wrought by mild and gentle Speechs, by his discreet and wise deport-
ment, that not onely our owne protest against [the Levellers], but doe 
acknowledge their revolt with teares.”136
Another accusation of sophistry took place in 1648, when “contrary 
to all law and reason [Parliament] will prove with their wild Soph-
istrie to be both good and requisite” and they “would indeavour to 
prove by Sophistria, that which they have no warrant for.” In a nod to 
the practice of parliament, the locus classicus of deliberative rhetoric, 
134 [Marchamont Nedham], A Paralell of Governments, London: 1647 August.
135 [Marchamont Nedham] Mercurius Pragmaticus, The Levellers levell’d, Or, The 
independents conspiracie to root out monarchie, London: 1647 December 8, p. 9.
136 Nedham, The Levellers levell’d, p. 13.
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Nedham proclaims his intention to “returne to [the Parliament] their 
owne words according to their owne practices, and tell them, That all 
the Rhetorique used in this point,… might have been spared.” Nedham 
did not view this “Rhetorique” positively, as it is meant “to abuse the 
minds of well minded people, and to heighten their fancies.” However, 
this was not so much an attack on rhetoric as such, as simply an attack 
on the other side of the debate, who used it “against our proceedinge.”137 
A type of paradiastole is used: the other side was one of demagogy, 
whereas Nedham was eloquent.
In case of demagogy, Nedham might have changed over to the roy-
alist side, but the demagogues remained the same. In An Answer to a 
Declaration, they were again the priests. Nedham marked them as fifth-
columnists, performing their “impietie” from the pulpit and printed 
pages alike. It was the “Forraign Nations” who encouraged the “In-
dependent Ministers” into preaching against the king, monarchy and 
government.138 As for Nedham’s views against participation, in No-
vember of the same year Nedham attacked those who would flatter 
the “rascall Multitude” with notions of popular rule.139 For a turncoat, 
some elements of Nedham’s cause remained surprisingly stable.
At this stage, it is useful to consider the question of his audiences. If 
we assume that Nedham changed tack back and forth between popular 
republican pamphlets and a more aristocratic mode, the changes seem 
unexpected and can understandably give rise to accusations of glar-
ing opportunism. Yet if we consider what the expected audience of the 
texts was, then – together with the already noted gradual changes and 
stable elements of his political writings – his disloyalty becomes more 
comprehensible. 
To a large extent, the most probable audience would have had hu-
manistic and rhetorical training. In previous scholarship, the republi-
canist newsbooks of Nedham and others, that extensively use examples 
137 [Marchamont Nedham] Mercurius Pragmaticus, An Answer to a Declaration, 
London: 1648, pp. 3-4.
138 Nedham, Answer to a Declaration, p. 11.
139 [Marchamont Nedham] Mercurius Pragmaticus, A plea for the king and kingdome: by 
way of answer to the late remonstrance of the army, London: 1648 Nov 30, p. 26.
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of classical history, are “evidently written with a wide readership in 
mind,” assuming “a basic knowledge of Roman history in their read-
ers.” This strengthens the impression “of a politically and intellectually 
alert electorate.”140 Yet the electorate is not all the people, and since 
Nedham refers often to “the People,” it would seem important to clarify 
this audience: who exactly would have been the citizens of his republic 
or kingdom?
Alas, in the England of the 1640s, where political tracts of all kinds 
proliferated, defining concepts like ‘the People’ loosely was surely a 
sensible strategy. In such a case as Nedham’s, it allowed the ideologi-
cal somersaults: it was prudent for him to praise “the People” in one 
context and blame “the rabble” in another, even if the reference group 
seems to be the same. Obviously the deliberate ambiguity also laid the 
door open to various misinterpretations. What must be the most plau-
sible interpretation from his texts, whether writing for the Roundheads 
or Royalists, is that Nedham was never a social revolutionary. As the 
fear of demagogues, antagonistic attitude towards the Levellers and the 
need for a humanistic elite shows, Nedham had no love for the multi-
tude, the vulgar, or the rabble.
As a last point, the question of popularity can be further clarified 
by considering the aesthetics of his writings. Nedham had the training 
and talent for satire, jocularity and saw himself as an accomplished 
wit. But shifting sides forced Nedham to accommodate his writing ac-
cordingly. For wit, if defined as Cicero did in De Oratore (2.58.236),141 
was a sign of an erudite, urbane orator. Such qualities did not always 
suit his texts easily, as he changed his posts, thus creating problems 
of decorum. In the early 1640s Nedham wrote for the Puritan cause, 
which is considered to have been “generally hostile to or ill at ease 
with wit and merriment.” Then Nedham’s attention was on the self-
professed plainness of his writing when compared to his opponent’s pre-
tentious style. Yet his writing was not perceived as such by them, since 
140 Worden, “Wit in a Roundhead,” p. 319.
141 As, “vel quod ipsum oratorem politum esse hominem significat, quod eruditum, 
quod urbanum: it shows the orator himself to be a man of finish, accomplishment 
and taste.” M. Tullius Cicero, De Oratore 2.58, Loeb ed., London: 1959. 
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Royalists derided Nedham precisely for defiling the literally noble art 
of wit. Although Royalists were not always above Nedham in resorting 
to populism, their accusation focused on the faulty decorum of using 
an exclusively elite style in a totally unappropriate manner: trying to 
seduce the vulgar classes. Accordingly when Nedham changed sides 
to the Mercurius Pragmaticus, he scorned the Roundheads for being in-
capable of such wit that he was now committed to.142 In a nutshell, 
Nedham’s style and politics were not a perfect fit for either side of the 
conflict, but fitting enough to be useful to both, and allowed changing 
sides easily. Which was exactly what would become necessary in 1649 
with the advent of the new republic.
142 Worden, ’Wit in a Roundhead’, pp. 308-9, 320, 322-323. 
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PART II Commonwealth 1649 - 1653
3. Return of Milton
In the final days of January 1649, Charles I, King of England, Scot-
land and Ireland went to trial and as a punishment his body politic 
was divided into its constituent parts. An event of this magnitude was 
bound to influence much of the political writing – not to mention ca-
reer prospects – of the authors under study. For John Milton, it meant 
a return to the sphere of public debate from years of silence. What is 
clear is that his skills as a writer had not been dulled, as already in Feb-
ruary he published The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates, to defend the act 
of decapitation.
Whether the argument in The Tenure is best described as being 
against monarchy, tyranny, or the enemies of mankind, is still disputed, 
and will certainly not be conclusively solved in this study. Nevertheless, 
as the topic of The Tenure is so crucially connected to the question of 
legitimate political authority, a few words on Milton’s argument will be 
mentioned. In the course of this study the topic of legitimate authority 
will be shown to be crucial in understanding many of the arguments for 
free speech in a republican mode. 
Milton presents in The Tenure a version of the origin of authority in 
“cities, towns, and commonwealths” as follows: “because no faith in 
all was found sufficiently binding, they saw it needful to ordain some 
authority, that might restrain by force and punishment what was vio-
lated against peace and common right.” This is a view of authority as 
necessary force, but qualified as one that requires consent by those both 
protected and threatened by such force. As in the course of time people 
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had “by trial… found the danger and inconveniences of committing 
arbitrary power to any,” they had to “invent laws” that were “either 
framed or consented to by all.” The goal was to “confine and limit 
the authority of whom they chose to govern them.” 
When consent is lacking, as in the case of “the unjust authority of 
kings,” then “the relation between king and subject can be no other 
than regal authority and subjection.” Here Milton’s view of authority is 
mainly similar to a simple force: a just force, when it reflects the “author-
ity of the people,” and an unjust one when reflecting simply the king’s 
own. The other aspect worth noting is how Milton conveys a sense of 
authority, as something held at the behest of the people, yet there seem 
to be few tangible checks on such authority. Accountability seems to 
rely simply on avoidance of revolution and rule of law, as changes to 
authorities happen “merely by the liberty and right of freeborn men to 
be governed as seems to them best” (CPW 3:198-99, 206).143 
We shall return to the question of authority at later stages: for now 
the study will continue to examine what Milton argues about rhetoric 
and politics. Milton explicitly attached the republican ideal of freedom 
to his conception of vir bonus, while simultaneously linking the abuse of 
rhetoric more closely to the ill-meaning men, as “none can love free-
dom heartilie, but good men; the rest love not freedom, but licence” 
(CPW 3:190). This would apply especially to the treacherous, dema-
gogic presbyters, who “after they have juggl’d and palter’d with the 
world” from “thir Pulpits and thir Pamphlets, to the ingaging of sincere 
and real men,” have turned “revolters from those principles” (CPW 
3:191). Again, it fell to the virtuous few, “the task to those Worthies 
which are the soule of that enterprize,” to be a sort of revolutionary 
vanguard “amidst the throng and noises of Vulgar and irrational men” 
(CPW 3:192).
As before, the problem was not rhetoric per se, but its abuse by false 
orators, “The unmaskuline [as opposed to that of a vir bonus] Rhetorick 
of any pulling Priest or Chaplain.” The otherwise admirable ability to 
see many sides to an issue was no excuse for duplicity, when commit-
143 Note that Milton adds “even if no tyrant,” so his theory is explicitly not simply 
against tyranny. 
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ted by “the ignorance or the notorious hypocrisie and self-repugnance 
of our dancing Divines, who have the conscience and the boldness, to 
come with Scripture in thir mouthes, gloss’d and fitted for thir turnes 
with a double contradictory sense, transforming the sacred verity of 
God, to an Idol with two Faces, looking at once two several ways; and 
with the same quotations to charge others, which in the same case they 
made serve to justifie themselves” (CPW 3:195-6). This view is in line 
with Milton’s earlier arguments about the need to come to a judgment 
and standing resolute, the opposite of which are the actions of unprin-
cipled weathervanes. 
Such abuse of rhetoric was not be hidden from Milton, who could 
easily recognise a paradiastole: “He who but erewhile in the Pulpits 
was a cursed Tyrant, an enemie to God and Saints, lad’n with all the 
innocent blood spilt in three Kingdoms, and so to be fought against, 
is now, though nothing penitent or alter’d from his first principles, a 
lawfull Magistrate, a Sovran Lord, the Lords anointed” (CPW 3:197). 
Presbyterians were clearly opportunist, seditious demagogues: “almost 
in all the Sermons, Prayers, and Fulminations that have bin utterd this 
sev’n yeares by those clov’n tongues of falshood and dissention; who 
now, to the stirring up of new discord, acquitt him” (CPW 3:197). They 
were “Ministers of sedition,” “Mercenary noisemakers” acting “as if 
sedition were thir onely aime” (CPW 3:236). Yet Milton was careful to 
lay the blame only on the demagogues, not on the whole “party calld 
Presbyterian, of whom I believe very many to be good and faithfull 
Christians, though misledd by som of turbulent spirit.” It was Milton’s 
duty to write so “that men may yet more fully know the difference be-
tween Protestant Divines, and these Pulpit-firebrands” (CPW 3:238).
It has been argued that only in 1649 was Milton troubled by the 
verbal ambiguity present in the treacherous equivocation of the presby-
terian ministers.144 However, as the previous chapter showed, the ani-
mus towards firebrand priests was already present in his earlier works, 
and the argumentation does not change a great deal. It might be that 
among the reasons why Milton chose to break his silence of many years 
144 Loewenstein, Representing Revolution, pp. 175-190.
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was his possibly growing opposition to presbyterians, but that is only 
conjecture. Whatever the reasons were, it is obvious that writing The 
Tenure was a much better career move than Milton’s earlier prose works. 
He was quickly hired by the new powers to write counter-propaganda, 
and the first of these commissioned polemics came out already in May 
1649, the Observations on the Articles of Peace, where Milton continued his 
attack on preaching demagogues. They were far from virtuous orators: 
it was “shameless hypocrisie, and of meer wolves in sheeps cloathing, to 
sow sedition in the Eares of all men” (CPW 3:322).
 Besides the continued attack on demagogy, Milton returned to an-
other earlier theme, that of education. In the Observations Milton cas-
tigated the “pittiful store of learning” of the demagogic “deceivers,” 
which accordingly makes for such dangerous and vile preaching. The 
foremost issue was learning, not so much the efficiency, as Milton ad-
mits that “the rancour that levens them have somewhat quickn’d the 
common drawling of thir pulpit elocution” (CPW 3:322-323). The cru-
cial lack is that of decorum, “utterly forgetting to be Ministers of the 
Gospel, they presume to op’n their mouths not in the spirit of meeknesse, as 
like dissemblers they pretend, but with.. devilish malice, impudence and 
falshood” (CPW 3:327). Those properly educated could see these faults: 
“let men reflect a little upon the slanders and reviles of these wretched 
Priests, and judge what modesty, what truth, what conscience, what any 
thing fit for Ministers, or wee might say reasonable men can harbour in 
them” (CPW 3:332).
It was one thing to counter poorly written propaganda, but texts of 
higher quality presented their own problems. Soon after the behead-
ing of Charles I a book purporting to present an autobiography of the 
late king’s suffering was published. The positive image of the king in 
Eikon Basilike made the book no friends among the new authorities, yet 
it was a publishing hit: there were 36 editions during the year 1649 
alone. Eventually, the skills of one of the new counter-propagandists 
were commissioned to come up with a riposte, and in October 1649 
the Eikonoklastes of John Milton was published. The two main problems 
Milton had to deal with were the quality of the text, and its audience. 
In the author of Eikon Basilike Milton had a rhetorically able op-
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ponent, who “by smooth and supple words” sought “to make som ben-
eficial use or other ev’n of [king’s] worst miscarriages” (CPW 3:377). 
Similarly, Milton also objected to the use of paradiastole to make the 
virtuous conduct of Parliament appear self-seeking and corrupt.145 This 
was clever use of rhetoric by the opponent, and at one point Milton ad-
mitted to the rhetorical skills of his opponent: “Wee have heer, I must 
confess, a neat and well-couch’d invective against Tumults; expressing 
a true feare of them in the Author, but yet so handsomly compos’d, 
and withall so feelingly.” As the rhetoric of the tract did not allow for 
an easy attack, Milton attacked instead the intellectual content: “But 
the matter heer considerable, is not whether the King, or his Housh-
old Rhetorician have made a pithy declamation against Tumults” (CPW 
3:382). Likewise Milton attacked the hidden intentions in the content, 
with Eikon being “the artificialest peece of fineness to perswade men 
into slavery that the wit of Court could have invented.” (CPW 3:392). 
Later in the tract Milton attacks the lack of logos in Eikon, arguing that 
proof is not gained “by a Game of Tictack with words” (CPW 3:564).
Taken at face value, it has seemed reasonable to argue that the rea-
son why Milton did not write “a rhetorical tour de force” was that he 
wanted to persuade his readers “not with lavish rhetoric but with the 
simple truth.”146 However, this is simply to confuse excessive ornamen-
tation (a rhetorical fault) with plain style (a rhetorical style).147 For a bet-
ter understanding of the publications made to counter the opponents of 
the new republic, it is necessary to appreciate how Milton, as befitted 
a writer trained in rhetoric, followed an ordered, formal rhetorical ap-
proach. He attacked the ethos of his opponents, then analysed their 
arguments, whether they are well founded, and also, whether there was 
any utility and moral value in them – these would be overlapping, un-
145 Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. II, p. 281, quoting CPW III: 501.
146 Laura Blair McKnight, “Crucifixion or apocalypse? Refiguring the Eikon 
Basilike,” in Religion, literature, and politics in post-Reformation England, 1540-1688, eds. 
Donna B. Hamilton, Richard Strier, Cambridge: 1996, p. 150.
147 Brian Vickers, “‘Words and Things’ – or ‘Words, Concepts, and Things’? 
Rhetorical and Linguistic Categories in the Renaissance,” in Res et verba in der 
Renaissance, eds. Eckhard Kessler and Ian Maclean, Wiesbaden: 2002, pp. 287-
335.
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like interest theory sometimes may let us assume. In the case of Eiko-
noklastes, Milton went through pages of arguments to show that there 
were not any tumults, and true to the rhetorical method – following a 
denial of the accusations – he followed by arguing that anything close 
to being considered tumults, were rather the king’s own fault. This ap-
proach explains for a great part the sometimes seemingly incoherent 
and contradictory approach to the counter-attacks – Milton’s oppo-
nents do not know what they are talking about; even if they do know, 
then what they talk about does not exist; even if it did exist it would 
not be a problem; if it would be problem they are not the ones to speak 
about it, or at least properly. The approach is formal, and not necessar-
ily intellectually coherent.
One of the attacks Milton makes on the learning of the writer of 
Eikon is worth a more detailed study, since it is so intricately related to 
one of the main topics of this study, i.e. demagogy as a term. Much ink 
has been spilled over a segment of Eikonoklastes, where Milton seemingly 
denigrates the word ‘demagogues’148 as used in Eikon Basilike: 
Setting aside the affrightment of this Goblin word; for the King by his leave 
cannot coine English as he could Money, to be current (and tis beleev’d 
this wording was above his known stile and Orthographie. (CPW 3:393)
A number of hypotheses have been put forward as to significance of this 
passage, not all satisfactory.
The first claim is the easiest to refute. Since the OED gives Eikon 
Basilike as the first instance of the use of the word ‘demagogue,’149 it 
has been argued that Milton did not like the word: it was an ugly ne-
ologism, a case of the ‘King coining English.’150 As a matter of fact, 
148 In fact, in CPW the quote from Eikon Basilike reads “Damagogues,” but this is 
simply a typo. The editor of the volume 3, Merritt Y. Hughes used the copy of 
Eikonoklastes in British Library, (599e18(1)), where the word is clearly “Demagogues” 
(p. 32). 
149 Despite my emailed attempts at correction.
150 Few examples: Merritt Y. Hughes in CPW 3:393n38; John Leonard, Naming in 
Paradise: Milton and the language of Adam and Eve, Oxford: 1990, p. 180; Thomas 
Corns, “Milton’s English,” in Companion to Milton, ed. Thomas Corns, Oxford: 
2001, p. 103. Corns goes as far as to suggest that “‘Demagogue’ proved a useful 
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it was already in use 20 years earlier by Hobbes, as mentioned in the 
introduction.151 This fact was not lost on an early critical interpreter 
of the passage in 1651, who wanted to ridicule Milton for his “learned 
observation” that “deserves the Laurell. Why is demagogue a more 
hobgoblin word, then Pedagogue?” The author of the Eikon Aklastos 
pointed out that the word could have been transcribed “out of many 
English Authors without offending against orthography.”152 
On the question of neologism, we are thus left with two choices: a) 
Milton was not familiar with earlier uses of the word, such as in Hob-
bes’ Thucydides translation, b) Milton did know the word, but none-
theless did not like it. The first choice would require such neglect of 
contemporary feats of learning that it would be an extremely unlikely 
possibility. The second option is supported by Milton’s restraint in us-
ing the word in his other texts, but the evidence of absence indicates 
only the absence of evidence. The argument of neologism ultimately 
leaves only conjecture, supported by ambiguity.
Another possibility is that Milton was attacking the lack of classi-
cal learning in the Eikon Basilike. The orthography could be an attack 
on the proper usage of the word in Greek – in the continuation of the 
sentence in the passage in question, Milton makes a reference to the 
author’s use of the word demagogues, “saving his Greek.” This could 
mean three things: first, the word itself was wrongly chosen – for exam-
ple, in Plato’s Gorgias (482c) demegoros is a word used for a crowd pleaser, 
rather than the ‘leader’, demagogos. Second, the declension of the word 
could be faulty: if the proper plural were to be used, the correct from 
should be demagogoi – or demagogi, as in the early modern Latin transla-
tions from Greek. Thirdly, the word is not used in the right context. 
The first two are again possible but conjectural, whereas the third can 
addition to the word stock, achieving rapid currency, and was picked up and 
adopted by Hobbes.”
151 See also earlier in Certain Considerations, p. 11.
152 [ Joseph Jane], The image vnbroaken: a perspective of the impudence, falshood, vanitie, 
and prophannes, published in a libell entitled Eikonoklastes against Eikon basilike, or, The 
pourtraicture of His Sacred Majestie in his solitudes and sufferings, Leyden?: 1651, pp. 115-
16. 
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be more fully assessed.
To assess the right context, we must ascertain the content of the 
concept rather than the word alone. Rather than arguing against ne-
ologism, Milton is said to accuse, by the “affrightment of this Goblin 
word,” the association of demagogues with scaremongering.153 One 
option is to assume from this that Milton thought demagogues were 
worth standing up for, “good Patriots,” and was diametrically opposed 
to their denigration. Such a claim is not quite plausible logically, as it 
would be a non sequitur to conclude from his mockery of the word in 
use alone, that his views on demagogy were opposite to those of the 
author of Eikon Basilike. Furthermore, it would also require us to assume 
that Milton suddenly changed his mind completely about the dangers 
of demagogy, in addition to assuming that none of his readers would 
have been familiar with the pejorative uses and contexts of the term 
that can be found from the classical works, especially in Aristoteles’ 
Politics. 
This is what Milton argued about “good Patriots” in context: [italics 
indicate phrases taken from Eikon Basilike] 
if the people were sent for, embolden’d and directed by those Demagogues, who, 
saving his Greek, were good Patriots, and by his own confession Men of 
some repute for parts and pietie, it helps well to assure us there was both urgent 
cause, and the less danger of thir coming” (CPW 3:393).
It is more plausible to assume that Milton is pointing out that the 
word demagogue, in its usual, pejorative sense does not apply to the 
“good Patriots,” “men of repute” and “piety” acting upon good and 
true cause: thus, “saving his Greek.” This is one of the most recur-
ring themes in Milton’s works: arguing against words stolen out of their 
original contexts and used to false ends. Furthermore, the formulation 
of “less danger of thir coming” could also mean that even in such a 
context, popular movements are not completely risk-free. And finally, 
this passage is yet another presentation of the view that virtuous men 
cannot possibly be demagogues.
Obviously, demagogues are only as dangerous as their audience, 
153 Annabel Patterson, Milton’s Words, Oxford: 2009, p. 103.
73RETURN OF MILTON
of which Milton had few good things to say. Indeed, the popularity 
of Eikon Basilike certainly did nothing to alleviate Milton’s antipathy 
towards the masses. At the end of Eikonoklastes, Milton showed little 
lenience to “the worthles approbation of an inconstant, irrational, and 
Image-doting rabble,” that “credulous and hapless herd, begott’n to 
servility” (CPW 3:601). Such an audience was a fertile breeding ground 
for trouble-makers, who could rely on “the envy and almost infinite 
prejudice likely to be stirr’d up among the Common sort” (CPW 3:339). 
It was the “low dejection and debasement of mind in the people” that 
was both cause and result of the success of religious firebrands: “the 
Pulpit stuff” of the “Prelats and thir fellow-teachers, though of another 
Name and Sect,” whose purpose “hath bin the Doctrin and perpetual 
infusion of servility and wretchedness to all thir hearers” (CPW 3:344). 
Thus “by so strange a method amongst the mad multitude is a sudden 
reputation won, of wisdom by wilfulness and suttle shifts” (CPW 3:345). 
Besides the religious demagogues, the troubles of England could be 
traced to the court fawners and flatterers, as “those neerest to this King 
and most his Favorites, were Courtiers and Prelates; men whose chief 
study was to finde out which way the King inclin’d, and to imitate him 
exactly” (CPW 3:350). This was repeated more strenously as “None 
were his [Kings] friends but Courtiers, and Clergimen, the worst at 
that time, and most corrupted sort of men,” who were “his Apes” (CPW 
3:370). In the “language of a Courtier” words such as “honour and 
civilitie” mean mainly “complement, Ceremony, Court fauning and 
dissembling” rather than “as they did of old, discretion, honesty, pru-
dence, and plaine truth” (CPW 3:539). Milton set his republican virtues 
against the worst of civil conversation.
The same lack of virtues was the lot of the popular demagogues, 
who could have not been farther from the civic ideals, as they also were 
“without the least true pattern of vertue, righteousness, or self-denial in 
thir whole practice” (CPW 3:344). Accordingly, it was again up to the 
virtuous few “to resist and make head against the rage and torrent of 
that boistrous folly and superstition that possesses and hurries on the 
vulgar sort” (CPW 3:348). The abuses of rhetoric could happen in a 
monarchical as well as in a popular government setting, whereas the 
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solution was always the same: the virtuous few.
The concluding question to the discussion on Eikonoklastes can be 
whether the virtuous few can be the elected few. Milton did refer in Ei-
konoklastes to frequent elections as an ancient liberty, removing of which 
amounted to tyranny on the king’s behalf (CPW 3:408). Milton also 
defended popular action on behalf of law and authority, and the role of 
popular representatives, as “they undoubtedly having most authority to 
judge of the public good, who for that purpose are chosen out and sent 
by the people.” Nevertheless, Milton omits any arguments as to why 
frequent elections, or acknowledging popular opinion would be a good 
things per se, and whether representatives have any other accountabil-
ity to their electors than what they themselves deem fit when creating 
the law of the land. There is little evidence to support popular action 
for any other reason than when it incidentally brings good results. For 
Milton, authority and power can be just or unjust, good or bad depend-
ing on their connection with the voice of reason.
Milton’s next task involved defending the commonwealth abroad 
as well as at home. In November 1649 – a month after Eikonoklastes 
was published – Salmasius’s (Claude Saumaise) defense of the reign of 
Charles I, Defensio Regia pro Carolo I, came out. In January 1650 Milton 
was commissioned to write in Latin for the international audience a 
riposte, which was published in 1651.154 The result, Pro Populo Anglicano 
Defensio, (hereinafter Defence of the People of England ) continues in the line 
of Eikonoklastes in being – among other things – a very personal attack 
and shows Milton’s rhetorical skills in the service of the republic at their 
best. What that meant in practice, is worth examining in more detail.
Unlike in Eikonoklastes, Milton gives no acknowledgement to the rhe-
torical skills of Salmasius: the “unjust slanders” are made by a “vain 
sophist” (CPW 4:303), a “barbarous rhetorician,” mere “grammarian” 
with a “great passion for calumny.” As a classicist, his writing is in “a 
kind of Latin,” (CPW 4:306) and his “foolish professorial talk” make 
for a “tiresome pedant” (CPW 4:307). Similarly, his other opponents 
are “bungling and immoderate panegyrists” (CPW 4:550), the writer 
154 Worden, Literature and politics, p. 230.
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of Clamor picked out as “a wandering beggar performing for a crowd” 
imitating “the sounds of only the basest animals.” There is “no use for 
a petty rhetorician so rank and fetid” (CPW 4:648). 
Salmasius had attempted to be more persuasive by claiming not to 
use rhetoric, but Milton, who saw no problems in a bona fide oratorical 
approach, turned the argument around: there was “no need for what 
you cannot accomplish.” From such “dull, stupid, ranting, wrangling 
advocate” there was to be nothing “requiring toil, clarity or taste,” and 
best he could manage would be “flowery rhetoric” (CPW 4:324). The 
“empty windbag” cannot “avoid the use of such rhetorical coloring as 
[he] can manage,” being closer to “some brazen hawker at a country 
fair,” and should therefore abstain from any claim to “ability at rhe-
torical narration” in the sense of a true “orator, historian, or even the 
meanest advocate” (CPW 4:325-6). The faults of Salmasius were not 
limited to bad rhetoric, bad Latin or bad cause, but also bad ethos, 
as he had a “churlish and unmannerly spirit and nasty habits” (CPW 
4:457). 
If Milton had low tolerance for bad rhetors, he did not have a high 
opinion of the audience of popular rhetoric either. On the masses Mil-
ton retained his negative views on the “raging mob of London hirelings 
and hucksters,” like “the vermin who followed Clodius.”155 On this top-
ic, Salmasius had held similarly negative views, and Milton admitted 
as much in saying how it “may be true of the dregs of the populace.” 
However, Salmasius had failed to make the distinction between the 
audiences of populist demagogy and republican oratory, of Clodius and 
Cicero. The arguments against the mad multitude did not apply to the 
nature of the “middle class, which produces the greatest number of 
men of good sense and knowledge of affairs” (CPW 4:457-8).
Milton took Salmasius to task for failing to understand this crucial 
difference at all levels. On the grounds of biblical authority, Milton 
asserted how the church-fathers indeed declaim against “plots rashly 
undertaken through the madness of a mob,” but they speak “not of 
the summons of magistrates, Senate of Parliament to a people.” Com-
155 Publius Clodius Pulcher, Roman populist politician, contemporary and opponent 
of Cicero.
76 COMMONWEALTH 1649-1653
ing from the proper authorities, there was nothing wrong in oratory 
towards the people. Especially were the contents of the oratory to rep-
resent a just and good message, such as the promotion of taking “arms 
against a tyrant” (CPW 4:413). Nonetheless, the contents of the oratory 
were of lesser importance than the source – agreeing with demagogues 
against tyrants would mean justifying means by the ends. As for the 
defense of monarchical authority, Milton returned to the fray with new 
tricks. Adding to his arguments on how the royal authority degener-
ates into tyranny, Milton came up with novel arguments on how royal 
authority is against God’s will, as the rabbins affirm.156 
Despite the presence of the arguments against monarchical author-
ity, the Defense has nevertheless been seen as a text accepting it.157 This 
theory relies much on the weight Milton put on the rule of law. As 
we have seen above, Milton’s arguments against flattery and tyrants, 
demagogy and democracies rely on the lack of reasoned and non-ar-
bitrary decision-making in such regimes. As things stand, Milton did 
assert how in all “civilized lands,” the unchanging principle of govern-
ment required the acknowledgment of the superiority of “the authority 
of the laws and the Senate,” whether by emperors, magistrates or the 
people (CPW 4:382). Milton thus continued to omit giving credence to 
consensual or majority rule, and concentrated on the rule of law. This 
omission has been seen as an implicit acceptance of the possibility that 
a well-intentioned monarch might wield legitimate authority. 
What is missing from this argument are the qualifications. Milton 
did indeed argue for submission to lawful powers and persons in au-
thority, but hedged so, that if “whatever power or magistrate acts in the 
contrary manner” to their duties, the people are not “debarred from 
wise opposition,” since the resistance is not to a “power or magistrate 
here favourably depicted,” but to “a tyrant, and a foe” (CPW 4:385-6). 
In addition, Milton appealed to historical records to show that “There 
is no royal prerogative which places any restriction on justice or eq-
156 More on this topic, Eric Nelson, “‘Talmudical Commonwealthsmen’ and the Rise 
of Republican Exclusivism,” Historical Journal, (50), 2007, pp. 809-835.
157 William Walker, “Paradise Lost and the forms of government,” History of Political 
Thought, 22 (2), 2001, pp. 270-299; Paul A. Rahe, Against Throne and Altar: Machiavelli 
and political theory under the English Republic, Cambridge: 2008, p. 115. 
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uity,” and that living under kings that were “subject to a Sanhedrin or 
a Senate or council” was living in a state of liberty (CPW 4:496-7). In 
the case of his own ‘senate’, Milton conflated both power and author-
ity in the parliament – “the power of Parliament, which is actually and 
truly the supreme power of the people joined together in that council” 
(CPW 4:488)158 – without considering electoral procedures any further 
than necessary: “the Parliament is the supreme council of the nation, 
established and endowed with full powers by an absolutely free people” 
(CPW 4:497). 
To conclude, before proceeding to infer Milton’s acceptance of mon-
archy from these statements, it should be borne in mind that at stake in 
the debate is not formal anti-monarchism, as pertains to purely theoret-
ical issues, but of actual, practical politics. It is doubtful that Milton was 
unaware of the difference between form and content, between names 
and real powers. By bringing in politics to the study of political thought, 
we can easily appreciate how it is possible to accept something with 
qualifications that effectively render the thing in question something 
else. In Milton’s case, we can see what all of his qualifications add up 
to: a ruler accountable to the supreme power of parliaments, without a 
right to use his powers as he pleases, without arbitrary prerogative. A 
few years earlier in the Answer to Nineteen Propositions, its writer, realising 
how qualifications to royal powers would actually take them away, had 
asserted how the mere taking away of the royal prerogative would make 
“the Kingdome a Republique.”159 It seems that Milton was similarly 
ready to accept the legitimacy of monarchies – as long as they were 
republics. 
158 The original Latin is more explicit: “Parlamenti autem authoritas quae re & 
veritate, summa populi potestas in illum senatum collata est.” John Milton, Ioannis 
Miltoni[i] Angli Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio: Contra Claudii Anonymi, aliàs Salmasii, 
Defensionem Regiam, Londini: 1651, p. 151. Possibly the translator considered that 
due to Milton’s conflation, the translation of his text could similarly render both 
authoritas and potestas as simply ‘power.’
159 Quentin Skinner, “The Monarchical Republic Enthroned,” in The monarchical re-
public of early modern England: essays in response to Patrick Collinson, ed. John F. McDi-
armid, Ashgate: 2007, pp. 239-40.
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4. John Hall of Durham160
John Hall was originally from Durham but like Milton went to Cam-
bridge to gain an education. There was much they shared in their poli-
tics during the 1650s, but even in Hall’s earlier writings we can find 
similarities, such as the commonplace humanist critique of superficial 
learning and deplorable interest in unsavoury matters. In the first poem 
of his collection titled Poems (1646), “A Satyre,” Hall describes 
Poore leaden creatures yet shap’d out to rule,…
onely fed 
With scraps of Tully.161 
Such a student, 
… rather then he’l construe Greek he’l chose 
To english Ovids Arte into prose,
in order to try to impress his superiors.162 Unsurprisingly, Hall’s own 
talent for classical learning was considered quite prodigal by his con-
temporaries.163
Admittedly, “A Satyre” does not give its readers unambiguous or 
easy interpretations, as even the title would suggest. Nevertheless, 
whatever Hall’s real intentions were – assuming that he had any apart 
from the jocular – the very first lines of the poem do give some inkling 
of the new ‘public sphere’ of the Civil War pamphleteering:
160 Henceforth simply John Hall: ‘of Durham’ is simply to acknowledge the existence 
of another contemporary author, John Hall of Richmond.
161 Hall, Poems, London: 1647, lines 147, 149-50, p. 8 (sig. B4v).
162 Hall, Poems, lines 171-2, p.9 (sig. B5r).
163 Biographical information from J. Davies, “An Account of the Author,” in J. Hall, 
Hierocles Upon the Golden Verses of Pythagoras, London: 1657; and Jason Peacey, 
“Nibbling at ‘Leviathan’: politics and theory in 1650s England,” Huntington Library 
Quarterly, 61 (2), 1998, pp. 241-257. 
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Pray let m’ alone, what do you think can I
Be still, while Pamphlets thus like hailstons fly
About mine eares? when every other day
Such huge Gigantick volumes doth display,...
To see such Paper-tyrants reign, who presse
Whole harmlesse reams to death...164
This study will show that this animus, whether truly intended or not 
during the time of its writing, repeats itself in Hall’s later political 
works. The pamphlets are railed against, yet Hall eagerly engages him-
self to write them nevertheless.
Another work that Hall published in 1646 was Horae Vacivae, a col-
lection of essays. In this work we may find more elaborated reasons as 
to why pamphleteering was objectionable. In this context it should be 
stressed that when any notion of public sphere is promoted, the un-
derlying premise is an assumption of informed choice. As such, this 
approach of advancing from opinions to knowledge was familiar to 
almost anyone trained in the ars humanitatis. Or as Hall put it: “Hee 
takes the best course to keepe his judgement from biasing, that narrowly 
heeds upon what principles both parties build, whether both stand fast 
to their owne grounds (as some in Philosophy utraque pars est vera) and 
whether ground is surer to build upon.”165
 However, the notion that if two differing viewpoints make for better 
knowledge, then more is even better, was not something that Hall (and 
many others) would have agreed with. Such an idealisation of a public 
sphere would be essentially epiphenomenal, devoid of any considera-
tion on who speaks what to whom – the rhetorical dimension. This di-
mension of public speech was not neglected by Hall. In “Of Opinions,” 
Hall gave the lie to hopes of a calmly conducted public debate: “The 
multitude is susceptible of any opinions, being ever unconstant, suspi-
tious, credulous, violently hurried away with them for the time, which 
is never long.”166 
164 Hall, Poems, lines 1-4, 7-8, p.1 (sig. B1r).
165 Hall, “Of Opinions,” Horae Vacivae, p. 7.
166 Hall, “Of Opinions,” Horae Vacivae, pp. 10-11.
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Nevertheless, Hall’s point was not to argue for irrationality, or dif-
ferent rationality. When Hall explicated the popular leaders’ aim to 
glory, he noted that the people “are most soone wonne, and most hardly 
held.” This was because “they rather desire to make men great, then they 
can endure them when they are great.”167 The multitude might be foolish, 
but not unpredictable in their actions. This lead to an ambiguous situ-
ation for any prospective demagogue, as their rise to power might be as 
easy as their fall from it. In his later works Hall would present his solu-
tions as to how public speech should be managed on an institutional 
level, but as can be seen, the basic ingredients were already present in 
the Horae Vacivae. 
Like Milton had done two years earlier in Areopagitica, in “Of 
Preaching” Hall also used the dichotomy between law and persuasion: 
“The Law speakes wounds, the Gospell oyle.” It was the “vehemency of the 
one, and the delicacy of the other” that were “the best rhetorike to win a 
Soul; the one inforces Arguments, the other confirmes them.”168 The prob-
lems were not due to rhetoric but its users. Hall’s antagonism towards 
one type of abuser, the firebrand priest, is evident in A true account and 
character of the times, historically and politically drawn by a gentleman to give 
satisfaction to his friend in the countrey.169 In this short pamphlet170 Hall pre-
sents as a “generall maxim” of policy, that “Clergy-men.. are a race of 
people, who though they least ought, have ever the basest ends of their 
owne.”171 This characterisation of a priest as a demagogue – someone 
presenting his case as a common, or higher good, while actually pursu-
ing their own hidden agenda – is not unsimilar to Milton and Marcha-
mont Nedham.
Since the departure of Nedham from editing the Mercurius Britani-
167 Hall, “Of Fame,” Horae Vacivae, p. 55.
168 Hall, “Of Preaching,” Horae Vacivae, pp. 37-38.
169 It was published in 1647, after Hall had moved from Cambridge to London – 
ostensibly to undertake legal training, but other things evidently came his way.
170 The nature of the tract, and keeping in mind Hall’s antipathy towards popular 
pamphleteering, make it plausible to suggest that the tract was aimed mainly at a 
selective audience – namely, his considered peers. 
171 [Hall], A true account, p. 6.
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cus, in 1648, there was a market opening for relaunching the title, as 
Mercurius Brittanicus (sic). Hall has been attributed as the editor of this 
newsbook, as well as of Mercurius Censorius. For the purposes of this 
study, these newsbooks yield little of value, other than as possible signs 
of Hall’s increasing engagement in public affairs. At some point in 1648 
John Hall found the occasion to write a tract concisely titled Paradoxes. 
Parts of the tract, four paradoxes, were published in 1650, and two 
more were added to an edition published in 1653. The reason for this 
seems to be that Hall had given the work to a friend of his, John Davies, 
who departed for France after the regicide and had left the publisher 
with only part of the whole work. After his return Davies managed 
to get the rest published.172 Davies’ claim on dating the writing of the 
work to early 1649 (if not earlier) seems plausible, considering how the 
Paradoxes fits into the general line of Hall’s early works such as Horae 
Vacivae – works showing off his mastery of different styles and genres of 
writing, whereas his later commissioned works are for obvious reasons 
more topical. 
As the title of Paradoxes suggests, the interpretation of the work 
should not be based on face values. Bearing in mind the difficulties 
inherent in interpreting explicitly ironical works of this genre, there are 
a few plausible claims to be ventured of the work, which would corre-
spond with the general argumentation of Hall’s other works of the era. 
The first paradox is “That an absolute Tyranny is the best Government.” 
This conclusion is reached through various examples of faulty logic, 
equivocation, etc. For example, through referring the Polybian cycle 
of revolution of government, and then inferring how “all other Gov-
ernments are imperfect species till they be consummated and made 
Tyrannical.”173 Hall continues in this fashion of specious arguments to 
defend courtiers, patriarchy, and all the other things he had been at-
tacking earlier as vices of monarchies. Most of the arguments promoted 
are in essence distortions, or reductions to absurdity of the pro-monar-
chical arguments made in the era. 
172 Bibliographical information from John Davies, “To the Reader” in Hall, Paradoxes. 
173 Hall, Paradoxes, pp. 3, 7.
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In turn, the fifth paradox, is a similar assault on the more popularly 
minded political arguments. Hall pursues this paradox by presenting 
in a new light the commonplace problem of republican citizenship, 
whether republics depend in the last resort on virtuous men, or on strict 
legislation governing them: “unless men were good Angels they could not 
live in [commonwealths], or if they were Divels might possibly be forced 
unto peace, there is not one of them but hath forgot to set down this 
most excellent and considerable peice (sic) of reformation.” The solution 
to republican citizenship would be simply “That Women ought to govern 
States rather than Men.”174
One of the reasons Hall gives to the preference of female gover-
nors is that they “are talkative.” This is “much the better for the people,” 
considering that one of the main complaints about autocratic govern-
ments had traditionally been the existence of “arcana imperii,” the lack 
of transparency: “dark and obscure Princes, that either mean nothing 
or ambiguously leave the people in suspence, and make liberty either 
dangerous, or flattery miscontrue it.”175 For Hall, it was as ridiculous 
to assert the need for transparency and civic participation, as it was to 
promote tyranny as a form of government.176
After the Paradoxes, Hall wrote a tract on the very topical issue of 
educational reform, An Humble Motion to the Parliament of England, Con-
cerning the Advancement of Learning.177 Hall painted an unflattering image 
of the current state of education, which obviously does not necessarily 
tell us much about the actual conditions. As mentioned earlier, com-
plaints about educational institutions were a humanist commonplace of 
the time (and arguably remain so). Nevertheless, what Hall presents as 
the reasons for and expected gains due to the advancement of learning 
can shed further light into his political thought.
174 Hall, Paradoxes, pp. 104, 107.
175 Hall, Paradoxes, pp. 131-2.
176 It is possible that this paradox was written and added to the 1653 edition, but there 
is no evidence of them being deliberately omitted from the 1650 edition. And as 
will become apparent, ridicule of the republican excesses was topical in 1650 as 
well. 
177 Cf. Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, pp. 212-15; McDowell, Poetry and 
Allegiance, pp. 203-5.
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For Hall, the present state of education is failing in its duties. The 
ways in which otherwise salutary subject of Latin, Greek, philosophy 
and ethics are taught, have proved to be deplorable “in filling the 
world with detestable quacking Empericks, lewd, and contentious, 
Gown-men, or ignorant mercenary Divines.”178 Rather than guiding 
the students towards the use of right reason and rhetoric, the system 
has become corrupt in encouraging sophistry and empty debating. Few 
men are left at the universities to engage students “in sober and ra-
tionall disputes, in which being restrained from sophistry, they may 
chase and polish their endowments, and whet one the other by praise 
or emulation.”179 The “Colledges” have become “of little or no other 
use then to nourish the supine idlenesse of a few Lurdans [dullards], and 
foment their illiterate debates,” who “love bawling and canvasing such 
unlearned opinions which runne in this circle without end, and con-
tribute not the least to the promotion or discovery of Truth.”180
Seen alone, Hall’s goal of truth-seeking seems a reasonable demand 
from an educational system. Nonetheless, there is a political dimension 
to the advancement of education: it equals the advancement of liberty. 
For Hall, “the interest and prosperity, the decay and ruin of such lit-
terary Republicks principally depends” on the “reformation of those 
fundamental constitutions” of education.181 The political goal – the 
benefit of the state – does not have as its sole requirement well educated 
truth-seekers. 
What does Hall refer to with the notion of “litterary Republicks”? It 
seems that Hall intentionally uses a double meaning, on the one hand 
to designate a republic of letters (an early version of respublica literaria), 
and on the other, a political conception of a republic led by men of 
learning. The first meaning is evident in a letter Hall wrote to Samuel 
Hartlib in April 1649, where Hall puts forward a proposal for an ‘Acad-
emy of Ingenuitys’, whose members would be chosen on the basis of 
178 John Hall, An Humble Motion to the Parliament of England, Concerning the Advancement of 
Learning, London: 1649, pp. 25-27.
179 Hall, An Humble Motion, p. 28.
180 Hall, An Humble Motion, p. 30.
181 Hall, An Humble Motion, pp. 5, 15.
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performances ‘memorable or Serviceable to the Politique or Litterary 
Republickes’ (italics mine).182 The second meaning is explicated in An 
Humble Notion, which will be explored more fully. 
One simple explanation of Hall’s promotion of ‘literary republics’ is 
that it gave the new commonwealth a reason for existence other than 
mere expediency.183 However, this undoubtedly plausible explanation 
yields only the marketing tool of Hall’s theory, but not the reasons to 
its nature. The role of Hartlib is important, in order to shed light on 
the literary republic. Hall and Hartlib corresponded extensively, and 
among other things, Hartlib requested from him a translation of a 
Christianapolis by Johann Christian Andreae, which Hall published un-
der the name of A Modell of a Christian Society in 1647. Andreae’s utopian 
fiction was notable for its trust in the power of education to create a 
society with much lessened need for legislation, e.g. in Hall’s translation 
“There shall not need many laws and injunctions.”184
The downplaying of the capabilities of legislation in favour of the 
possibilities of human reason is present in Hall’s defense of the over-
turning of old laws: “For so long as humane reason is weake and imper-
fect, it can never provide any Lawes against all circumstances of chanc, 
length of time, fraud and weaknesse of mankinde, but it will bring forth 
a necessity to repeale them, equall, if not superiour to that which first en-
acted them.”185 Again, a justification of the revolution cannot be taken 
out of the equation for this claim, but the argument does cohere with 
Hall’s notion of the ends of education.
Hall gives a picture of the development of human reason through 
education, as one of realisation that mere superficial learning would 
182 Quoted in McDowell, Poetry, pp. 61, 62n. 
183 Norbrook, Writing, p. 216.
184 Johann Valentin Andreae, Christianopolis [1619]: compare Hall’s translation, A 
Modell of a Christian Society, London: 1647, p. 51, and translation by Edward H. 
Thompson in Archives internationales d’histoire des idées 162, Dordrecht: 1999, p. 255: 
“There is no need of a code of laws.” It should be noted that Hall’s translation is 
very concise, so possibly his choices were intended to give the gist, rather than 
literal translation of Andreae’s work.
185 Hall, An Humble Motion, pp. 19-20.
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not be of “use among mankinde.” Hall’s aim was to create citizens who 
would be “masters of the true use of reason.” As an educational pro-
gramme, Hall did not present very radical notions: the true use of rea-
son meant “that it was better to grave things in the mindes of children, 
then words.” Again, the argument is not against classical rhetoric, but 
rather a ‘return to origins’ in the sense that Hall’s argument in not very 
far from Cicero’s or Quintilian’s ideas of the need to grasp the world of 
res in order to give verba more impact. Or in Hall’s words: “Language 
must of necessity adde beauty and perfection, and acquaint [speakers] 
with a much of knowledge.”186
Nevertheless, Hall professes great faith in the capabilities of citizens 
raised through such educational programs. They would create almost 
utopian possibilities of societal arrangements, or “Scheams of Com-
monwealths.” In such a learned environment the leaders “shall then see 
Policy reconciled to Divinity, Morality, and it self, and yet better able 
to lay designes and prevent dangers.” Eventually, it will result in the 
“ judgement of confusion, which hath so long and so heavily laine upon 
mankinde, [to be ] by degrees removed.”187 
However, despite these utopian strains, what An Humble Notion ul-
timately presents is a compromise between Hartlib and Milton. The 
utopian, pansophistic role of education was something Hall clearly was 
much more at ease with than Milton, but at the same time his prag-
matism in his policy proposals steers closer to Milton’s writings. Most 
evidently this middling position is present in Hall’s acknowledgment of 
how “an endeavour to bring all persons under the sway of knowledge, 
could not but approach very neare a Platonicke Commonwealth, and 
must in the triall enervate the people.”188 
And it is from Milton that Hall took the words to plead the par-
liament to “take off that hatefull gagg of licencing.” A plea that was 
186 Hall, An Humble Motion, p. 34.
187 Hall, An Humble Motion, p. 44.
188 Hall, An Humble Motion, p. 32; compare to Milton in Areopagitica (CPW 2:256): “To 
sequester out of the world into Atlantic and Eutopian polities, which never can be 
drawn into use, will not mend our condition;.. but those unwritten, or at least un-
constraining laws of virtuous education, religious and civil nurture, which Plato 
there mentions.”
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likewise qualified “with all due provision for the civill peace.” Like Mil-
ton, Hall is more worried about the effects of licensing upon learning: 
it “silences so many Truths, and frights so many ingenuities, and makes 
them abhorre the publick.”189 In Hall’s literary republic, participation 
in public affairs was a good state of affairs – as long as it was done by 
those qualified through their learning. For them licensing was a hin-
drance, whereas unhindered free speech would have been neither nec-
essary nor beneficial for the republic as a whole. 
Just like for Milton, Hall’s engagement with the commonwealth lit-
erally paid off: in May 1649, Hall was enlisted by the government as 
a tract writer against the republic’s critics, with a salary of £100 per 
annum. His first commission was to write a reply to the presbyterian 
William Prynne, whose A legall vindication of the liberties of England against 
illegall taxes came out in July. In the following October Hall’s A Serious 
Epistle to Mr William Prynne was published, but since by September Hall 
had already departed for Scotland, it can be assumed that A Serious 
Epistle was written around August.190
In the Epistle Hall continued the defense of the overthrow of old laws 
from An Humble Notion, albeit with more elaboration. He argued that 
mere appeal to common law and traditions would not suffice: “he that 
would exactly examine the justness of al changes of States and Com-
monwealths, Must have another Touch-stone then the bare Municipall 
Laws of a Country.” The role of reason is paramount, as it is “those 
Generall and Royall Laws of Reason [of ] Nature, Nations and Neces-
sity that must be appealed to.” Hall presents these attributes “as be-
ing fixt veritable and universall, whereas particular Ordinances of any 
place are not so,” which results in their being the measure of legitimate 
authority. Earlier claims to such authority were merely “either Impos’d 
by a power or become valid by contract,” and accordingly, were “no 
longer to be obey’d, when that power is broken or contract dissolv’d.”191 
189 Hall, An Humble Motion, p. 30.
190 Bibliographic record from Jason Peacey, Politicians and Pamphleteers: Propaganda 
during the English Civil Wars and Interregnum, Aldershot: 2004, p. 199.
191 Hall, A Serious Epistle, p. 10. A Stoic connection in Hall’s thinking here is plausible, 
but not necessarily necessary.
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Hall’s use of the language of natural law creates a need to step back 
from some of our own contemporary usages of natural law theories. 
Currently, and due to long-term historical developments, natural laws 
are often conflated with natural rights. However, for someone like Hall, 
right and duties were of secondary importance – if at all – as the far 
more important issue was the right course of action from those admin-
istering the republic. His ‘Stoic sages’ needed working peace, and the 
individual needs and wants of “such and such a skittish person” were 
unimportant considerations “upon cases of necessitie” for the State. 
The best sorts of commonwealths “in whom the chiefe care and trust of 
preservation is reposed,” were those with power to enforce such needs 
as “necessity and reason of State” required.192 From such arguments on 
behalf of subordination to the public weal, it was easy to make the case 
against free speech.
As mentioned earlier, in September 1650 Hall traveled to Scotland 
in Oliver Cromwell’s entourage, as a war correspondent for Mercurius 
Politicus. In Scotland he also continued his functions as an official tract 
writer, and his next work, The Grounds and Reasons of Monarchy, was first 
printed at Edinburgh.193 As the title states, the tract focuses explicitly 
on the invalidity of monarchy as a form of government. Hall argued 
that demonstrating the errors of monarchy is better proof than defen-
sive arguments about other possible forms: “I had rather tell a man 
he was out of the way, than in endeavouring to lead him to the end of 
his journey, lead him further about.”194 This approach conveniently al-
lowed Hall to avoid making open commitments as to the best political 
arrangements for the new republic.
A few more reasons can be mentioned as to the demonstrative na-
ture of Hall’s tract. One is in Hall’s immediate continuation to the 
192 Hall, A Serious Epistle, pp. 25-6.
193 Edition used: J[ohn] H[all], The grounds and reasons of monarchy considered: in a review 
of the Scotch story, gathered out of their best authours and records, Corrected and reprinted 
according to the Edinburgh copy: 1651. Bibliographical information from Peacey, 
“Nibbling at Leviathan,” p. 243. The initials J.H. in this work have caused some 
confusion over the years: it has been assigned to e.g. John Hunton.
194 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, sigs. A3v-A4r. 
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analogy on telling rather than leading, which he puts in more philo-
sophical terms: “Scepticisme is not onely uselesse, but dangerous; if 
in setting our thoughts in a posture of defence, it makes us absolutely 
wavering and incredulous; so had I rather be Scepticall in my opin-
ion, then maintain it upon Grounds taken up, and not demonstrated.” 
Much ink has been spilled on the importance of skepticism in early 
modern political thought, but Hall’s argument goes to show that the 
while the problems of skepticism were indeed present in contemporary 
writings, they were hardly insurmountable.195
It is clear that Thomas Hobbes’s works had created a challenge to 
the way of writing political texts, but this seems to have much less to do 
with fundamental questions of epistemology, than with stylistic choices. 
This can be seen in Hall’s acceptance of the formal validity of Hobbes’ 
‘demonstration’ of monarchy, but which he failed to assert: “Mr. Hobs 
in his de Cive, though he assured himself that the rest of his Book (which 
is principally erected to the assertion of Monarchy) is demonstrated, yet 
he douts whether the Arguments which he brings to this businesse be so 
firm or no.”196 This allowed Hall to appropriate the form of Hobbesian 
argument, and use Hobbes’ lack of proof on behalf of monarchy to his 
own advantage.
Nevertheless, the Hobbesian style was only adopted pro forma. Hall 
pays tribute to the mode of argument familiar from Hobbes when argu-
ing against “Phylologicall and Rhetoricall Arguments,” which “have 
not a little hindered the severer disquisition of reason, and proposessed 
the more easy mindes with notions so much harder to be layd aside, as 
they are more erronious and pleasing.”197 In practice, as will be shown, 
Hall uses extensively similar philological and rhetorical arguments: for 
example, by making an argument about the uselessness of argument by 
analogy, and then supporting it with a much better analogy fitted to his 
own purposes.
In Grounds and Reasons Hall rehearses the commonplace arguments 
195 Leading text: Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651, Cambridge: 
1993.
196 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, pp. 49-50.
197 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, p. 21.
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on the corrupt, supercilious royal courts, where those “prepossessed 
with the affection of a Prince, or bewitched with some subdolous fa-
vour,” would care little for truth, reason or common good. The reasons 
given follow the traditional arguments of ‘supply and demand.’ Those 
“dazled with the splendor of a Court” do so due their lack of proper 
education: “it is no marvell if we see many Gentlemen whose education 
enabled them onely to use their senses and first thoughts,” and it is not 
in the monarch’s interest to promote any such education, lest the “en-
chantement” should be broken. As for the “Princes themselves,” having 
been “trained up in these Arts, or receiving them in Tradition,” they 
have an undoubted advantage in manipulating the court.198
In addition, Hall argued that such rulers used their knowledge of 
“how to wind all their humours to their own advantage,” also for de-
ceiving the public at large, “now foisting the Divinity of their Titles into 
Pulpits, now amuzing the People with magnificencies and inter-ludes.” 
In this demagogic role, the ‘princes’ could resort to populism if it was 
to their own private gain, for example by “giving up the eminentest of 
their Ministers (which they part with as indifferently as their Robes) 
unto the rage and fury of the People.” Against the combined power of 
the status and rhetoric of such a ruler, his cronies would not have much 
of a chance, given that they were “commanded and condemned by the 
same mouth.”199
Thus far, Hall has presented the dangers of monarchy within the 
tradition of classical republican, Tacitean interpretation: princely rule 
corrupts its users as well as anyone under such a system. As can be ex-
pected, Hall proceeds to attack the prostrating language of evil coun-
cellors in familiar terms, as “the Attributes of Sacred Majesty, Grace, 
and Highnesse; or any other Terms that the servile flattery and witty 
Barbarity of Courtiers can give unto them.” However, Hall does not 
push this point to argue for the inherent impossibility of good govern-
ment under such a system, but instead argues that with some reasona-
ble self-reflection men could resist the superficial razzle-dazzle of kingly 
splendor: “if men would call their reasons into Counsel, they might 
198 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, pp. 4-5.
199 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, p. 6.
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find that these blazing Stars were opake Bodies, and shone onely by 
reflection.”200
The possibility of being or becoming non-corruptible leads Hall 
to argue in effect against the inherent corruptive nature of monarchi-
cal rule. There are “good Princes being swayed by the advice of men, 
good and wise, and the bad seduced by men of their own inclinations.” 
Princes get the advisors they want. However, Hall’s argument is not 
simply to be in favour of accepting monarchy, because in some cases 
it might work. What he suggests is a bit more subtle. Starting from the 
proposition that at the end of the day, the rule of a prince can be only 
as good or bad, as are his councellors, Hall continues to argue that a 
monarchy of good councellors should rather be called an optimacy: 
“what else are all Monarchies, but in reallity Optimaces for a few only 
essentially govern, under the name of one.”201
Left at that, Hall’s argument would merely have been a nicer rede-
scription of a pejorative term. Accordingly, Hall pursues adamantly 
his preference for ‘optimacy,’ appealing to the authority of Virgilio 
Malvezzi who “contrarily [to pro-monarchists] remonstrates (in his 
discourses upon Tacitus) that Optimacies are clearly better than Mon-
archies, as to all advantages.”202 There is a discrepancy between Hall’s 
earlier statement conflating monarchies and optimacies, to which two 
possible explanations present themselves. The first is pragmatism: it is 
plausible that the discrepancy is part of an intentional attempt not to 
argue against the possibility of a strong executive official, while still 
steering away from the strong monarchical claims – the loss of logical 
coherence being sometimes the price for politically astute statements. 
The second possibility is theoretical, concerning the institutional con-
tent of Hall’s optimacy: if monarchy is just a form of government among 
others, and in essence all forms of government (outside anarchy, which 
could be disqualified by definition as lack of government) are de facto 
optimacies, then a good monarchy is merely incidental whereas a good 
optimacy may be described and promoted. Which is exactly what Hall 
200 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, p. 11.
201 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, p. 15.
202 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, p. 50.
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did, notwithstanding his explicit claims to merely analyse the institu-
tion of monarchy. 
The significant distinction between negative monarchy and positive 
optimacy is the amount of people involved. The content of government, 
“Civill matters[,] consist in long debate, great consideration, patient 
expectation and wary foresight, which is better to be found in a number 
of choice experienced heads, then in one single one.”203 However, de-
spite the seemingly consensus-building nature of decision-making Hall 
paints with his imagery of “long debate, great consideration, patient 
expectation and wary foresight,” he did take into account the possibil-
ity of disagreement in a system without a dominant and dominating 
character. To Hall, such problems commonly attributed as faults in re-
publican systems are rather its strengths. In this view, “Factions” only 
“poyse and ballance one another, and many times like the discord of 
humors upon the naturall Body, produce reall good to the Politicks.” 
Hall did also accuse monarchies of being highly vulnerable to danger-
ous factions despite their proponents claims to the contrary, but in this 
case the discrepancy can be explained by Hall’s hedging of the effects 
of factions in republics, where they were not dangerous “unless they be 
Cruelly exorbitant.” It is plausible to assume that that would be the case 
in monarchies.204
Again, so far Hall is treading on a familiar republican territory: 
leaving a single person to rule risks domination, and tumults are not 
necessarily a bad thing. Nevertheless, there are important qualifica-
tions to these assertions. Concerning “Civill matters,” Hall deviates 
from the standard republican account, by omitting from his definitions 
any reference to the commonplace republican idea on how that which 
did concern all, ought to be consulted of by all. Merely by definition, 
“a number of choice experienced heads” cannot mean everyone, but 
furthermore, Hall makes no attempt to broaden the scope even to those 
concerned by the matters under discussion. In Hall’s optimacy, there is 
no inherent right to to be consulted or even to have a say.
203 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, p. 19.
204 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, p. 20.
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The same lack of rights applies to factionalism, which is a question 
of tolerance rather than of any right to dissent. When Hall attacks the 
royalist arguments promoting the ideal of unity and undivided sover-
eignty, he calls them to task for being “Flourishes, or meerly Concep-
tions, such are the reference and perfection of an Unity, which must 
needs work better and more naturally, as one simple cause.” This anal-
ogy is not only unconvincing in itself, in “that it stills and restrains 
all other claims,” but also since it mistakes the nature of “many co-
ordinate” claims, which can lead to beneficial ends: “though among 
many joynt Causes, there may be some jarring, yet like crosse wheels in 
an Engine, they tend to the regulation of the whole.”205 Complexity as 
such was not the problem: decentralised decision-making was workable 
when designed well, and factions were kept in limits.
Hall’s political arrangements were thus based not so much on no-
tions of rights as on limits. An important limit was in popular political 
arrangements. Hall held no positive notions about elections. To begin 
with, there was little to praise in the idea of being ruled by the will of 
the “weak and stupid multitude.” And although the reference was to a 
royal coronation, Hall’s dismissive remarks are indicative of his views 
on the authority gained through elections in general: Hall saw them as 
merely a popular method of keeping tyrants in power, part of the ma-
nipulative ‘dazzling’ by princes.
As for that formall election and stipulation, who sees not what a vain and 
ridiculous cheat it is, they coming with swords in their hands to demand 
the Scepter of a weak and stupid multitude that appears onely to gaze 
upon the Ceremonies, and whose refusal were ineffectual; but it is a gra-
cious piece of the Caball of Tyrannie to deceive the People with Shadows, 
Fantasmes, and names of Liberty.206
It was up to the chosen experienced heads in an optimacy to gain the 
true sense of liberty, which would not include such cheats as popular 
elections or universal free speech. 
After the demonstrations of Grounds and Reasons of Monarchy, Hall’s 
205 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, p. 50.
206 Hall, Grounds and Reasons, p. 35.
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skills were commissioned to more straightforward defending of the 
Parliament’s actions. Over the summer of 1651, the arrest, trial and 
subsequent execution of the Presbyterian preacher Christopher Love 
had created something of a media circus, to which Hall was ordered 
to reply.207 The chronology of events is telling of the rapid writing and 
publishing of political pamphlets at the time: Love was sentenced to 
death on July 5th and executed on August 25th. In between there were 
numerous publications asking for clemency, among them Love’s advocate 
in mid-August.208 Hall’s reply, A gagg to Love’s advocate: or, An assertion of 
the justice of the Parlament in the execution of Mr Love came out within two 
weeks.
The main thrust of A gagg was to argue that Love and his acolytes 
were part of a Presbyterian demagogic conspiracy. The tract to be 
countered, Love’s advocate, was an example of the abuse of rhetoric to 
such heinous ends. Straight from the start, where the author of the tract 
“hath don his part captandi benevolentiam,” it was “to no other purpose 
then slily to conveigh into the mindes of them that see not so clearly” 
the justness of Love’s execution.209 Hall proceeded to give his reasons 
as per that judgement, among which there was a long segment on the 
dangers of religious demagogy. For Hall, it had been a “sensible” deci-
sion by the Parliament to have “thrust all the black coats out of Com-
mission, and made them uncapable of civil offices.” Nevertheless, the 
dangers of demagogy were not that simple to keep in check: “they cast 
out one Divel; and seven wors are enter’d in.”
The description Hall gave is well representative of the generic image 
of the religious demagogue in the republican writings of the era: 
207 Peacey, Politicians and Pamphleteers, p. 263.
208 [Anon], Love’s advocate, or Certain arguments tendred to the serious consideration of all that 
truly fear God, either in Parliament or Army, concerning M. Christopher Love minister, now 
a condemned prisoner in the Tower, for the utter repealing, or at least the moderating that sad 
sentence under which he now lyeth. With clear satisfaction to all contrary scruples to unbyassed 
spirits./By a faithfull friend to the Parliament, one who never yet declined their cause to the right 
or left, but hath continued in their service from the beginning of their troubles to this very day, 
London: 1651.
209 J.H., A gagg to Love’s advocate: or, An assertion of the justice of the Parlament in the execution 
of Mr Love, London: August 1651, p. 7.
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a young man, who hath had only the slender breeding of the Universitie, 
and som short acquaintance with systems to pearch up into the pulpit, 
and hence give laws to the State, subdivide the populacy to factions and 
interests, crie or decrie as it come’s to their passion, profit, or Ignorance, 
which I profess I tremble at, and abuse that sacred and internall judg of 
man Conscience, leading it in the seducible, and screwing it, & transform-
ing it into what shape they pleas.
The demagogue was thinly educated, out of his league, causing may-
hem due to malevolence or ignorance, and paying no heed to the duties 
of his office. Faced with such terrors, there was little incentive to argue 
for great latitude in free speech. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the vitriol Hall and the 
other writers under study could release against religious demagogues 
did not easily translate into any notions of secularism, separation of 
chuch and state. Hall, for one, explicitly steered away from chancing 
accusations of being anti-clerical: “Far bee it from mee it intend by this, 
that precious and seraphical part of the Ministrie, that daily bring in 
souls, and shine like stars in their several orbs; These that move like the 
heavens silently and constantly in their calling, yet daiely shed down 
rich and happie influences.” Whom Hall had in mind were those not 
respecting the aforementioned duties of their office: “I meane those 
other that tread out of their paths, and in stead of preaching of Christ, 
faith, humilitie, obedience, &c, dispute passes, fall upon rears, bring in 
Intelligences, and so distort the word to varnish their own distractions.” 
The solution Hall advocated was not only to disallow civil offices 
from preachers, but to control strictly those who would venture outside 
their assigned realm, for them “the civil magistrate (to whom God hath 
intrusted the waies of saving his people) ought to beware as pests and 
banes of mankinde, as busie-bodies.” Thus, Hall does not propose a 
separation of church and state, leaving each to their own devices, but 
rather he promotes actively pursuing and punishing religious dema-
gogues. To Hall, it was “heroick to extinguish these firebrands that 
throw all Europe into flames and combustion.”210 Finally, it was clear to 
Hall that the demise of Christopher Love was not the end of the danger 
210 All quotations after the previous note from J.H., A gagg to Love’s advocate, p. 15.
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of religious demagogy. To Hall, it was a conjecture “utterly groundless, 
if not absurd,” to assume that the Presbyterian party “should suddenly 
change their opinions, and laie aside their perversness,” “for the life of 
a single Demagogue.”211 
In 1652 Hall briefly returned to translating Greek works. His pref-
ace to Longinus’ Peri Hypsous does not only give us an example of the 
seventeenth century perspective on rhetoric, but also shows the imme-
diate political importance of theorising about it.212 When describing his 
“conception of Eloquence,” Hall explained the different views prevalent at 
the time. To one view the “end of Oratory is to perswade or Gain,” described 
as “A way of speech prevailing over those we designe it to prevail.” This 
is “the short or Laconick way,” but the other, “the more spacious or Asiatick” 
style was harder to describe. In the end Hall calls it “Empire wholly com-
manding, yet never to be commanded.”213 The more difficult style is of course 
more rare, and also more glorious to those who master it: “notwithstand-
ing all the adresse and advantage it gives to publick persons, all the leans and 
establishment of future fame, the number of Oratours truly great, is scarce.”214 It is 
described as somewhat “divine,” “Ethereall” and “above man.”215
Such high quality of rhetoric was the dominant one in ancient re-
publics, of which “Greece had the greatest Ascendant over Eloquence of any 
nation.”216 However, things had changed since then. The form of gov-
ernment had its rhetorical requirements from the citizens, and in the 
past “In Senates and Harangues to the people length was necessary, for the 
same men acted both parts (and that in a single Citie).” These old ways of re-
publican public speaking were no longer valid, “the Scene is changed,” 
211 J.H., A gagg to Love’s advocate, p. 17.
212 John Hall, “To my Lord, the Lord Commissioner Whitelock,” Περί ‘ύψους. Or, 
Dionysius Longinus of the Height of Eloquence. Rendred out of the Originall. By J.H.Esq., 
London: Nov 1652. 
213 Hall, “To Whitelock,” sigs. B1r-v. Discussed also in Joad Raymond, The invention 
of the newspaper: English newsbooks, 1641-1649, Oxford: 1996, pp. 274-5. However, 
Raymond sees only the first description as the definitive one.
214 Hall, “To Whitelock,” sig. B2v.
215 Hall, “To Whitelock,” sigs. B3v-B4r.
216 Hall, “To Whitelock,” sig. A4v.
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and “(in Civil matters) we are to speak to the few and not the many,” for two 
reasons. First, “as the corruption of time hath diseas’d most Governments into 
Monarchies,” there was less need of popular consent: “that which was 
necessary to gain the people, degenerated in time to be in fashion in counsel.” The 
second reason was that due to population growth, even the “least of 
these few populacies now in being, is too great to be included in the same walls, or 
brought to the hearing of one voice,” with the result that “long studied orations 
being become uselesse.”217 
As we can see, Hall’s politics were deeply intertwined with his views 
of rhetoric, and as for the other republican authors considerations of 
rhetoric were reflected against the classical republics. Rhetoric could 
have powerful political effects, which was precisely the whole point in 
translating old rhetorical works: or, as Hall marketed his work, it was 
the “very point of Oratory” to reign “over the minds of men,” to which end he 
could present “these old precepts” to “conduct the greatest wits, and the sharpest 
observatours.”218 For Hall, rhetoric has lost the significance it had in the 
ideal of participatory citizen in a more democratic form of government, 
but even in the early modern era it was a power that should be used by 
those to whom it was appropriate: the wielders of legitimate power, the 
decision-makers, that is, the authorities.
5. Nedham’s fall and rise
For Marchamont Nedham, the new realities of power in 1649 initially 
spelled trouble. After the execution of the king in January, he aban-
doned for a while the editing of Mercurius Pragmaticus. He managed to 
resume publication of the newsbook from April to June, adding to the 
title the words (For King Charles II). The new edition largely continued 
the arguments familiar from his previous newsbooks: against arbitrary 
power from whatever the source. Nedham’s agility in face of the new 
situation is quite neat, arguing that the new tyranny was like the mon-
217 Hall, “To Whitelock,” sigs. A7v, A8r-v.
218 Hall, “To Whitelock,” sigs. A6v-A7r.
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ster Hydra: “We thought to have cut off its head with one blow with 
the Kings, and now it hath got an hundred new heads, with a huge taile or 
train of petty Tyrannies, and a sting at the end of it, to wound and poison 
all our Liberties.”219
For a while, Nedham managed to evade the authorities and to pub-
lish his critiques of the regime of the new “King Oliver.”220 Yet ulti-
mately, with the advent of the new Treason Act, or the “new Treason-
Trap of State to catch me and my Intelligence, as.. against honest John 
Lilburne and the Levellers,”221 he was arrested and sent to Newgate prison 
in June 1649. During that time he wrote and published a pleading tract 
called Certain Considerations Tendered in All humility, to an Honorable Member 
of the Councell of State, Aug. I 1649.222 
Concerning Nedham’s time of imprisonment in June 1649, Nigel 
Smith has made the following hypothesis: “If we believe his claims that 
imprisonment gave him the leisure to explore classical sources, Certain 
Considerations sees the emergence of the republican theory which was 
later to emerge in Mercurius Politicus.”223 For a few reasons, this hypoth-
esis is implausible. The first is the continual presence of classical works 
already in his earlier works, many of which were also partaking in the 
republican tradition. The second, and most obvious one is that Ned-
ham spent only six weeks in prison, compared to years spent at school 
and in the university exploring the same classical sources. Indeed, as 
he claimed in the preface to Certain Considerations, he wrote to his target 
audience “not as if you knew not these things already; but only out of a 
desire to be your Remembrancer.”224 
219 [Nedham], Mercurius Pragmaticus (For King Charles II), London: 1649, sig. A1v.
220 [Nedham], A most pithy exhortation delivered in an eloquent oration to the watry generation 
aboard their admirall at Graves-end. By the Right Reverend, Mr Hugh Peters, Doctor of the 
chair for the famous Universitie of Whitehall, and chaplain in ordinary to the high and mighty 
K. Oliver, the first of that name, as it was took, verbatim, in short hand (when he delivered it) 
London: 1649 May.
221 [Nedham], Mercurius Pragmaticus (For King Charles II), sig. A1v.
222 Worden, Literature and Politics, pp. 18-19.
223 Smith, Literature and Revolution, p. 33.
224 Marchamont Nedham, Certain Considerations Tendered in All humility, to an Honorable 
Member of the Councell of State, Aug. I 1649, London: 1649, sig. A2v.
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The third reason is that although there was indeed something new 
that came into Nedham’s political writings from Certain Considerations 
onward, it was not directly from classical sources. What was new was 
Nedham’s much heavier use of early modern continental interpreters of 
classics, whom we would call political Aristotelians, natural law think-
ers and neo-Stoics.225 The works of Arnold Clapmar and Christoph 
Besold were especially important in Certain Considerations and would 
continue to be so in his coming works. Besold was a ‘Civilian,’ that is, 
a professor of civil law in Germany. The few studies on him argue that 
his influence outside Germany, especially in England, was minimal,226 
and very few assert put significance to Nedham’s usage of Besold.227
The attribution of influences is of course a question fraught with dif-
ficulties, and one that might never escape the accusations of arbitrari-
ness on the scholar’s part.228 In the end, the philosophical correspond-
ence of the two texts cannot be but arbitrary, as it was so chosen by the 
quoting author. Nevertheless, there are three points that can be said on 
the connections between Besold and Nedham, none of which require us 
to consider the concept of influence or convictions. First is the rhetori-
cal aspect of quoting: in political texts it is to a large extent an appeal to 
testimony, to other authorities on the subject – as considered by the au-
thor. And especially so in a pleading work such as Certain Considerations, 
where an appeal to “the best Opinions and Examples” was explicit in 
225 Nedham, Certain Considerations, pp. 3-4, 10, 12 (Christoph Besold); p. 7 (Konrad 
Rittershausen); p. 11 ( Justus Lipsius). 
226 E.g. Julian Franklin, John Locke and the theory of sovereignty, Cambridge: 1978, p. 66; 
Conal Condren, George Lawson’s Politica and the English Republic, Cambridge: 1989, 
pp. 51–7.
227 Johann P. Sommerville, “English and European political ideas in the early seven-
teenth century: revisionism and the case of absolutism,” Journal of British Studies, 
(35), 1996, p. 175n; Robert von Friedeburg, “The Juridification of Natural Law: 
Christoph Besold’s Claim for a Natural Right to Believe what One Wants,” His-
torical Journal, (53), 2010, p. 2n. As the title of Friedeburg’s article suggests, there 
is a similarity between Besold’s and Nedham’s earlier thinking on the freedom of 
conscience. However, Nedham’s usage of Besold shows no evidence of any clear 
connection on this topic. 
228 Quentin Skinner, “The Limits of Historical Explanations,” Philosophy, (41), 1966, 
pp. 199-215.
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order to purport objective reasoning.229 
The second point is related to the first and has to do with the con-
venience of the arguments. The rhetorical choices are arbitrary but 
not random: that is, they are choices based on, and to some extent, 
governed by the needs of the quoting author to make his own case. 
Again, these choices can lead to being diametrically opposite to the 
intentions of the earlier author, or directly contradicting the internal 
correspondence of a philosophical structure, or vice versa. In this sense 
it would seem to be unwarranted to claim ‘casual’ use of an earlier au-
thor’s texts:230 unless we can prove that usage is indeed casual – say, in 
a case where the author randomly chose his quotes – we should rather 
assume that quotes are chosen intentionally to support the case of the 
quoter. Indeed, other than making a facsimile of an earlier text it is dif-
ficult to rule out the possibility casuist, rather than casual, use – even 
by cronies.
What did Nedham then take from Besold’s de arcanis Rerumpublicarum 
dissertatio, the book most often quoted in Certain Considerations?231 For one 
thing, so many of the classical quotes are verbatim from that opus, that 
it could well be that Nedham relied on that book as his only source for 
quotations. Aside from bibliography, we know from the direct quotes 
three topics relevant to this study, first of which is the control of the 
clergy. This was not a new topic to Nedham, but one where he now 
had to take into account the new form of government. For Nedham, 
229 Nedham, Certain Considerations, sig. A2v.
230 von Friedeburg, “The Juridification of Natural Law,” p. 2n.
231 The quoted title would indicate that the text used was the chapter 5, book 2 of 
Besold’s Politicorum libri duo: quorum primus reipublicae naturam & constitutionem, XII 
captibus absolvit: alter vero, De republica in omnibus partibus gubernanda, IX sectionibus trac-
tat, [Frankfurt am Main]: Prostat Francofurti in officina J.A. Cellii, typographi 
Tubingensis, 1618, republished in an edition of Arnold Clapmar, De Arcanis Rerum-
publicarum Libri sex/illustrati a Ioan Corvino IC. Accessit, Chr. Besoldi De eadem materia 
discursus. Nec non Arnoldi Clapmarii et aliorum Conclusiones de iure publico. Editio nova 
priore in multis locis correctior, Lugduni Batavorum [Leiden]: Apud Iacobum Marci, 
1644, where the relevant section is marked dissertatio – and not discursus, pace Fried-
rich Meinecke, Machiavellism: the doctrine of raison d’État and its place in modern history 
[1924], London: 1997, p. 130.
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the historical record in general was clear: invectives “under pretence 
of Religion” were never “tolerated by any prudent States-men.” But 
“especially in a free State, care must be taken to curb the licentiousnesse 
of Sermoning.” To support this argument, Besold was useful: “For, as it is 
observed by Besoldus the Civilian, this very thing was the ruin of those 
many flourishing Commonwealths in Greece.”232
Technically it could be argued that Nedham is confusing concepts, 
in the sense that political oratory, rather than religious sermons were 
behind most of the troubles of Greek city-states. However, this con-
flation is in the end intentional – as will become apparent, the whole 
point of the exercise is to present any religious speeches with political 
consequences as being political rhetoric under religious pretences. In 
Certain Considerations, as befits the style of the tract in aiming at a more 
elevated mode of analysis, Nedham elaborated more than before on 
the problems of clergy. He gave more historical examples, such as that 
of Girolamo Savonarola who “bewitched the People” with his “fraudu-
lent Arts.”233 The reasons given were also more detailed: “whatsoever 
is delivered under a religious pretence, strikes an impression upon the 
soul, and through the ears sinks deep into the minds of the vulgar.” 
Proper subjects for priests were “what concerns the corruption of mens 
manners, and the salvation of souls” and governors should act accord-
ingly.234
Since the seventeenth century priests had had their training in clas-
sical rhetoric, and they could thus use it with great effect even if the 
location was not as theory demanded.235 How those skills were used was 
the problem. Accordingly, Nedham wrote of “the ancient Demagogues 
232 Nedham, Certain Considerations, pp. 10-11.
233 Nedham, Certain Considerations, p. 11. On Hierom Savanarola [sic] – “(if I well 
remember the story out of Lipsius)” – can be found in Justus Lipsius, Monita et 
exempla politica: Libri duo, qui virtutes et vitia principum spectant, Amsterdam: 1630, lib. 
1, cap. 3, pp. 21-22. The circumstances of the writing in prison may explain both 
such haphazard quotes, and the otherwise much more accurate ones – surprisingly 
so, if compared to Nedham’s earlier works.
234 Nedham, Certain Considerations, pp. 10-11.
235 More on the topic: Brian Vickers, In defence of rhetoric, Oxford: 1988; Mack, Eliza-
bethan Rhetoric.
101NEDHAM’S FALL AND RISE
of Athens, or popular Orators in Rome” who could “chain the hearts of the 
people to their own tongues, and lead them by the nose which way they 
please, to the accomplishing of any design whatsoever.” This “strange 
power” led to immensely negative outcomes when used by “Pulpit-Pol-
iticians,” i.e. priests.236 In good hands, as shown by classical “Counsel” 
of “Alexander in Curtius,” rhetoric was definitely a positive force: the 
“cure of mutinous and dis-affected Spirits must be a businesse of Time; 
and is not to be effected by Laws like Thunderbolts, but by the still 
small voice, the smooth oyle of gentle language, persuasive Admoni-
tions and Declarations.”237 If Nedham was presenting himself as such 
a persuader, the strategy clearly worked: his next place of employment 
was with the authorities.238
The dichotomy between good and bad oratory, between crowd con-
trol and corruption, is repeated in Nedham’s views about informants, 
the second topic where Besold was used. Nedham accused “Spies,” gov-
ernment’s informers, of depriving the people of “the liberty of hearing, 
speaking, easing and uttering their minds to each other.” In such cases, 
the people would think that “they have lost all and so grow desperate.”239 
Informers, “mercenary varlets,” were a major cause of “tyranny,” since 
they were “so destructive of civill Conversation, which is the end of 
Governments, Societies, and Cities.”240 Behind Nedham’s arguments, 
seemingly in favour of free expression hindered by informers, lie obvi-
ously strong vested interests: he saw that his short imprisonment was 
caused by such informers as he had earlier espoused. But now they were 
“secret whisperers, who serve their own ends,” thus making Nedham 
236 Nedham, Certain Considerations, p. 11.
237 Nedham, Certain Considerations, p. 4. Quote is also verbatim in Clapmar, De Arcanis, 
p. 318.
238 Although other factors might have had influence: David Norbrook has proposed 
that “the fact that Nedham was known for a time to have been of different views 
could be useful for propaganda purposes.” In this view, Nedham offered “himself 
as a model for other writers who can decently change sides under his cover.” 
Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 222.
239 Nedham, Certain Considerations, p. 8, preceded by a non-attributed quote from 
Tacitus’ Agricola, (2).
240 Nedham, Certain Considerations, pp. 12-14.
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himself “the unfortunate Subject of many idle Insinuations.”241 
A similar approach can be seen in Nedham’s change from his ear-
lier views on severely restricted public sphere. Nedham now quoted 
Suetonius on how “in a Common-wealth or free City, both the opinions 
and tongues of men ought to be free.”242 Yet as has been shown ear-
lier, this quote by itself proves no inherent right to free speech - rather 
the question is related to prevention of social unrest, through moder-
ated leeway of venting ill feelings. Such rhetorical redescription is used 
in relation to “opprobrious Speeches against Government,” as well as 
“Pasquils and Pamphlets”: rather than calling speech-makers seditious, 
they should be characterised as “Authors of new Rumours, idle Newes-
mongers” and so on. Rulers should merely “neglect and scorne,” or 
mildly reprove such people as they were “unworthy [of ] their revenge 
or notice.” In a Tacitean vein, Nedham argued that showing anger at 
authors would only “seem to acknowledge what they write.” Prohibi-
tions or punishments have no other effect than to augment the reputa-
tion of wits, and magnify their fame as authors. Ignored authors gain 
no credibility, but banned writings gain a reputation making “them the 
more sought after.”243 
Despite these revaluations in Nedham’s favour, he did not let the 
pragmatic approach go as far as to support any liberties universally. 
Nedham made important caveats in all of his revaluations. The “bitter 
arrowes” of “licentious railings and revilings” are not approved of as 
such, any more than the “scurrilous Productions.” And despite Ned-
ham’s anger at the “Eaves-droppers,” he still claimed that a common-
wealth needed “Scouts or Informers.” These would spy on “persons 
disaffected and seditiously inclined,” but should not “intrap or insnare 
any”: their information was only for the rulers “private information in 
general.”244
The third topic from Besold is one that binds the aforementioned 
241 Nedham, Certain Considerations, p. 14.
242 A quote already mentioned in connection with Milton’s Areopagitica, but here 
explicitly quoting Suetonius. 
243 Nedham, Certain Considerations, pp. 7, 9; Smith, Literature and Revolution, p. 33.
244 Nedham, Certain Considerations, pp. 7, 9, 13.
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ways of pragmatic management together: simulacra.245 For the pur-
poses hoped for this study, we may define simulacra as ways of simu-
lating something which produces aspired results without the costs of 
the original. As an example, Nedham presents the policies of Augustus 
and Tiberius in favour of free speech as inter simulacra libertatis: they 
gave liberties in name, in order to take actual liberty away.246 Nedham 
gives a quote – closely resembling the commonplace Platonist metaphor 
of the time247 - on the analogy between horsemanship and governing: 
“prudent States-men [ought] to order a mutinous & seditious People in 
a new Republique, with meekness and moderation; bridling them with 
Laws, but somewhat loosly; lest by reining them too hard, they hoist 
themselves out of the Saddle.”248 This vision admits rights and liberties 
only when advantageous. 
Although Nedham could readily assimilate such aspects of reason 
of state thinking into his politics, the connection should not be pushed 
more than is adequate. The philosophy of interest theory – if it can 
even be called that249 – was applicable to, but certainly did not govern, 
Nedham’s writings. It clearly fits well into the pragmatic methods of al-
lowing some measure of free speech, but pragmatism was not the only 
concern. As demonstrated earlier, Nedham showed little toleration for 
politically active clergy, and indeed, none of the pragmatic reasoning in 
favour of free public speech applied to firebrand priests. For Nedham, 
reason of state clearly had its limits.
Reason of state was (and is) far from a simple phenomenon of poli-
tics, and this study will return to it at later stages, but in context of 
Certain Considerations one aspect should still be preliminarily mentioned, 
that of intellectual consistency. Nedham’s opposition to seditious ser-
245 The fourth and final chapter of Besold’s Dissertatio is titled “De Simulacris 
Imperiorum.”
246 Nedham, Certain Considerations, p. 10. 
247 Skinner, Hobbes and republican liberty, pp. 28-30.
248 Nedham, Certain Considerations, p. 4. The quote is attributed to Besold’s Dissertatio, 
although it is actually from Clapmar, De Arcanis, lib. VI, pp. 317-18.
249 Noel Malcolm, Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years’ War: An Unknown 
Translation by Thomas Hobbes, Oxford 2007.
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mons has been seen as one case of such a troubling inconsistency: how 
could a performed oration such as sermon, be more dangerous than 
journalist’s texts? Similarly, if Nedham’s aim was to absolve himself, 
which would have been a prudent course of action in 1649, the problem 
of audience remained: the same people who opposed preachers would 
have not supported Nedham’s views otherwise.250 
However, these inconsistencies only appear if we assume that the 
reason of state thinking demands that threats to state are of primary 
consideration, means of delivery notwithstanding, and that Nedham’s 
only intention with his text was to absolve himself. In the end, the case 
was neither: evidence clearly suggests that Nedham uses aspects of rea-
son of state thinking, and tries to absolve himself, but at the same time 
he is holding on to many of his earlier arguments about methods of 
good governance. ‘Principles’ might be an unexpected term to use with 
Nedham, but their existence is a plausible explanation to these seeming 
inconsistencies.
Shortly after the publication of Certain Considerations, Nedham es-
caped from prison and led the life of a fugitive for a few months.251 
With the rise of the engagement controversy, Nedham began to make 
tentative attempts to find a new livelihood in the ranks of the com-
monwealth writers. By November his petitioning bore fruit, as “favour 
hath once more turn’d the wheele of my fortune,” and Nedham gained 
back his liberty.252 He turned to his new tasks with gusto, and in May 
1650 published The case of the Common-wealth of England, stated: or, The 
equity, utility, and necessity of a submission to the present government.253 We can 
plausibly assume that not much of the intent of his book would be lost, 
250 Smith, Literature and Revolution, pp. 33-34.
251 Worden, Literature and Politics, pp. 18-19.
252 Letter to Henry Oxinden, Nov. 19, 1649, British Library MS, Add 28002, fol. 172.
253 Complete title is The case of the Common-wealth of England, stated: or, The equity, utility, 
and necessity of a submission to the present government: cleared out of monuments both sacred 
and civill, against all the scruples and pretences of the opposite parties, viz. royallists, Scots, 
Presbyterians, Levellers: wherein is discovered severally the vanity of their designes, together with 
the improbability of their successe and inconveniences which must follow (should either of them 
take effect) to the extreme prejudice of the nation: two parts: with a discourse of the excellencie of 
a free-state above a kingly-government, London: 1650.
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had he replaced the “Common-wealth of England” in the title with his 
own name.
In the Case, Nedham presented a highly calculating view of repub-
lican authority: in crude terms, republican authority had been won in 
battle, so therefore it was just and should be obeyed. This view of au-
thority, where “Force and Power is put is [sic] equall Balance with popular 
Consent in relation to change of Government” is supported by a barrage 
of quotations by “Civilians” – that is, mainly protestant representatives 
of political Aristotelianism such as Besold, Henning Arnisaeus, and 
Hugo Grotius.254 
In a similar vein, Nedham presented a view of popular authority 
based on common consent, where justification came simply through 
majority rule. Or as the title of chapter 4 of the 1st book stated the 
idea: “That a Government erected by a prevailing Part of the People is as valid de 
Jure, as if it had the ratifying consent of the whole.”255 Nedham acknowledges 
the assumption that ideally consent should be “of the Body of the Peo-
ple, or of the major part of their Representatives,” but the context of the 
civil war does not allow for such idealism when “Government is decid-
ed by the Sword.” In such a case, “what Government so ever it pleases 
[the conquerors] to erect, the People having lost their Right of election 
to them, must be as valid de Jure, as if it had the Peoples Consent.” In 
the case of the newly-found republican authority, there is no need for 
the people to “expresse positive Consent to justifie a new Government; so 
a tacit or implied consent is sufficient.” Nedham’s argument for submission 
to the present authority was essentially an argument for authority per 
se: “Consent, (as one saith well)256 is the very dictate of Nature or common 
Reason, because it is better to have some Justice than none at all” – things could 
be worse.257
One worse option would be a royal authority, mainly for the same 
reasons as for Milton in The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates. However, as 
for the option of popular authority, where Milton largely omitted the 
254 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, p. 23. 
255 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, p. 19.
256 The following part seems to be a quote, but one hitherto unknown to modern 
editors or to the present author. 
257 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, p. 23.
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practical issues involved, Nedham argued bluntly that it would be just 
as bad. In a lengthy portion of the Case, directed against the Levellers, 
Nedham argued that “a democratic or popular form [of government] 
that puts the whole multitude into an equal exercise of the supreme 
authority, under pretense of maintaining liberty, is in the judgment of 
all statesmen the greatest enemy of liberty.”258 Reasons for that were 
numerous, but the relevant issue for this study is the question why con-
sensual authority cannot be derived through a popular form of govern-
ment. 
The main problem is, of course, the expected loss of liberty. Rely-
ing on the arguments in Tacitus, Sallust, Livy, Aristotle and Besold on 
how “the People becomes a most pernicious Tyrant,” the subsequent 
disorder risks bringing monarchical authority back to power.259 Other 
reasons include more pragmatic ones – disorderly elections if such were 
to be had – and expectations of both the electors – the people’s repre-
sentatives will reflect the “choice of the lowest of the people,” and that any 
representative averse to “licentious waies” would always be rejected. 
Even if virtuous orators could be found, they would not get elected. 
Finally, problems with the popularly elected representatives – positions 
of authority will be manned by persons “poor, and unexpert in Affairs, 
if they are Busie-bodies, and have a nimble Faculty of prating, are [then] 
usually adored by the Vulgar, as the only States-men.”260 
The problem with such “grand Demagogues, or Leaders of the Peo-
ple” would be that authority would become a mere commodity, “So 
that (as Plato and Plutarch say), meer Popularity is no Government, but is as 
it were a Market, wherein all Offices of Government are exposed to Sale,” and 
“He ordinarily gains the best bargain of Authority, that hath the long-
est Purse, and most powerfull Tongue, to perswade the Clerks of the 
Market.”261 In such a situation authority loses any connection it might 
have with aspects of objective legitimacy such as law, reason, justice, 
258 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, p. 71.
259 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, p. 72.
260 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, pp. 74-5.
261 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, p. 75; “Clerk of the Market,” quoting Poly-
bius, The Histories, 6.66. 
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public interest, or common consent. There is very little incentive to 
promote participation if the results are such.
Nedham’s solution for republican authority in the Case of the Common-
wealth relies on expertise: “it is use and experience that fits a man for 
the carriage of Grand Concernments of State.” As “Aristotle adviseth,” 
it is such men who should be entrusted with “Affaires altogether, they 
having all those Advantages of Observation, Custom, and Experience, 
which cannot be expected from a tumultuary Succession, of raw and 
unexpert Statists.”262 A state in a “Popular Form,” such as ancient Rome, 
was “underpropp’d by the Wisdome and Authority of the Senate,” and 
in turn “that Famous Councell, the Areopagites” was underpinning the 
“Common-wealth of Athens.” In 1650, the authority was in the Parlia-
ment. Nedham’s own words sum up this view of republican authority 
quite succinctly: 
How much safer then must it needs be for the People of this Nation, to 
leave the Succession of Representatives, and the Form of a Councell in the fu-
ture, with the time and manner of their Constitution, and Rules for Elec-
tion, to be ordered by the wisdom and discretion of Parliament.263
As can be assumed from such an approach to popular participation, 
any ideas of freedom of expression were not forthcoming. Obviously, 
as Nedham was writing from a much more secure standing than ear-
lier, he did not have any more incentives to promote free speech even 
as a necessary evil. Levellers’ favourable views on such liberties were 
attacked as “not liberty but licentiousness,” springing from “strange 
principles of pretended freedom.”264
However, Nedham did stay consistent to his views on freedom of 
conscience. In the Case of the Common-wealth, he presented a defence 
of religious liberty that can be interpreted as a defence from rhetori-
cal premises. He began with a commonplace of rhetorical theory that 
“since it is of unavoidable necessity that while the world stands there 
will be divisions of opinion,” then “certainly such a course must needs 
262 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, pp. 75-6; quote from Aristotle, Politics, 7.3. 
263 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, p. 76.
264 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, p. 69.
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be most rational [a call for logos] which shall provide ways of remedy 
against such inconveniences as may follow them rather than inventions 
of torture and torment to thwart and stifle them.” Nedham presented 
a policy alternative to applying excessive force to a mostly harmless 
thing - an alloiosis, with meiosis and alliterative amplification. This is 
“because the understandings of men can no more be compelled, than 
their wills, to approve what they like not.” The preferred alternative is 
the way of rhetorical persuasion, instead of commandments, in order to 
deal non-violently with various divisions of opinion.265
The danger posed to this freedom of conscience came from the usual 
suspects: Presbyterians and other firebrand priests. Nedham again at-
tacked the notions of church reformation, conscience, and covenant as 
malicious designs to create factions “for the casting down of our present 
governors,” after which the instigators could “set up themselves in the 
seat of authority.”266 Under the cloak of religion lay only power-hungry 
usurpers, whose factionalist designs would be laid bare by Nedham. 
Unsurprisingly, he presented his own product as “free from partiality 
and the least tincture of faction.” Nedham added to his claims of ethos 
by way of anamnesis, that is, recalling the “learned men who wrote be-
fore,” who would also supply extra credibility to his arguments, as they 
“were most likely to speak truth as being uninterested in our affairs and 
unconcerned in the controversy.”267
This captatio benevolentiae brings us again to the question of reason of 
state, which was gaining ground in Nedham’s argumentation, as is evi-
dent in his hints at that “more current way of persuasion” of counselling 
“what will be profitable and convenient,” instead of telling people what 
ought to be done.268 In the years to come, Nedham’s dealing with this 
way of persuasion become more and more explicit. 
265 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, p. 91.
266 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, sig. A4.
267 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, sigs. A2-A3.
268 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, sig. A4.
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PART III Protectorate 1653 - 1655
6. Hall and John Streater at odds
So far the writers under study, despite their differences, have been rea-
sonably united in their distaste for popular measures. For a perspec-
tive on how more popular republican institutions were imagined at the 
time, the time has come to turn to John Streater. Streater was a printer 
by training, but apparently had no interests in writing political prose 
before 1653. His first known work, A glympse of that jewel, judicial, just 
preserving libertie, was apparently written during his service with Crom-
well’s army in Ireland, from where he arrived to London in March of 
that year.269 
As was the case with Milton and Hall, Streater also founded his 
political theory on natural law, as put in A glympse: “All Law and Gov-
ernment originally ariseth from the Law of Nature.” Similarly, Streater 
held also their republican view of liberty, where “government and Law 
is nothing else but a rational restraint of absolute Libertie.”270 Never-
theless, from such foundations Streater ended up with a very different 
theory of republican government, and accordingly, he did not receive 
any salary from Cromwell’s government. This was due to two strands 
in his political philosophy: first, from the same premises he drew differ-
ent conclusions than the republicans on the payroll. Second, in certain 
cases Streater agreed with the arguments familiar from other works 
under study, but considered them beneficial rather than dangerous.
269 Biographical information: Adrian Johns, “John Streater,” Oxford DNB. 
270 John Streater, A glympse of that jevvel, judicial, just, preserving libertie, London: March 
1653, pp. 2, 8.
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For Streater’s views on the law of nature, the main implication was 
that natural law had to be universal, or “equall” to have meaning. If all 
persons were equal, they should have equal say in matters, and “hence 
may be concluded, that no person or persons hath right to Government, 
or power in giving Laws, but when they stand constituted by vertue of 
an immediate election, or derivatively.”271 Starting from commonplace 
principles that government should be according to reason and equity, 
Streater drew the conclusion that it could only take place within a sys-
tem of popular government, as “the right of the People, for the good of 
the generality, or the greatest number”272 – almost a complete antithesis 
of other republicans under study. 
In a similar move, Streater argued that the rational restraint of ab-
solute liberty applied to those in power as well as to the ruled. In order 
“to preserve a peoples Rights and Liberties, from such as would make 
themselves Lords thereof,” there was no other way then through “often 
or annual elections.” Whereas for the other republicans elections risked 
veering away from right reason in favor of populist pandering, Streater 
offered that possibility as a complementary benefit: “for if the people 
keep the right of often elections in their hands, it will make such as af-
fect Government desire to be alwayes in the peoples favour.” And as 
others had considered one of the drawbacks of popular governments 
to have been their proclivity to banish from their midst their best and 
brightest out of envy, Streater considered such ostracism as a good bal-
ancing measure, in helping to ensure that the people “take heed they 
lend not such persons too much of their favour.”273 
At the same time, Streater did acknowledge the danger in some of 
the criticism against popular commonwealths, but consistently argued 
that they could be dealt with through institutional rearrangements. To 
prevent factionalism, Streater agued that “the manner of the choice of 
Members representative in a Parliament, should be so, as to prevent 
making of parties.”274 Yet unlike many of his contemporaries, Streater 
271 Streater, A glympse, pp. 9-10.
272 Streater, A glympse, p. 3.
273 Streater, A glympse, p. 10.
274 Streater, A glympse, p. 3.
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did not see the dangers of factionalism deriving from popular orato-
ry. In reciting his lessons from Roman history, Streater approved of 
the practices of those who gave their “Orations to the people, and not 
minded the Senate.” Such orators, circumventing the authority vested 
in the senate, were to be commended since they “restored the Author-
ity of the people, and minded them that Government was provided 
for their good, to deliver them from serving the more powerful.”275 To 
Streater, a greater danger than popularism was the “assumed absolute-
nesse” by those who held the reins of power. 
The methods of keeping those in power in check included institu-
tional arrangements, or “reason of State,” such as the constant rotation 
of the offices of authority.276 As mentioned, popular oratory was an-
other method, but one that relied on a generally well-informed public. 
That the value of education was almost universally promoted in most 
political theory has already been mentioned, and Streater was no ex-
ception. Streater repeats the argument familiar from Milton, that igno-
rance benefits the prospective tyrants: “’tis the policy of him that would 
invade the liberty of a people, to keep them ignorant.”277 
However, rather than advocating the learning of true reason from 
classical texts or other confirmed sources of wisdom, Streater encour-
aged public engagement: “Citizens should converse and confer often 
of their Liberties, of Government, of Laws, of Peace, of War.”278 This 
notion of active engagement went beyond those hitherto presented. 
The importance of public speaking, informing and being informed was 
due to its importance to Streater’s idea of the foundations of freedom: 
“Every one is to understand he is equally interessed with any member 
in respect of the common Libertie.”279
275 Streater, A glympse, p. 14.
276 Streater, A glympse, p. 4.
277 Streater, A glympse, p. 5.
278 Streater, A glympse, sig. A3r. There is inevitably a self-serving notion here: as 
learned writers would promote the reading of learned writers, it is in a printer’s 
interest to promote an active ‘public sphere.’ Nevertheless, had Streater only been 
interested in his personal prosperity, surely there would have been less dangerous 
ways of doing so than through political engagement. 
279 Streater, A glympse, p. 8.
112 PROTECTORATE 1653-1655
Nevertheless, from Streater’s popular republican proposals of re-
form, only his appeal to an end to the indefinite terms of parliamentar-
ians met with success, as within a month of the publication of his tract 
Oliver Cromwell dissolved the Rump Parliament. In the aftermath 
of Oliver Cromwell’s dissolution of the Rump Parliament and subse-
quent power-grab, the earlier differences in degree about republican 
policies gained a new importance. As we have seen in case of Nedham, 
the choosing of sides earlier had meant traversing the divide between 
parliamentary and royalist camps, whereas after April 1653 it was the 
differences between the republican authors that led to similar antago-
nisms – as well as rewards and punishments. John Hall chose to defend 
the dissolution in a series of publications, beginning with A Letter Written 
to a Gentleman in the Country in May 1653. Hall’s defense included an ar-
ray of redescriptions of republican arguments, where he approved, or at 
least paid lip service to principles whose wholesale application was not 
feasible at that juncture.
To begin with, Hall agrees with the need for rotation of those in 
positions of power. In a republic, there is nothing “more destructive to 
it, than the Continuation of many men in the same power, especially 
unlimited and supreme.” Cromwell’s actions were to be lauded for put-
ting a timely stop to this development. However, Hall did not argue 
that the destructive effects were caused by lack of accountability, which 
allowed him to skip the question of elections, usually the main method 
of maintaining accountability. Rather, he attributed the problem to the 
corruptive effects of long-term office-holding, since then “knowledg of 
Faces, Acquaintance, Familiarity, and those little intrigues men will make, 
though they hate one another, will bring all to Ruine.”280 
Similarly, Hall agreed with the anti-monarchist principle of not 
leaving power in the hands of a single individual, but in the current 
situation there had to be a state of exception to the rule. In the interests 
of liberty it had to be acknowledged that “though multitude of Counsellors 
is strength and safety, yet in distemper’d and turning States it is weak-
280 [ John Hall], A Letter written to a Gentleman in the Country, touching the Dissolution of the 
late Parliament and the Reasons therof, London: 1653, p. 10. 
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nesse and distraction.”281 The metaphors of mental sickness are used to 
great extent: “the Liberty of the People” – as in popular or representative 
government – was “a Sword taken out of a Mad Mans hand, till he re-
cover his senses.” In comparison, a “Rationall Man” would not expect ‘a 
Liberty of choosing a Representative” in such a situation.282
However, despite this implicit approval of the system of representa-
tive government, Hall’s ideal of it does not follow the idea of strict rep-
resentation. On the contary, Hall argues that without any checks to 
ensure the election of “men that had constantly been true to the Commmon-
wealth,” the representation of unsavory elements – “Malignants” and 
the “Presbyterian Party (which is meerly a Jesuit in a Genevah cloak, but 
somewhat more insupportable)” – has been detrimental to the working 
of the system as a whole. The result has been unrelenting partisanship, 
far from the ideal of learned deliberations of the select few: “instead of 
bringing a select Company of honest Gentlemen to debate together, we 
should have brought so many Bandogs to have travers’d Factions.”283
Altogether, Hall’s argument from necessity is backed by clever, 
if unscrupulous rhetorical redescriptions. Hall asserted that “if you 
will say that the Liberty of the People by this meanes is stifled,.. it is only 
suspended.”284 Nevertheless, it is notable that Hall did not steer away from 
republican principles as such, even if he does allow himself a lot of lee-
way in interpreting them. The political effects of rhetorical redescrip-
tion can be immense, yet they may also reveal fundamental questions 
of political theory. In Hall’s words, “it comes to a Question, Whether 
it be better for us to be in Slavery under the name of Liberty, or in Liberty 
under the effects of Slavery.” Was it worth to keep the republic in a state of 
liberty, even if it meant giving up for the time being the notion of liberty 
as self-government? For Hall, the answer was a resounding ‘yes.’285
John Streater, however, did not agree with the rationalisation of po-
litical engineering. Immediately in April he circulated among army 
281 Hall, A Letter, p. 12.
282 Hall, A Letter, pp. 15-16.
283 Hall, A Letter, pp. 10-11.
284 Hall, A Letter, pp. 15-16.
285 Hall, A Letter, p. 15.
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officers a manuscript of “Ten queries,” asking them, e.g., “Wether or 
noe is the giuing of the supreame power into the hands of fiue, or six 
more, such a thing as the gouernment of a Co~monwealth, when the 
Co~monwealth is excluded from the liberty of making a choyce of per-
sons to gouerne?”286 His continued dissent took a published form in a 
newsbook called The Grand Politick Informer. Unfortunately, most of the 
issues of are no longer extant due to its heavy suppression by the gov-
erning authorities. The only remaining issue, fourth or fifth, was dated 
to late October, by which time Streater had already been apprehended 
and sentenced to prison for publishing seditious pamphlets.287
Streater’s awareness of the risks involved was evident in his attempts 
at clearing himself from accusations of factionalism: “we would entreat 
thee not to censure the Politick Informer, for inclining to either one 
faction or another.” Streater’s approach was the classical evoking of 
ethos, of assurance that his “principles are right,” and how “it is not the 
work of one that undertaketh pollitick observations to incline any way, 
but onely to discover the reasons of state, the proper tendencie, the end 
and aim.” True to the arts of rhetoric, Streater’s anamnesis, recalling 
Livy and Tacitus, evokes the tradition of how one should “unmask and 
unrobe the state of things, to declare the truth.”288
Nevertheless, as we have seen in earlier cases of such captatio benevo-
lentiae by the professedly uninterested, coolly analytical reporter of af-
fairs, Streater did not abstain from asserting his own views and prin-
286 [ John Streater], Ten queries: by a friend of ye now dissolved Parliament. MS, Thomason 
tracts, E693(5), placed between tracts dated 25 and 26 April, fols. 3-4. Published 
also in John Streater, Secret reasons of state in reference to the affairs of these nations, at the 
interruption of this present Parliament: anno 1653. discovered. Also, the power of parliaments, 
touching imprisonment, debated. With other matters worthy of observation, in Jo: Streater’s 
case: this being a narrative of his two years troubles at the beginning of the late monarchie, erected 
by General Cromwel, London: 1659, pp. 5-6.
287 [ John Streater], A further continuance of the grand politick informer, discovering the wick-
ednesse and mysteries of the present state iniquities on foot about the 14 of September 1653, 
London: 1653, pp. 37-43; Joad Raymond, “John Streater and The Grand Politick 
Informer,” The Historical Journal, 41(2), 1998, pp. 568-572.
288 Streater, A further continuance, p. 42; Raymond, “John Streater,” p. 573, points out 
well the dilemma of dissent in Streater’s strained attempts not to seem an anti-
commonwealthsman.
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ciples. Streater’s “true and just government of a Common wealth,” is 
made of “a people representative, annually elected,” and where “no one 
ought to usurp supream power” – after which Streater accuses the “cor-
rupt persons, that have now Usurped and assumed the Supream power 
to the great detriment of the people of England.” Such views were bound 
to grate on the authorities.289
Interestingly, at this point Streater made no claims to a right to dis-
sent. Since he did handle the topic in later writings, we may assume 
that he was aware of the idea of free speech, but omitted it for some 
reason in A further continuance. One possible reason is that he consid-
ered the present rule as a state of tyranny, where any freedoms granted 
would be meaningless: even an “antient Liberty” like petitioning, when 
“the people may account it a favour” becomes void of content when 
it is received arbitrarily. In addition, when referring to the banning 
of public meetings “under a pretence of preventing of carrying on of 
plots,” Streater argued that such a “design of preventing meeting” was 
familiar to tyrants throughout history, since when people “know not 
one anothers minde, they cannot so readily put in execution any thing 
that may be hurtfull to the Tyranny.”290 By extension this argument 
could easily apply to free speech as well.
John Hall responded to the arguments of Grand Politick Informer with 
a tract called A Stop to the Mad Multitude.291 If Streater had abstained 
289 Streater, A further continuance, p. 42.
290 Streater, A further continuance, p. 40.
291 [ John Hall of Durham], A Stop to the mad Multitude, Or A Seasonable Antidote Against 
a dangerous Cup of Poyson, Presented in a late Scandalous Pamphlet, Entituled The Grand 
Politique Informer. Wherein is laid open the Hellish Plots, Designs, and Machinations, which, 
under the Pretence of Liberty, are now carried on for the subversion of Religion, and disturbance 
of the Peace of this Common-wealth. By a true Lover of his Countrey, London: 1653. There 
is no dating marked in the Thomason tracts, there is reason to believe it came 
out before late October: on p. 9 of Hall’s Sedition scourg’d, or A view of that rascally & 
venemous paper, entituled, A charge of high-treason exhibited against Oliver Cromwel, Esq; for 
several treasons by him committed, reference was made to “the reason of delivering a 
Parchment sealed, there hath been so much said of the matter, in the Grand Poli-
tique Informer better Informed, pp. 10, 11. that it is needless to transcribe any thing 
hither.” There is no extant book with such a title, but pages 10-11 of A Stop to the 
Mad Multitude do correspond to the topic referred to in Sedition Scourg’d, which is 
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from declaring his explicit commitment to free speech, Hall set his 
views out in the open from the very beginning of his tract: “Of all the 
many evils which this untoward Age is guilty of, I find none greater, nor 
more dangerous, than the idle and wanton liberty of the Press.” Obvi-
ously, the qualification “idle and wanton” designates a licentious type 
of liberty, which by definition would not be true liberty. Hall recited 
the arguments familiar from Nedham, that in an unrestricted state 
“uncontrolled faction and sedition have obtained so great a reputation, 
that whosoever is a friend to Authority, doth run an apparent hazard of 
being characterized for one who is an enemy to the Publique.”
Hall shared the contempt authors like Milton had for “shallow ap-
prehensions,” “wild fancies” and “impudence” etc. of writers with di-
verging views on politics. Yet unlike Milton, Hall advocated a retreat 
to the “private sphere.” Hall’s efforts are nevertheless somewhat un-
convincing, given that at the same time he was “engaged to endeavour 
at least to set a stop to the easily deluded multitude.”292 Nevertheless, 
throughout his tract Hall consistently abstained from making any ex-
plicit arguments on the merit of free speech as such. There is no refer-
ence to concordia discors, supporting tolerance due to skepticism, or pre-
venting social unrest through ‘venting of ill spirits.’ On the contrary, 
Hall explicitly denigrated freedom of speech as demagogy: “freedom 
to revile, reproach, scandalize, rail, cast all manner of ignominy upon 
Magistrates,” and as “stirring up [of ] the people to mutiny, faction, 
sedition, rebellion.”293
The opinion Hall had of demagogues was (and arguable still is) fair-
ly uncontroversial. 
Tis the high-way, the beaten path of Politicians, and aspiring spirits, to en-
crease an opinion of themselves, by lessning the reputation of others, and 
to make themselves appear the more beautiful, by throwing dirt in those 
faces which are better than their own. 
dated to October 20th. It is not known whether the title of Streater’s pamphlets was 
at some point spelled Politique, or whether that spelling was Hall’s own choice.
292 Hall, A Stop to the mad Multitude, p. 2.
293 Hall, A Stop to the mad Multitude, p. 25.
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For Hall, such demagogues aimed to “flatter the credulous Multitude.” 
This critique was obviously a republican commonplace, but Hall saw 
this as specifically problematic due to the demagogues’ aim of flattering 
the multitude “out of their due obedience.”294 If, “by these their whin-
ing dissimulations, they might tempt the ignorant multitude in foolish 
Compassion to flock unto them,” there was little chance to erect the 
“new model of Law, plain, easie, and obvious to the meanest capacity, 
at this time framing, and fashioning upon the wheels of prudent consul-
tation, and mature deliberation.”295
 Hall presented his own work as a text in line with prudent, mature 
demonstration aiming at common good, thus undemagogic and there-
fore permissible. His claim to the reader was to have presented “a bare 
relation of the naked truth, not clothed with the least amplifications 
of Rhetorick, nor circumstantiated with any malitious Aggravations of 
my own.”296 If taken at face value and out of context, it is understand-
able that such lines have given rise to the view of seventeenth century 
republican political philosophy as aiming at higher truths, being anti-
rhetorical and disinterested in partisan advantage. And as in the previ-
ous cases, Hall did nothing of the sort. A Stop to the Mad Multitude is filled 
with rhetoric and blatantly partisan. As for its political philosophy, the 
tract does show Hall’s engagement in attempting to counter the chal-
lenge of Streater: how to build an argument for legitimate republican 
authority, that would not require consent as its basis.
Hall set “the Representative of the people” against democracy – 
contrary to the “Vulgar Error,” of a traditional view that saw them as 
“convertible.” He conceded that in a “true Democracy,” where “every 
man whatsoever” had “a free vote and suffrage” in choosing the gov-
294 Hall, A Stop to the mad Multitude, p. 7. For one example of such a demagogue, see 
Hall’s views on John Lilburne: “he had disguised his Hellish Intentions under the 
fair and plausible (but most deceitfull) pretences of the peoples Liberty, Publique 
Good, and the like”; “all his speeches [grew] openly factious and seditious, and 
lest he should not be able to do mischief abough with his clamorous tongue, he 
betakes himself to the Press, as an Engine fit to convey his poisonous principles 
throughout the whole nation,” pp. 26-27.
295 Hall, A Stop to the mad Multitude, pp. 9, 17.
296 Hall, A Stop to the mad Multitude, p. 28.
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ernment, whose members could be altered “according to the will and 
pleasure of the people,” and - most importantly - where “nothing must 
be done without the joint and mutual consent of all,” authority would 
ipso facto be legitimate. None of these things held true in the repre-
sentative system in force in England, where less than one percent of the 
population could vote in elections, the representatives sat indefinitely, 
and where “the Majority of voices is sufficient” for elections and legisla-
tion. 
Hall asserted that although he seemed “to give the Praecedency to 
Democracy,” he did not want to “derogate from the honour of our old 
Parliamentary Government.” Because of practical reasons, true democ-
racy was impossible in “so great and populous place as England,” even if 
it was and had been feasible in ancient Greek city-states or “many free 
Cities, and Cantons at this day, which do still conserve their Liberty by 
a Democracy.” Representative government did not have the inherent 
legitimacy of a democracy, since democracy was not “established upon 
power.” According to Hall, representative government was: “What rea-
son is there, that ninety nine should be forced to take Lawes from an 
hundred? Is it not from this presumption, that an hundred is like to 
beat ninety nine?” Majority government relied on force, therefore in 
principle it could not be any more legitimate an authority than (con-
veniently enough) rule by a beneficial ‘Lord Protector,’ such as Oliver 
Cromwell.297 
What then were to be the theoretical sources of authority, if democ-
racy was impossible and parliamentary government had been found 
wanting? There were two directions to take, first one involving more 
popular measures, such as voting. This Hall found utterly abominable: 
“if Prerogative be once prostituted to the licentious liberty of the giddy 
Multitude, it will be an hard matter to restore Authority to its due Maj-
esty, and to recall the People to their wonted Obedience, and sobriety.” 
Outside true democracy, popular measures would only lead to licence. 
A better option was to rely on the “choice experienced heads,” who 
would utilise “that excellent way of judging according to right reason.” 
297 Hall, A Stop to the mad Multitude, pp. 18-19.
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If governors were “to be forestalled with popular opinion, an Error will 
soon gain as good a reputation.. as the greatest, and most Demonstra-
tive truth.”298 The role of the governors was to do what was right for the 
common good, not what was popular. Neither self-government nor free 
speech was a necessary requirement to achieve that goal.
Hall continued his diatribes against unwanted and unwarranted 
public speech in Sedition Scourg’d, dated October 20, 1653.299 As in A 
Stop to the Mad Multitude, Hall began by lamenting the effects of unre-
stricted printing. As such, “The Invention of Printing was doubtlesse at 
the first one of the most laudable and profitable discoveries that could 
have been made by man.” However, “so unlucky hath it been, that 
since the mystery of it grew common, and the permission in a manner 
general, it hath been a pestilent Midwife to these accursed brats, Error 
in the Church, and Sedition in the State.” Hall did not see these widely 
acknowledged problems as unavoidable, but mitigable evils. Instead, 
he argued that printing had not been correctly appreciated by the au-
thorities: “the Governours themselves” were not “wholly blameless for 
such inconveniences.” For Hall, the action of printing texts was not 
dissimilar to that of printing money. If seigniorage was widely accepted 
to be something that had to be controlled by the authorities, so should 
printing.300
Such building of more detailed analogies in support of his earlier 
views on public speech was also evident in Hall’s view of the roots of 
republican government. Again Hall conceded that “the people be the 
primary cause of Government, and the End thereof, and may by their con-
sent, or disapprobation, either ratify or vacate any form therof.” Never-
theless, this is a just the preliminary to a concessio, as Hall continued to 
assert how “for the administration and execution of Government, its a thing 
298 Hall, A Stop to the mad Multitude, pp. 24, 30.
299 [ John Hall], Sedition scourg’d, or A view of that rascally & venemous paper, entituled, A 
charge of high-treason exhibited against Oliver Cromwel, Esq; for several treasons by him com-
mitted, London: 1653, against a libel dated 14th of August: Anon, A charge of high 
treason exhibited against Oliver Cromwell Esq; for several treasons by him committed, London: 
s.n., 1653.
300 Hall, Sedition scourg’d, pp. 1-2.
120 PROTECTORATE 1653-1655
the practice wherof is not feasible by the people and the effects of it, if it 
were endeavor’d would be monstrous beyond all imagination.” The same 
point was made in an overtly rhetorical fashion when Hall considered 
the proverb Salus Populi Suprema Lex: “to continue on the Metaphor, tis 
the Physician, that is to say, The Wise man in power, that must be the Judge, 
not the patient, that is to say, the Multitude, in danger.” There is no ques-
tion whether ends justify the means for Hall: “if the people be the end 
of Government, that which most aimes at the good of the people, comes 
the neerest that end.”301
Nevertheless, Hall’s professed concern for the welfare of the people 
should not be confused with a trade-off between freedom and security. 
That is simply not how the issue was argued. For Hall and the other 
republicans could all agree that liberty was neither unregulated licence 
nor all-providing absolutism. What they disagreed about was the opti-
mal position between the two extremes, and what institutional mecha-
nisms were involved. Thus Hall could criticise Streater, “the Grand 
Politique Informer himself” on his views on representative govern-
ment, not because they were in disagreement over the merits of having 
a parliament, but because they did not agree about the circumstances 
of checking its power. Hall was accurate about Streater in his judge-
ment that it was “not the dissolving of the late Parliament that sticks in 
their stomacks, for that they are satisfyed well enough with.” Rather, 
they were “unsatisfyed because the Nation is not turn’d wild into an 
irregular and dangerous Liberty, and consequently permitted either to 
return into new quarrels, or reduc’d under its former Tyranny.” As we 
shall see, the question whether to permit the people “to a choice of their 
own Governours,” did not find easy answers in popular, aristocratic or 
any other sort of republican strands of thought.302 
Hall’s next work under study, Confusion confounded,303 is dated to Janu-
ary 1654. In it, Hall delved deeper into the questions of what he saw 
301 Hall, Sedition scourg’d, p. 4.
302 Hall, Sedition scourg’d, p. 8.
303 [ John Hall], Confusion confounded: or, A firm way of settlement settled and confirmed: 
Wherein is considered the reasons of the resignation of the late Parlament, and the establishment 
of a Lord Protector, London: 1654.
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as the foundations of the welfare of the people – government as guided 
by right reason and natural laws. In a way, this strand of argumenta-
tion, when used against both popular government and public speech, 
was more potent than the more pragmatic arguments. As a question of 
expediency or utility, the need for free speech or self-government could 
be accepted in principle, if not in every situation. However, if reasons 
based on the nature of society, human nature or deductive reasoning 
could be found to make free speech or self-government irrelevant, it 
would also remove any grounds for the pragmatic argument of ‘neces-
sary evil.’ 
Hall asserted that the main fault of the previous Parliament had 
been “Division, which is the murtheress of Councils,” and “the main 
pretence was Religion.” Besides the immediate dangers of factionalism 
and radicalisation of the political process, Hall saw further disturb-
ing elements in the process that allowed for diminished capabilities for 
reasoned government. Starting from the mental capacities of the ex-
Parliamentarians, whose religious notions, “proceeding from ill made 
brains, and disturbed fancies, strongly tinctured with an hypocondri-
ack melancholy,” Hall continued to question the usefulness of the re-
sulting thoughts. Since they were “not bringing any assurance out of 
the word, or any other sign that they proceed from the Spirit of light,” 
it was clear to postulate that “if they become once Magisterial, [they] 
oblige us to quit our Discourse.” This would mean giving up “our natural 
reason, our experiences drawn even from common sense, the means God 
hath ordained to direct us in civil matters,” in favour of “those Wills-
with-Wisps, or ignes fatui of revelation and pretended Spirit.”304
This metaphor of ‘ignes fatui’ has similarities with Hobbes’ argu-
ment in Leviathan ch. V (Of Reason and Science): “metaphors, and 
senseless and ambiguous words are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon 
them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, 
contention and sedition, or contempt.”305 While Hall’s use of the meta-
phor did obviously not attribute a similar role to rhetorical speech, but 
to pretended religious discourse, the aim was similar: government by 
304 Hall, Confusion Confounded, p. 3. 
305 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 22.
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right reason, void of contention and sedition.306 The Hobbesian allu-
sions are even more pronounced, when after Hall had referred to the 
Stoic view “as was said of old, that man was naturally sociable,” he con-
tinued: “or as a learned Modern hath said, that he is compelled into Society 
meetly for the advantages and necessities of life.” Hall presented both 
of these points leading to the same conclusion, that men rely on being 
protected “by law, which is but the regulation of the force of a Coun-
try.” Otherwise “there shall be nothing but warr and confusion in that 
place,” in “the state of Nature.”307 
Hall continued to assign the main role in his theory of government 
to the rule of law, whereby laws are the representation of right reason 
and nature, against the notion of government through discourse, delib-
eration and compromised interests. On deliberation, the emphasis was 
laid on the inevitable discord in its very nature: “as it happens in all civ-
il debate, that sly and ambitious factions discover not the main at first, 
but endeavour to creep in by insinuations and plausible pretences.”308 
On the role of law, Hall gave praise to how “The Common Law is recta 
ratio, in the determination of Justum between parties, holy and inviolable 
as the Laws of Nature and Reason.” Although it might seem that Hall 
did not appreciate the differences between natural and positive law due 
to his conflation of the two, his point is actually more subtle than that. 
What Hall argued was that though common law was “running in a 
municipal channel,” it was “yet as old and venerable as reason itself.”309 
Nonetheless, Hall recognised that common and natural law, despite 
being the foundation of a society, could not be relied to supply answers 
to every contingency. The “wickedness of humane nature is too subtil,” 
and “the weakness, or incapacity of men” such “that they can provide 
no Law against all emergences and contingences.” Therefore, it was 
only mitigation of “the rigour of the positive Law,” that “may relieve 
the subject” (note: subject, not a citizen). Unless the courts of law would 
306 For more on Hall’s possible connections with Hobbes’ works, cf. Peacey, “Nibbling 
at Leviathan.”
307 Hall, Confusion Confounded, p. 9 [incorrect pagination, sig. Cv].
308 Hall, Confusion Confounded, p. 10 [sig. C2r].
309 Hall, Confusion Confounded, p. 13 [sig. C3v]. 
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apply such mitigation, “making a general Law” would be necessary, 
with the end result that “Laws would become innumerable.”310 There 
is neither room nor need in Hall’s commonwealth for public debate or 
decisions on what those laws might be or who would mitigate them. If 
any cases of publicly airing grievances could be fathomed, they would 
be presumably be dealt with by courts of law rather than in those of 
public opinion. 
In an ironic twist, Hall’s own career of promoting an end to useless 
public debate came to an abrupt end in the spring of 1654. The pay-
ment of his salary had become unreliably irregular, and lacking official 
commissions, he returned to making translations. It has been specu-
lated that he fell out of favour,311 or the financial troubles of the Pro-
tectorate led to his redundancy.312 For both of these reasons there is a 
common denominator: the possibility that the policy he had advocated, 
the suppressions of licentious texts, was deemed succesful enough that 
his services were not considerered worthwhile anymore. In practice 
neither the suppression nor the discontinuation of official propaganda 
was total, and there remained enough printed material in circulation to 
justify various counter-attacks by the writers under study. Nevertheless, 
there were several occasions where the need for official propaganda 
was not overwhelming enough to guarantee regularity of commissions.
It is important to bear in mind that the eagerness to engage in the 
battle of ideas was shared by most republicans in deed, if not always 
in words. Whether their motives for doing so were more principled or 
pecuniary may never be known, but what is certain is that their lives 
were made financially more secure by the demand for propaganda. In 
Hall’s case, as most of his later tracts were written against texts that 
were to be suppressed, it meant that those texts were being extensively 
reproduced in print. This can hardly have been a good incentive for 
keeping him on the payroll – if one could try and stop the action, why 
pay for reaction? 
310 Hall, Confusion Confounded, pp. 13-14 [sigs. C3v-C4r].
311 Peacey, “Nibbling at Leviathan,” p. 244.
312 Cf. also Joad Raymond, “John Hall’s A Method of History: A Book Lost and 
Found (with transcription),” English Literary Renaissance 28(2), 1998. 
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7. Streater’s Observations
John Streater was released from prison in February 1654, and quickly 
returned to his vocation.313 It is not certain whether he was the editor of 
the newsbook Mercurius Aulicus, of which three issues came out between 
20 March and 3 April. At face value, the newsbooks do not follow 
Streater’s earlier animus against Cromwell. On the other hand, there is 
a clear sense of irony in naming a newsbook that praises Cromwell after 
an earlier Royalist newsbook from the mid-1640s. It is also difficult to 
escape a heavy sense of sarcasm in the contents of the newsbooks.314 
Nevertheless, making too many inverted assumptions about the real 
intents of the newsbook could lead to weak interpretations. In any case, 
there is no uncertainty and little irony in the newsbook Streater began 
to publish from April onwards, titled Observations, Historical, Political, and 
Philosophical, Upon Aristotles first Book of Government: Together, With a Narra-
tive of State-Affaires in England, Scotland, and Ireland: As also from other Parts 
beyond the Seas.
Before examining the Observations, there is a case for grappling with 
the question of whether Streater’s punishment affected his writings. 
The evidence is far from clear: on the one hand, his writings before 
and after his prison sentence have much the same intentions, many of 
them use classical allusions extensively, and usually put forward the 
captatio benevolentiae of the disinterested observer. Even in the scholar-
ship arguing for Streater’s compromises with political politeness in his 
Observations, there is an acknowledgement of the presence of such com-
promises in Streater’s Grand Politick Informer.315 It is a paradox of early 
modern writing that the authors who highlight the risk of censorship 
313 Raymond, “John Streater,” p. 570.
314 Adrian Johns, The nature of the book: print and knowledge in the making, Chicago: 1998, 
p. 278n27; George Watson (ed.), The New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature, 
Vol.1, 600-1660, Cambridge: 1974, p. 2109.
315 Raymond, “John Streater,” pp. 573-4.
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in creating slavish fustian, nevertheless defy the censors, thus contra-
dicting their own assertions. Undoubtedly the existence of censorship 
should not be discounted, yet neither should it be exaggerated.316 Per-
haps we should approach the Tacitean critique of self-censorship not so 
much as a causal relationship of sociology, rather than seeing it more as 
a precautionary political principle – after all, some authors do return to 
the fray, without bending the supple knee.
Streater’s Observations is a case in point. On the very first page Streat-
er’s captatio benevolentiae asserts how “it shall not be my Work to divide, 
distract, or disturb.” We can already assume that such an assertion is 
more needed in a situation of enforced censorship than otherwise, and 
the acknowledgement of censorship is explicitly addressed in Streater 
“presuming that the present Authority will not suppress or prevent this 
Work of publike view, being confident they affect Honour and Justice.” 
Of course, Streater’s work could have easily been (and was) interpreted 
as aiming to divide, distract or disturb its readers, but Streater claims 
that by such criteria authors like “Machivel, Suetonius, Tacitus, Poli-
bius, Plutarch and Bodin” ought not to be published to common view 
either.317 Rather than submitting to the requirements of censorship 
Streater argued for latitude in interpreting them.
For heuristic purposes, Streater’s political philosophy in the Obser-
vations can be described as dualistic, with binary oppositions of good 
and bad principles, actions and policies. Many of the pairings are sta-
ples of republican political theory: there is liberty and slavery, tyranny 
and self-government, flattery and oratory, and so forth. Streater man-
aged to connect the good and bad aspects respectively into a virtuous 
and vicious cycle. There are a few nuances to this otherwise somewhat 
Manichean worldview. However, in the interest of easier presentation 
316 See e.g. Annabel Patterson, Censorship and interpretation: the conditions of writing and 
reading in early modern England, Madison: 1984, and its critique in Blair Worden, 
“Literature and political censorship in early modern England,” in Too mighty to be 
free: censorship and the press in Britain and the Netherlands, eds. A.C. Duke, C. A. Tamse, 
Zuthpen: 1987. 
317 [ John Streater], Observations, Historical, Political, and Philosophical, Upon Aristotles first 
Book of Government, no. 1, 4-11 April, London: 1654, pp. 1-2.
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of Streater’s political thought, the binary oppositions will be dealt with 
first, followed by the problems remaining from (and to an extent, caused 
by) the dualism of the whole.
The foundation and reference point for Streater’s theories lay in “the 
Law of Nature, the which is the intent of the Body of this Work.” He 
abstained from fuller elaborations on his understanding of ‘nature’ in 
the law of nature, merely inserting a long quote from Nathaniel Cul-
verwell’s work on the topic. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study 
the relevant result from Streater’s understanding of the law of nature 
is its effect on the nature of government: “it is agreeable to the Law of 
Nature, which received its being from the eternal Law, which maketh 
sweet harmony upon often touching on this string (Do as you would be 
done unto) be contented to be governed as well as to govern.”318 The law 
of nature resulted in republican self-government. Or, as Streater put 
it on the next page, when referring with approval to “the Basis of the 
Government of the State of Lacedemon,” that “all should be free, that all 
should be able to govern.”319
The argument of the naturalness of republican government was fur-
ther advanced by Streater’s elaboration of the nature of law in the final 
issues of Observations, when he considered that “now it would be expedi-
ent to shew what is Law, and what is not Law.” As befits the republican 
nature of law, Streater does not see law as a hindrance against freedom 
but as an enabler of liberty. Man is not dominated when he is “limited 
and bounded by Reason and Laws.” However, unlike for Hall or Mil-
ton, for Streater these limits have to be fully consensual rather than 
discovered: “That is Law which a People, Nation, City, or Commonwealth do 
entirely and unanimously consent unto; not being forced or over-awed to consent 
thereto.” When making the same point from the negative perspective 
Streater put extra emphasis on the lack of domination, but also opened 
318 Streater, Observations, 1, p. 3. Streater’s quote on the ‘origin of being’ and ‘the 
origin of motion and rest’ can be found in Nathaniel Culverwell, An Elegant and 
Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature [1652], Robert A. Greene, Hugh MacCallum 
(eds.), Indianapolis: 2001, pp. 26-27.
319 Streater, Observations, 1, p. 4.
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the ‘unanimous consent’ to cover representative institutions:320 “That is 
not Law, that is imposed upon a people, when neither they, nor those 
deputed by their lawful election, have given their consent thereunto, 
without being awed to such consent, or invited be expecting reward, or 
fearing displeasure if not consenting.”321 
In the last issue of Observations, Streater continued to make further 
distinctions on the question of free consent to laws, i.e. what is the na-
ture of a free person, what are the “distinctions between freemen and 
slaves.” For laws to be valid, they have to be given by people who can 
freely consent: “The freeman is not, nor ought to be subject to any Law, 
but that, unto which he hath consented to be conformable to, not be-
ing awed or forced thereto.” Alternatively, “the slave is to be subject to 
the will of his Lord: the reasons of state of a Tyrant are but his will,” 
i.e. they were not rightly called laws.322 As can be seen, for Streater 
legitimate authority was derived from a conception of consent, which 
depended on extreme sensitivity to any use of force or influence, how-
ever benign it might be. 
These caveats applied to political decision-making as well as indi-
vidual electoral choices. This is still a republican form of liberty, but 
one taken to its individualistic extreme. As such, it would seem to be 
in contradiction with a view of republican polity as one of politically 
active, virtuous citizens in pursuit of the honour gained from vita acti-
va.323 Nevertheless, such views – while perhaps relevant in understand-
ing classical Roman or renaissance Italian ideals of citizenship – are 
not as useful in explaining seventeenth century English republicanism. 
320 Representation was touched explicitly in issue no. 7, where Streater asserted how 
everyone should be consulted about “the good of Societie,” and “if the body be too 
large to meet in Councel together,” then “all free people ought to be in [Councel] 
by their Representatives.” Streater, Observations, 7, p. 52.
321 Streater, Observations, 10, 20 – 27 June, pp. 75-76.
322 Streater, Observations, 11, 27 June – 4 July, pp. 83.
323 This ideal of positive participation is familiar to us from works of e.g. Hannah 
Arendt and John Pocock: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: 1998; 
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition, Princeton: 1975, and Pocock, “Foundations and Moments,” 
Cambridge: 2006, pp. 43-46.
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Streater belongs to a strand of republicanism for which the argument 
for voting relied more on avoidance of being under the will of others, 
than on any inherent virtue of participation.
Another important aspect – already touched upon as being ‘agree-
able to the Law of Nature’ – was the rotation of government, i.e. no 
one should be elected to power indefinitely, but “He is a Governor of 
a Commonwealth that commandeth and obeyeth by turns.”324 What 
Streater presented as “the best way to preserve Society and Govern-
ment in its purity,” was “to change those that govern, often.” Streater 
continued this point with a general description of the nature of good 
government, appealing to the authority of “Hermes Trismegistus,”325 who 
“calleth Man A Great Miracle.” In taking account of the aforementioned 
topics, the decription is quite concise: 
Man is indued with a divine Understanding, to observe the order of the 
Celestial bodies, and to rule and govern the Terrestrial; in which every 
man, according to nature, should have a share; the which may be said to 
be, when those that govern are deputed or elected by the people, and when 
they continue limited by time how long to continue, and by Laws how to 
rule.326
Streater had no time for arguments about the ‘mad multitude,’ since 
for him “the people onely are the best affecters, and the best affecters 
of publique good.”327 However, Streater’s popular allegiance should not 
be exaggerated either. It is quite plausible to argue that to a large extent 
every form of representative democracy aims at some manner of elite 
rule, and in seventeenth century context this was certainly the case.328 
Streater was possibly the most popularly minded republican of the pe-
riod, yet when he presented the various forms of government “with all 
324 Streater, Observations, 2, April 4 – 19, p. 9.
325 The most likely source for this quote is John Everard’s translation of the Corpus 
Hermeticum, The Divine Pymander in XVII books, London: 1650.
326 Streater, Observations, 10, p. 73. Streater’s immediate addition to this part has 
an interesting note of Stoic sociableness: “Man is partaker of Reason, by means 
whereof, men are associated each to other.”
327 Streater, Observations, 9, June 13 – 20, p. 67.
328 Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government, Cambridge: 1997.
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their Reasons of State,” even to him a “Democratical Government” was 
defined as government “by the better sort of the people, without respect 
of Nobility or Riches at their constituting.”329 The difference, as shown 
above, was that these “better sort” had limited terms in office and were 
directly elected. 
Despite the favourable description Streater was giving of popular 
rule, his political thinking was influenced as much by anti-tyranny as 
pro-democracy. For example, the commonplace argument in favour of 
political decision-making in senates, parliaments or other leading coun-
cils involving more than one person, had been that in a multitude of 
counsellors there is strength. Streater, however, put the emphasis on se-
curity from tyranny, since “a small Councel is easier wrought to the will 
of a Tyrant then a great Councel.”330 The foundation for anti-tyranny 
lay again in “the Law of Nature, which intendeth nothing but harmony, 
sweetness, and mildness,” and was thus diametrically opposed to being 
in “servitude of a domineering, usurping, insulting, mad Tyrant.” It 
seems that Streater was fully aware of the risk of equivocation on words 
like ‘tyranny,’ since he immediately added that “he that ruleth by Force 
is little better.”331 The telltale sign of trouble was in grounding authority 
in power, whereas quibbling on words would be beside the point. 
In Observations, Streater had little time for arguments from necessity. 
“Those that rule by force,” despite any protestations to the contrary, 
were quite simply “mad; they have lost the Reason of true and just 
Policie.” Because of (and it seems, despite) this loss of mental faculties, 
those who ruled by force aimed to “repair to Force, to affright, aston-
ish, and amaze people, thereby to awe them to obedience.”332 However, 
for Streater such displays of power could not hide the true nature of 
things: “Those that make use of Force to keep the World in slavery are 
329 Streater, Observations, 1, pp. 4, 6.
330 John Streater, “A politick commentary on the life of Caius Julius Caesar,” Ch. 3, 
in Perfect and impartial intelligence, London: 16 May – 2 June 1654, p. 21. 
331 Streater, Observations, 11, p. 85. The connection to Hobbes is not explicit, but 
plausible.
332 Streater, Observations, 11, p. 85.
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but slaves themselves,”333 – that is, slaves to their own passions, having 
given up on reason. And ultimately, the attempts to force or to awe 
people into believing otherwise would also fail, since “when a people 
dare do no other then flatter and lye, they will flatter and lye, and call 
them vertuous and noble Princes, which they know in their hearts to be 
no other then Tyrants, and Enemies to their Country.”334 Accordingly, 
for tyrants, there was definitely an incentive not to allow free speech.
Streater gave examples of such tyrants, like “Simple Caligula,” who 
“made Laws to make it treason to say he did otherwise than govern 
well, or that he committed treason.”335 Many of those in power who 
had failed to govern well, had “thought to secure themselves by mak-
ing Laws, that it shall be Treason or some other high crime, to say that 
they have done, or that they do that which is not just.” Some of the 
arguments Streater gave against such censorship are already familiar, 
e.g. the pragmatic Tacitean argument how “that which a people are 
forbid, they desire most.” Accordingly, “those that are limited in their 
words, are the more unlimited in their thoughts, they being deprived of 
speaking, take the greater liberty of thinking” – i.e. censorship cannot 
guarantee the repression of dissent as such, but may even encourage 
it. And in shooting the messengers, censorship restricts the chances of 
knowing about causes of dissent. Indeed, Streater suggests that if the 
efforts put to repressing dissent were allocated to taking away the cause 
“the effect would have ceased.”336
However, in tyrannies this was not going to take place. For one 
reason, tyrants and their sycophants were more willing to engage in 
rhetorical redescription of dissent than tackle the complaints. If any 
of “the people complain of such practices, as oppressive, immediately 
they have been taken to be disturbers, factions, seditious and traiter-
ous persons.”337 Ultimately, because the “Tyrants cannot indure to be 
told of their Tyrannie; or to have it said of them that they be Tyrants, 
333 Streater, Observations, 1, p. 4.
334 Streater, Observations, 8, p. 62 (incorrectly paginated p. 58).
335 Streater, Observations, 7, May 30 – June 6, p. 51.
336 Streater, Observations, 8, p. 60.
337 Streater, Observations, 8, p. 61 (incorrectly paginated p. 57).
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and Vsurpers, therefore they debar a man of that noble priviledge of 
Liberty of speech, yea of the truth.” There are some nuances to the 
unyielding view Streater presented here, which will be discussed later. 
At this stage, the general approach is said to be that “The Tyrant.. 
Chaineth up the mouth of man, depriveth him of that which is his right 
by nature, as Aristotle here saith, he hath speech given him to dignifie 
what is just, and what is unjust.”338 
Streater’s arguments in favour of free speech rely heavily on the lan-
guage of natural law. He argued that free speech was “natural for all 
men,” as “Man is a rational Creature, and hath power and is able to 
judge truly, and aright of all causes and things.”339 Accordingly, it was 
“Law of nature which ordained speech,” the liberty of which “none 
ought to be deprived of.”340 In addition, speech naturally took place in 
a socialising context: “Man is an understanding creature, and therefore 
a sociable creature, whose property it is to meet and assemble togeth-
er.” The logical next step was the conduct of popular politics through 
speech, as men met “in their Senate-house or Townhouse to treat of 
their affairs: the which Meetings are the Priviledges and Rights by Na-
ture that belong to such and so noble a creature as Man is.”341 
In those “Councels of the people, in their Parliaments or Senates, 
liberty of speech is to be used.” However, as Streater did not advocate 
merely a direct democracy, he went further in even giving guidelines 
to the deliberative rhetoric of those who “represent the people, being 
elected of and by the people.” They should speak with “boldness,” “like 
the people, who have a natural inclination to speak truth with bold-
338 Streater, Observations, 8, pp. 59-60.
339 Streater, Observations, 8, p. 60.
340 Streater, Observations, 8, pp. 61-62 (incorrectly paginated pp. 57-58). For the latter 
quote, the context does include some caveats: “Sir Edward Cook, 4 part Instit. chap. 
High Court of Parliament, fol. 8. reporteth, That the first thing the Commons of 
England craved upon their first meeting in Parliament, was Liberty of Speech; the 
which indeed none ought to be deprived of, provided that it extend not to scandal, 
and that what is said is spoken with wisdom, gravity, and constancie.” Further 
caveats will follow. 
341 Streater, Observations, 7, pp. 51-52. And as shown earlier, Streater saw that partici-
pation in such meetings should be universal to all free people.
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ness.” ‘Boldness’ might refer to lack of propriety or to parrhesiastic 
frankness, but a more likely candidate would be ‘bravery.’ When listing 
the duties and ideal characteristics of representatives, Streater affirmed 
how they “ought not to be daunted by the greatest Person or Forces 
under heaven.” By being “free from force and over-awing,” they could 
meaningfully use free speech in their debates “of what is profitable and 
what is not profitable to the Commonwealth; of what is just, and what 
is unjust.”342 
It was also in the nature of Streater’s republicanism that there would 
have to be persons who govern over their equals – even if they change 
places in steady intervals. And among one of his distinctions between 
freemen and slaves was “That the freeman, or the free Commonwealth, 
can bring them to be accountable, that govern command or rule.”343 In 
order to facilitate the governors’ accountability, there would have to be 
free speech. However, Streater does not argue for free speech so much 
as a necessary evil, but in more positive terms. The argument for free 
speech was due to the “the greatest advantage” to be gained: the “ben-
efit the freedom of Speech will bring to a Commonwealth” is “that it is 
chiefly to detect Injustice and Oppression.”344 
At the same time, the benefits of the freedom of speech could also be 
shared by those in power, as it was “not unprofitable or those that obtain 
power justly, to permit of sociable meetings of mankinde, permitting 
them to have liberty to treat of Government.” As has been shown, this 
was to allow for the natural right, but in addition it could be allowed 
for by “those that are in government” when they “doe govern well,” 
since then the citizens “will speake well of them.”345 It was in the com-
mon interest of the governed and the governors, when those in power 
were “aright informed, whether they govern aright or no; whether they 
please the people or displease them.” Streater was not explicit whether 
such a court of public opinion would reflect right reason or whether it 
should be followed in every circumstance, so such strong interpreta-
342 Streater, Observations, 8, pp. 62 (incorrectly paginated 58). 
343 Streater, Observations, 11, p. 85.
344 Streater, Observations, 8, pp. 62 (incorrectly paginated 58).
345 Streater, Observations, 7, p. 52.
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tions seem unwarranted. What he did suggest was that the lack of valid 
information about public opinion was “one reason why that so many 
Changes in State and Commonwealths happen.”346 Avoiding political 
troubles through censorship was to put the cart before the horse. 
In order to get valid information, it was necessary to refrain from 
any over-awing or other methods of domination, coercive or gentle. It 
was “not profitable for those in power to ask” about their performance 
“of those he obligeth to him by committing great Trusts or favours.” 
The problem was not merely the conflict of interest that might lead to 
receiving biased, slavish advice. More dangerously, it could led to a 
situation where those already corrupted by favouritism would use their 
position of advice for furthering their personal interests: “they account 
that the public good that is good to them.” In such a case, the rulers 
would not only lack information, but would be actively fed disinforma-
tion by “those that dayly receive profit by their favour.” Accordingly, 
“those that govern are wonderfully deceived in looking upon the flat-
tering titles, praises, and prayers of those that seek or expect favours.”347 
Pandering to power was not merely slavish, but detrimental through 
the resulting factionalism.
The dangers of flattery and demagogy are familiar from the oth-
er republicans under study, yet their existence has been an argument 
against monarchy as well as popular rule. Streater, however, had una-
bashedly favourable views on the nature of the people – ‘mob,’ ‘multi-
tude,’ or other such pejorative terms were not part of his rhetoric in Ob-
servations. Indeed, at several instances his views seem borderline naïve: 
writing that “if people have not cause to speak evil of those in power, 
they will not speak evill of them” can give an impression of someone 
with a tin ear for libel.348 Likewise, the expectations Streater has of the 
‘natural’ inclinations of the people and their representatives, seem to 
leave the republic a hostage to fortune: “those who are employed in the 
Supreme Councels of a Commonwealth, as they are to arm themselves 
with wisdom and courage, so they are to lay aside all partiality and 
346 Streater, Observations, 8, p. 60.
347 Streater, Observations, 8, pp. 59-60.
348 Streater, Observations, 8, p. 60.
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private respect, and onely minde that of the publike.”349
Nevertheless, there are a few plausible explanations for Streater’s 
virtuous populism. One is a question of marketing tactics: the most 
positive statements of the natural goodness of people and the benefits 
of free speech can for the most part be found in issue number 8 of the 
Observations, whereas other issues do include more nuanced and quali-
fied views. Second is the existence of institutional arrangements, checks 
and balances, that would not leave the welfare of the republican whole 
completely dependent on the moral integrity of its parts.350 Third is that 
by abstracting the people as a whole into a benevolent force allowed 
Streater to be suspicious of the individual parts. Thus Streater could si-
multaneously assert that “the voice of the people is as the voice of God,” 
and “the people have no end in them but good”351 and also give advice 
how “the best way to be sure not to be deceived, is to suspect all men, 
but not shew the suspition.”352 In a sense, Streater’s political theory al-
most needs demagogues and flatterers, in order to take the blame from 
the abstract ‘people,’ who “are not so soon deceived, as those in power 
are, by their minions and flatterers.”353
Accordingly, Streater put great weight on avoiding the dangers 
wrought by “Flatterers,” the “wicked guides,” who “will for their own 
ends not value the publike ruine and destruction.” It was the “greatest 
Wisdom and Art that can be shewed by those that govern,.. to avoid Flat-
terers, and such persons that do aym at ngthing [sic] but themselves.”354 
As usual, these characteristics applied to a demagogue as well, to him 
who “incites and stirs up the souldiery of the Commonwealth to re-
bel to commit treason,” or “tickleth the people with pleasing plausible 
works, and words.”355 Such abusers of rhetoric were clearly a far cry 
349 Streater, Observations, 9, p. 69. Cf. also the reference to the “Councel-Chamber of 
Reinspourg [Regensburg?]” on the same page. 
350 Further elaboration of this point will follow shortly. 
351 Streater, Observations, 7, p. 52.
352 Streater, Observations, 1, p. 2.
353 Streater, Observations, 7, p. 52.
354 Streater, Observations, 1, p. 2. 
355 Streater, “A politick commentary on the life of Caius Julius Caesar,” pp. 22-23.
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from the “eloquence and eloquent men” of the Ciceronian ideal.356
To the two group of abusers, flatterers and demagogues, for whom 
“the pretence of publike good is the onely way to carry on a designe for 
a particular interest,” were also added false prophets: those who would 
induce the people “to expect happiness in another world, rather then 
Liberty in this.”357 The antipathy against firebrand preachers was one 
of the things Streater had in common with the other republicans of the 
age. Streater painted them unapologetically as dissemblers, who were 
“calling this a truth to day, & a ly to morrow.” For them, “most com-
monly that is called truth, which those in power doe own.” Through 
such sanctimonious opportunism it had come to be that “at this day 
Religion is the only thing that most in power make use of to awe people 
to obedience.”358 Awe, and thus lead into slavery.
Due to the actions of such individuals, “those that intend evil, or are 
of an evil minde,” there would even have to be some restraints upon 
free speech. For Streater, “discipline” was justified in such cases, but if 
unfounded or arbitrary, “it preserveth not people, but instead thereof 
brings them into perfect servitude.”359 In the end, Streater did not so 
much have a problem with censorship per se, as with its abuse – if it was 
not arbitrary, then it would not necessarily be dominating.
The question of freedom as non-domination, of true liberty, sur-
faced ipso facto in Streater’s grappling with Aristotle’s Politics, when it 
came to the question of natural slavery. By the 11th issue of Observations, 
Streater put flatly his answer to the question “is ther a bondslave by 
nature,” as “I deny.” The main argument, as ever, was from ‘nature’: 
if there were slaves by nature, there must be Lords also, “the which 
356 Streater, Observations, 10, p. 73: “The commendation of Cicero, lib. I. de Oratore, to 
eloquence and eloquent men:.. also in lib.6. de Repub. or dream of Scipio.” Cicero 
also quoted in issue 6, p. 42 on “his 3[.] Book of Laws,” and 10, p. 78 on “(lib 3. 
de natur. Deor.)” These books, while commonplaces in the republican tradition, are 
also particularly interesting in the connection between Streater and James Har-
rington. 
357 Streater, Observations, 9, p. 70 (incorrectly paginated 68).
358 Streater, Observations, 6, p. 45.
359 Streater, Observations, 9, p. 70 (incorrectly paginated 68). 
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is contrary to nature.”360 Nevertheless, Streater immediately added a 
caveat “that in policy, it is reasonable and requisite to reduce all man-
kinde to a well-tempered and composed servitude.” Streater elaborated 
on the content of such ‘servitude’ “that the spirits of mankinde be not 
depressed or dejected” – the mark of domination – “but that service 
should be rather to teach experience, and restrain the Circle of Nature, 
until they are of age and of discretion that it extend not its limits.”361 
This was to accomodate the needs of education – the period in life 
where the status of being dominated was unavoidable. 
For Streater, the role of education had two significant aspects: the 
emancipatory and the traditional. The emancipatory nature meant 
that even though there were no natural slaves, the existence of slavery 
and enslavement were evident truths. The risk of enslavement should 
and would cause freemen to revolt, but since slavery breeds servility, 
what could be done to those who have never tasted freedom in the 
first place? Streater presented learning as a method of emancipation, as 
“noble and notable vertues.. may be hatched by the gentle warmth of 
education, in the breast of the slave or of the servant.” There was noth-
ing in ‘nature’ prohibiting a slave adequately “intelligible to know times 
and seasons for planting, plowing and sowing,” from being “as capable 
to attain to the knowledge of the sciences.”362 The knowledge of which 
contained the traditional aspect of education, i.e. the upbringing of 
good citizens. Streater’s advocacy of this commonplace had even an air 
of a cliché, when he referred to how “the City or Civil Society do cause the 
liberal Sciences, the art & manner of Government to be taught,” so that “it 
may be supposed to be a good means to arrive at the End” [italics mine].363 
Quite possibly Streater did not hold formal education in such a great 
360 Streater, Observations, 11, p. 83. Note the difference to Milton, who “for all his ha-
tred of tyranny and love of liberty, was opposed to the enslavement of the wrong 
people rather than to slavery per se”: in Steven Jablonski, “Ham’s Vicious Race: 
Slavery and John Milton,” Studies in English Literature, (37), 1997, p. 188.
361 Streater, Observations, 11, p. 83. Seemingly servitude was an inflammatory term, 
considering the way Streater immediately began qualifying it: “I mean, tempered 
& composed so,..”
362 Streater, Observations, 11, pp. 83-84.
363 Streater, Observations, 1, p. 7.
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esteem as his other contemporaries in the task of encouraging virtue 
out of free citizens. What Streater presented as better means to such 
an end were theatres, showing “Plays and Interludes to heighten the 
minds of people.” Not just any performances but those “wherein are 
notably presented the Genues [sic] of a State,” namely anti-tyrannical 
drama. Another notable difference to other republicans under study is 
in the role of passions in the creation of virtuous citizens. Whereas the 
commonplace argument on behalf of education would include learn-
ing to control one’s passions and to use right reason, Streater specifi-
cally argues on behalf of passions in promoting a hatred of tyranny. For 
this reason, theatre plays enjoy a more important role than passionless 
teaching could: “they are as passions and as lovers pulses, which do 
shew the soul more quicker then do words or actions.”364 Nevertheless, 
the role of any form of education and the civic virtues thus nurtured, 
was of secondary importance to the role of institutions in the preserva-
tion of liberty.
As mentioned above, a partial solution for deciphering Streater’s 
populism lies in the organisation of political institutions in such a way 
as to avoid leaving the welfare of the republic a hostage to fortune. 
Whether the rulers were good or not was beside the point, since even 
a good absolute ruler was still an absolute ruler. The possible benefits 
would not outweigh the potential losses. Accordingly, “the way for a 
people to prevent the receiving of evil from absolute Authorities, is, 
to be sure not to receive good from absolute Authorities.” In practical 
terms, or in Streater’s words, “the English whereof is this, That limita-
tions be upon those that have power.” To fully appreciate Streater’s sus-
picion of the corrupting nature of unlimited power, consider his views 
on ‘theocracy’: if “Angels sent by God were to govern a Nation,” then 
surely God “would have that Nation to limit those Angels by Laws and 
Ordinances, that were contrived and formed by reason, else the Angels 
would soon become Devils.”365
364 Streater, Observations, 4, p. 30, as quoted in Nigel Smith, “Popular republicanism 
in the 1650s: John Streater’s ‘heroick mechanicks,’” in Milton and Republicanism, 
eds. David Armitage et al., Cambridge: 1995, p. 151.
365 Streater, Observations, 10, p. 77.
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Some of these limits were prosaic, requiring that those in power 
should be checked by laws, and others have already been mentioned 
earlier – laws should be founded on consensual authority, and legisla-
tors should be held accountable through elections and free speech. In 
addition to such “distinctions between freemen and slaves,” Streater in-
cluded separation of powers: “The freeman or free Commonwealth, is 
to put a difference between the Legislative power, the Executive power, 
and judicial power: if either two or all three are joyned in one, it is no 
other then a tyranny.”366 However, Streater omitted more detailed de-
scriptions on the practicalities of the separation of powers. In the first 
issue of Observations he mentioned only in passing how “it is the opinion 
of some,” that a republic “mixt partly Aristocratical, and partly Demo-
cratical” might be a preferred choice, “for then the people could have 
curbed the pride and oppression of the Senate, without indangering the 
State.”367 Otherwise Streater considered the rules of limiting powers “a 
Mystery not fit to be discovered now.”368
The practicalities were thus omitted, but Streater did strongly ad-
vocate a general understanding of politics, which would allow a set of 
criteria for judging the propriety of institutional arrangements to be 
formed. At points, these criteria seem as ambiguous as those found in 
more modern institutional mission statements. To give a few examples: 
“Commonwealth” should “be accounted perfect or imperfect, as the 
several Members thereof are either perfect or imperfect, and as they are 
arightly proportioned;”369 “he that frameth in his minde the building 
of a stately structure, doth not consider the parts, but the whole; and 
after he hath framed the whole fabrick in his minde, then he beginneth 
to consider the parts.”370 Considering Streater’s background in engi-
neering, the use of such metaphors not only makes sense, but it is also 
important to understand how ‘built’ republican instruments – such as 
366 Streater, Observations, 11, p. 83.
367 Streater, Observations, 1, p. 6.
368 Streater, Observations, 11, p. 86. Streater’s “now” might have meant the next issue, 
but as this turned out to be the last issue of Observations, we shall never know.
369 Streater, Observations, 3, p. 18.
370 Streater, Observations, 9, p. 66.
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institutions – are of different degree of ‘perfection’ from that found in 
nature.371 
As has been shown, much of the argumentation in Streater’s po-
litical theory rests on the laws of nature dictating the necessity of free 
speech, social behaviour, etc. Nevertheless, these laws provide only the 
foundations for the best possible society, rather than guaranteeing a 
perfect one. The basic ontological premise for the unattainability of 
natural perfection is because “if it were so that any thing could be per-
fect, it would be good; and there is not one thing good, but that which 
Hermes Trismegistus calleth The onely Good; meaning God.”372 Since aim-
ing to such natural, Godly perfection was clearly futile, the political 
striving for embetterment, proceeding “forwarder towards Perfection,” 
would need to mean the redefinition of ‘perfection’ in terms of the 
means rather than the end: “in Cities endeavouring to live well and to 
press towards Good, is the Perfection.”373 Similarly, the ‘perfection’ in 
things built – buildings, institutions – does not follow from their ‘natu-
ral’ perfection, but from their functionality: how they provide for the 
well-being and harmony of the whole. Thus, their exact shapes and 
forms would be of lesser importance than the guiding principles, the 
most important of which was the common good.
The main method of transferring the principle of perfect building 
into political institutions was through public interest: “If it be so that 
the whole is before the parts; then it may be safely concluded, that the 
public should be before the private.”374 The appeal to the role of self-
interest was made in defence of elections and the rotation of offices. 
Popularly elected governors make for better choices, since “it is most 
certain that they do give advise with a great deal lesse respecting of any 
particular interest.”375 Without the rotation of offices those in power 
“make not laws for the society, but for themselves, and in favour of their 
371 Johns, The nature of the Book, p. 279.
372 Streater, Observations, 7, p. 49. The Corpus Hermetica had been translated recently, 
in 1650.
373 Streater, Observations, 7, pp. 49-50.
374 Streater, Observations, 9, p. 66.
375 Streater, Observations, 8, p. 60.
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interest.”376 However, rather than arguing for an elite (of one or many) 
who would be able to ascertain the public interest, Streater claimed that 
the maintenance of liberty through popular self-government was only 
possible “when several interests are incorporated into the one publick 
interest.”377 As befits Streater’s way of riding roughshod over details, the 
exact method of this incorporation was omitted from the Observations.
In concluding this account of Observations, we can note how Streater’s 
approach to free speech has affinities with our current positive asser-
tions on it. However, when presenting such ‘winning arguments,’ there 
is all the more reason to guard against merely transposing our present 
understanding to the seventeenth-century frame of reference. Despite 
his connection of tyranny with censorship and popular republics with 
free speech, Streater also claimed that an absolute monarch would be 
“free to permit the liberty of speech,” if he ruled well.378 Streater pro-
ceeded to give a number of examples of such cases, referring to Paolo 
Giovio on how “Many Princes have esteemed of the liberty of speech at 
a high rate,” and Tacitus on “the difference between those Princes that 
are just, noble, and vertuous; and those that are corrupt and of base mind.”379
Considering Streater’s strong advocacy of republicanism, this might 
seem odd on first reading. In the very beginning of Observations, Streater 
had argued that Princes and great men were inherently injurious to 
common good even despite their wisdom and valour.380 Furthermore, 
according to Streater, the “free Commonwealth, is to put a difference 
between the Legislative power, the Executive power, and judicial pow-
er: if either two or all three are joyned in one, it is no other then a 
tyranny.”381 But if by definition an absolute monarch, even a benevolent 
376 Streater, Observations, 7, p. 53.
377 Streater, Observations, 5, p. 35. 
378 Streater, Observations, 8, pp. 59-60. 
379 Streater, Observations, 8, p. 61 (incorrectly paginated 57).
380 Streater, Observations, 1, p. 3. Reasons given make for familiar reading: “they have 
too much liberty.. they abound all things.. their Minions and Flatterers, do no 
good.. all or most Ministers of State are detestable, foolish, and covetous.. igno-
rance in affairs of State,” etc. 
381 Streater, Observations, 11, p. 83.
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one, inherently wields tyrannous power leading to a loss of liberty, how 
could liberty of speech even exist under such a ruler? 
One part of the answer lies in the nature of free speech, which, up 
to a point, can be useful to the purposes of a tyrant. As in the case of 
Nero, who “pretended hatred to flatterers; (that was but to invite free-
dom of speech, the better to discover mens mindes and affections).”382 
This is the familiar Tiberian argument, of paying lip service to laws 
only as long as it is needed. Nevertheless, the crux of the matter is that, 
despite the connections and compatibility between republican liberty 
and free speech, they are not quite the same thing. This point was not 
lost on Tacitus, whom Streater quoted on the rule of “Prince Nerva of sa-
cred memor, and of the Emperour Trajane,” when “a man might THINK WHAT 
HE WOULD, AND SAY WAT (sic) HE THOUGHT.” This favourable 
situation was “a rare felicity of the time,” i.e., a chance, subject to lucky 
circumstances.383 Free speech could exist where liberty did not, even if 
its status would be more secure in a republican form of government. In 
the end, republican liberty is a question of status, whereas rights and 
privileges can be either granted or taken, or if natural, protected or 
limited, by authorities of any kind.
8. Nedham and Milton for the Protectorate
It should come as no surprise that Marchamont Nedham had few 
problems in accommodating himself to the new political situation after 
1653. He has been attributed as the author of A true state of the case of the 
Commonwealth, published in February 1654.384 This attribution is taken 
382 Streater, Observations, 10, p. 76.
383 Streater, Observations, 8, p. 61 (incorrectly paginated 57). The quote is from 
Tacitus, Histories, 1.1, “Rara temporum felicitate, ubi sentire quae velis, et quae 
sentias dicere licet.” The translation is Henry Savile’s [1591] – except the use of 
capital letters, which was Streater’s choice of emphasis.
384 Full title: [Marchamont Nedham], A true state of the case of the Commonvvealth of Eng-
land, Scotland, and Ireland, and the dominions thereto belonging; in reference to the late estab-
lished government by a Lord Protector, and a Parlament. Manifesting therein, not only a consis-
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in this study as plausible enough, as there are certainly large portions of 
the text which are familiar and consistent with Nedham’s earlier views 
and writings. However, the text does have some aspects which would 
suggest that it was either an uncharacteristic or at least innovative work 
by Nedham, or that he was not the sole author.385 
For example, the amount of religious rhetoric throughout the text is 
unlike Nedham’s earlier works. As for the content and the arguments 
brought forward, there were some novel emphases. The restriction of 
the powers of the Parliament was defended as preventing the legislators 
from making laws needlessly and endlessly.386 The argument for the 
separation of powers got a novel spin due to the freedom of debate in 
the Parliament: if Parliament would take on the task of the judiciary, 
individual members could claim non-responsibility in case of malad-
ministration due to their free speech.387 
This particular argument would have been a very easy target for 
authors such as Streater, who would base their case in favor of regular 
elections precisely on the need to hold parliamentarians accountable 
for their policies and actions. Claiming freedom from accountability 
because of free speech simply would not follow. However, and this is 
where the text has more affinities with Nedham’s earlier works, A true 
state makes no case for the need for authority based on popular rule 
through regular elections. Legitimate authority can be said to come 
from the people, when it is not hereditary or derived from inherent 
superiority. If these conditions are met, as in the case of the Protec-
tencie with, and necessary consequence upon the foregoing alterations; but also a full conformity 
to the declared principles and engagements of the Parlament and Army. It being the judgment 
of divers persons, who, throughout these late troubles, have approved themselves faithfull to the 
cause and interest of God and their country. Presented to the publick, for the satisfaction of oth-
ers, London: 1654. 
385 To Blair Worden, Nedham being the sole author has not been ‘persuasively’ 
contested: Worden, Literature and Politics, p. 428. However, considering how much 
of Worden’s book is dedicated to the interconnectedness of authors and their 
works, it should not be beyond the realm of the probable that A true state had extra 
input from others. 
386 Nedham, A true state, pp. 9-11, 23-25.
387 Nedham, A true state, p. 24. 
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torate, such a rule of the realm can be defined as being “sufficiently 
popular.”388
Similarly to Nedham’s earlier works, in A true state more weight is 
put on the freedom of conscience than on the freedom of public speech. 
The “great care of the Parlament” was “to make a Christian provision 
for the Liberty of tender Consciences.” This task involved “excluding 
ever licentious and blasphemous Opinions and Practices.”389 As for the 
duties “incumbent upon the Magistrate,” they included the provision 
“for the Civil peace, and to prevent fore-seen evils and inconveniences 
growing upon the Commonwealth, tending to Confusion.” Such in-
stances included all occasions “given to subtile heads and carnal minds 
to display innumerable Parties and Factions under the banner of Re-
ligion, spreading abroad most blasphemous Opinions.”390 As earlier, 
Nedham saw religious demagogues as one of the main dangers threat-
ening the state: “the licentious subverting of all Order and Govern-
ment,” “under the profession of Christ” to “the apparent hazard, vexa-
tion, and disquiet of the Commonwealth.” In the struggle “to restrain 
such as shall abuse their Liberty to the Civil injury of others, and to the 
actual disturbance of the publick Peace,” the ideal of free speech would 
have to yield to the “way of Coercion.”391 
It is noteworthy that the argument is hedged to such a great extent. 
The text does not include an outright dismissal of the ideal of free speech, 
and the exceptional nature of the current situation is emphasised at 
every turn. Nevertheless, it would be too conjectural to interpret from 
the mere absence of negative views that Nedham was emphatically for 
free speech either. One plausible assumption that could be interpreted 
from A true state, is that freedom of speech was among other aspects of a 
political philosophy that aimed for a golden mean. The contemporary 
political arrangement represented well this ideal in having “the Uni-
tive vertue (but nothing else) of Monarchy,” “the admirable Counsel 
of Aristocracie,” and “the industry and courage of Democracie.” Due 
388 Nedham, A true state, pp. 28-29.
389 Nedham, A true state, p. 41.
390 Nedham, A true state, p. 42.
391 Nedham, A true state, p. 43.
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to this mixed government, “the Frame of Government appears so well 
bounded on both sides, against Anarchie and Tyrannie,” proving it to 
be “a seasonable Mean.”392 In the quest for a balance between these two 
extremes, freedom of speech would not enjoy a sacrosanct status.
In the summer of 1654, Oliver Cromwell summoned the first Pro-
tectorate Parliament, but the election did not result in a legislative body 
characterised by harmony and mutual understanding. As the session 
started in September, so did the outpouring of critical political pam-
phlets. Nedham returned to the task of countering such ‘seditious libel’ 
in October, with a newsbook called The Observator, with a summary of intel-
ligence. The newsbook was mainly dedicated to defending the prevailing 
form of government. Alas, only two issues were published – to which 
the reason could conceivably be the one already raised with John Hall: 
that perhaps not every single piece of counter-propaganda was neces-
sarily deemed worth paying for. 
In the case of the Observator, especially in its first issue, the main 
thrust of argument was to present the targets as open displays of mental 
disorders. Aptly, the motto of the newsbook was ‘semel insanivimus, 
omnes’ (we have all been mad once). Presumably this approach also 
allowed Nedham to fully plumb the depths of his forte, i.e. scatologi-
cal humour: “IT’s a mad world, my Masters, when the Press and the 
People are troubled with such a Loosness, that whatever they take in, 
runs through them presently; which is a main reason why so many 
worshipfull Penmen are condemned weekly to the Privies instead of the 
Gallies.”393 In comparison to such wit on Nedham’s behalf, his oppo-
nents, the “unparallel’d Vermin,” spewed “Comedies” weekly from the 
press, “without the trouble of good Letters or care of good manners.”394
The need to counter such writers was not merely due to their un-
comeliness, but for the effects their writings had. In the second issue 
Nedham’s metaphors changed from the intestinal to those of incinera-
tion: “ONE had need cry out Fire, Fire, for a Reformation of Pamphlets, 
392 Nedham, A true state, pp. 51-52.
393 Marchamont Nedham, The Observator, with a summary of intelligence, London: Oct 
24 - 31 1654, no. 1, p. 1.
394 Nedham, The Observator, 1, p. 2.
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or else they may fire both City and Country.” The continued analogy 
might fail, but the sense of emergency and willful destruction carries 
through: “The single-sheeted Incendiaries walk now in state, and toss Gra-
nado’s without controll.”395 And as in Nedham’s earlier writings, the 
main agents of destruction that needed to be quenched, remained the 
same: “those Vagabond Factions, that ramble about, under the name 
of Religion, to blow the Bellows of Sedition,” “giddy Incendiaries, that 
clothe themselves with the name of Gods people” – i.e. religious dema-
gogues.396 
It is worth noting the selection of Nedham’s targets. For Nedham to 
shower abuse on William Prynne, Spittelhouse or other perceived Fifth 
Monarchists was not unusual, but as has been shown, John Streater was 
also responsible for very critical writings against the new form of gov-
ernment that Nedham was defending. Yet The Observator steered clear 
of any comments on Streater’s works.397 This omission could be due 
to Nedham not openly disagreeing with Streater’s brand of republi-
canism. There is some evidence, albeit scanty, of connections between 
Streater and Nedham,398 and there is no evidence of the type of ani-
mosity between John Hall and Streater. Nevertheless, from an empiri-
cal viewpoint, the lack of evidence means the question must remain 
ultimately unresolved, even if the silence speaks volumes.
When Nedham was engaged to counter the domestic enemies of 
the commonwealth, Milton continued to take the fight to the foreign-
ers. Joannis Miltoni Angli Pro Populo Anglicano Defensio Secunda, hereinafter 
Second Defence of the English People, was published in Latin in May 1654. It 
was written against a libel entitled Regii sanguinis clamor ad coelum adversus 
paricidas Anglicanos that came out in 1652; i.e., before the dissolution of 
the Parliament. Most of the tract seems to have been written before 
April 1653,399 but it is treated at this point of the study since some of its 
395 Nedham, The Observator, 2, (Oct 31 – Nov 7), p. 9.
396 Nedham, The Observator, 2, pp. 12, 27.
397 Outside the apparent similarities between the titles of Observations and Observator, 
which were rather commonplace at the time. 
398 Worden, Literature and Politics, pp. 313-16.
399 Cf. Worden, Literature and Politics on the composition of the tract.
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parts are relevant to the events after that date.
The Second Defense continued Milton’s line of inveighing against the 
“multitude,” those of “the wonted manner,” and “blind superstition of 
the mob” (CPW 4:549, 551). Milton did not share the Machiavellian 
view of people as inherently decent, but often misled: rather he sees the 
sole positive aspect in them as their English character,400 which could 
in best cases keep them from their natural, base inclinations. In those 
fortuitous cases “the lofty exaltation of their minds,” when “better in-
structed,” could keep them from becoming such a mob. (CPW 4:552) 
Otherwise, the reasons for uncomely behaviour were unchanged from 
those given in earlier tracts: the people were “maddened by priestly 
machinations” (CPW 4:551), “the pre-eminent ignorance or insolence” 
of “ministers” (CPW 4:626).
Besides the current actions of firebrand priests, Milton also drew 
upon classical references. He acknowlegded that “times may often 
come when a majority of the citizens are wanton, preferring to follow 
Catiline or Antony” (CPW 4:648). Catiline, satis eloquentiae, sapientiae pa-
rum, was of course the archetype of a demagogue. However, this refer-
ence to Catiline should not be interpreted as highlighting the threat of 
rhetoric, but rather its abuse – as well as its proper use. After all, it was 
Cicero’s use of rhetoric which had saved the republic. This connection 
has been seen as intentional, enforcing the image of Milton as Cicero, 
reliving the ethos of the golden age of republican liberty and oratory.401 
Accordingly, Milton described himself as the ideal orator defend-
ing the republic, “having from early youth been especially devoted to 
the liberal arts.” His education came in use in order to “add as much 
weight as possible to the counsels of my country and to this excellent 
cause.” Milton could “worthily” praise and extoll by both deliberative 
and epideictic rhetoric the glorious exploits of republics, and defend the 
truth “by reason” (CPW 4:553). It was up to Milton to “rightly councel, 
encourage, and inspire” (CPW 4:685). Although “the distinguished or-
ators of ancient times undoubtedly surpass me, both in their eloquence 
400 More on the analysis of the English character in Milton and other republicans: 
Scott, Commonwealth principles, pp. 238-241.
401 Smith, Literature and Revolution, p. 190. 
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and in their style,” Milton could appeal to Cicero’s authority402 in the 
sense that he aimed to “outstrip all the orators of every age in the gran-
deur of my subject and my theme” (CPW 4:554). Of great things can 
great speeches be made. Thus, “in short, it is the renewed cultivation of 
freedom and civic life that I disseminate throughout cities, kingdoms, 
and nations” (CPW 4:556). 
As to how the supply of such great orators could be maintained, 
Milton returned to elaborate on the purposes of education, since “noth-
ing can be more efficacious than education in moulding the minds of 
men to virtue.” These virtues were of the civic variety, to aid in govern-
ing the state effectively, and preserving it “for the longest possible space 
of time” (CPW 4:625).403 Towards the end of the tract, Milton gave 
his counsel to Cromwell. He included an exhortation to “take more 
thought for the education and morality of the young.” Meritocracy and 
elitism went hand in hand, as “the rewards of the learned” should be 
kept “for those who have already acquired learning, those who already 
deserve the reward.” This was the connection between the deliberat-
ing, literate elite educated in rhetoric who could enjoy the privilege of 
free speech: those who could, should debate freely amongst each other, 
in a spirit of “free inquiry.”404 Censure by the envious, narrow-mind-
ed and superstitious “half-educated” would definitely break any sense 
of propriety.405 For Cromwell, audi altere partem is instrumental, as he 
should “never be afraid to listen to truth or falsehood, whichever it is,” 
but afterwards “take the side of those who think that not just their own 
402 In De Oratore, book III.
403 The time scale is significant, in comparison to Harrington’s ‘immortal common-
wealth.’ 
404 Similarly, ethos of the speaker cannot be separated from this privilege, as it was 
Milton’s noble deeds that had bestowed upon him “a good conscience, good repute 
among good men, and this honorable freedom of speech” (CPW 4:627).
405 Milton made this point also in reference to his earlier work: “I wrote my Areop-
agitica, in order to deliver the press from the restraints with which it was encum-
bered; that the power of determining what was true and what was false, what 
ought to be published and what to be suppressed, might no longer be entrusted to 
a few illiterate and illiberal individuals” (italics mine). The quality of the censors, rather 
than censorship as such, was the problem.
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party or faction.” It was in this aim for the common good that “all citi-
zens equally have an equal right to freedom in the state” (CPW 4:679) 
– not through self-governance, but in the ‘effects’ of freedom, as Hall 
would have put it. 
In his continued omission of giving credence to consensual or ma-
jority rule, and concentrating on the rule of law, Milton was following 
his earlier works. However, this strategy of omission must have been 
easier to use against monarchy in 1651, than after Oliver Cromwell’s 
dissolution of the parliament. In this context the Second Defence is clearly 
addressing the questions relevant to the events immediately before its 
publication. Milton argued that “a people torn by so many factions” 
did “not itself permit that condition in public affairs which is ideal and 
perfect,” as a form of government (CPW 4:680). When relating what 
the principles of such government should be, Milton presents reasons 
similar to Nedham’s, worth quoting in full: 
For why should anyone then claim for you freedom to vote or the power 
of sending to Parliament whomever you prefer? So that each of you could 
elect in the cities men of his own faction, or in the country towns choose 
that man, however unworthy, who has entertained you more lavishly at 
banquets and supplied farmers and peasants with more abundant drink? 
Under such circumstances, not wisdom and authority, but faction and 
gluttony would elect to Parliament in our name either inn-keepers and 
hucksters of the state from city taverns or from country districts plough-
boys and veritable herdsmen. Who would commit the state to men whom 
no one would trust with his private affairs? (CPW 4:682).
The main difference to Nedham is that not only does Milton see such 
government as a way out of the state of liberty, but it also leads to loss of 
any sense of freedom for the individual. Under electoral system, people 
are slaves without perceiving it: “They can perhaps change their ser-
vitude; they cannot cast it off” (CPW 4:683). Popular authority would 
have to wait until the people become wiser, and lose their false con-
sciousness. Until that there would be a need “of some tutor, some brave 
and faithful guardian of your affairs” (CPW 4:684). In such a republic, 
consent has as little relevance to legitimate authority, as freedom of 
speech has with having a say in decision-making. 
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By 1655 Milton’s failing eyesight had caused him to start using an 
amanuensis for dictation, and his official duties and salary were both 
reduced. There is no evidence of his next work, Defense of Himself (Pro 
se Defensio, 1655) being officially commissioned,406 and considering the 
personal tone of the book, it was plausibly published on Milton’s own 
initiative.407 The main theme of the book was to defend Milton’s ear-
lier Defensio Secunda, against its detractor, Alexander More. Milton had 
falsely thought More to have been the writer of the Regii sanguinis, an er-
ror in judgement which More in turn attacked and Milton nevertheless 
chose to maintain as the true state of affairs.408 Accordingly, the vitriol 
and themes of the Defensio Secunda were continued.
In his attacks on More’s use and knowledge of rhetoric, Milton 
reached from ancient times to the present. More’s choices of “rhetori-
cians” were questionable, whereas Milton, if he were to use “illustri-
ous orators,” could “easily and immediately make apparent how unlet-
tered” More was “in these matters, and how ignorant” (CPW 4:734). 
The attack against Milton’s own rhetoric and ethos was dismissed, 
since “appropriate praises are not indecoruous” at certain occasions, 
and furthermore, there actually was no praise of himself, but merely 
“a plain and simple narration” against “abuses and calumnies” (CPW 
4:735). Truth might win in an open argument, but in politics reputa-
tion, auctoritas, still counts: “those men who are accustomed to ponder 
public affairs and to weigh matters with proper judgment agree with 
me that nothing is of greater moment in the judgment of a cause than 
the quality of the life and manners of him who defends that cause most 
keenly” (CPW 4:736-7).
Considering the amount of abuse Milton could shower on More, 
the issue of manners could be seen as somewhat counter-productive. 
Nevertheless, as pertains to decorum, if any breaches had been made 
by Milton; they could be attributed to his opponent, who had by his 
406 Reuben Sánchez, Persona and decorum in Milton’s prose, Madison, NJ: 1997, p. 127.
407 Gordon Campbell, Thomas Corns, John Milton: life, work, and thought, Oxford: 
2008, pp. 264-5. Cp. also to the point made about the fall of Hall from favour, or 
Nedham’s Observator. 
408 Worden, Literature and Politics, p. 262.
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manners “changed innocent words into unchaste ones” (CPW 4:743), 
and could be blamed for leaving little choice to Milton: “He who de-
cribes you and your villainies must speak obscenely.” And even so, the 
“gravest authors.. have always thought that words unchaste and plain 
thrust out with indignation signify not obscenity, but the vehemence of 
gravest censure” (CPW 4:744). Admittedly, an air of too much protest-
ing seems present: why does Milton insist on giving excuses to excuses, 
for things he is not guilty of to begin with? One answer is in the formal, 
rhetorical method, and another is the aim of highlighting the lack of 
classical learning in his opponents. Milton would have an arsenal of 
armaments for shooting his opponents down – which ipso facto was the 
clinching argument. 
For example, when Milton’s opponent tried to appeal to the author-
ity of Cicero, Milton answered how “it does not appear to me that he 
has set up boundaries of decorum so narrow and severe that it would 
be difficult for anyone to contain himself within those boundaries.” 
Rather, “nothing is farther removed from the very nature of decorum 
than that a man like you.. should employ language which is elegant, or 
reproach that which is foul” (CPW 4:744). Milton made his own argu-
ment from classic sources: “no orator known for the baseness of his life, 
not even if he were the most eloquent of the Athenians, should have the 
right to speak on public matters to the people” since “more harm pro-
ceeds from the example of a base character than good from the most 
chaste and holy oration.” Thus, “how much more shameful it is that a 
fornicator and adulterer, as though he were the messenger and minister 
of God, should possess the most pernicious right to preach in a church 
on sacred matters to Christian people.” (CPW 4:761-2). 
This acknowledgement of the roles of ethos and utilitas, in what was 
allowed as free speech, was in turn used to defend Milton’s rebuttal. 
Milton raised his own disinterested ethos against his opponent: “there 
is no reason why I should think that you who preach for hire are bet-
ter able to advise than I who counsel gratis.” Clearly, in proper hands 
such as Milton’s, free speech served its purpose: “shall not our people 
stand in need of me to advise them freely, which is a right allowed to 
every citizen, though I stand below the rostrum?.” In relation to the 
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previous paragraph, it can be assumed that the definition of “every 
citizen” would be quite restricted, depending on ethos, purpose, skill 
(CPW 4:772).
When it comes to More, his skills are severely lacking. He is com-
pared to “the many mountebanks and empirics, the multitude of drug-
sters and quacks.. at Rome or in Venice.. hawking their boxes and nos-
trums” (CPW 4:764), “a wandering sophist and the mere sport of your 
own windiness.” And especially, he is guilty of that “art of abuse” (CPW 
4:765) or the “rhetoric of devils” (CPW 4:766) of which he accuses Mil-
ton. Milton, of course, is justified and virtuous in his writings, exhibit-
ing merely “most just vituperation” (CPW 4:796). In the opponent’s 
“manners may be found no grace, in whose writings no elegance,” and 
his ignorance is shown when he declares “that unseemly which Marcus 
Tullius judged to be supreme in an orator,” which “even to Plato and 
Socratics” was “seemly or decorous”: that is; “pleasantries intermixed 
and interspersed sometimes in the gravest matters.” For the audience of 
“learned and intelligent men,” this is clear (CPW 4:771).
On the subject of learning, another opponent of republicanism must 
be mentioned, even if he was not explicitly mentioned in Pro Se De-
fensio. A few years before Pro Se Defensio, Hobbes had written how “in 
these westerne parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions 
concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from Ar-
istotle, Cicero, and other men, Greeks and Romanes” and thus “men 
from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew of Lib-
erty,) of favouring tumults and of licentious controlling the actions of 
their Soveraigns.”409 Milton saw the same learning in a diametrically 
opposed sense: “We who as youths under so many masters are accus-
tomed to toil at imaginary eloquence, and think that its rhetorical force 
lies in invective no less than in praise, do at the desk bravely strike 
down, to be sure, the names of ancient tyrants” (CPW 4:795).
Hobbes saw as especially dangerous the rhetorical rediscription 
allowed by the humanistic education, as it was “from the reading, I 
say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because 
409 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (1651), Cambridge: 1991, pp. 149-
50. 
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the Greek and Latine writers, in their books, and discourses of Policy, 
make it lawfull, and laudable, for any man to do so; provided before he 
do it, he call him Tyrant.”410 However, for Milton, this laudable prac-
tice was rather unfortunately restricted to “the debating room or in the 
school of rhetoric” and the abuse of rhetoric was in the form of flattery 
to tyrants “for in the state for the most part we adore, or rather worship 
such men, and call them most mighty, most powerful, most august” 
(CPW 4:795). It has been argued that Milton’s Tenure of Kings and Magis-
trates of 1649 was “perhaps one of the linguistically slippery works that 
Hobbes condemned in Leviathan”411 – perhaps in Pro Se Defensio Milton 
gave his answer.
410 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 225-6. On the paradiastolic rediscriptions and Hobbes: 
Skinner, Reason and rhetoric, pp. 339-42. 
411 Joad Raymond, “The King is a Thing,” in Milton and the Terms of Liberty, eds. 
Graham Parry, Joad Raymond, Cambridge: 2002, p. 71.
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PART IV 1656
9. Nedham, his Excellencie
While John Milton was engaged in continental battles of the pen, the 
mode of government at home continued to drift further away from its 
republican moorings. In January 1655 Cromwell had dissolved the 
cantankerous first Protectorate Parliament, and continued anew to 
rule without one. The combination of financial troubles and censor-
ship spelled trouble for writers relying on commissions from the gov-
ernment. Not only was Milton facing economic hardship, as mentioned 
earlier, but in April of 1655 a cost cutting exercise targeted John Hall 
and Marchamont Nedham as well. Having been made redundant, 
Hall returned to Durham, where he died in the autumn of 1656. Ned-
ham managed to secure other sources of revenue, biding his time and 
making advances to the authorities about his usefulness.412
Meanwhile, over the summer and autumn Cromwell established a 
new system of military government, known as the rule of the Major-
Generals. By November the prospects of establishing a republican form 
of government were very low considering the actual state of affairs, 
which would make Nedham’s next action seem curious in retrospect. 
He chose to register for publication a book titled Excellencie of a Free-
State, the contents of which were essentially a collection of his news-
book editorials from Mercurius Politicus.413 The editorials were originally 
412 Raymond, “John Hall’s A Method of History”; Peacey, Politicians and Pamphleteers, 
pp. 278, 292; Worden, Literature and Politics, p. 311.
413 Full title: Marchamont Nedham, The excellencie of a free-state, or, The right constitution 
of a common-wealth: wherein all objections are answered, and the best way to secure the peoples 
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published between 1651 and August 1652, that is, during the Com-
monwealth era.414 There are some undisputable differences between 
the two sets of texts,415 but not to such extent that would justify dealing 
with the texts twice in the course of this study. Nevertheless, the ques-
tion remains: why did Nedham, the epitome of a paid hack, choose to 
put forward very republican-oriented arguments in the context of late 
1655, rather than defend the status quo?
A plausible explanation lies in the combination of the low ebb of 
republicanism, and the misfortunes of the unpopular government: it 
could be that Nedham was representing his republican credentials in 
expectation of a possible change of government – one that would value 
a republican ideologue.416 The likelihood of that happening were made 
all the more likely by the continued financial and other difficulties of 
the government over the spring of 1656, problems which necessitated 
the summoning of a new parliament. The publication date of the Ex-
cellencie of a Free-State was in June 1656, two months before the official 
campaigning for the elections for a second Protectorate Parliament.417 
Nevertheless, the argument from political opportunism should not be 
pushed too far.
Throughout his career Nedham was willing to argue on both sides 
of the question. We have seen how in the 1640s arguments advanced 
by Nedham for the parliamentary cause, were castigated in his royalist 
phase, and similarly his examples from Classical and Renaissance his-
tory used to prove one thing in his Roundhead writings would prove 
another in his Cavalier texts – or put in more rhetorical mode, “his 
arguments turning (as it were) on their footnotes to meet each change 
of allegiance.”418 The argument here is that if considered against the 
liberties discovered: with some errors of government, and rules of policie, London: 1656.
414 Worden, Literature and Politics, pp. 218, 306, 310.
415 On which Worden, Literature and Politics, pp. 309-13 is the magisterial exposition. 
416 Worden, Literature and Politics, pp. 310-11.
417 Austin Woolrych, Britain in Revolution: 1625-1660, Oxford: 2002, pp. 640-1; Wor-
den, Literature and Politics, p. 310.
418 Worden, “Wit in a Roundhead,” pp. 303, 321. As will be shown, this tendency 
continued after 1650s until the very end of Nedham’s career.
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background of rhetorical training and ideals, Nedham’s shifts of alle-
giance are to some degree understandable as arguments from both (or 
all) sides of the questions.
This brings also new light to the persistent question about Nedham’s 
conscience and political principles: was he a complete hack? Certainly 
he was justly accused of apostasy and venality, but nevertheless, it did 
not stop him from making the same charges against others. To some ex-
tent the roots of this problem lie in the assumption that the seventeenth 
century political culture was one of rigidity, consensus and firm ideolo-
gies, although the humanistic educational culture did not advance such 
values. It is worthwhile to note how after 1655, when Nedham could 
practically write the Mercurius Politicus without any opposition, he did 
not – despite the opportunity – let the newsbook become uncontro-
versial nor consensus-oriented. Indeed, it has been even argued that 
Nedham’s “texts can be seen as a practical enactment of his belief that 
different opinions needed to be overcome than silenced, in a kind of 
concordia discors”419 – a variation of the ‘wars of truth’ of Milton.
There is also another solution to the problem of Nedham’s con-
science, concerning the ‘art of dissimulation.’ The suggestion is that 
Nedham might have agreed with his friend Henry Oxinden, who 
“viewed the contemporary world in terms of Machiavellian duplic-
ity and regarded ‘the art of dissimulation’ as essential to survival in 
it.”420 One problem with this explanation is that dissimulation belonged 
rather to conversation than to public speaking or writing (nor was it 
necessarily and solely a vice).421 There are connections between the ‘art 
of dissimulation’ as a part of polite conversation and the art of rhetoric, 
but whether the methods of handling social relationships can be used 
to explain Nedham’s public writings (where he often enjoyed anonym-
ity) is highly questionable. Ultimately, the question whether Nedham’s 
political views changed to the extent his allegiances did, must depend 
on an analysis of the contents of his writings.
419 Raymond, “The newspaper,” p. 126.
420 In Worden, “Wit in a Roundhead,” p. 304; also Paul A. Rahe, “An inky wretch: 
The outrageous Genius of Marchamont Nedham (seventeenth century journalist 
and master of partisan reporting),” The National Interest, Winter 2002. 
421 As in Francis Bacon, “Of Simulation and Dissimulation,” in his Essaies. 
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Undoubtedly Nedham did change his accusations of flattery, when 
it came to its popular mode: in 1648 he wrote against flattering the 
“rascall Multitude” with notions of popular rule, but in 1656 against 
the flattery presuming “to prophane that pure way of a Free-State, or 
Government by the People.”422 In Excellencie of a Free-State, “the only 
Patern of a Free-state fit for all the world to follow” was “to place both 
the exercise & interest of Supremacy in the hands of the people, so that 
nothing of a publick interest could be imposed, but what passed cur-
rant by vertue of their consent and Authority.”423 Rather than being 
the harbingers of anarchy, “the People are best Keepers of their own 
Liberty, because it is ever the Peoples care to see, that Authority be so 
constituted, that it shall be rather a burthen than benefit to those that 
undertake it.”424
Nevertheless, Nedham’s change of opinion is qualified to an extent 
that his change of approach is not, in the end, total. Immediately after 
praising “a Government by a free Election and Consent of the People, 
setled in a due and orderly succession of their supreme Assemblies,” 
Nedham explicitly qualifies who the ‘people’ are. Not wanting to leave 
any room for misinterpretations about the people, as in the body of 
citizens eligible to vote, they would be a severely restricted class apart 
from the populace as a whole:
To take off all mis-constructions; when we mention the People, observe all 
along, that we do not mean the confused promiscuous Body of the People, 
nor any part of the people who have forfeited their Rights by Delinquency, 
Neutrality, or Apostacy, &c. in relation to the divided state of any Nation; 
for they are not to be reckon’d within the Lists of the People.425
Seen from a viewpoint of decorum, of adapting to the audience, it seems 
that Nedham indeed adapted his political viewpoints according to the 
422 [Marchamont Nedham] Mercurius Pragmaticus, A plea for the king and kingdome: by 
way of answer to the late remonstrance of the army, London: 1648, p. 26; Nedham, The 
Excellencie of a Free State, p. 83.
423 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 8.
424 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 26.
425 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, pp. 70-1.
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audience: the readers of 1640s were more likely to be a varied assort-
ment of people than the restricted readership of 1650s. This does not 
solve definitely the question of his democratic leanings, but if seen apart 
from the possible adaptation to the audience, the omission of any Level-
ler-style promotion of democracy seems to indicate that the question is 
how much (or little) Nedham would have wanted to enlarge the elector-
ate. Thus, whether the composition of ‘the people’ is finally any broader 
than in the Case of the CW, remains open to interpretation. More impor-
tantly however, what can be ascertained is that the role of the senate 
was argued from a grounds of election and rotation of offices, but the 
authority invested stayed the same: “in Free-States.. the Majesty and Au-
thority of their Suffrages, or Votes [was held] intire in their Senators, 
or supream Assemblies.”426
In comparison to his earlier writings, the senate has become a place 
of interests, rather than wisdom and discretion only. Counter-intuitive-
ly, acknowledging the role of interests would not result in an amoral 
market-place election, but in a situation where “none but honest, gen-
erous, and publick spirits, will then desire to be in Authority, and that 
onely for the Common good.”427 Furthermore, the difficult issue of the 
role of interests in general is elaborated in much greater detail in Excel-
lencie of a Free-State than earlier. Nedham made clear the problem of 
confusing terms when discussing the error of the regulation of affairs 
by reason of state: “But for fear be mistaken, you are to understand, 
that by Reason of State here, we do not condemn the equitable Results 
of prudence & right Reason: for upon determinations of this nature 
depends the safety of all states, and princes.” The reason of state to 
be condemned was from “corrupt principle,” the tricking, changeable, 
“Humane Invention,” “that Italian Goddess, Raggione di Stato.”428
 The republican right reason was what serves the true, public inter-
est, and was mainly described in opposition to factionalism in a society: 
“Faction is an adhering to, and a promoting of an Interest, that is dis-
426 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 171.
427 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 26.
428 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, pp. 205-7.
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tinct from the true and declared Interest of State.”429 Quoting classical 
authorities, “as Cicero defines faction to be a deviation from the declared 
interest of State,”430 Nedham asserted how faction could be discovered 
from “any Designs, Counsels, Actings, or Persons, moving in opposi-
tion to that which is the true publick Interest.”431 Promoting of private 
interests will “put the Commonwealth into frequent flames of discon-
tent and sedition.”432 Such promoters were, of course, the demagogues. 
The locus classicus of demagogues was naturally Athens. One com-
monplace reason for its downfall was the nature of the people, which 
argument Nedham chose to avoid in Excellencie of a Free-State. Rather, 
he laid the guilt heavily on the demagogues and the weak institutional 
arrangements, thus absolving the people from much of the blame. It 
was the power-hungry authorities’ “doctrine of tyranny,” their unwill-
ingness to relinquish their power, whose “custome hath been still to 
perswade men, partly by strong pretence of Argument, and partly by 
force, that they may do what they list.”433 Tumults caused by this doc-
trine resulted from the “Tricks and Cheats,”434 through which people 
were “drawn in, or provoked”435 to tumults, as they were used by “pow-
erful persons”436 for their own ends. This was the “true Reason” of mis-
carriages of “any Government of the People.”437 In the contemporary 
context potential demagogues, such as royalists were “not to be allowed 
sharers in the Rights of the people” since it would “give them opportu-
nity to sow the seeds of new Broyls and Divisions.”438
The opposite of such pernicious demagogues was, as ever, the virtu-
ous orator, the role of whom Nedham considered essential in keeping 
429 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 29.
430 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 246.
431 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 228.
432 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 35.
433 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 77.
434 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 111.
435 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 108.
436 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 90.
437 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 89.
438 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 95.
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the potentially destructive power of the people in check. People might 
be the best guarantors of their own liberties, but that did not mean they 
were incapable of destroying the commonwealth and the same liberties 
with it. Thus Nedham returned to the positive power of eloquence and 
ethos, as defined by classical (and republican) examples, in keeping the 
lower levels of society in order: “an Eloquent Oration, or Perswasion, 
(as we see in the example of Menenius Agrippa) or the Reputation of some 
grave or honest Man, (as in the example of Virginus, and afterwards of 
Cato) doth very easily reduce and pacifie [the people].”439 
The obvious next step was to ask how to proceed with and to guar-
antee the existence of such orators. The answer was through human-
istic education. The importance of such education was stressed by the 
danger of its alternative: ignorance. In Excellencie of a Free-State Nedham 
asserted how it was an especially grave policy error in a republic to keep 
“the people ignorant of those ways and means that are essentially nec-
essary, for the preservation of their Liberty” and therefore “it is without 
all question, most necessary, that they be made acquainted, and thor-
oughly instructed in the Means and Rules of its preservation.”440 High-
er education was an important, but not the only, means to that end.
One way to advance the required level of education for the public 
at large was to use epideictic rhetoric, to commend or condemn, as 
was done from the Roman Rostra. The public would be informed with 
such praises as “how easie and excellent [freedom] is above all other 
Forms of Government, if it be kept within due bounds and order.”441 
For the youth and children who “should be educated and instructed 
in the Principles of Freedom” the schools played an essential part.442 In 
schools, it was “the Free-States of Greece,” which Nedham saw as the rec-
ommended models, since they “tyed up their Pædagogues and Teach-
ers, to certain rules.” And not only were the teachers controlled, but 
also the curriculum, since they “selected certain Authors to be read 
439 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 109.
440 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, pp. 160-1.
441 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 24.
442 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, pp. 178-9.
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onely, as Classical.”443
Nedham’s stress on the subject matter reflected the siege mental-
ity of the Commonwealth: education in its two forms prepared people 
“against the Adulterous Wiles and Rapes of any projecting Sophisters 
that may arise hereafter.”444 And without due control over educational 
institutes - “Schools, Academies, with al other Seed-plots, and Semi-
naries of Youth” - will “otherwise be but so many Nurseries of Re-
bellion, publike Enemies, and unnatural Monsters: that will tear the 
bowels of their Mother-Countrey.”445 It has even been argued that 
for Nedham “republicanism would not be secure until a new political 
generation had been raised, educated in the history and precepts of 
liberty.”446 However, despite the present dangers, Nedham did profess 
faith in the education, through which the citizens of a republic could be 
“sufficiently instructed how to demean themselves, for the avoiding of 
Licentiousness, Tumult, and Civil Dissension.”447
The qualifications Nedham added about ‘due bounds and order,’ 
and the needs to avoid licentiousness are familiar from his earlier writ-
ings. Nevertheless, in Excellencie of a Free-State Nedham’s rhetoric and 
arguments seem quite favourable to the ideal of freedom of expression. 
He wrote how “calling Tyrants to an account” was “a noble Act of Jus-
tice,” and such “worthy patriots” should be rewarded with honours as 
they were in ancient Greece and Rome.448 In popular commonwealth 
“the Liberty of Accusation by the People, before their Supreme As-
semblies” was defined as “essentially necessary for the preservation of 
a Commonwealth”449 and “of absolute necessity to the safety and well 
being of a Commonwealth.”450
To the argument that such liberty of criticism might lead to cal-
443 Nedham, Excellencie of a Free State, p. 181.
444 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 161.
445 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 180.
446 Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 310.
447 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 192.
448 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 78.
449 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 114.
450 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 119.
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umny, “ambitious slandering of men, by whisperings, reports, or false 
accusations,” Nedham countered that the problem was caused by the 
“Lordly interest of Dominion,” i.e., by the form of government.451 The 
“crooked way of Calumniation” was much less used under the “Peoples 
Form of Government,” but it was not and never had been allowed or 
approved of in there either.452 The problem remained serious, as “Ca-
lumniations against Persons in Authority” were “the greatest abuses 
and blemishes of Liberty, and have been the most frequent Causes of 
Tumult and Dissension.”453 Nevertheless, as in Certain Considerations of 
1649, Nedham shifted the responsibility to the authorities: their ac-
countability would prevent the “popular clamour and Tumults” caused 
by any charges of abuse, as well as protect the state “from Usurpation 
by men of power.”454 It was the tyrants’ peace that was guarded by un-
warranted claims of sedition.
However, as for freedom of expression otherwise, Nedham repeat-
edly warned against turning liberty into licentiousness. The main wor-
ry was civil dissension, and accordingly Nedham’s listing of the only 
“particulars” of “true freedom,” by which “people are said to enjoy 
their rights,” did not include any notions of free speech or press. (The 
five points were: pragmatic laws, swift administration, accountability of 
authorities, uninterrupted representative institutions, and free elections 
thereof ).455 Nedham’s arguments lie mainly in advancing the chanc-
es to oppose the authorities. In 1656 this can be understood from the 
context of Cromwell’s Protectorate: Nedham did not support or defend 
Cromwell’s advent to power. He did not oppose it openly either, but his 
views on the liberty to criticise, accountable governors and so on can 
be seen as subtle opposition to the perceived excesses of power in the 
Protectorate’s system of government. 
451 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, pp. 111-2.
452 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 118.
453 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, p. 195.
454 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, pp. 195-6.
455 Nedham, The Excellencie of a Free State, pp. 4-5.
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10. James Harrington and his Oceana
Another author who attacked the excesses of power and published his 
writings in time to influence the Parliamentary elections of 1656 was 
James Harrington. The Commonwealth of Oceana was initially published 
in September 1656, but was pulled out of the press. After a series of in-
terventions, it came out again in November 1656. It was Harrington’s 
first publication, at the age of 45. His background was from the nobil-
ity, with brief spells of studies in Oxford and in the Inns of Court. After 
several years of travels on the continent, he returned to a life of leisure 
at his family manor. In 1647 he was appointed to accompany the im-
prisoned king Charles I. Harrington was discharged of those duties 
before the king’s decapitation in 1649. He then returned to his manor, 
and at some point began the work on his magnum opus, the Oceana. 
The exact dates of the composition of Oceana are not known. Har-
rington himself claimed that he had “not been yet two years about it” 
(PW 156), but in a context of excusing the errata. The two-year period 
would place the initial impetus in 1654; i.e., after Cromwell’s ascend-
ancy and the first protectorate elections. This image is reinforced in 
The examination of James Harrington, depicting an interview in 1662 where 
Harrington claimed to have started to write his work after Cromwell’s 
ascendancy to “the throne” (PW 859). However, as will be shown, there 
is much in the work that was directed against Hobbes’ Leviathan, sug-
gesting an even longer period of gestation, if not outright composition. 
The relationship with Hobbes will be analysed in due course, but I 
will begin my analysis by introducing the republican system presented 
in the work. This is because the role of public speech and rhetoric in 
Harrington’s political philosophy is intrinsically dependent on the ar-
rangements and institutions of the Harringtonian republic. What con-
stitutes an early modern republic was, and is, a highly contested issue. 
The consensus used in this study can, for heuristic purposes, defined as 
a political arrangement containing elements of popular rule under the 
rule of law. Any further elaboration of republicanism tends to result in 
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clashes between various schools of thought. In Harrington’s case, the 
main strands of the more recent interpretations can be defined as the 
classical, utopian or non-republican.
The classical republican Harrington followed the classical ideals 
of actively participating, virtuous citizens skilled in rhetoric, and his 
political system was a way of making sure such citizens would rule in 
an orderly manner. A constitution and the rule of law would create a 
framework, where democracy could work without succumbing to mob 
rule or factionalism caused by demagogy.456 Continuing from this view, 
the utopian republican Harrington was presented as a re-thinker of 
classical tradition. Participation was not so much encouraged as man-
dated in his obsessive utopian system, removing the need for virtu-
ous moral action or choice. Thus, Harrington’s institutions are rather 
procedural machines of ritual performances, where real, open debate 
would be out of place and, in practice, nearly impossible.457 Lastly, the 
non-republican view of Harrington has presented him as bringing clas-
sical tradition to its end. His system of peaceful order was effectively 
sacrificing classical ideals for cold calculations of interests and social 
engineering. His system meant the end of republican politics of partici-
pation through public deliberation, to be replaced by common consent 
to institutionalised, representative decision-making.458 
456 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 393-394; Blair Worden, “English 
republicanism,” in Cambrige history of political thought, 1450-1700, eds. James 
Henderson Burns, Mark Goldie, Cambridge: 1994, p. 468; Glenn Burgess, 
“Repacifying the polity: the responses of Hobbes and Harrington to the ‘crisis 
of the common law,’” in Soldiers, writers and statesmen of the English revolution, eds. 
Ian Gentles et al., Cambridge: 1998, pp. 222-223, 225-226; Norbrook, Writing the 
English Republic, p. 365.
457 Frank E. Manuel & Fritzie P. Manuel, Utopian Thought in the Western World, Oxford: 
1979, pp. 362, 364; J. C. Davis, Utopia and the ideal society: a study of English utopian 
writing 1516—1700, Cambridge: 1981, pp. 207-209, 211, 238-239.
458 Elizabeth Skerpan, The rhetoric of politics in the English Revolution, 1642 – 1660, Co-
lumbia: 1992, pp. 205-207; Scott, “The rapture of motion,” pp. 146, 150-151; 
Paul A. Rahe, “Antiquity Surpassed: the Repudiation of Classical Republican-
ism,” in Republicanism, Liberty and Commercial Society, 1694–1776, ed. David Woot-
ton, Stanford: 1994, p. 259; Paul A. Rahe, Republics ancient and modern. vol 2: New 
modes and orders in Early modern political thought, Chapel Hill: 1994, pp. 184, 191; Alan 
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For most of these schools of thought, the issue of public speech has 
been of secondary importance, as the emphasis has been on the role of 
classical precedents. Gary Remer has been an exception to the rule, 
and his valuable study of Harrington’s “new rhetoric” argues that the 
innovatory approach to rhetoric in Harrington’s political system can be 
explained by his redefinition of republicanism. For Remer, Harrington 
reworked his brands of rhetoric and republicanism from their classical 
models.459 This will bring us to the second level of analysis, the “moder-
nity” of Harrington’s thought. 
Numerous debates have been had on whether Harrington was fol-
lowing classical precedents or was a thoroughly modern thinker. This is 
generally an extremely contested territory in the study of early modern 
republicanism, especially with Paul A. Rahe and Jonathan Scott.460 In 
describing the dichotomies of classical/modern or liberalism/republi-
canism for authors their views are often assessed in relation to classi-
cal authors, humanistic values, etc. Yet since rhetoric could be used 
or abused, bring benefits or disadvantages to society its role had to be 
weighed and, according to each author’s preferences, the results varied 
greatly. It is possible to study and to evaluate how the early modern 
authors utilised classical authors for their views and purposes, but how 
classical authors viewed rhetoric will not provide any simple litmus tests 
for republican values in the early modern era.461 
Cromartie, “Harringtonian Virtue: Harrington, Machiavelli, and the Method 
of the Moment,” The Historical Journal, 41(4) 1998, pp. 1004-1006; David Wootton, 
“Introduction: The Republican Tradition: From Commonwealth to Common 
Sense,” in Republicanism, Liberty and Commercial Society, 1694–1776, ed. David Woot-
ton, Stanford: 1994, pp. 13-14.
459 Gary Remer, “James Harrington’s New Deliberative Rhetoric: Reflection of an 
Anticlassical Republicanism,” History of Political Thought, 16(4), 1995. I am much 
indebted to Remer’s groundbreaking article, despite some disagreements which 
will become apparent.
460 Main works: Jonathan Scott, England’s Troubles: Seventeenth century English political 
instability in European context, Cambridge: 2000; Rahe, Republics ancient and modern.
461 In this field, neglecting the role of rhetoric can lead to interpretations where 
classical references are dismissed as only rhetorical ploys while the hidden 
liberalism is genuine. For example, this seems to be the case in Mitchell, “A Liberal 
Republican ‘Cato’.” Admittedly, this might indeed be true in some cases, but it 
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In Harrington’s case, the classical roots of his philosophy are well 
recorded, but in previous research especially the non-republican school 
of thought has questioned their application. Harrington has been seen 
as jettisoning classical ideals, or perverting them or, at least, aligning 
himself with classical authors of questionable democratic credentials: 
for example, to Jonathan Scott, the “ruling spirit” of Harrington’s 
brand of republicanism was not “Cicero.. but Plato.”462 While not aim-
ing to be a work of classical scholarship, one of my aims is to show that 
there are grounds to argue that some of these customary conceptions 
of classical republican writers are unfounded. Nevertheless, my main 
aim is to show that Harrington could also have read from classical 
authors aspects of his politics that have been sometimes appropriated 
as modern inventions. Much of Harrington’s critique of Hobbes can be 
reinterpreted from this perspective. 
At the same time, some parts of Harrington’s political thought, pre-
viously attributed mainly to the role of rhetoric, rely instead on other 
elements of early modern political and social theories. These topics in-
clude counsel and civil conversation, which, although related to classi-
cal rhetoric, are not solely governed by it. A common factor is that they 
have been influenced by rhetoric to some extent, or used in conjunc-
tion with rhetorical modes, but they have also often been presented as 
alternatives to rhetoric or modes of political action, distinct and even 
untainted by rhetoric. Accordingly, in earlier studies some of them have 
been subsumed either more into Harrington’s rhetorical views, or more 
into his republican theory. As these topics lie somewhere between rhet-
oric defined as eloquent persuasion, and Hobbesian politics free from 
rhetoric, my reflections here are necessarily tentative, since such topics 
represent a large field of study in their own right.
Furthermore, I will analyse the interplay between Harrington’s 
political theory and its relation to rhetoric, in the context of law and 
education. As mentioned earlier, traditionally scholarship on classi-
cal republicanism has stressed the role of humanistic education, and 
does not explain why rhetoric would be inapplicable for promoting modern or 
liberal values.
462 Scott, “The rapture of motion,” p. 162.
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thus the role of rhetoric, in creating the virtuous citizens needed for 
a well-working republic. For seventeenth century republicanism, this 
emphasis has been questioned by Paul Rahe, who has argued that edu-
cation was deliberately abandoned for institutional arrangements. In 
turn, Jonathan Scott has argued that this observation only applies to 
select republicans.463 Richard Serjeantson has argued that humanistic 
political philosophy was in fact divided on the subject, to those favour-
ing learning as a means to cultivate virtue with minimal legislative 
framework, and to those favouring a more legalistic approach. This 
dichotomy was not new to the seventeenth century, but can be traced 
to the differing views of Plato and Aristotle.464 This chapter aims to 
show that the tension and compromising between these two approaches 
to early modern political theory can be especially useful in explaining 
Harrington’s thinking.
We may begin with Harrington’s approach to institutions and inter-
ests. The system of government Harrington proposed was quite elabo-
rate, but the gist of it can be defined as bicameral, representative insti-
tution where deliberation, and thus the use of rhetoric, is confined to 
the upper chamber. This “house of knights,” or “senate” would “debate 
and propose” legislation, which was to “be promulgated for the space 
of six weeks.” To prevent abuses of power the lower chamber, or “house 
of deputies,” would work as a counter-balance, as it had the power to 
accept or reject the proposal in a vote, or “result.”465 Harrington’s later 
463 Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 293; cf. Rahe, “Antiquity Surpassed,” and Rahe, 
Republics ancient and modern.
464 Richard Serjeantson, “Law, Education, and the Ideal Society,” a paper given at 
the New Worlds Reflected, conference at Birkbeck College, University of London, 10 
December 2005. 
465 This definition is taken from a later work, The Ways and Means Whereby an equal and 
lasting Commonwealth May be suddenly introduced and perfectly founded with the free consent 
and actual confirmation of the whole people of England, p. 824. Also as: “Let the senate 
have the whole authority or right of debating and proposing unto the people; let the 
popular assembly have the whole power of result; and let what shall be proposed 
by the senate, and resolved by the popular assembly, be the law of Oceana” in The 
Art of Lawgiving pp. 672, 674; basically the same as in The Rota or a Model of a Free 
State or Equal Commonwealth pp. 815-816. The descriptions from later works are due 
to their conciseness: Oceana has the description in much greater detail, which need 
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works will be dealt in due course, but it is worth noting here that this 
basic division of power, “debate” and “result,” was unchanged in all of 
his later works – even if its expressed form was concisely shortened over 
the years.
In Oceana, Harrington defined debate as being “to discern, or put 
a difference between things that being alike are not the same, or it 
is separating and weighing this reason against that and that reason 
against this” (PW 173-4). Other interchangeable terms for debate given 
in later works were: dividing, which “in the language of a common-
wealth,” was defined as “separating one thing, one reason, one interest, 
or consideration, from another” (PW 416); and deliberation, “in which, 
as the scale by the weight of reason or passion comes to be turned one 
way or other” (PW 422). Defined thus, debate seems closely connected 
to political and forensic rhetoric, choosing policy or judging based on 
reasoning in utramque partem.
However, due to Harrington’s tendency to juxtapose the terms rea-
son and interest, it has become almost a commonplace that Harrington 
simply equated reason with interest. Accordingly, as pertains to rheto-
ric, Gary Remer has argued that Harrington’s system relied on “ra-
tional rhetoric,” which was “a rhetoric based on self-interest,” and thus 
“rational debate is about calculating these interests.”466 Yet another in-
terpretation is possible from the context. My argument is that what is at 
issue is the question of bringing the common good to the debate, rather 
than proposing any felicific calculus.
Counter to oft-repeated claims Harrington did not presume all men 
to be wicked,467 but only as it pertained to the “distinct interests.” In 
Oceana, the lawgiver Lord Archon explicated that “we are not so to un-
derstand the maxim of legislators which holdeth all men to be wicked, 
as if it related to mankind or a commonwealth,.. but as it relates unto 
every man or party, under what color soever he or they pretend to be 
trusted apart, with or by the whole.” With the division of power and 
not detain this study. 
466 Remer, “Harrington’s New Deliberative Rhetoric,” p. 554.1
467 For example: Davis, Utopia and the ideal society, p. 239; Rahe, Republics ancient and 
modern, p. 181. 
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different responsibilities therein, and without excessive, corrupting 
wealth, such threat from factions could be avoided. The debate could 
be aligned to the shared, common interest, to confine the senate to fol-
low the guidelines of virtue, rule of reason and common good in their 
debates on the commonwealth, “interests whereof are the only straight 
lines that they have whereby to reform the crooked” (PW 292).468 Since 
the use of the concept of interests is so fundamental in Harrington’s 
political theory, it is essential to analyse it in detail – especially in order 
to differentiate it from interest theory, and the reason of state.
In Oceana the “reason of state” equalled “the interest (or error, as was 
said by Solomon) of the ruler or rulers.” Yet Harrington did not argue 
against reason of state simply because it could promote monarchical in-
terest or had monarchical connotations: it could also signify the error of 
“the people”469 (PW 171). This seeming paradox has created confusion 
among researchers who have taken at face value republican characteri-
zations of aiming for political solutions to finding the public interest: 
Harrington’s conceptualisation has been seen as inconsistent, and his 
theory as confused.470 To shed light on this confused issue, we need to 
take into account the moral dilemmas caused by the uninhibited use of 
the language of interests, in the manner of reason of state theorists. De-
spite their currency and superficial novelty, the topics of national inter-
est and reason of state were dealt with within the framework of moral 
good and expediency, might versus right. Or most usefully in the early 
modern context, this dispute can be described as the conflict between 
honestas and utilitas to use the terms in Cicero’s De Officiis, a bestselling 
textbook of the early modern epoch.471
468 Eric Nelson has argued this point against Remer’s view (op. cit., p. 180) that 
the senate, though wise, was simply not virtuous enough: Eric Nelson, The Greek 
tradition in republican thought, Cambrigde: 2004, pp. 123-124.
469 Pace Gunn, “Interest doe not lie.”
470 Gunn, Politics and the public interest, ch 4 passim. Despite the needless conflation 
of reason and interest, Gunn did note that Harrington did not aim for a simple 
hedonic calculus, but for a mechanism of finding the common good.
471 On the conflict in political theory, see Thomas Mautner, “Grotius and the 
Skeptics,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 66(4), 2005; Conal Condren, “The Paradoxes 
of Recontextualization in Early Modern Intellectual History (review article),” The 
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This conflict, especially as portrayed in the Stoic sources available to 
Harrington, shows close affinities with their views. The most relevant 
examples are Cicero’s De Legibus (1.23), which presents the right reason, 
recta ratio, the objective reason expressed in human institutions as the ba-
sis of society.472 In De Natura Deorum (2.154) - or his “most excellent book,” 
to quote Harrington, Cicero presents mankind as “the only beings that 
exercise reason, and live according to justice and law” (PW 186).473 And 
in De Re Publica, in the part that was known from St Augustine, who 
quoted from it in his City of God (2.21), the definition of a Common-wealth 
is “the estate of the commonty” and “that this commonty is not meant of euery 
rablement of the multitude, but that it is a society, gathered together in one con-
sent of law, and in one participation of profit.”474 Harrington used such points 
to define government “de jure, or according to ancient prudence” as “an 
art whereby a civil society of men is instituted and preserved upon the 
foundation of common right or interest.” (PW 161)475 
This last ‘or’ has caused many of the difficulties in interpreting Har-
rington. It has become a commonplace in research literature to assert 
how Harrington equated right, reason, interest and law. In the Stoic 
approach this is not completely impossible, but few Stoics would have 
approved of the simple view that whatever brings utility equals good, 
yet this is what Harrington’s line on “reason is nothing but interest” 
would seem to indicate (PW 171). 
Historical Journal, 37(1), 1994; concerning the proper ends of deliberative rhetoric, 
see Virginia Cox, “Machiavelli and the Rhetorica ad Herennium: Deliberative 
Rhetoric in The Prince,” Sixteenth Century Journal, 28(4), 1997, pp. 1109-1141.
472 Cromartie, “Harringtonian Virtue,” p. 994.
473 Malcolm Schofield, “Stoic and Epicurean political thought,” in The Cambridge 
History of Greek and Roman Political Thought, eds. Christopher J Rowe, Malcolm 
Schofield, Cambridge: 2000, p. 451; Jon Miller, “Stoics, Grotius and Spinoza on 
moral deliberation,” in Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy, eds. Jon Miller, Brad 
Inwood, Cambridge: 2003, p. 122.
474 St. Augustine, Of the citie of God vvith the learned comments of Io. Lod. Viues London: 
1610, p. 82.
475 This point was not lost to John Toland, who attached Cicero’s definition of a 
republic to the first leaf of Harrington’s collected works: James Harrington, The 
Oceana, and other works of James Harrington, esq; collected, methodiz’d, and review’d, with 
an exact account of his life prefix’d, John Toland (ed.), London: 1700.
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Although the possibility of inconsistency should never be ruled out, 
there is reason for another view. If we look at Harrington’s assertion in 
context (in a very literal sense) it does not seem reasonable to claim that 
Harrington is promoting an amoral approach. Two earlier scholars of 
natural law that Harrington used extensively against might-makes-
right argumentation were Hugo Grotius and John Selden. They both 
used the second speech of Carneades against natural law, known from 
Lactantius, as an example of such thinking that was to be refuted (Gro-
tius in De Jure Belli et Pacis and Selden in De Jure Naturali.)476 Harrington 
in turn made a similar point against Thomas Hobbes, calling him a 
follower of “his furious master Carneades.” Here Harrington made one 
of his many jibes at Hobbes, this one on Hobbes’ professed claims to re-
pudiate classical political thought (more on which later). Thus, “though 
he seems to skew at antiquity,” for Harrington Hobbes was still effec-
476 Hugo Grotius, The Illustrious Hugo Grotius of the Law of Warre and Peace with Annota-
tions, London: 1654, sig. *3r. On a further note, it has been argued that the argu-
ment Richard Tuck makes of Carneades as a symbol for early modern skeptics 
(e.g. “..for ‘Carneades’ one should in effect read ‘Montaigne’ or ‘Charron’”: Rich-
ard Tuck, “The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law,” in The Languages of Political 
Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden, Cambridge: 1987, p. 109) is 
wrong, and Grotius used only the latter of Carneades’ speeches as an example of 
a consummate rhetor promoting the ragione di stato -thinking that he wanted to 
refute: Mautner, “Grotius and the Skeptics.” Another argument is that not mere 
self-preservation, but precisely the Ciceronian view of the Stoic oikeiosis lies behind 
Grotius’ theory: Benjamin Straumann, “Oikeiosis and appetitus societatis: Hugo 
Grotius’ Ciceronian argument for natural law and just war,” Grotiana (New Series), 
(24/25) 2003/4, pp. 41-66. More on Grotius as a neo-Stoic humanist: “[pact is] 
Grotius’s answer to the reason of state theorists who argue that the profitable must 
be pursued at the expense of the just, or that the just reduces to the profitable,” An-
nabel Brett, “Natural right and civil community: The civil philosophy of Hugo 
Grotius,” Historical Journal, 45 (1), 2002, p. 40. For an interpretation of Grotius as 
Stoic and skeptic, Jon Miller “Stoics, Grotius and Spinoza.” On Selden, J. P. Som-
merville “John Selden, the Law of Nature, and the Origins of Government,” The 
Historical Journal, 1984, p. 443 “Selden firmly rejected any hedonist moral theory, 
dismissing as ‘plagues of the human race’ those ancient philosophers who denied 
that anything was ‘by nature or per se just or unjust’ and who made human will 
and utility supreme.” Sommerville used Selden, De jure naturali, London: 1640, p. 
38. Selden in turn used Lactantius, Divine Institutes, (5.17), from which Selden also 
commented on Carneades in op.cit. p. 81.
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tively rehashing old ideas on refuting natural law arguments in favour 
of utility-based theory (PW 165). 
Taking into account these views on Thomas Hobbes, we are able 
to get a clearer understanding of the assumed equation of reason and 
interest. In the “Epistle Dedicatory” to the Human Nature, nowadays 
better known as the Elements of Law Natural and Politic, Hobbes had ar-
gued “that they who have written of justice and policy in general do 
all invade each other, and themselves, with contradiction.” This was 
because they relied on a dogmatic kind of learning, relying on ear-
lier authority, thus causing “truth and the interest of men” to collide. 
Therefore everything could be disputed “because it compareth men, 
and meddleth with their right and profit; in which as oft as reason is 
against a man, so oft will a man be against reason.”477 
Harrington quoted this line with insouciant recognition that it “is 
thought to be a shrewd saying, but will do no harm” (my italics).478 No 
harm to the ideas of classical political philosophy, as the disagreements 
of political authors do no harm to the ideal of right reason as such. And 
even if it was granted that political argumentation was fundamentally 
about individual interests, this did not need to lead to an incapability 
of writing about politics in the classical manner, since not all inter-
ests were alike or similar in value – “for be it so that reason is noth-
ing but interest, there be divers interests, and so divers reasons.” The 
most important interest, or reason, is of course that of the common 
good: “There is a common right, law of nature, or interest of the whole, 
which is more excellent, and so acknowledged unto be by the agents 
477 Thomas Hobbes, Humane nature or, The fundamental elements of policie. Being a discoverie 
of the faculties, acts, and passions of the soul of man, from their original causes, according to 
such philosophical principles as are not commonly known or asserted, London: 1650, sigs. 
A5-6.
478 This reference, “And as often as reason is against a man, so often will a man be against 
reason,” in Oceana, although noted in Liljegren’s edition, was missed by Pocock. 
The footnote notes only the italicization, “as if H had meant them to be read as 
a quotation” with “a Hobbesian flavour.” This omission is noted in Vickie Sulli-
van, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England, Cam-
bridge: 2004, p. 168, but Sullivan misses completely how Harrington does not 
simply “concur” with the quote.
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themselves, than the right or interest of the parts only” (PW 171).479 
That is, not just an amalgamation of purely self-interested individuals. 
To back up this analysis Harrington included the following quote 
from Grotius: “Wherfore tho it may be truly said that the creatures are naturally 
carry’d forth to their proper utility or profit, that ought not to be taken in too general 
a sense; seeing divers of them abstain from their own profit, either in regard of those 
of the same kind, or at least of their young” (PW 171).480 This was the Stoic 
idea of oikeiosis, emphasizing the point that although self-interest is an 
acknowledged force in a society, it does not lead to the conclusion that 
society should only aim at utility and profit. Rather, even sociable indi-
viduals can pursue other than purely self-serving actions. 
From this definition of law of nature and the excellence of public 
interest, Harrington continued to assert the essential aspect of man-
kind as beings partaking in reason, as they “must either be less just 
than the creature [brutes or savages], or acknowledge also his common 
interest to be common right.” With these Stoic definitions to back him 
up, Harrington could seemingly concede a point, while promoting his 
own - or to use the technical term, he performed a concessio - “if reason 
be nothing else but interest, and the interest of mankind be the right 
interest, then the reason of mankind must be right reason” (PW 171-
2). No mathematics or calculation was required to recognise this kind 
of prudence.481 Granted, Harrington’s explications left some ambiguity 
as to how abstaining from self-serving actions would serve one’s own 
interest. In later stages of this study we shall see how this theme was 
explicated (possibly even developed) more fully. 
It was through the aforementioned means of appeal to oikeiosis that 
allowed Harrington to bring together a natural law conception of right 
479 Timothy Dykstal has argued that “if, as Harrington insists, reason is ‘nothing but 
interest,’ there is no natural (or transcendent, or ‘right’) reason to contemplate or 
appeal to.” But as will be shown, Harrington did not insist. Timothy Dykstal, The 
Luxury of Skepticism: Politics, Philosophy, and Dialogue in the English Public Sphere, 1660-
1740, Charlottesville: 2001, p. 19.
480 It is likely that Harrington made his own translation from the Latin original, since 
the the wording of the 1654 translation does not match.
481 Scott, Commonwealth principles, p. 184. 
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reason with the ideal of popular government. Such a conception of au-
thority would not fall prey to the claims that uneducated masses would 
not care for the common good, thus needing to be ruled by a tech-
nocracy. In order to shed more light on Harrington’s conceptions, it is 
necessary to delve further into his understanding of authority and the 
parameters of popular government.
If beginning from the concept of authority, we have seen that de-
spite the variety of views of the authors under study so far, the general 
tendency has been to equate authority with power. The few exceptions 
appear mainly in translations from Tacitus or are otherwise occasional. 
James Harrington made an exception by explicitly distinguishing be-
tween authority, and power or empire in Oceana. For Harrington, this 
distinction had been lost in time, and as part of his retrieval of “ancient 
prudence” he built much of his political theory around this concept of 
authority. To talk about just or unjust power or authority was beside 
the point, for power is amoral, and authority is by its very nature just in 
Harrington’s theory. The distinction is worth quoting in full:
To the goods of the mind answers authority; to the goods of fortune, power 
or empire. Wherfore Leviathan, tho he be right where he says that riches 
are power, is mistaken where he says that prudence, or the reputation of prudence, 
is power: for the learning or prudence of a man is no more power than the 
learning or prudence of a book or author, which is properly authority. 
A learned writer may have authority tho he has no power; and a foolish 
magistrat may have power, tho he has otherwise no esteem or authority 
(PW 163).
Harrington defined authority through right reason, just laws and as 
“the heavenly treasures of virtue, and [the] influence of it upon govern-
ment” (PW 169). Nevertheless, in saying that virtue, reason and law 
are conflated into authority Harrington does not mean that a monarch 
could rule in their name, as Harrington interpreted Hobbes’ theory. 
Harrington gave the example of unfree Turks, who merely live under 
empire of laws – since the ruler could change them at his will – whereas 
the free people of Lucca prosper under authority of laws – since their 
consent is required (PW 170).
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To fully understand Harrington’s term for authority and power re-
quires some elaboration about his use of the terms reason and consent 
as well. The reason behind authority could only come through rea-
soned debate between the most reasonable people, who make up a sen-
ate. In Harrington’s model, the senate can be elected, since there is a 
natural deference to prefer the wiser to those less so, when any group of 
people choose their leaders (PW 172-3). Harrington did make an equa-
tion of noble birth with humanist merit, combining feudal and human-
ist ideas. Nevertheless, Harrington’s complicated electoral procedures, 
which showed many affinities to Streater’s ideas – especially in relation 
to the individualistic conception of liberty – showed that this deference 
was not to be based on force, but on individual judgement.
Harrington’s conception of judgement explains also why the senate 
had authority, but not power. Granting also ultimate power to authori-
ty would lead to a disaster of government: instead of the common good, 
the senators would legislate according to their own factional interest 
only. Therefore the consent of the larger electorate was required for 
laws to be adopted. In this manner, the senate represents the authority 
of reason without power. The lower house represents the larger elector-
ate and thus the main power (albeit with less reason) in the common-
wealth, who have the final say. Thus, a “legislator that [could] unite 
in his government” authority and power “coms nearest to the work of 
God” (PW 169).
Harrington’s understanding of the nature of authority is directly re-
lated to his view on the power and role of rhetoric. As rhetoric is persua-
sive but without physical power lacks coercive force, similarly the senate 
can give counsel to the greater part of the people but not directly com-
mand them: “the office of the senate is not to be commanders but coun-
sellors of the people” (PW 173). Such beneficial counsel can take place 
in a republican framework with established rules and checks (on which 
shortly more), whereas in a monarchical context any public-spiritedness 
is lost: “counsellors of princes” being mere flatterers, “expedient-mon-
gers” seeking favours, and untrustworthy “ journeymen” (PW 258).
Harrington’s conception of authority thus entailed the qualities of 
right reason, learning, etc. – so as we saw earlier, it meant in practice 
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the upper classes, just as for Milton. The crucial difference to Milton is 
that Harrington’s conception does not focus on office-holding, but on 
the general quality of having authority. Since both power and authority 
can be had without holding office, Harrington ends up with a com-
pletely different view of office-holding from Milton. All of the offices in 
Harrington’s utopia, Oceana, are filled by election. Harrington’s main 
argument is thus that the key to the successful governance of a republic 
is the check of a popular vote. 
But then again Harringtonian elections were quite different from 
those in use in England at the time,482 which brings us to the issue of the 
institutions of popular government. Harrington presented several his-
torical systems of voting – though not always accurately – to argue for 
the authority of his system of rotation of offices and voting. His version 
was ultimately based largely on the Venetian system of ballots, which, 
among other things, meant secret voting. Although electoral privacy 
has since become the norm, at the same time it is yet another conten-
tious issue for republicanism as a theory of government. From classical 
authors to modern theorists, a persistent argument has been to point 
out that the purpose of elections is to make each individual vote for the 
choice they see as most conducive to the public interest, and there is less 
chance of this happening in secret voting.483 Yet Harrington argued 
for electoral privacy and secrecy precisely from his understanding of 
republican liberty:
The election or suffrage of the people is freest where it is made or given in 
such a manner that it can neither oblige nor disoblige another, or through 
fear of an enemy, or bashfulness towards a friend, impair a man’s liberty 
(PW 181).
Harrington’s argumentation shows great affinities with Streater in this 
very individualistic conception of liberty. In the case of voting, there 
482 In what follows, I have benefited greatly from Hubertus Buchstein, Öffentliche und 
geheime Stimmabgabe. Eine ideengeschichtliche und wahlrechtshistorische Studie, Baden-
Baden: 2000.
483 A recent contribution is by Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, “Unveiling the 
Vote,” British Journal of Political Science, 20:3 ( July), 1990, pp. 311-333.
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were to be no favours, coercion, intimidation, etc. to “impair a man’s 
liberty” (PW 180). Equally, before a vote of approval in the lower cham-
ber of the parliament the 23rd order of Oceana declares “while a law is 
in promulgation the censors shall animadvert upon the senate, and the 
tribunes upon the people, that there be no laying of heads together, 
conventicles or canvassing to carry on or oppose anything,”484 based on 
the view that then “all may be done in a free and open way” (PW 281). 
Put simply, if the “suffrage be barefaced, I dare say you shall not have 
one fair cast in twenty” (PW 244). As befitted a classical republican, 
Harrington quoted from Cicero’s Oratio pro Plancio (6:16) how the secret 
voting was “a welcome constitution” to people of Rome, as it “increased 
the freedom of their judgment” (PW 180).485 
The laws regulating the public debate need to be separated from 
Harrington’s views on the ideal of participatory citizen. Besides the 23rd 
order, others that have given grounds to think that Harrington did not 
share the republican ideal of participation are the 19th and 22nd orders. 
The first of these ordains the arrest and subsequent trial of “any person 
or persons” that “shall go about to introduce debate into any popular 
assembly” of the commonwealth (PW 251), and the latter depicts the 
deputies oath that “they will neither introduce, cause nor to their power 
suffer debate to be introduced into any popular assembly of this gov-
ernment” (PW 267). This has given rise to claims that in Harrington’s 
system citizens are to passively accept or refuse, without any chance 
for debating on public matters.486 As will be shown later, Harrington 
specifically discounted this claim in his later works, for now the focus is 
on the nature of authority.
We have thus far seen that Harrington expected participation 
484 Also PW, pp. 335, 662, 674, 799, 816, 824, 843.
485 Although, neither this oration nor Cicero’s The Laws (De Legibus), that Harrington 
also used extensively, were quite so unequivocal about the benefits of secret voting. 
486 Rahe, Republics ancient and modern, pp. 185-188. Gary Remer has argued along 
similar lines that Harrington wanted to restrict public debate, but as David 
Norbrook has pointed out, this is only the case if compared to ancient republics: 
“by the standards of seventeenth century England, popular participation in 
Oceana would still have been extensive.” Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 
368; Remer, “Harrington’s New Deliberative Rhetoric,” p. 536.
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through voting and deliberation in the upper chamber; for his con-
temporaries the focus was more often on the negative aspects of par-
ticipation. What argument did Harrington have against the claim that 
consensual authority through elections would lead to a race to the bot-
tom as no one would care for the common good? As shown above, 
Harrington considered that in principle people could be allowed to give 
their consent through elections, resulting in what we would call legiti-
mate authority. What could not be allowed was the use of such public, 
populist rhetoric that allowed for the rule of demagogues and the loss 
of calm deliberation. The rhetorical question was referred to in Oceana 
as: “what convenience is there for debate in a crowd, where there is 
nothing but jostling, treading upon one another and stirring of blood?” 
(PW 266).
Demagogues were purely self-interested men, harmful to the com-
mon good. Harrington’s depiction of demagogy is in this respect tra-
ditional, although he did not depict it as an inherent and unavoidable 
feature of republican society. When referring to “the glib tongues of.. 
demagogues and grandees,” their knowledge of politics is questioned: 
“Is there one of them that yet knows what a commonwealth is?” They 
are depicted as paid hacks, “fiddlers that have disturbed your rest for 
your groat,” and as unvirtuous manipulators: the “cunning men” of 
Bacon, those “that are good in canvasses and factions, [yet] are other-
wise weak men.”487 It was precisely those skilled in manipulation, who 
stood to gain most from open voting and unrestricted public speak-
ing. Their profiteering can be stopped by “such a government in which 
these shall not dare to scrape, for fear of the statute” (PW 265). 
Furthermore, Harrington argued that “you shall never find that 
[the people] have assumed debate [in the representative] for itself, 
but for something else.” Something else could be the actions of dema-
gogues, against whom his orders could help, but in the face of fun-
damental injustice, the orders would be of no help whatsoever. Har-
rington was not so unrealistic as to assume that his system could stop 
debate altogether,488 but accepted that if “the common sort” were to be 
487 Francis Bacon, “Of Cunning,” 22, The Essaies, Edinburgh: 1614.
488 Pocock,”Introduction,” PWJH.
178 1656
“injured” by those in positions of authority, there was not much that 
“should hinder the people of Oceana, if they happen not to regard an 
oath from assuming debate, and making themselves as much an anar-
chy as those of Athens” (PW 268). Harrington fully expected his system 
to fail if the senate would go astray from the common good. Avoiding a 
civil war was yet another incentive for the senate to abstain from pursu-
ing self-interested goals. Harrington’s choice of political system aimed 
at producing results that were beneficial not only to a simple majority, 
but acceptable to most everyone. 
What is common in the aims of the orders is the individualistic con-
cept of liberty: anyone accepting bribes would in effect sell their own 
liberty away, and open voting would only allow those skilled in ma-
nipulation, bribery or canvassing to exert dominion over others. The 
question is not about idealised participation, but of framing republican 
government in such a manner that authority can be consensual and lib-
erty is not lost. A final consideration is whether the framing is too strict, 
in the sense that public peace is the most important consideration. The 
need for peace is of course often behind any attempts at restrictions to 
public speech and to rhetoric in general.
Firstly, we may consider how Harrington actually used rhetoric in 
his works. As is well known, most of Oceana is in the form of deliberative 
and forensic orations,489 and it contains speeches for and against sug-
gested policies. In these, the proper use of ethos, pathos, and logos are 
reiterated, for example, in assessing the speech of the character named 
Philautus de Garbo: “Wherefore being a man both of good parts and 
esteem, his words wrought both upon men’s reason and passions” (PW 
233).490 It can also be argued, that the use of rhetoric does not neces-
sarily imply a positive view of oratory per se, as the works of Thomas 
Hobbes can show. But in Harrington’s case, there is reason to assume a 
489 Smith, Literature and Revolution, p. 171.
490 Gary Remer has argued that Harrington’s “rational rhetoric” meant that 
debate could be free of emotions, and there were no ethical requirements set 
to the speakers. Yet, both ethos and pathos are effectively used by the debaters, 
and seemingly they are held none the worse for it. Remer, “Harrington’s New 
Deliberative Rhetoric,” pp. 532-35, 541, 552-56.
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positive view, when considering the institutional context.
Outside popular tumults, political violence and such problems - 
which, even if abetted by demagogues’ use of rhetoric, were not fun-
damentally caused by it - Harrington did not see conflicts of words as 
harmful: far from it. In Oceana, Harrington equates the usefulness of 
debate to the analogy of a commonwealth as a ship, as without opposi-
tion that “breathes” into “sails and stirs the waters,” the ruler would be 
left “to flag in a perpetual calm.” The analogy continues: “A ship ma-
keth not her way so briskly as when she is handsomely brushed by the 
waves, and tumbles over those that seem to tumble against her” (PW 
292). Thus, there are grounds to question many of the assumptions 
about Harrington as a modernist, Hobbesian social engineer, who was 
set against classical rhetoric and citizenship. 
As we have seen, Harrington put much effort to arguing for well-
ordered institutions to bring about order and harmony to the republic. 
These institutions were depicted with the help of astronomical allu-
sions: orbs, spheres, galaxies etc., and Harrington relied strongly on 
celestial mechanics, cosmic harmony and order for a model in his 
political philosophy. Accordingly, the founder of Oceana’s astronomi-
cal constitution, Lord Archon, felt “exultation in his spirit” when he 
“beheld not only the rapture of motion, but of joy and harmony, into 
which his spheres without any manner of obstruction or interfering, 
but as it had been naturally, were cast” (PW 342). This beautiful order 
mimicked the order of the universe, and Harrington’s laws, not suspect 
to modification, were such as “to make a perfect and (for ought that in 
human prudence can be foreseen) an immortal commonwealth” (PW 
210). 
This use of astronomical imagery has also been interpreted as Hob-
besian, rooting it in the framework of contemporary natural philoso-
phy. This argument relies strongly on Harrington’s purported aban-
donment of classical precursors. Yet neither the quest for order nor im-
mortality necessarily signal a Hobbesian viewpoint, as Hobbes was far 
from being the first political theorist to advocate harmonious, immortal 
models of society. Furthermore, Hobbes’s model was an artificial ma-
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chine, whereas Harrington promoted a cosmological model.491 
An alternative source for Harrington’s theory can be found in the 
works of Cicero. To give just a few examples: in Cato Maior Cicero gave 
the view that through “beholdyng & considering the orders of ye celes-
tial bodies, & waighing how duelie they obserue their courses and mo-
tions,” humankind “might imitate and folow the same right order in the 
trades of their life and constancy”492; in Tusculan Disputations the mind 
of a “wise man,” through contemplating “the motions and turninges 
of the whole worlde,” can understand its divine nature “whereby, it is 
filled with insatiable ioy,” and it is by the virtue of “the very thinking, of 
the power, & nature of the gods, [that] enflames our heartes, to folowe 
that eternitye.”493 
Similarly, Cicero’s role can be seen in the reasons for opposing can-
vassing and public debate as infringements of political privacy that have 
already been mentioned, and, as in the case of cosmological imagery, 
a more modern conception (for example, of representation replacing 
participation) was not needed. Similarly, Cicero could also be relied 
on for supporting views against debate in a popular assembly, as it was 
“affirmed by Cicero in his Oration for Flaccus, that the commonwealths 
of Greece were all shaken or ruined by the intemperance of their comi-
491 Thus, the argument in e.g. Scott, England’s Troubles, p. 339, that Harrington’s 
famous “in the art of man, being the imitation of nature which is the art of God, 
there is nothing so like the first call of beautiful order out of chaos and confusion 
as the architecture of a well-ordered commonwealth” (PW 341) is a paraphrase 
of Hobbes’s beginning of Leviathan (“NATURE (the art whereby God hath made 
and governs the world) is by the art of man, as in many other things, so in this 
also imitated, that it can make an artificial animal” (Hobbes, Leviathan, p.1)) does 
not hold water in this respect. Rather, it is an imitation, or even a parody, to 
jibe at Hobbes – just as Harrington did at so many other points of Oceana, which 
will be shown in due course. Scott, “The rapture of motion,” pp. 160-2; Scott, 
England’s Troubles, pp. 328-33, 339-40; Scott, Commonwealth principles, pp. 30, 164-
6, 181, 204. For other examples of the commonplace, see John Hall, “A Method of 
History,,” p. 287.
492 Cicero, The Worthye Booke of Old age othervvyse entituled the elder Cato, London: 1569, 
fol. 57v (21).
493 Cicero, Those fyue qvestions, which Marke Tullye Cicero, disputed in his Manor of 
Tusculanum, London : 1561, fols. 202-203 (5.24-25).
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tia, or assemblies of the people” (PW 267, also 477).494 From the same 
oration Harrington could have also found more supporting arguments 
to his views on “the rashness of a multitude” and “the influence of a 
seditious speech in a public assembly.”495 And similarly to Harrington’s 
scheme for Oceana, in Cicero’s depiction of the Roman senators and 
people, the interests of the two are aligned to the common good to an 
extent where “there is no diversity of opinion, or of inclination, or of 
language.”496
Yet, to Harrington Cicero did generalise excessively when referring 
to the commonwealths of Greece, since “all the world knows he should 
have excepted Lacedaemon.” This was because in Sparta the popular 
assembly “had no power at all of debate,” and ensured that “that com-
monwealth stood longest and firmest of any other” (PW 267-8). Har-
rington took this version of Sparta for his own political model mainly 
from Plutarch, Lives, quoting the life of Lycurgus as “the senate shall 
propose unto the people and dismiss them, without suffering them to 
debate” (PW 211). 
Nevertheless, Harrington’s reliance on this text should not be ex-
aggerated either. Harrington’s system did not include improvements 
recorded in Lycurgus, such as the ephori. On the contrary, he saw the re-
forms of Theopompus and Polydorus as oligarchic exclusions, with the 
494 “that ancient country, which once flourished with riches, and power, and glory, 
fell owing to that one evil, the immoderate liberty and licentiousness of the popu-
lar assemblies.” What precedes the quotation in question bears close resemblance 
to Harrington’s ideas on the proposal, promulgation and private debate: “For our 
ancestors, those wise and upright men, would not permit the public assembly to 
have any authority to make laws; they chose that whatever the common people 
decided, or whatever the burgesses wished to enact should be ordered or forbid-
den, after the assembly was adjourned, and after all the parts had been properly 
arranged, by the different ranks, classes, and ages, distributed in their tribes and 
centuries, after having listened to the advocates of the proposal on which the vote 
was to be taken, and after the proposal itself had been for many days before the 
people, and had had its merits inquired into. But all the republics of the Greeks 
are governed by the rashness of the assembly while sitting.” Cicero, “Oratio pro 
Flaccus” in The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, London: 1856 (15-16). 
495 Cicero, “Oratio pro Flaccus,” (57).
496 Cicero, “Oratio pro Flaccus,” (96).
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result that “the people immediately became unquiet and resumed [the] 
debate” (PW 275). Similarly, although Harrington could read in Plu-
tarch how the lack of trade and luxury kept “any fine curious Rethori-
cian” from coming to Sparta “to teache them eloquence, & the cunning 
cast of lying,”497 he was openly sympathetic to trade and commerce.498 
This adds credence to the view that he did not consider rhetoric per se 
as problematic. 
The significant other to Sparta was the Athens of the Peloponne-
sian war (and here Harrington fully agreed with Cicero’s judgement on 
Greek commonwealths). Harrington quoted extensively from Hobbes’ 
translation of Thucydides, and used it to present the dangers of allow-
ing debate in a popular assembly, which “was the destruction of Ath-
ens” (PW 266). Although there were other reasons behind the troubles 
of Athens, which will be dealt with later on, the main blame lay in the 
institutional deficiencies.499 
When comparing Harrington’s presentation of Alcibiades to that 
of Nedham in 1650 in Case of the Commonwealth, there is a telling differ-
ence. Nedham was presenting Alcibiades as an example of a successful 
military commander, “who having done many services for the Athe-
nian populacy, was only for a petty misfortune, and no other cause, in 
managing the war of Sicily called home and banished both from his 
command and country.” In 1650 Nedham presented Alcibiades’ fate as 
proof of the popular folly of the Levellers, as how “upon another turn 
of popular air” Alcibiades was “sent the second time into banishment 
497 Plutarch, The liues of the noble Grecians and Romanes, Thomas North (transl.), London: 
1579, p. 50.
498 Cromartie, “Harringtonian virtue,” pp. 999-1002.
499 Although Rome was a more positive example in general, its history could yield 
similar examples of the results of allowing debate in the popular assembly: “the 
Roman tribunes qui fere semper regebantur a multitudine magis quam regebant [this is 
from Livy, The Early History of Rome, 3.71: ut fere semper reguntur a multitudine 
magis quam regunt: as always, the servants rather than the masters of the mob] 
proposed not unto the result only, but unto the debate also of the people, who were 
therefore called unto the pulpits, where some vomited, and others drank, poison” 
(PW: 262-263).
183JAMES HARRINGTON AND HIS OCEANA
by those levelers.”500 For Harrington, Alcibiades – the quintessential 
example of a self-serving, “vain-glorious” orator and military com-
mander who had little interest in the common good – was “that ranting 
fellow” who “fell on demagoguing for the Sicilian war,” thus leading 
the city that had no protection against his kind into ruin (PW 268).501 
Harrington could have chosen to argue that Athens failed because of 
its excesses of democracy, and Sparta’s success was due to its more aris-
tocratic government. Like many classical predecessors, he could have 
defined Sparta as a “laudable oligarchy, as it is termed by Isocrates,”502 
without losing his credentials in following classical political philosophy, 
“for that word is not, wherever you meet it, to be branded, seeing it is 
used also by Aristotle, Plutarch and others, sometimes in a good sense” 
(PW 263). Yet he chose to argue that his model of government repre-
sented the democratic, popular variety of republican government. 
The theorist Harrington mainly chose to oppose for his use – and 
abuse – of classical precedents and forms of government was Thomas 
Hobbes. Harrington’s presentation of reason as interest has already 
been mentioned, but besides aligning Hobbes’ thinking to the param-
eters of classical political philosophy of honestas et utilitas, Harrington 
argued that a) Hobbes’ dismissal of classical commonwealths was un-
founded, b) his use of classical sources was faulty and c) his professed 
anti-classicism was far from sincere. 
In Leviathan (1.21), Hobbes had continued his attack on classical po-
litical philosophy by arguing that the emulation of ancient common-
500 Nedham, Case of the Common-wealth, p. 77.
501 Obviously the perception of Alcibiades can be traced to differing accounts 
classical authors gave of him, but undoubtedly both Harrington and Nedham 
chose to favour some interpretations over others as they fitted their own 
schemes. For example, in 1646 John Hall used Alcibiades as an example of easily 
adjusting conversationalist: “since mens humours are so various as their faces, 
there is required a supplenesse in behaviour (for men of morose natures, doe but 
in a manner stifle the vitall parts of humane society) and this was excellent in 
Alcibiades, who could conforme to the constitutions of all those severall people 
his variety of fortune made him converse with.” John Hall, “Of Company,” Horae 
Vacivae, pp. 87-8.
502 Pocock’s edition has “Socrates,” but the original (Chapman) edition of 1656, p. 
151 shows Isocrates.
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wealths was the prime cause behind the troubles of his time, against 
which would be needed “the antidote of solid reason,” i.e. political sci-
ence as presented by himself. Harrington’s counter-attack on behalf 
of classical politics was to point out that Hobbes had admitted “the 
great prosperity of ancient commonwealths.” Some particular com-
monwealths were “less perfect in their policy than others,” and could 
thus show some signs of infirmity, but “the excellency of that kind of 
policy” that was the reason behind the prosperity of the ancient com-
monwealths “in general” should be emulated, not disparaged (PW 178).
Hobbes continued his attacks on classical learning in chapter 46 of 
Leviathan by asserting that from “Aristotle’s civil philosophy,”503 people 
could learn the style of rhetorical redescription where “all manner of 
Commonwealths but the popular (such as was at that time the state of 
Athens)” could be called “tyranny.” This redescription allowed “the 
aristocracy of the thirty governors” set up in Athens by Sparta to be 
called “the thirty tyrants.” For Harrington this was a senseless argu-
ment, since the thirty tyrants were “called tyrants by all authors.” Thus 
the only redescription was done by Hobbes himself “who will have 
them against all the world to have been an aristocracy” (PW 206). 
The differences between Hobbes and Harrington show also in 
their views of Catiline, the archetype of the seditious demagogue in 
the Roman republic. For Hobbes, arguing after the Catiline Conspiracy 
of Sallust, Catiline “was author of the greatest sedition that ever was 
in Rome”504 and in “whom there never was a greater Artist in raising 
seditions.”505 But for Harrington, Catiline was an example of how the 
proper political arrangements could save Rome from ruin, despite the 
“intended mischief” (PW 199). 
Finally, Harrington could point out how Hobbes, “though he seems 
to skew at antiquity,” was still relying on classical authors in his political 
philosophy. Quoting from Leviathan (2.18) Hobbes’ view that “covenants 
being but words and breath, have no power unto oblige, contain, con-
503 Probably the Politics. 
504 Hobbes, Elements of Law, ch 28, sect 13.
505 Hobbes, On the Citizen, ch 12, sect. 12.
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strain, or protect any man, but what they have from the public sword,” 
Harrington argued that in this Hobbes was “following his furious mas-
ter Carneades” (PW 165). The source for this argument was from the 
Prolegomena to De Jure Belli et Pacis of Hugo Grotius, where numerous 
classical quotes were given for such might-makes-right views, of which 
“whom rather than Carneades” was the most proper advocate.506 
On a final note on the classical roots in Harrington’s political the-
ory, a few words are in order about his use of the word “demagogue.” 
Hobbes’ translation of the Peloponnesian War is the likeliest source, given 
the fact that Harrington used the book extensively, and for both Hob-
bes and Harrington the word denotes not only a leader of the people, 
but also specifically a leader through the use of oratory. But there are a 
few other Greek sources that can be added as sources to Harrington’s 
usage. Aristotle’s Politics (5.5) shows how the term developed its conno-
tation with oratory. According to Aristotle, demagogues are the usual 
cause of revolutions in democracies. In the past they were military lead-
ers, but concomitantly with the progress of rhetoric, they had become 
leaders through oratory.507 Although the Politics was also an important 
opus for Harrington, there is no direct quotation to this particular part. 
A more explicit source is the Lives of Plutarch. In the end of Oceana (PW 
357), Harrington recited at length the story of Timoleon, referring to 
“Laphystius, an envious demagogue,” and “Demaenetus, another dem-
agogue.” It is yet another ironic twist that Harrington used the profess-
edly anti-humanist Hobbes’ translation of Thucydides approvingly and 
directly, but for Plutarch, he chose to use the Greek sources.508
506 As in Grotius, The Illustrious Hugo Grotius of the Law of Warre and Peace with Annotations, 
fol. *3. That quote was the one used to support Harrington’s views on the common 
good as presented earlier. 
507 A 16th-century translation of the book translated the word as “guides and leaders of 
the people,” or “Captains” and “men of eloquence” as needed: Aristotles Politiqves, 
or Discovrses of Government, tr. Loys Le Roy, called Regius, London: 1598, pp. 273-4.
508 Thomas North’s translation (which was actually a translation from Jacques 
Amyot’s French version) referred to “accusers.. that continually made orations to 
the people.” The Greek version referred to demagogues as unavoidable sycophants 
in a democracy: πάση δημοκρατια συκοφάντην, έπεχείρησαν καί Τιμολέοντι δύο 
τών δημαγωγών Λαφύστιος καί Δημαίνετος. Plutarch, Ploutarchou bioi: Plutarchi 
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We can now move on to another use of classical sources, that of 
oratio and sermo. As described in the introduction, early modern civil 
conversation has been sometimes needlessly conflated with earlier theo-
ries of conversation from Cicero onwards, and these problems are use-
ful to bring to mind when deciphering the classical/modern division 
in Harrington’s political theory. In Oceana, there was an explicit place 
for useful civil conversation: “the academy of the provosts.” The given 
purpose of the academy was to “freely and affably” receive “all sorts 
of company that will repair thither for conversation or discourse, so it 
be upon the matter of government, news, or intelligence.” Through the 
academy one could even make policy suggestions, which would “be 
argued or discoursed upon by the rest.” Harrington allowed for those 
“not being able or willing to come in person” to leave an anonymous 
letter, where any advice they “ judgeth may be for the good of the com-
monwealth” could be left for the academy (PW 252).
If looked from the perspective of content and uses of information 
gathered and discussed, the academy can be seen in a respectably re-
publican light. It has been seen as a way to lower the threshold for a 
common citizen when approaching official institutions,509 and an in-
stitution characteristic of Harrington’s “city-state view of the polity,” 
bearing resemblance to similar bodies proposed earlier by Henry Rob-
inson and Samuel Hartlib.510 Nevertheless, if the composition and char-
acter of discussion in Harrington’s academy are analysed, the similari-
ties with these bodies end, and the purportedly democratic nature of 
the academy can be questioned. 
vitae graece et latine, vol. I, Theodor Döhner (ed.), Paris: 1857, p. 303. 
509 Charles Blitzer, An Immortal Commonwealth. The Political Thought of James Harrington, 
New Haven: 1960, p. 273; Davis, Utopia and the ideal society, p. 229.
510 Pocock’s note Oceana, p. 252; Samuel Hartlib, A further Discoverie of The Office of 
Pvblick Addresse for Accomodations, London: 1648; Henry Robinson, The Office of Ad-
resses and Encounters: where all people of each rancke and quality may receive direction and 
advice for the most cheap and speedy way of attaining whatsoever they can lawfully desire, 
London: 1650. Additionally Scott, Commonwealth principles, p. 81 has argued for a 
similarity with the Office of Addresses with [Samuel Hartlib]: A description of the 
famous Kingdome of Macaria, London: 1641, but as there is no reference to such an 
office in Macaria, Scott probably meant the aforementioned book instead. 
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Harrington qualified his speakers on their social skills, starting 
from the reception at the academy when the people in question were 
to be “heard in the way of civil conversation, which is to be managed 
without any other awe or ceremony than is thereunto usually apper-
taining.” Similarly, the academy was to be administered in a manner 
that “may be most attractive unto men of parts and good affections 
unto the commonwealth,” as the main incentive was “the excellency 
of the conversation.” And as for the letters brought to the academy, 
they were to be read by either the provosts or “by the gentlemen of the 
academy” (PW 252). 
With these caveats, Harrington could disqualify most of the people 
outside the gentlemanly elite, as the conventions of civil conversation 
and polite behaviour could not easily be expected from anyone out-
side the elite.511 Harrington called the academy “the affability of the 
commonwealth,” but rather than denoting it as easily approachable by 
anyone, it seems a definition more telling of the expected gentlemanly 
atmosphere inside (PW 252). Bearing in mind the character of Har-
rington’s meritocracy as it was brought up in the previous chapter on 
education, it is difficult to see how the academy could include anything 
but gentlemen.
As for the character of discussion, the nobility would discuss things 
very differently in the academy, than they would in the senate of 
Oceana. In comparison with the ideals of classical rhetoric, civil con-
versation in the academy is not to involve the outspoken, emotional 
deliberation of opposing views.512 Later in Oceana, Harrington added a 
qualification to this effect within a quote from Francis Bacon, as to how 
councils “‘are at this day in most places but familiar meetings’ (some-
what like the academy of provosts) ‘where matters are rather talked on 
than debated’” (PW 266).513 Altogether, Harrington’s civil conversation 
seems to share many of the aspects commonly seen to belong to polite, 
complaisant, ritualistic, deferring, non-provocative civil conversation 
by men of quality, manners and proper background. This is made even 
511 Bryson, From courtesy to civility, pp. 171-181.
512 Remer, “Harrington’s New Deliberative Rhetoric,” p. 538-539. 
513 Bacon, “Of Councel,” 20, Essaies.
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clearer in his later works, when he made an added qualification for 
similar academies that they “be governed according unto the rules of 
good breeding or civil conversation.”514
Yet the courteous character of the academy should not be exagger-
ated either. There is a strand in early modern republicanism, accord-
ing to which some of the developments in heightened civility were not 
necessarily worthwhile. Harrington shared in these worries about the 
contemporary fashions in conversation, which would shy away from 
important matters in favour of idle talk: “conversation in these days 
is a game, at which they are best provided that have light gold.” This 
avoidance of contentious issues was often associated with its emasculat-
ing effects, as when comparing conversation to “the sport of women 
that make flowers of straws, which must be stuck up but may not be 
touched” (PW 339). Against this trend, Harrington’s academy was to 
promote interest in politics despite its polite ways, and the “gallants” of 
Oceana would be “showing themselves not more unto the ladies at their 
balls, than unto your commonwealth at her academy” (PW 310).
There was also another side to conversation: plain talk. As in the 
case of counsel, one argument against the use of rhetoric in politics was 
to promote plain-talking, honest conversation as a method of parlia-
mentary debate. In Oceana, the tellingly named character of Epimonus 
de Garrula presented such a view, claiming that “in [the lower house 
of ] the parliament of Oceana you had no balls nor dancing, but sober 
conversation.” In Epimonus’ view this kind of conversation in the par-
liament was much superior to the ideal debate of classical deliberative 
rhetoric, as it “flowed forth into language that.. is far better than Tul-
ly’s; or, let anybody but translate one of his orations and speak it in the 
house, and see if everybody do not laugh at him.” Epimonus’ speech is 
in context of the aforementioned secret voting in parliament: his claim 
514 Brief Directions, (self-date Novemb. 13. 1658, but printed in 1659), PW 594, as well 
in Art of Lawgiving, (1659 no date), PW 671, and Rota (1660 Jan 9), PW 814. The 
whole title of Rota includes a telling qualification, as it was “a model of a free-state, 
or equall common-wealth: once proposed and debated in brief, and to be again 
more at large proposed to, and debated by a free and open society of ingenious gentlemen” 
(my italics). 
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was that no secrecy was needed since the debate was conducted as “so-
ber conversation; a man might know and be known, shew his parts, and 
improve ’em” (PW 242). 
However, the reasons given for secret voting applied also to purport-
edly plain speaking, since the danger of feigned frankness remained 
in the “sober conversation.” No matter how plainly one would put the 
anti-rhetorical argument for open truth, the doubt remains of it being 
just a rhetorical ploy to obstruct the interests of others.515 Accordingly, 
Lord Archon counters Epinomus by suggesting that “is it not a strange 
thing that [the ballot boxes] should be thrown first into the fire by a fair 
gamester?” The sober conversation of Epimonus is a sham, as differing 
interests will always permeate the debate and open voting. It was pre-
cisely those skilled in manipulation who stood to gain most from open 
voting. It made sense for them to feign frankness and plain talk. And 
even more importantly, in the end it did not even matter whether the 
anti-rhetorical argument for open truth was made honestly or not, since 
the dangers involved were not removed. In voting as in conversation, 
there would always be those “that are not able to withstand the brow of 
an enemy, and others that make nothing of this, are less proof against 
that of a friend” (PW 244). Debate without interests was an oxymoron, 
so it was best to accept the omnipresence of rhetoric, and regulate it to 
the most beneficial effects it could undoubtedly bring: eloquence in the 
senate, private discourses by the parliamentarians, civil conversation in 
the academy.
Finally, we can consider Harrington’s view on the relationship be-
tween law and education. If starting from a dichotomy of law and educa-
tion as preferences for a well-ordered society, a first look at Harrington’s 
place in such a scheme would seem paradoxical. He could be placed 
in the legalistic camp with Machiavelli,516 as pertains to his view that 
“great virtue” cannot exist “without the best education, and best edu-
cation without the best laws” (PW 178). Yet he also quoted from Cicero 
515 Richards, Rhetoric and Courtliness, p. 5. 
516 Niccolo Machiavelli, Machiavels Discovrses. upon the first Decade of T. Livius, London: 
1636, 1.4: “good examples result from good education, good education from good 
laws.” 
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and Tacitus in order to argue that “the best rule as to your laws in gen-
eral is that they be few” (PW 187). As for education, Harrington quoted 
approvingly Isocrates’ view on the Athenians, who “write not their laws 
upon dead walls, nor content themselves with having ordained punish-
ments for crimes, but provide in such a way, by the education of their 
youth, that there be no crimes for punishment” (PW 299). 
My argument is that Harrington chose both education and laws. In 
his view they were neither mutually exclusive approaches, nor individu-
ally sufficient. The point was to distinguish their proper fields of appli-
cation: what law alone should govern, and where to rely on education. 
This dichotomy is evident in Harrington’s qualification for the afore-
mentioned views on Athenians, as Isocrates spoke “of those laws which 
regarded manners, not of those orders which concerned the administration 
of the commonwealth” (PW 299, my italics). 
As pertains to the laws and procedures of government, Harrington 
belonged to the legalistic camp. Oceana was “the empire of laws, and 
not of men” (PW 161). If laws did not guide administration, it was left 
open to abuse by those unguided by virtue. It was “the maxim of a 
legislator” to rely on orders, whereas urging to trust individuals instead 
of written law was “the maxim of a demagogue” (PW 205). This meant 
also that laws should be as few as possible, but not any fewer. Har-
rington argued that “if you will have fewer orders in a commonwealth, 
you will have more.” This presumably refers to any ambiguity in, or 
dead zones of legislation, which would give an added opportunity to 
demagogues, “the end whereof is to have no order at all” (PW 337). 
Legislation should thus be of an optimal amount, but in addition, 
it should also be of a high quality. In this Harrington disagreed with 
Machiavelli, who Harrington read as arguing that virtuous customs 
could keep corruption away even in the face of bad legislation. For Har-
rington, Machiavelli “understood not a commonwealth as to the whole 
piece,” since a pernicious rule of procedure, such as allowing debate 
between the proposers of legislation and the voters, would have perni-
cious effects by its very nature. An order with bad results was simply 
a bad order, notwithstanding any mitigation through customs (PW 
321-22). 
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In return, administrative orders could have effects on the customs. 
Harrington argued that the “uprightness which was in Lacedaemon” 
resulted from “being set straight” by Lycurgus, whose arrangements 
brought “the manners of her citizens unto its rule” (Oceana, p. 207). 
Conversely, Athens was an example of how a bad constitution could 
bring out the worst in citizens. It is to be noted that while Harrington 
referred in this context to the “ill education” of Athenians, he did not 
refer to education of manners, but to how their customs had degener-
ated due to their faulty constitution. This is apparent from the fact that 
his allusions to Xenophon and Polybius517 both deal with the faults of 
the Athenian constitution (PW 279), he later explained specifically that 
the type of education Isocrates referred to was of a different kind, “lest 
you should think he contradicts Xenophon and Polybius” (PW 299), 
and Harrington had a very positive view of the level of learning ancient 
Athens represented (PW 305).
Despite the stress on administrative orders Harrington did not go 
as far as to suggest that the wellbeing of a commonwealth could be left 
solely to them. For Harrington “the laws of a government, how whole-
some soever in themselves,” would not alone insure public order. Unin-
formed citizens could still rebel against laws, when “men by a congruity 
in their education be not bred to find a relish in them.” Shaping minds 
through education, “the Plastick art of government,” was as important 
as the administrative orders, in the sense that neither could be left to 
the whims of individuals: “education of a mans Children is not wholly 
to be committed or trusted unto himself“ (PW 299). On a practical 
level, this Isocratic aim of having “no crimes for punishment” was to be 
achieved by epideictic oratory as well as schooling.
For schooling, Harrington promoted an education that relied on 
classical, humanist and republican upbringing. His approval of Athe-
nian learning has been mentioned, and he had a similarly positive 
view of Romans, “by whose means we are as it were of beasts become 
men” and could become “a wise and a great people” (PW 192). He used 
Rome also as an example of how education into republican virtues was 
517 Polybius, Histories, 6.44; (Pseudo-)Xenophon, Athenian Constitution. 
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so much more preferable to being “bred under a monarchy,” that even 
those who politically preferred monarchy, would not “prefer the educa-
tion of the sons of Brutus before that of Scipio” (PW 299).
Besides the inherently attractive qualities of such an education, the 
avowed goal of Harrington’s schools was the same as for humanistic 
learning in general: preparation for public service.518 Since the work-
ings of Harrington’s political system were based on classical political 
theory, “knowledge of ancient prudence,” it was necessary to gain such 
knowledge through learning. This learning was to be had from “schools 
of good literature,” namely “such as we call universities.” Harrington 
promoted a school of politics, or as his sales-pitch went, “if you would 
have your children to be statesmen, let them drink by all means of these 
fountains [the universities]” (PW 305-6).519
Fundamentally the rule of learning and merit was equated with aris-
tocratic rule in the senate and magistracy. For Harrington there was 
“something in the making of a commonwealth, then in the governing 
of her” that “seems to be peculiar unto the genius of a gentleman” (PW 
183). To prove this assertion, Harrington argued from historical exam-
ples that all founders of republics were first and foremost gentlemen. 
They needed to be learned as well, like Lycurgus: “if he had not been 
learned in all the learning of Crete, and well travelled in the knowledge 
of other governments, he had never made his commonwealth” (PW 
305). But it was just as significant that he “was of the royal blood.” An 
exception to the rule on nobility was Moses, but he “had his education 
by the daughter of Pharaoh,” which would seem to have made him a 
gentleman by adoption (PW 183).
518 Although this is nearly a commonplace in current scholarship, I have benefited 
from Anthony Grafton & Lisa Jardine, From humanism to the humanities: education and 
the liberal arts in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Europe, Cambridge, Mass.: 1988.
519 This is likely yet another jibe at Hobbes, who in the Conclusion of Leviathan, p. 
395, had proposed that “the Universities are the Fountains of Civill, and Morall 
Doctrine, from whence the Preachers, and the Gentry, drawing such water as they 
find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the Pulpit, and in their Conversation) 
upon the People, there ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both 
from the Venime of Heathen Politicians, and from the Incantation of Deceiving 
Spirits.” I owe this point to Richard Serjeantson. 
193JAMES HARRINGTON AND HIS OCEANA
Besides the argument from history, Harrington used the argument 
common to grant applicants everywhere: “To be learned requires 
leisure and income.” This proviso allowed the exclusion of the lower 
masses, as the idea “that the people can have leisure to study, is a vain 
imagination” (PW 257). Likewise, the liberal professions, “divines, law-
yers” could be left out, since albeit their learning, their income was 
from work that left them no leisure (PW 258). At least, not in the same 
way as those whose income came from landed wealth. Through these 
(and few other) caveats, Harrington could point out the caretakers of 
“the superstructures of [popular] government” (PW 257). It was the 
nobility, who “have nothing else but their education and their leisure 
for the public, furnished by their ease and competent riches, and their 
intrinsic value” (PW 261).
These qualities of the nobles gave them the skill, as well as the 
responsibility for the other aspect of education, epideictic oratory. 
Through “the senate, a main part of whose office it is to teach and 
instruct the people,” the people, who were represented in the preroga-
tive assembly – i.e., the lower house – were treated with an oration “by 
some knight or magistrate of the senate, to be chosen out of the ablest 
men” every Tuesday. The content of the orations was a repetition of 
“the orders of the commonwealth with all possible brevity,” followed by 
further elaboration “of one, or some part of it” (PW 283). 
The aim of such instruction was to raise awareness of “the treas-
ures of the politics,” in order to prevent sedition rising from misconcep-
tions – “disturb[ing] your government with whimsies, and freaks of 
mother-wit” – and to prevent any backtracking into the world of arcana 
imperii, having the people “to be stutter’d520 out of their liberties.” In this 
respect, basic knowledge of the political processes was more impera-
tive than simple virtue, since “this commonwealth is the estate of the 
people; and a man, you know, though he be virtuous, yet if he does not 
520 In reading “stuttered” instead of “fluttered” (as suggested by Pocock), I have 
followed the usage of David Norbrook, who suggests that Harrington’s choice of 
words is characteristic of republican theory, which associated “absolutism with 
the erosion of confidence in public speech.” It is also the actual spelling. Norbrook, 
Writing the English Republic, p. 416.
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understand his estate, may run out or be cheated of it” (PW 283). 
As can be seen, the expectations of the epideictic orations were quite 
high, which is indicative of the trust Harrington had in the power of 
rhetoric. Of course, these orations were neither dialogue nor politi-
cal rhetoric, and even Thomas Hobbes deemed it worthwhile to give 
instruction to subjects.521 The difference is in the republican goals, 
and view of the audience. Harrington took the view “of Cicero by 
Machiavel,”522 that the people, notwithstanding their intellectual defi-
ciencies, “if they be shown truth, they not only acknowledge and em-
brace it very suddenly, but are the most constant and faithful guardians 
and conservators of it” (PW 284). 
Just before the above quotation from Cicero, Machiavelli qualified 
his view on the orator who could have such an effect in demonstrating 
to the people their erroneous ways, as being a “good man.”523 This 
accords well with classical rhetorical theory as represented by Cicero 
and Quintilian, to whom the qualities of an orator included necessarily 
high morals: a good orator had to be a good man. But Harrington did 
not explicitly insist on this, or other moral or rhetorical criteria, for his 
debaters and orators, which has been interpreted as a sign of his rein-
terpretation of rhetorical theory.524
Nevertheless, if, for example, Cicero’s moral requisites are viewed 
in the light of his admiration for the correlation between nobility and 
intellectual, political and martial skills, Cicero could be seen even as a 
predecessor to Harrington’s views.525 Furthermore, if the education – 
which should be seen as governed by laws concerning morals in the Iso-
cratic manner – of Harrington’s citizens is considered alongside their 
assumed intrinsic qualities, the most plausible conclusion is that Har-
rington viewed the ideal citizens as orators with high morals. 
As for the absence of explicit rhetorical criteria for senators, outside 
521 Hobbes, Leviathan, 2.30.
522 Machiavelli, Discovrses, 1.4 
523 Machiavelli, Discovrses, 1.4: “qualche uomo da bene, che, orando, dimostri loro 
come ei s’ingannano.”
524 Remer, “Harrington’s New Deliberative Rhetoric,” pp. 547, 556.
525 Bryson, From courtesy to civility, p. 145.
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what can be assumed from their humanistic education, it should be 
noted that one of the purposes of the Tuesday lectures was precisely to 
“teach your senators elocution.” In his defence of rhetoric, Harrington 
was consistent to his Aristotelian view that rhetoric, even if it could be 
used for ill, could also be used for good cause. Neglecting the art would 
give the upper hand, and thus an undeserved victory to enemies skilled 
in rhetoric:
Elocution is of great use unto your Senators; for if they do not understand 
rhetoric (giving it at this time for granted that the art were not otherwise 
good), and come to treat with or vindicate the cause of the commonwealth 
against some other nation that is good at it, the advantage will be subject 
to remain upon the merit of the art, and not upon the merit of the cause. 
(PW 286)
To sum up, Harrington’s political theory relies much on the presence of 
classical rhetoric in service of the republic, but his republican views on 
popular authority, liberty and reason – somewhat counter-intuitively 
in comparison to other writers under study – resulted in a restricted 
sphere for public speech. This, as in the case of Milton, goes to show 
that the combination of individual rights, popular government and rule 
of law was not straightforward, especially when mixed with a strong 
notion of liberty as non-domination.
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PART V Protectorate 1657-1660
11. Reception of Oceana – Nedham in 1657
Unsurprisingly, the republican arguments of Oceana did not meet with 
overall approval from the royalist writers, but in republican circles the 
reception of Oceana was also mixed. We can surmise that Streater was 
not diametrically opposed to the arguments, having been one of the 
publishers. John Hall was an ex-writer already, but Nedham did have 
some critical points to make in a set of editorials to Mercurius Politicus 
(March-April 1657) that he began “From Utopia” and “From Oceana” 
(hereinafter Letters).526
The publication of Excellencie of a Free-State had not irreparably dam-
aged Nedham’s career, even though the composition of, and the politi-
cal influence of Cromwell on, the second Protectorate parliament was 
far from hospitable to republican ideas. Nevertheless, from Nedham’s 
editorials we may easily see that his earlier overt criticism of high au-
thorities had much lessened. In the case of the Parliament, the general 
drift was towards more authoritarian forms of government: the Febru-
ary of 1657 saw the presentation of the Humble Petition and Advice, a 
constitutional draft suggesting that Cromwell be the first king of a new 
hereditary monarchy. It has been suggested that Nedham’s writings 
paralleled these developments: he first presented pro-monarchical ar-
guments and distanced himself from them as soon as Cromwell himself 
declined the crown offered to him.527 An earlier scholar went as far as 
526 Marchamont Nedham, Mercurius Politicus, (352-356), March-April 1657, pp. 7641-
7720.
527 Peacey, Politicians and Pamphleteers, pp. 292-93; and “Nibbling at Leviathan,” pp. 
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to suggest that the editorials “were obviously intended to prepare the 
public mind for the restoration of kingship.”528
However, Nedham’s editorials do not lend themselves easily to such 
an unambiguous reading of his intention. A contemporary reader, John 
Pell, claimed that Nedham “spoke so darkly that no man can possibly 
have found out what it was.”529 Some scholars have chosen to abstain 
from interpretation, merely acknowledging the “trenchant irony in the 
series of witty articles”530 or concluding that Nedham was “copping 
out,”531 or “retreating from an awkward position” that the Excellency of 
the Free State put him in, without considering what exactly was the posi-
tion taken in the Letters.532 Despite the pervasive irony, parody and 
ambiguity in the Letters, a few scholars have argued that Nedham did 
intend some of the things written, such as “anti-formalism” and the 
“adaptability” of constitutions and forms of government,533 and advo-
cating “pragmatism rather than utopianism regarding governmental 
forms.”534
However, it is difficult to easily accept any anti-formalist reading of 
the Letters when keeping in mind the context. When Nedham argued 
how “for these seven years last past,” the mirror-image of England, 
255-56; Worden, Literature and Politics, pp. 316-17.
528 Wilbur Cortez Abbott, The writings and speeches of Oliver Cromwell, vol. 4, Harvard: 
1937, p. 431.
529 Quoted in Peacey, Politicians and Pamphleteers, p. 292.
530 Barbara K. Lewalski, Life of Milton: a critical biography, Blackwell: 2002, p. 341.
531 John Pocock, “James Harrington and the Good Old Cause: a study of the 
ideological context of his writings,” The Journal of British Studies, 10(1), 1970, pp. 
30-48.
532 Pocock, “Introduction” (PW 13-14).
533 Scott, Commonwealth Principles, p. 131; Jonathan Scott, “Classical republicanism 
in seventeenth century England and the Netherlands,” in Republicanism: a shared 
European heritage. Vol. I. Republicanism and constitutionalism in early modern Europe, eds. 
Martin van Gelderen, Quentin Skinner, Cambridge: 2002, p. 65 (quoting Letters 
7675).
534 Peacey, Politicians and Pamphleteers, p. 292. Peacey did acknowledge the “ambiguous” 
tone of the texts, an acknowledgment which is lacking in “Nibbling at Leviathan,” 
pp. 255-56.
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“Utopia hath been sorely afflicted with an infectious Itch of scribling 
political discourses,” i.e. disputes about “Government.. about Notions, 
Forms, and Shadows,” it should not be overlooked that on the preced-
ing page he had also asserted how it is “a sure Maxim of State, To live in 
Jest, and never to be in Earnest, except it be in order to die.” It would be highly 
inconsistent to take only some of Nedham’s claims at face value without 
keeping in mind his starting point to the reader: “you are thereupon to 
understand, throughout the whole Course of my Correspondence with 
you, that whatever I write is no further in earnest than you please to 
make it so.”535
Paradoxically, Nedham’s admitted irony is an aid to interpretation 
in the sense that much of the logic of political reasoning given in the 
Letters does make more sense, if assumed to be nonsense. Nedham 
could claim that the Utopians, “in order to the more secure enjoying 
of.. Freedom,” gave up their “private Right for the public convenience,” 
since “the Rules and Reasons of Government cannot be always the 
same,” and “no certain Form can be prescribed at all times.” On the 
same page, he finishes by describing “a free State” to be “in every form, 
where Men are put into the way of a free enjoyment and security of 
their Rights.” In this context of both having and not having a form, 
rights and free state, Nedham adds that “a Free State may be.. that 
which Men call Monarchy.”536 In a similar vein, in the next Letter Ned-
ham told a tale of how the Utopians at first had difficulty accepting 
that “the Wisdome of the Senate, is the Wisdome of the whole people, and contrary 
Opinion (whatever the pretence be) is adjudged Faction,” but they then “made 
a shift to see the Truth of all, That men are as Free every jot under a 
Right Principality, as under a Popular Forme.” Thus, they “began to 
hate Faction grounded upon Forms and Notions, and became Fitter to 
live under a Prince in time to come.”537 
The difficulty of ascertaining whether Nedham is being ironically 
negative, or seriously positive in his descriptions, causes understandable 
problems in finding unambiguous intentions in the Letters. Arguably, 
535 MP, 352, pp. 7642-3.
536 MP, 354, p. 7675.
537 MP, 355, pp. 7690-1.
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due to the expressly ironic unwillingness to make clear claims in the 
Letters, the result is that most interpretations of them can be both con-
tested and asserted. Yet before giving in to discombobulation, there are 
three steps that can help to understand Nedham’s intentions to a great-
er extent than just referring to their ironic nature, or using disjointed 
quotes to prove a previously chosen argument. The first is Nedham’s 
early reference to “Lucians Philosophers” in the Letters538: it serves to 
remind us how his work belongs to the Lucianic tradition of serio ludere, 
as attested also by Nedham’s nom de plume, “Joco-serio.”539 Obviously 
the problem remains to discern what is meant seriously and what not, 
but the evidence of a serious point makes for a more worthwhile search 
for it, than would be the case in a completely frivolous text.540
The next step is to see what could be deduced of Nedham’s inten-
tions through his choice of this genre – why did Nedham set himself up 
so as not to be taken seriously? One possibility is that he was presenting 
a veiled critique of the suppressive mood of politics: drollery becomes 
the only possibility when anything more serious was costly. Thomas 
More was a case in point, when slipping from his principle of drolling, 
“by being but once in his daies in earnest,” it resulted in “a sad example 
to such as shall venture to be in earnest, among the great Politicoes of 
the captious World.”541 Accordingly, the Letters describe as “the Fun-
damentall Law of Utopia” to never be in earnest or “appear in print so 
profound and serious Projectors” of political writings.542 Whether we 
should also read into the fundamental law a normative intent against 
free speech, is a question to which we shall return shortly, but for now 
we must ask where did Nedham place himself in such an oppressive 
setting.
Hitherto scholars have argued that in the interests of his own surviv-
538 MP, 352, p. 7643, referring most likely to A feast of Lapithae. 
539 MP, 355, p. 7692. Also given in 352, p. 7642 as Thomas More’s motto, “Betwixt Jest 
and Earnest.”
540 A possible interpretation as well, but surely there would have been less elaborate 
ways of writing such a text than the Letters. 
541 MP, 352, p. 7632.
542 MP, 352, p. 7633.
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al Nedham aimed in his editorials to set himself apart from Harrington 
and other writers of political theory. However, this is unlikely, since 
Nedham included himself among such authors, when referring to “a 
jolly Crew of the Inhabitants of the Island of Oceana,” that had recently 
landed in Utopia. Among this crew was “that wondrous wise Republi-
can called Mercurius Politicus (who served up the Politicks in Sippets).”543 
It has been suggested that this is a reference to someone else from whom 
Nedham was distancing himself:544 for example, to John Streater, of 
whose Observations it was an “apt description.”545 Such a solution is su-
perfluous, since the description is just as fitting to Nedham and his 
editorials. 
Furthermore, in the next editorial Nedham referred to the cures 
given to “the Mangie Scriblers of the Politicks,” who “may all have Un-
guent for the Itch, except Mercurius Politicus.” This was because he “gave 
over in time, and now for Drolling deserves to be condemned to the 
perpetuall drudgerie of a Pamphlet.”546 The penance is of course fairly 
supercilious, if the ‘punishment’ prescribed was to keep on working 
as before. What Nedham was presenting was a self-serving argument 
similar to that in Certain Considerations: it was better to counter than to 
forcibly suppress the political bickering. For Utopia, this meant retain-
ing “a State Droll in pension, as a most necessary Officer, to Correct all 
that presume to Print or Dispute about Models of Government.” Thus, 
“the little Wits of the City, being duly Lasht, are kept from Lashing 
out.”547 Despite his earlier forays into the same disputes, Nedham could 
undoubtedly be persuaded to serve in such a duty for Cromwell. 
We have thus seen that Nedham was not so much denouncing his 
former positions as standing by them, while attempting to maneuver 
himself into a more favourable position. The last step is then to see 
whether the same applies for the political content of Letters: do they 
show similarities in respect to Nedham’s other political arguments that 
543 MP, 352, p. 7644.
544 Peacey, Politicians and Pamphleteers, p. 292.
545 Worden, Literature and Politics, p. 316.
546 MP, 353, p. 7659.
547 MP, 355, p. 7690.
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he seemed to have held true to over his career. As mentioned, proposed 
arguments such as the promotion of monarchy are not clear and evi-
dent in view of the explicit drollery of the text, but what should also be 
considered is whether there was even a giant leap in Nedham’s political 
philosophy to begin with. As seen in earlier chapters, Nedham’s brand 
of republicanism was not very populist to begin with, and one seeks in 
vain in the Letters for any arguments on behalf of popular participa-
tion. At the same time republicanism was not attacked either, so the 
Letters do not represent a total turn in favour of monarchy either.
Concerning what criticism can be found in the text, there is much 
that follows the republican tradition. Nedham mocked the mistaken 
“notion of Liberty” advocated by Levellers and others, who “thought it 
lay in having no land-Lord, no Law, no Religion, save his own Phantsie.” 
This ‘negative liberty’ was, of course, simply licence: “it being then 
understood, that this only is perfect Liberty, where none obey, all com-
mand, & every one doth what he list.” In such conditions, there was “no 
Free State then.” And accordingly, as follows the usual republican cri-
tique of licentious regimes, “the People ran out into endless Factions.”548 
As seen earlier, these arguments for true liberty and against factional-
ism were commonplace for Nedham as well as other republican writers 
– and that included James Harrington. It should therefore come as no 
surprise that the only political critique of Oceana in the Letters concerns 
the trust placed on voting as a viable mechanism for choosing decision-
makers. Nedham’s dismissal – “a High-Constable is a Prime officer of 
State” in Oceana, “if he Ken the Knack of Balloting” – was perfectly 
in keeping with his earlier arguments against more democratic elec-
tions.549
We have thus seen that from what we can decipher through the 
sediments of irony and obfuscation in the Letters, in the end they do fit 
into Nedham’s general preferences for republicanism: wariness about 
arbitrary control of public speech, but with little admiration for what 
he considered ‘little wits’ or foolish visionaries. This last point deserves 
some further reflection, since it seems to me a better solution to inter-
548 MP, 354, p. 7674.
549 MP, 356, p. 7706.
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preting the intention of the Letters than the anti-formalism mentioned 
earlier. It has been argued that the English revolution was “explicitly 
anti-formal”550 from the perspective of religion. This claim has been 
further extended to political theory as well, where anti-formalism has 
been seen as “animating” republicanism.551 It can be questioned wheth-
er that argument is logically valid, if the assumption is simply that what 
happens in the religious theory shows inevitably in political as well. 
Nevertheless, that question need not detain us, since as pertains to Ned-
ham, we can see that the claim does not apply. 
While Nedham was undoubtedly pragmatic in his personal politics 
as well as in his writings, the importance given to the anti-formalist 
argument rests on somewhat faulty grounds. If the argument rests on 
Nedham’s explicit statements in the Letters, the failure is to take ac-
count of the drollery, and conversely, if drollery is accepted, the argu-
ment relies on an excessively convoluted reasoning. To prove the point, 
consider how in the last Letter, Nedham finished his editorials by say-
ing that he was done with Harrington “and all the Builders of Castles 
in the aire.”552 Now, in the first Letter when Nedham listed such – sup-
posedly formalist – visionaries, he included Henry Vane, who is nev-
ertheless considered one of the main representatives of anti-formalism 
alongside Nedham.553 Something has got to give, and in the end, much 
of what Nedham argued against ‘formal’ political theory – if such a 
thing is assumed to be applicable to seventeenth century political writ-
ings – can easily be explained through the aforementioned ridiculing 
of factionalism, and of visionary and pretentious philosophers in the 
Lucianic mode.
Nedham discontinued the Letters in April, at the same time as 
Cromwell did not accept the crown offered by the Parliament. It is 
550 J.C. Davis, “Against Formality: One Aspect of the English Revolution,” Transactions 
of the Royal Historical Society, 6.3, 1993, pp. 265-288.
551 Scott, “Classical republicanism in seventeenth century England and the Nether-
lands,” p. 64.
552 MP, 356, p. 7706.
553 MP, 352, p. 7644. Scott, “Classical republicanism in seventeenth century England 
and the Netherlands,” p. 65.
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plausible that Cromwell’s ambivalence had an effect on Nedham’s deci-
sion, since whether we read the Letters as promoting or resisting king-
ship, either approach had been made less topical by Cromwell’s foot-
dragging over the matter. In any case, Nedham kept his post and soon 
returned to his forte of hounding the opponents of Cromwell. In July 
1657 he proceeded to attack John Goodwin, a Cambridge-educated 
divine of renowned literary skills.554 The Great Accuser cast down gives 
a particularly interesting insight into Nedham’s approach to rhetoric. 
As Cromwell’s main press agent, Nedham could have simply restricted 
himself to attacking Goodwin’s politics, his opposition to Cromwell 
only, yet Nedham’s chosen method of damaging Goodwin politically 
was to attack his oratory. 
In Goodwin’s writing “the gauderies of a little rambling Rhetorick 
will not serve to dress out such a discourse.”555 To Nedham, Good-
win could only show “a few flashie strains of Oratory to amuse the 
Reader,”556 and his “knicking and knacking.. with such kind of Knacks 
and Play-games as make a ratling noise in Rhetorick, to please child-
ish fancie.”557 Goodwin’s arguments were “contemptible, by reason of 
a certain Figure called Antikatacresis much used by Mr. Goodwin 
in his way of Rhetorising.”558 Instead of an orator, Goodwin was “like 
a Conjurer.. fain to cast a Figure to make it appear so,” using “Fig-
urative and Tropical expressions.559 Goodwin was “a cunning man” 
who could “gather grapes off Thorns, Figs off Thistles, and Reasons 
of Brambles, and fetch rational conclusions from a quaint Collusion 
554 Marchamont Nedham, The Great Accuser cast down; Or, A Publick Trial of Mr. John 
Goodwin Of Coleman-street, London, At the Bar of Religion & Right Reason, London: 1657 
July.
555 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 76.
556 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 77.
557 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 83.
558 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 101. The term ‘anticatachresis’ seems to be a fabricated 
one, as it is not found in any standard textbook of rhetoric. However, as Nedham’s 
purpose is ridicule, it is plausible that Nedham’s claim here is that Goodwin’s 
rhetoric is so inappropriate, that even to describe it requires accordingly outlandish 
terms.
559 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 96.
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of Tropes and Figures.”560 Yet his lack of arguments – “unless such 
strains of Rhetorick of Logick as are in use at the University of Belins-
gate [market in London celebrated for fish and foul language], may be 
called Arguments”561 – left the work “only a quaint piece of Tautologie 
flourished over with a new dress: For, abstract the Rhetorical levities, 
and there remains nothing but the same Crambe.”562
If Goodwin’s content and form were poor, what were then the proper 
bases of argumentation, when not writing for the masses? In a lengthy 
passage, Nedham used the classical typology of passion and reason 
as such foundations: “right reason and Justice are common Principles 
which all men have in them more or lesse, and do bear a reverence 
thereto by the very light of Nature, and therefore when any thing that 
is reasonable and just comes to be insisted on, all men do readily assent 
to it.” Exception to the rule of reason are those “who may be byassed 
to the contrary by Passion.” Like reason, passion was “an Affect com-
mon to all men likewise more or lesse,” but since it was “an infirmity of 
nature which either clouds reason, or suspends the use of it in the man, 
or men so affected,” it caused “them to do things unjust.”563 Rhetoric, 
as used by orators, could be used to solve this problem, but also to ag-
gravate it in case of demagogues – especially in case of religious dema-
gogues such as Goodwin.
Nedham’s distaste for religious demagogues had clearly not abated, 
but of particular interest in Goodwin’s case is that Nedham accused 
Goodwin not only of being a demagogue, but one lacking skills in 
rhetoric. Goodwin, with his “pompous way of Affectation with Strains 
of Oratory”564 and “loose temper” was conjuring discontent, disaffec-
tion and faction among the people.565 His true pleading was for “the 
Right and power of Patrons,” which he concealed “with many Flow-
ers of Rhetorick.”566 In a series of rhetorical questions, Nedham sur-
560 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 97.
561 Nedham, Great Accuser, pp. 94-5.
562 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 80.
563 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 41.
564 Nedham, Great Accuser, sig. b1r.
565 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 63.
566 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 40.
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veyed the tactics of demagogy. They instilled “false conceptions, mis-
takes, and misapprehensions of Affairs” into “People’s minds,” using 
language “artificially and craftily contrived” with “oblique hints and 
secret wipes.” Such tricks, more efficient than “down-right language” 
charmed the “vulgar sort,” and the recent history of England was a 
case in point.567 It should be noted that “down-right” language does not 
denote rhetorical language: otherwise Nedham’s case would have been 
self-contradictory.
Nedham’s text was not devoid of political counter-arguments, of 
which the theological dimensions are outside the scope of this study, 
but it should still be noted how Nedham specifically tied his arguments 
against religious demagogues to the general problems related to deci-
sion-making in assemblies, i.e. to deliberative rhetoric as public speech. 
Nedham’s appeal was again to history, as “the experience of all Ages, 
where various interests and conditions of men have met in numerous 
popular Assemblies” had showed, the priests would “too often debate 
for victory, too often to gratifie a friend.”568 Nedham’s rhetorical ques-
tion was “How often hath the present Authority been put to a stand by 
such Demagogues, who have abused the Pulpit, and the Ordinances 
of God.”569 Priests were not only violating their own faith, but also the 
proper decorum of deliberative rhetoric in their quest to challenge le-
gitimate authorities – both heavenly and secular.
12. Harrington’s Prerogative 
Nedham was not the only writer to put forward criticism of James 
Harrington’s Oceana. A thorough reply to these critiques was made in 
the Prerogative of Popular Government in 1658, through which Harrington 
567 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 128.
568 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 114.
569 Nedham, Great Accuser, p. 64.
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could elaborate upon, and redefine his earlier claims.570 The disagree-
ments were numerous, not all of which are of immediate relevance to 
this study. There are a number of arguments in the Prerogative that were 
simply reiterations of those presented in Oceana. For example, Har-
rington reaffirmed his admiration of antiquity for its “learning” and 
“inimitable eloquence” (PW 399-400), in particular due to the role of 
education through epideictic oratory. To exemplify this idea, he recited 
the story of Pacuvius Calavius exhorting the people of Capua, as it 
was told by Machiavelli (PW 418).571 Outside monarchist circles, such 
points were less contentious, since they had a firm foundation in the 
classical republican tradition.
To defend his republican allegiances to popular government, Har-
rington added a great deal of theological arguments. Not only by using 
such biblical injunction as how “in a multitude of councellors (say both 
Solomon and Machiavel) there is strength,” and that “The voice of the 
people is the voice of God” (PW 391), but the whole of the second part 
of the two books of the Prerogative was dedicated to analysing the early 
church and the Hebrew commonwealth.572 In particular, Harrington 
argued that “the suffrage of the people” in electing office-holders was 
already introduced by Moses, and things “were no other in Athens and 
Rome than they had been in the commonwealth of Israel” (PW 518-9). 
Thus, his own theory of popular government could be shown to rely on 
the twin pillars of both religious (biblical and Talmudic) and classical 
precedents, and traditions of learning.
However, for the classical models of government, Harrington had 
to deal with the conventional division between the two basic models 
of Greek republics, Sparta and Athens. Harrington admitted that “the 
570 According to the editor of PW, the Thomason collection acquisition date is on 28 
November 1657. I have nevertheless chosen to use the printer’s date, 1658, since 
that is the year most often used in the research literature, and since in this case the 
exact dating of the work is not of the utmost relevance to my arguments. 
571 Quoting Discourses, 1.47.
572 For a recent study on the importance of these aspects in Harrington’s thought, 
see Eric Nelson, The Hebrew republic: Jewish sources and the transformation of European 
political thought, Harvard: 2010.
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Greeks commonly are to understand to distinguish of these two” – that 
is, of Athens as a democracy and Sparta as an aristocracy or oligarchy. 
But he could claim that even “according to the judgment of some of the 
Athenians themselves,” such as Isocrates,573 Sparta was indeed a popu-
lar commonwealth. Harrington sided with this view, and could thus de-
fine his model of government as “that which is properly and truly to be 
called a democracy, or popular government” (PW 479).574 Harrington 
did not need to innovate or redefine conceptions of Sparta, as he was 
merely retrieving the ancient prudence. Furthermore, it is worth noting 
the context of Harrington’s quotation from Areopagiticus. In it, Isocrates 
wrote how in most of his works he condemned oligarchies and special 
privileges, while commending equal rights and democratic govern-
ments – yet “not all of them, but those which are well-ordered, praising 
them not indiscriminately, but on just and reasonable grounds.” Funda-
mentally, this was Harrington’s approach to politics as well: a republic 
without law and order was not a commendable republic. 
Harrington’s belief in the validity of such classical authors’ defini-
tions of commonwealth was what set him up again against his contem-
porary, Thomas Hobbes. As in Oceana, Harrington reiterated his oppo-
sition to Hobbes’ politics, “with as much disdain as he opposed those of 
the greatest authors” (PW 423). However, the context of this particular 
quote has become so oft quoted, that it requires further analysis, for 
reasons that will become shortly apparent. To begin with, it is worth-
while repeating the relevant passage in full:
It is true I have opposed the politics of Mr. Hobbes, to show him what 
he taught me, with as much disdain as he opposed those of the greatest 
authors, in whose wholesome fame and doctrine the good of mankind be-
ing concerned, my conscience bears me witness that I have done my duty. 
573 The quotation is from Isocrates, Areopagitica (61): “the Lacedaemonians are the best 
governed of peoples because they are the most democratic; for in their selection 
of magistrates, in their daily life, and in their habits in general, we may see that 
the principles of equity and equality have greater influence than elsewhere in the 
world--principles to which oligarchies are hostile, while well-ordered democracies 
practise them continually” (George Norlin tr.).
574 See also PW 528 for the same definition for Israel, “from the institution of Moses 
to the monarchy.”
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Nevertheless in most other things I firmly believe that Mr. Hobbes is, and 
will in future ages be accounted, the best writer at this day in the world; 
and for his treatises of human nature, and of liberty and necessity, they are 
the greatest of new lights, and those which I have followed and shall follow.
Among other things, this passage has been used to show Harrington’s 
acknowledgement of the stature Hobbes already had in the intellectual 
life of the era.575 Less convincingly, it has also been used to argue for 
the influence Hobbes’ theory had on Harrington’s,576 indeed so repeat-
edly that the “intellectual debt” has nearly become the conventional 
wisdom.577 Considering how much of Oceana is critical of Hobbes’ poli-
tics, and the same argument is explicitly continued in the Prerogative, 
it is clear that Hobbes’ work had an influence on Harrington – in the 
sense that his writings would certainly not look the same if Hobbes had 
never lived. However, it is implausible to assume that this influence was 
a positive one, that we should see Harrington as an open and willing 
Hobbesian, since Harrington clearly said otherwise in both words and 
arguments. Arguing otherwise would require an unabashed reading 
out of context. 
The first sentence is, as said, an open refutation of Hobbes’ politics, 
with a nod to Hobbes’ undeniable capability as a writer in scorning 
earlier authors. The second sentence, rather than being mere praise, 
is a continuation of the acknowledgement of Hobbes’ talents as “the 
best writer at this day.” It is definitely not a defence of Hobbes’ politics. 
Furthermore, Harrington’s references to “treatises of human nature, 
and of liberty and necessity,” should not be read as an approval of Hob-
bes’ views on those matters. What Harrington refers to as the “new 
575 Quentin Skinner, Vision of politics, vol. III, Cambridge: 2002, p. 266.
576 Jonathan Scott, “The peace of silence: Thucydides and the English civil war,” 
in Hobbes and history, eds. G. A. J. Rogers, Tom Sorell, Wellington: 1996, pp. 
106-7; Scott, “Classical republicanism in seventeenth century England and the 
Netherlands,” pp. 72-3; Scott, “Rapture of motion,” p. 155; Scott, Commonwealth 
principles, p. 163; Scott, England’s troubles, pp. 329-30. 
577 Gary Remer, “After Machiavelli and Hobbes: James Harrington’s Commonwealth 
of Israel,” in Political Hebraism: Judaic Sources in Early Modern Political Thought, eds. 
Gordon Schochet, Fania Oz-Salzberger, Jerusalem: 2008, p. 215, refers to “several 
writers,” yet quotes only Jonathan Scott.
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lights” that he will follow, are also names of Hobbes’ books: Human 
nature (1650, the unauthorised version of parts of Elements of Law Natural 
and Politic) and Of Liberty and Necessity (1654).578 On its own, this passage 
is not sufficient to claim that Harrington approved Hobbes’ views of 
the topics as such. Any comparison of their views needs to be based on 
a wider reading of Harrington’s works than this passage alone allows. 
As was shown earlier in Oceana, Harrington’s views of liberty and hu-
man nature were certainly very much at odds with Hobbes’. 
At the same time, Harrington’s view of the human nature was not 
only different from Hobbes’, but Harrington himself saw it as a bold re-
assertion of classical political theory. This is shown when Harrington 
reiterates and elaborates his views on the relationships between human 
nature and laws. The crucial connection, as in Oceana, was in the com-
mon interest: “All civil laws acknowledge that there is a common in-
terest of mankind, and all civil laws proceed from the nature of man; 
therefore it is in the nature of man to acknowledge that there is a com-
mon interest in mankind,” and that interest is “distinct from the parts 
taken severally.” The acknowledgement of the common interest was 
“the main of this philosophy,” which consisted “in deposing passion, 
and advancing reason to the throne of empire.” Harrington followed 
this claim by admitting that he “expected news in this place that this 
were to promise more for the magistrate or the people than hath been 
performed by the Stoics” (PW 415). 
Harrington continued to make connections between his theory and 
the ancient prudence, by explicitly adding to his description of the def-
erence shown to the wiser by the less so, the professedly Roman origins 
of the claim. The wiser acquired “an authority with and imprint upon” 
the rest, “which action and passion in the Roman commonwealth were 
call’d auctoritas patrum, & verecundia plebis” (PW 416). As presented ear-
lier, Harrington’s political theory rested to a large extent on this view of 
authority, and its difference from the view that simply conflated power 
with authority was large. Accordingly, Harrington put much effort into 
578 The reference to the Of Liberty and Necessity is also noted in Nicholas D. Jackson, 
Hobbes, Bramhall and the politics of liberty and necessity: a quarrel of the Civil Wars and 
Interregnum, Cambridge: 2007, p. 303.
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reiterating and elaborating upon his use of the term ‘authority’: for ex-
ample, by presenting the distinction through an example of the com-
monwealth, whose “power extends no further than her own people, but 
her authority may govern others, as that of Athens did Rome, when the 
latter wrote her twelve tables by the copy of the former” (PW 464).
Harrington’s insistence that the authority be based on intellectual 
abilities, rather than merely martial virtues or pure brawn, had a direct 
influence on his view on public speech. Against the view that his belief 
in the virtues of open debating must necessarily lead into anarchy, Har-
rington emphasised in the Prerogative that debate was not to be engaged 
upon by just anyone, but only by the best and wisest. Neither should 
political debates take place in any forum, or in any manner, whatso-
ever. At numerous instances Harrington specifies the decorum for his 
conception of debate. There are different fields of debate, as they that 
could “discern in private affairs are called discreet, but they that can 
do it in public are prudent” (PW 416).
While Harrington’s “debate” involved numerous attributes (the 
force of reason, prudence, and so forth) it is necessary to delve deeper 
into the definitions. Adding to the definitions in Oceana, Harrington de-
fined reason in the Prerogative as being divided into two parts (a Cicero-
nean-Ramist definition): “invention” was in the sphere of an individual 
genius, “ judgment” was a shared capability of the “people” (as defined 
by Harrington, PW 391).579 Everyone had enough reason to make judg-
ments, which was the basis for broadening the decision-making struc-
ture to include as many voices as possible. The way for the people to 
exercise this aspect of reason was to debate in the senate or, for the 
larger part of the people, to vote in the popular assembly.
Although Harrington put a great deal of effort in ensuring that 
the political debates of an ideal commonwealth were held in an or-
derly manner, he did not consider controversy as such to be a problem. 
Straight from the beginning of the Prerogative, Harrington divided con-
579 Considering the argument how Harrington supposedly equated reason with 
interest, it is not very obvious how divisions such as these would apply to any 
conception of interest – outside resorting to the aforementioned view of Harrington 
being ‘confused.’
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troversies into the argumentative – “those of the pen,” which relied on 
force of reason – and the violent – “those of the sword,” which relied on 
force alone. The latter were to be banished from a well-ordered society, 
but religious and political controversies “of the pen,” were “most hon-
ourable” and “useful” – and “the most noble,” when aiming for “the 
vindication of popular government” (PW 391). Harrington’s preference 
for order and harmony did not make him averse to conflict as such, and 
as has been shown earlier, Harrington could rely on a long tradition 
of classical republicanism in promoting peaceful harmony over violent 
conflict.
Nevertheless, Harrington could also rely on the same classical tra-
dition to argue that the willingness to allow controversy should not 
extend to all the levels of government. Outside the senate, Harrington 
argued, political debating had pernicious effects, as proven by the ex-
ample of ancient Athenians. Their way of letting people speak for, or 
against, legislative proposals in the popular assembly was a “custom of 
prating” that “made excellent orators, but a bad commonwealth.” The 
problem lay not in the people showing “their eloquence,” but in the pos-
sibility it opened for the “frequently bribed” demagogues to “conceal 
their knavery” (PW 478-9). Like for Nedham, the pecuniary interests 
of demagogues would ruin any notion of useful popular debate in the 
common interest.
Finally in relation to the Prerogative, it should be re-emphasised that 
for Harrington’s views on demagogy, rhetoric was not considered the 
main problem. Unlike Hobbes, Harrington did not regard the study of 
rhetoric as the cause behind demagogy, nor did he see the rhetorical 
worldview as an inherently false approach to politics. It is difficult to 
find any political thinkers who would deny that fiery rhetoric could be 
used for rabble-rousing, but for Harrington no orator could have power 
to cause real danger to the commonwealth, if the proper political ar-
rangements were in place. To assume “that one man alone, whether he 
be rich or poor, should without a party be able to disturb a common-
wealth with sedition” was “an absurdity” (PW 424). Political action has 
larger causes and requires factional interests to collide with others, or 
with the common good, whereas mere talk is cheap. 
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With Oliver Cromwell’s passing on September 3rd of 1658, the Protec-
torate entered what came to be its last twenty months of existence. At 
the time, however, Oliver’s son Richard took the reins of power and the 
political scene saw no major changes, and the same applied on the field 
of political theory. James Harrington continued his attempts to argue 
for the benefits of his ideas in another larger work, the Art of Lawgiving, 
which in the appendix to the text is self-dated to February 20th 1659. 
This would suggest that much of the work was written somewhat ear-
lier. However, he also offered a shorter statement of his main ideas in 
Brief directions shewing how a fit and perfect model of popular government may be 
made, found, or understood, self-dated November 13th, 1658. This text in 
itself is not of immediate relevance to the study at hand, but the impor-
tant point to note is its form: its brevity was to allow more readers to 
gain easier access to his theories, possibly due to Harrington’s friend 
Henry Neville’s influence (PW 101).
In the Art of Lawgiving, Harrington returned to one of the main ar-
guments against a republican polity, that republican modes of govern-
ment were always prone to factionalism. Harrington’s answer had a 
strongly anti-monarchical stance, in the sense that he contrasted the 
few deficiencies of republicanism to the much worse option of monar-
chy. A republican polity was the lesser evil: even if “commonwealth is 
a seditious government, yet must it be the least seditious government.” 
In contrast to his earlier admissions of the internal problems of Greek 
commonwealths, Harrington now even chose to use a classical exam-
ple, arguing that the ancient Corinth had never suffered from internal 
sedition (PW 693).580 
From the point of view of public speech, Harrington’s approach 
to the power of rhetoric to guide political events was a moderate one. 
580 Quoting Xenophon, Hellenica (4.4).
2131659
On the one hand, he continued to argue that in the greater scheme of 
things – that is, depending on the institutional arrangements, division 
of wealth, and other ‘superstructures’ of government – rhetoric was of 
limited power. A case in point was the downfall of the British monar-
chy, when all the “persuasion of court eloquence” could not prevail in 
the face of parliaments (PW 608). 
On the other hand, unfettered, popular free speech was still some-
thing to be avoided, and Harrington emphasised the concept of matu-
rity as the method of getting the common good to be the main aim of 
debate. In view of the prevalence of Roman allusions in Harrington’s 
writings, this allusion is most likely to the Senate, as an assembly of 
elder statesmen. The senators had to be able to realise that the need to 
submit their proposals to the lower chamber would make it very dif-
ficult to bring their own factional interests into play. Such deliberations 
were then “without any bias upon or diversion of such debate from 
maturity.” The “final cause of the senate” lies upon such “maturity of 
unbiased debate” (PW 676). 
As maturity by definition cannot be a common trait for the citizens, 
not everyone was expected to become a statesman either. However, in 
this respect the Art of Lawgiving was on the face of it more favourable 
to meritocracy. Higher tasks were meant for the most able, and Har-
rington argued that “where a man from the lowest may not rise unto the 
due pitch of his unquestionable merit, the commonwealth is not equal” 
(PW 677). This opening up should be taken with a grain of salt, con-
sidering that the system of education, the main provider of the abilities 
needed to perform the duties of higher statesmen, is unchanged from 
Oceana. As seen there, Harrington’s educational system was designed 
to promote republican values in general, but only for the chosen best. 
In general, outside Oceana Harrington rarely pondered the topic of 
education. This desuetude has given rise to different interpretations of 
his motives. It has been postulated that this was caused by Harrington 
becoming more Hobbesian,581 or alternatively, that Harrington’s insti-
581 Alan Cromartie, “Harringtonian Virtue,” p. 1002.
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tutional arrangements removed the need for individual education.582 
The problem with the first claim is that, unlike Hobbes, Harrington 
did not disown his beliefs in humanist education and oratory. As for the 
second, it seems to be an unwarranted speculation, considering that 
the institutions remain the same throughout Harrington’s works. And 
judging from the subject of a debate in February 20th 1660 at Har-
rington’s Rota Club – “whether learned or unlearned subjects are the 
best” – clearly the questions of learning did remain on the agenda, if 
not in the writings.583 
A likely explanation why Harrington neglected the issues of educa-
tion in his later writings is that they were relatively uncontroversial, es-
pecially in comparison with Harrington’s other views. This is apparent 
from the topics his critics would highlight, and accordingly, Harrington 
concentrated on those parts that needed defending from critique. Fur-
thermore, as we shall see, towards the end of the 1650s it made more 
sense to concentrate on the political arrangements, which were in a 
state of flux. After all, education was by its very nature a longer-term 
process, whereas any constitutional changes would be imminent.
In the course of the early 1659, the time of the third Protectorate 
Parliament, Harrington added ever-stronger statements to his brand 
of republicanism. In a work titled Politicaster, or, a comical discourse, in 
answer unto Mr. Wren’s book, intituled, Monarchy asserted, against Mr. Har-
rington’s Oceana, self-dated to 20 March, we find him grappling with 
the claim made by Wren that majority rule essentially involved rule 
by force. This argument was not restricted to monarchists alone, as we 
have seen it had been propounded by republican authors like John Hall 
as well. Harrington’s conception of majority rule bypassed this claim 
by arguing that in politics, majority rule was essentially also the rule 
of right reason, and thus legitimate. Since people were able to look be-
yond themselves, they would consent to majority decisions in the same 
way as to anything requiring certainty: “that which appeared unto the 
most, is most authentick. And what can you desire more of certainty in 
582 Skerpan, The rhetoric of politics, p. 216.
583 Samuel Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys, vol. I, (1660), eds. Robert Latham & Wil-
liam Matthews, London: 1970, p. 61; Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 416. 
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a government, than all that certainty which can be had in the world?” 
(PW 720). 
In his later writings Harrington remained adamant in this view. 
Against the notion that allowing free elections would risk restoring 
monarchy, Harrington argued that elections could be allowed since – 
sooner or later, but not more than seven years – people would see where 
their true interest lay: in a republican form of government (PW 745). 
This can be seen in A Discourse upon this saying: the Spirit of the Nation is not 
yet to be trusted with Liberty; lest it introduce Monarchy, or invade the Liberty of 
Conscience (self-dated to 16 May), which featured an often-quoted anec-
dote about a pageant in Rome:
[it] represented a kitchen, with all the proper utensils in use and action. 
The cooks were all cats and kitlings, set in such frames, so tied and or-
dered, that the poor creatures could make no motion to get loose, but the 
same caused one to turn the spit, another to baste the meat, a third to skim 
the pot and a fourth to make green sauce. If the frame of your common-
wealth be not such as causeth everyone to perform his certain function 
as necessarily as this did the cat to make green sauce, it is not right. (PW 
744)
This anecdote has been often presented as representative of Har-
rington’s views on participation and self-government.584 Yet it would 
seem inappropriate to speak of “poor creatures,” if the purpose was an 
exhortation to emulate. Therefore, if this passage is to be taken at face 
value and not as a hyperbole, it would imply a very poor understanding 
of rhetoric on Harrington’s part, which is not corroborated by his other 
writings. Since clearly Harrington knew of rhetoric and used it in his 
writings, it is then reasonable to assume that he could use hyperbole in 
an analogy. Furthermore, considering the amount of trust Harrington 
put in the debating, voting and the capability to reason, as parts of his 
republican system, it is very difficult to see how these kinds of political 
action could be done by simple cogs in “a human machine.”585 Surely, 
584 Scott, “The peace of silence: Thucydides and the English Civil War,” p. 127; Scott, 
“Classical Republicanism in Seventeenth century England and the Netherlands,” 
p. 73; Rahe, Republics ancient and modern, p. 182.
585 Davis, Utopia and the ideal society, p. 239
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such actions would seem to imply active thought processes, rather than 
mere “politics on a slab.”586
Harrington’s Discourse upon this saying, was written in the context of 
novel political developments. In April the third Protectorate Parlia-
ment had been disbanded, and the Rump Parliament was recalled. In 
May, freedom of the press was reinstated – at least in the sense that cen-
sorship was not heavily enforced, which duly resulted in a barrage of 
pamphlets: in Thomason tracts, there are 652 separate pamphlets from 
1659, against 282 in 1658.587 Like Harrington, many authors wrote 
on the benefits and dangers of allowing elections, and, more gener-
ally, what the coming institutional arrangements of the commonwealth 
should be. Among them, John Streater took full advantage of the occa-
sion by bringing out several pamphlets on those topics.
The new political climate saw Streater restored to his rank in the 
military, which did not hinder him from re-engaging in republican 
writings.588 In The continuation of this session of Parliament of 16 May, 
Streater returned to the problems of factional interests. Streater ar-
gued that the establishment of a “Free State” in 1649 had been the best 
thing ever to have befallen the nation, despite the “inconveniences” 
that followed. This was not due to any faults in republican ideals, but 
because of “them that did alwayes in design Obstruct the carrying on 
of the Good Old Cause, and did privately Insinuate poysonous Counsel 
and practices, by endeavouring to divide the Parliament of the People into 
factions, by which means the work of Settlement was obstructed.”589 
We may assume that the “privately” given ill counsel in a parliamen-
tary government would not imply demagoguery, yet the effects are the 
same: discord and failure to fully gain from the benefits of a free state. 
Where such miscreants have better chances are in a form of govern-
ment where a single person is lifted to supremacy, since then “Favour-
586 Scott, “The rapture of motion,” pp. 159-162.
587 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, pp. 715, 723.
588 Johns, Nature of the Book, p. 292.
589 Streater, The continuation of this session of Parliament, justified; and the action of the Army 
touching that affair defended: and objections to both answered; according to the best rules of law, 
reason, and just-preserving policie, London: 1659, p. 11. Date from Thomason copy.
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ites take advantage to discontent the people.”590 And as Streater put it a 
few weeks later in Government described of 1 June, “a Monarch shall never 
want Flatterers to prompt and hasten him to a Tyranny.”591
There are two main points in Streater’s argument. First, there will 
always be factional interests, and we shall return to this point shortly. 
Second, preventing any harm by such interests will require institution-
al arrangements rather than putting trust in personal ethics. Streater 
duly quotes Aristotle about the need for good laws over good men, and 
points to the lessons from Tacitus and Suetonius on Nero, and of more 
recent ones on Oliver Cromwell. There is a need to give “exact Rules 
to the People, to choose such persons as are capable of (their) Trust.” 
As for the chosen representatives, their institutional rules must ensure 
that the unavoidable factional interests will not gain the upper hand in 
the legislative process. The most important way to that goal is to rely 
on the representatives to be self-interested, since “if a Member of the 
Peoples Representative knoweth his time is limited as to the Exercise 
of Supream power, and that he must again Repair to a private life, and 
be governed by the same Law he maketh; he will be sure to look to the 
making of good Lawes.”592 The rotation of offices is not just a question 
of preventing the corruptive effects of power, but also to keep the inter-
ests concentrated on the good of the whole.
Streater continued this line of thought in the Secret reasons of state of 
23 May, a pamphlet detailing his troubles with the law after having 
written the Grand Politick Informer in 1653. The political events thereaf-
ter he considered a justification of the “excellent Lesson, Not to trust 
to Men, but rather to good Constitutions, and good Lawes.” However, 
Streater’s publication of his defence in 1653 allowed him also to present 
a further elaboration of the reasons behind that lesson.593 At stake was 
590 Streater, The continuation of this session of Parliament, p. 13.
591 Streater, Government described: viz. what monarchie, aristocracie, oligarchie, and democracie, 
is. Together with a brief model of the government of the common-wealth, or, free-state of Ragouse. 
Fit for view at this present juncture of settlement, London: 1659, p. 3. Date from Thoma-
son copy.
592 Streater, The continuation of this session of Parliament, pp. 13, 15.
593 Streater, Secret reasons of state in reference to the affairs of these nations, at the interruption of 
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not so much a question of Streater’s belief in ethics or virtue of citizens, 
but rather a deeper question, about the concept of legitimacy. Laws 
and constitutions are what separate mere power from legitimate au-
thority. Without them, arbitrary use of power would become the rule. 
As Streater put the matter in two examples, first one hypothetical – “I 
have power to kill this Gentleman next me, but not by Law” – and the 
second one very actual, from 1653: “So the Parliament hath power to 
deliver me to prison without shewing cause, but no legal power.”594
What, then, is the purpose of law? For Streater, “The Law intendeth 
but three things only to defend, in which all else is comprehended: they 
are Life, Liberty, and Estate.” Of these three, “Liberty is the chief.” 
The substance of liberty is that it must be “a just preserving Liberty 
that shall be for the good of society,” and not mere licence, “every ones 
doing what he listeth.”595 Streater elaborated further on the importance 
of defining liberty through its benefit to the common good in Govern-
ment described. As in the earlier Observations, the result of restraining the 
freedom of action – “true Liberty is such a thing, as a convenient and 
necessary Bondage” – is a very individualistic, almost Millian concep-
tion of liberty: “that is, I ought to be limited in such a thing: If not, it 
will be to the detriment of another; this Liberty would not consist with 
Society.” Streater’s reasoning does not rely on rights of individuals, but 
on the effects of free actions on others and the common good. Streater 
used suicide as an example, portraying it as a supremely individualistic 
action that would bring no benefits to the society, so “he that would 
assassinate himself, must be deprived of his Liberty to do so horrid an 
act.”596
The immediate political effect of this conception of liberty was to 
put strict criteria on elections in the near future. Streater remained ada-
this present Parliament: anno 1653. discovered. Also, the power of parliaments, touching im-
prisonment, debated. With other matters worthy of observation, in Jo: Streater’s case: this being 
a narrative of his two years troubles at the beginning of the late monarchie, erected by General 
Cromwel, London: 1659, p. 6. Date from Thomason copy.
594 Streater, Secret reasons of state, p. 13.
595 Streater, Secret reasons of state, p. 12.
596 Streater, Government described, p. 8.
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mant that elections were absolutely necessary, as “often changing of 
Officers” was “the true Embleme of a Free-State.” Rotation of those 
in power must have been the primary reason for choosing “Ragouse” 
(present-day Dubrovnik) as an ideal to be followed, since the republic 
was otherwise very aristocratic and thus hardly a suitable model for 
the popularly minded Streater. Nevertheless, although voting often was 
necessary, doing so “at this Juncture of time” would be akin to suicide, 
as elections would “deprive (the people of England) of the blessed Gov-
ernment of a Free-State.” Elections were the peoples right, but they 
should “be intrusted with such Qualifications, as may preserve the In-
terest of the Commonwealth.”597 
In his next work, A shield against the Parthian dart, Streater continued 
the argument for allowing only qualified elections. In response to an 
earlier writer who had connected Streater with Harrington, Streater 
unabashedly approved of Harrington’s theory: “That a Commonwealth 
may be Governed as Mr. Harrington describeth, is certain; nay England 
it self.” But as in the previous work, the timing was not right for such 
arrangements, as “the Interests on foot in the Nation maketh it Incapa-
ble: Therefore such a Government must be made choyce of, that may 
best fit the Interests.”598 Streater’s prose concerning ‘interests’ is not 
crystal-clear here, but since the reference was to Harrington, the most 
plausible assumption is that the concept of interests is similar. ‘Interests’ 
as used here referred to private, factional interests versus the public 
interest; that is, the true interests of the people. There would thus not 
need to be any conflict between Streater and Harrington’s concepts of 
interest.599 This postulation is corroborated by Streater’s definition of 
“A Free-State,” which “is the Ruling of the People (by Turns) by Laws that 
are Superiour to private Interest, that may preserve all.”600 
597 Streater, Government described, p. 8.
598 Streater, A shield against the Parthian dart, or, A word to the purpose, shot into Walling ford-
House: Answered in defence of the present actions of state here in England, that produced the late 
change of government, London: 1659, pp. 17-18. Thomason date on 22 June. 
599 Pace Steven Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment for Possessive Individualism: 
Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth,” American 
Historical Review, June 1998, p. 723. 
600 Streater, A shield against the Parthian dart, p. 16.
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The antagonism between private and public interests is also evident 
in Streater’s depiction of the struggle for liberty of conscience. It was 
“a thing desired by all,” and individually all “desire it to themselves, 
but are not willing to part with the like to others.” In “the rise of any 
opinion at first, It will cry and plead for Liberty of conscience,” since 
that is in individual, private interest, “but when it is grown to number, 
strength and power sufficient to preserve it self, it then thinketh it self 
not safe, but in the discountenancing, contending against, endeavour-
ing the suppression and ruine of all other perswasions.” Attempts at 
monopoly were also in private interest, and as mentioned earlier, such 
factional interests were inevitable. However, they could be best man-
aged in a free state: “Liberty of conscience is defended and secured 
better in the Government as a Common-wealth.”601 
In sum, for Streater the freedom of conscience, speech, and other lib-
erties, as well as elections or any other institutional arrangement, were 
best arranged in such a way as to benefit the liberty of free men, living 
in a free state as a free people. Their greatest interest lay in guarding 
that liberty. Defined thus, Streater’s talk of ‘interests’ hardly qualifies as 
an immediate outgrowth of the theory of reason of state. 
The role of interests and reason of state have also been seen as cen-
tral concepts in the book Marchamont Nedham wrote during the sum-
mer, titled Interest Will Not Lie.602 As shown earlier, interests are far from 
necessitating an amoral approach to politics. There are good and bad 
interests, both of which are defined by their effect on the common-
601 Streater, A shield against the Parthian dart, p. 21.
602 The full title is Interest will not lie. Or, a view of England’s true interest: in reference to the 
papist, royalist, Presbyterian, baptised, neuter, Army, Parliament, City of London. In refutation 
of a treasonable pamphlet, entituled, The interest of England stated. Wherein the author of 
it pretends to discover a way, how to satisfie all parties before-mentioned, and provide for the 
publick good, by calling in the son of the late King, &c. Against whom it is here proved, that 
it is really the interest of every party (except only the papist) to keep him out: and whatever 
hath been objected by Mr. William Pryn, or other malcontents, in order to the restoring of that 
family, or against the legality of this Parliament’s sitting, is here answer’d by arguments drawn 
from Mr Baxter’s late book called A holy commonwealth, for the satisfaction of them of the 
Presbyterian way; and from writings of the most learned royalists, to convince those of the royal 
party, London: 1659.
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wealth. In Interest will not lie, written against a pamphlet called Inter-
est of England Stated,603 Nedham declared in the exordium how “it was 
necessary for the right information of our Countrimen of all Parties, to 
give them a view of their true Interests.” The problem with the other 
pamphlet was not the use of interests as such, but as “Designs being 
now generally laid to engage the People anew in blood and confusion, 
and this fawning Pamphlet having for the same cause been dispersed 
throughout the Three Nations” it was necessary to attack this clearly 
factionalist interest.604
Another problem in presenting interest theory as a method of politi-
cal arithmetic lies in hindsight. Although interests can be validly pre-
sented as a source for a more modern analytical calculus of politics, 
contemporaries did not use it solely for that. Both Nedham and his in-
tellectual forebear the Duke of Rohan presented their works as uninter-
ested analyses of political events, but even more as persuasion towards 
political ends. As we have seen, during Nedham’s career the various 
interests he propounded conveniently coincided with the aims of his 
employers.605 This lack of consistency has then left puzzlement over his 
actual understanding of the term.606 From what we can read in Ned-
ham’s texts, a plausible explanation is that he did not so much consider 
the substance of the concept, rather than point out the ways in which it 
was used – what was the true intention behind the rhetoric of interests.
The extent to which the talk of interests was mere rhetoric, claiming 
not to be so, is shown by Nedham’s choice of attacking his opponent. 
Interest of England Stated has been attributed to the Anglican divine John 
Fell, but was published anonymously. Nedham did not say whether 
he was aware who his opponent was, but nevertheless vehemently at-
tacked him and his kind of cunning men. His approach was to trace 
and overtake “the Deceiver (I mean this Author) in his own Method.” 
603 Thomason date for Interest of England Stated is 22 June, and for Interest Will Not Lie, 
17 August.
604 Nedham, Interest will not lie, p. 3.
605 Besides Interest will not lie, this can also be seen in other ‘Roundhead’ writings like 
Case of the Common-wealth, as well as Royalist ones like The case of the kingdom. 
606 Worden, “Wit in a Roundhead,” pp. 318-9.
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As inherent in rhetorical theory, Nedham’s own insinuations and per-
suasions were obviously intended as positive, because they were for a 
better cause – and simply put, his. However, eventually Nedham did 
not attack the rhetorical weaknesses – maybe none were to be found 
for him – and instead made use of the faulty premises underlying the 
text. For example, by the author’s “ joining the word Royalist and Eng-
lish Protestants, he intimateth, as if none were good Protestants but 
Royalists.”607 Despite claims by scholars to the contrary, Nedham did 
not concede to his opponent’s view that rhetorical inducements were 
not required when interest and profit were pleaded.608
On the contrary, in attacking “treasonable Papers” and “the slie 
insinuations and perswasions of cunning men,” Nedham argued that 
the danger did not lie in the papers or persuasions as such, but in the 
case that the people were “seduced from a right understanding.” Ned-
ham supplied his counterarguments “for the right information.” In 
1659 the demagogues were the “Grandee-Cavaliers” in England and 
abroad, who besides using disinformation and propaganda to foment 
discontent and to “bewitch” the people, were also using “subtile Argu-
ments of Perswasion.” Nedham also blamed petitions, “cloathed in fine 
language” as being unwarranted, demagogic methods for stirring the 
populace to insurrections.609
Danger of popular flattery is of course connected with the more 
general danger of demagogy. What is counted as demagogy depends 
much on rhetorical redescription, and as usual, for Nedham it was rep-
resented by those with whom he was in disagreement. Nedham pre-
sented demagogues as fomenters of faction, rabble-rousers, licentious 
libellers, but participated in the same contestatory discourses with simi-
lar vehemence. In general, popular flattery was the accusation he had 
launched at Levellers and others who made their appeals to and in the 
name of the common people, but like in Interest will not lie, it was also 
607 Nedham, Interest will not lie, pp. 3, 7.
608 Steve Pincus, “From holy cause to economic interest: the study of population and 
the invention of the state,” A nation transformed: England after the Restoration, eds. 
Steven Pincus, Alan Houston, Cambridge: 2001, p. 286.
609 Nedham, Interest will not lie, pp. 3-4, 30.
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used against Royalists claiming the language of common interest in 
order to advance their own. In the context, this avenue of attack was 
more sensible, since the ascendant power was the royalist, rather than 
leveller side. 
Whereas Nedham put his arguments in a negative form against the 
royalists, during the fall of 1659, Harrington continued to present the 
positive side of republican ways. He kept trying to present his ideas 
in other formats, presumably for easier digestion. In early autumn he 
wrote Aphorisms Political, self-dated 25 August, of which The Second Edi-
tion, Enlarged was self-dated to 12 September. The text is largely a reit-
eration of Harrington’s earlier ideas in 125 aphorisms. Possibly reflect-
ing the somewhat chaotic contemporary political situation, or simply 
because of the changed format of the text, there is more emphasis on 
the orderliness of parliamentary debate in Harrington’s system. Those 
capable of “prudent,” “orderly” and “mature” debate were “few and 
eminent” (namely the aristocracy), and who would hence be restricted 
to the senate (PW 771-72). As it was the aristocracy’s role to deliber-
ate on policy, indeed, “if the aristocracy be not for the debate it is for 
nothing,” it was necessary that debating should take place in a proper 
decorum.610 Besides the role that aristocratic comportment might have 
in more convenient debate, the senate would not fall to factions due to 
the aforementioned institutional arrangements, but without them the 
danger of “anarchy.. by the people, or their demagogues or incendiar-
ies” arose (PW 773).
Harrington continued to warn of the dangers of allowing public 
speech in the lower chamber of the Parliament in Valerius and Publicola, 
self-dated 22 October and written in a form of a dialogue. Any notion 
of having a reasoned debate in a popular setting would be as lost as the 
“great men” of Athens, who were as “start hares,” when “hunted in the 
tumult of the popular assembly” (PW 793). Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that Harrington’s restrictions applied only to the voting instanc-
es, to the public assemblies. Harrington makes no claim that debat-
ing on public matters was arcana imperii, or that it should be completely 
610 Remer, “Harrington’s New Deliberative Rhetoric,” p. 554.
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suppressed as such. In Valerius and Publicola, (PW 799-800) Harrington 
explained how during the period of promulgation “the whole people, 
both by discourse and letters, debate six weeks together upon the mat-
ter.” This more private way of debating, avoids “tumult and confusion” 
in the assembly. It would be pointless to try to suppress public debate, 
since “those of the representative would one way or other have debate.” 
The main point is that there should not be “any debate at all in the 
representative,” but no restrictions are put to “debate in those that are 
of the representative” (my italics).611 Although most of the contemporary 
critique of Harrington’s works concentrated on it being too republican 
and not on its restriction on debate (unlike modern commentary), it is 
likely that Harrington wanted to emphasise this aspect of his theory. 
At least, in his introduction to the dialogue, Harrington presented his 
choice of medium as intending such an effect in general, since “the way 
of dialogue,.. faithfully managed, is the clearest and most effectual for 
the conveying a man’s sense unto the understanding of his reader” (p. 
782).
Valerius and Publicola is also significant as it is a rare instance of Har-
rington writing about petitions, one of the few forms of generally ac-
ceptable methods of public speech, as mentioned in the introduction. 
Of course this was not always the case, and in 1659 there were a large 
number of petitions demanding changes in the political system. Indeed, 
they were made to such an extent, that the military junta that had 
taken power in a coup around the same time as Harrington was finish-
ing Valerius and Publicola, even prohibited the collection of signatures for 
petitions in December 1st. For anyone with anti-rhetorical views, peti-
tions would surely have been expected to be made in the old and tried 
way. For Harrington, there is reason to assume that he saw the use of 
rhetoric as perfectly acceptable in petitions. Not only did Harrington 
already have generally positive views on rhetoric, but he also used peti-
tions in an improper fashion. In Valerius and Publicola, the character of 
Publicola is told to have petitioned the committee for government to 
take into use the political arrangements he has previously printed “over 
611 This point has been argued also in Cromartie, “Harringtonian Virtue,” pp. 1004-
1005.
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and over” (PW 800). Seemingly, the petition is presented as of the old 
deferential, private variety. But in the same way that his whole dialogue 
was a new way for Harrington to try and persuade his readers of the 
usefulness of his political arrangements, the petition shared the same 
goal. It was publicly printed, openly political and premeditated, and 
used rhetoric: in a word, feigned.
From November, Harrington took over as the driving force behind 
a debating society called the Rota Club. Its activities probably serve 
to explain partially the lessening amount of his writings from then on. 
Though we will never know for certain, it is also possible that he expe-
rienced disappointment and withdrew from public engagement – or, as 
one scholar eloquently put it, he went from making “serious proposals 
for an actual political settlement” to producing “intellectual entertain-
ment for the wits and virtuosi of the town.”612 Similarly, John Streater 
wrote little after the army coup. He disagreed with it, and engaged in 
plots against the junta. After such adventures he published in Decem-
ber 15 A Letter sent to his Excellency the Lord Fleetwood, publicly arguing 
against military rule. Probably as a kind of reward, when the Rump 
returned to power in 26 December, the very next day Streater was rein-
stated as official printer. However, his political engagement was much 
less in the sphere of public writing than before.613
14. Milton’s Ready and easy way
While Harrington and Streater were concerned with questions of po-
litical settlement, and other means of accommodating to the problems 
of public speech, John Milton’s publications in 1659 were more about 
questions of religion. However, in these writings there are few impor-
tant ruminations about the power of education that connect with the 
topic of rhetoric. Although it was not published at the time, the mod-
612 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, p. 743.
613 Adrian Johns, Nature, pp. 293-5.
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ern scholarly consensus dates the writing of Christian Doctrine to this 
time.614 In the manuscript, Milton returned to consider “free discussion 
and inquiry.” As they were “allowed in academic circles,” they “should 
certainly be denied to no believer” (CPW 6:121). And as was the usual 
case, the audience for this discussion was already set: “I address myself 
with much more confidence to learned than untutored readers.” It is in 
this context, that “it is in the interests of the Christian religion that men 
should be free not only to sift and winnow any doctrine, but also openly 
to give their opinions of it” (CPW 6:122).
When Milton wrote that “when God wants us to understand and 
thus believe in a particular doctrine as a primary point of faith, he 
teaches it to us not obscurely or confusedly, but simply and clearly, in 
plain words” (CPW 6:287), it was not against rhetoric, but against the 
monkish interpretations of clergy that Milton was arguing. Pertaining 
to Milton’s views on rhetoric, the often-made attack on rhetoric was its 
untruthfulness. Here Milton’s “better definition of falsehood” is note-
worthy: “parables, hyperboles, fables and the various uses of irony are 
not falsehoods since they are calculated not to deceive but to instruct.” 
Similarly, issues of audience were to be kept in mind, since when holy 
“texts command us to speak the truth,” the most important question 
was “but to whom?” (CPW 6:760).615
As previously mentioned, polite civil conversation seems to have 
had troubling aspects to Milton: he made a point against “crafty and 
hypocritical playing down of one’s merit, when one is really fishing for 
compliments” (CPW 6:734). Significantly, unlike other points, this one 
lacked any scriptural quotations. It could be that Milton could find no 
quotations for this aspect of the courtesy theory, and decided to inveigh 
against it anyway. Milton also recognises comity as a virtue, but not 
when it is “counterfeit or affected.” Also included is urbanity, which 
614 Gordon Campbell et al., Milton and the manuscript of De Doctrina Christiana, 
Oxford: 2007, pp. 157-8.
615 If not seen in such a rhetorical context, Milton’s view may appear shocking, as 
they did to Perez Zagorin to whom “Milton’s allowance for lying.. was so wide 
that it bordered on laxity”: Perez Zagorin, Ways of Lying: dissimulation, persecution, 
and conformity in early modern Europe, Cambridge, Mass: 1990, p. 240n.
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“entails not only elegance and wit (of a decent kind) in conversation, but 
also the ability to discourse and to reply in an acute and apposite way.” 
Similarly, frankness (libertas loquendi), “what makes us speak the truth 
fearlessly” is listed (CPW 6:769-70).
Although the political connection to the role of rhetoric is not ex-
plicit in the writings of this time, we can assume that it was not com-
pletely dismissed, considering the title alone of A Treatise of Civil Power in 
Ecclesiastical Causes; Showing That it Is Not Lawful For Any Power on Earth to 
Compel in Matters of Religion (February, 1659). In this pamphlet, Milton 
reasserted the power of learning against false beliefs in a similar way 
as it would prevail against demagogy: “seducement is to be hindered” 
by “instant and powerful demonstration to the contrary; by opposing 
truth to error.” Intolerance was also cast out on the grounds of utility, as 
“Force is no honest confutation, but uneffectual, and for the most part 
unsuccessful” (CPW 7:261). It was the “sound doctrine, diligently and 
duly taught” that would be “always prevalent against seducers” (CPW 
7:261-2). Milton was adamant that “surely force cannot work perswa-
sion” (CPW 7:266), and what was needed was a rhetorical approach: 
dialogue, discussion and argument.616
In Considerations touching the likeliest Means to remove Hirelings out of the 
Church (August, 1659) Milton further explicated the problem of bad 
education: “under force, though no thanks to the forcers, true religion 
oft-times best thrives and flourishes,” but “the corruption of teachers, 
most commonly the effect of hire, is the very bane of truth in them who 
are so corrupted” (CPW 7:277). He made another acknowledgement 
of the hindrance of “schoole terms and metaphysical notions, which 
have obscur’d rather than explan’d our religion, and made it seem dif-
ficult without cause” (CPW 7:305). Milton deemed it “a fond error.. to 
think that the universitie makes a minister of the gospel” (CPW 7:315). 
Rather, “those theological disputations there held by Professors and 
graduates are such as tend least of all to the edification or capacitie of 
the people, but rather perplex and leaven pure doctrin with scholasti-
cal trash.” Therefore, “to speak freely, it were much better, there were 
616 Sharon Achinstein, Literature and dissent in Milton’s England, Cambridge: 2003, p. 
141.
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not one divine in the universitie; no schoole-divinitie known, the idle 
sophistrie of monks.” (CPW 7:317). In return, Milton returned to his 
own proposals on the practicalities of humanistic education, propos-
ing that “in greater number all over the land schooles and competent 
libraries to those schooles, where languages and arts may be taught free 
together,” “so all the land would be soone better civiliz’d” (CPW 7:305). 
This proposal was repeated in Proposalls of Certaine Expedients (Novem-
ber 1659), written under the rule of the junta, as the “liberty to erect 
schooles where all arts & sciences may be taught in every citty & great 
towne,” by which means “the land would become much more civilized” 
(CPW 7:358). 
Milton’s renewed emphasis on right reason and education should be 
kept in mind when analysing his much better known work from this pe-
riod, The Readie & Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth.617 Although 
declarations affirming the establishment of the Commonwealth, with-
out a King or House of Lords, to be governed by representatives of the 
people, were made even on January 23rd, the consensus view of modern 
historians is that the return of the monarchy had been inevitable since 
the autumn of 1659.618 Nevertheless, while we have seen Harrington 
and Streater reduce their output, Milton did not. This can be seen as 
an act of boldness, an unwillingness to bow to the ‘inevitable’. Or, as 
implying that consensus was not necessarily the voice of right reason. 
As we shall see, this was certainly the main political statement of The 
Readie and Easie Way.
Milton began his tract by inveighing against the current trend, the 
“unsound humour of returning to old bondage, instilld of late by some 
cunning deceivers; and nourished from bad principles and fals appre-
hensions” (CPW 7:355, 407-8). The perpetrators of such foolishness, 
617 The full title is The Readie and Easie Way to Establish a Free Commonwealth, and the 
Excellence Thereof, Compared With the Inconveniencies and Dangers of Readmitting Kingship 
In This Nation. First edition of the work came out in February, and a second in 
March-April, 1660. The quotations are given to both editions, while following 
the wording as it was in the first. Obviously, if the quote is to be found only in the 
second edition, there will be only one reference.
618 Woolrych, Britain in Revolution, p. 756.
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priests in particular, were willingly misleading their improperly edu-
cated countrymen. Milton portrayed it as adding insult to injury, when 
considering the natural character of the English, who possessed “a 
spirit in this nation no less noble and well fitted to the liberty of a Com-
monwealth, then in the ancient Greeks or Romans” (CPW 7:356, 420). 
It was in those ancient republics that the difference between eloquence 
in a republic and flattery in a monarchy was first asserted, and Milton 
reminded his readers of how in a republic its leaders “may be spoken 
to freely, familiarly, friendly, without adoration,” “whereas a king must 
be ador’d like a Demigod” (CPW 7:360, 425). It was thus all the more 
incomprehensible, that people possessing the required qualities for, and 
the knowledge of the alternatives to, living in a republic would willingly 
give it up. People who:
hath fought so gloriously for libertie, how they can change thir noble words 
and actions heretofore so becoming the majestie of a free people, unto the 
base necessitie of court-flatteries and prostrations, is not only strange and 
admirable, but lamentable to think on (CPW 7:363, 428). 
The reason for this Tacitean backsliding lay not in rhetoric, as can be 
seen in the 2nd edition, where Milton accused the royalists of lacking 
decent rhetoric: from the “new fanatics not of the preaching but the 
sweating-tub” nothing eloquent could hardly be expected, as “the lan-
guage of thir infernal pamphlets” testified (CPW 7:452-3). The problem 
lay in the rabble and their rousers, as “the cause thereof may be ascrib’d 
with most reason to the frequent disturbances, interruptions and disso-
lutions which the Parlament hath had” from two sources: “partly from 
the impatient or disaffected people, partly from some ambitious leaders 
in the armie” (CPW 7:365, 430). The latter being quite incorrigible, 
Milton appealed that “if the people, laying aside prejudice and impa-
tience, will seriously and calmly now consider thir own good” (CPW 
7:367, 431), the correct way could be seen. 
What that way would involve was republican institutions. As has 
been mentioned earlier, and unlike his contemporaries, Milton neglect-
ed the role of institutions in most of his writings. This neglect has result-
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ed in claims that, similarly to Nedham, Milton was an ‘antiformalist.’619 
He has been seen as a writer for whom the very idea of dealing with 
forms of government was to invite dogma into political life. According 
to this view, Milton was above all a believer in the liberating power 
of education, freedom from within and not through forms. While un-
doubtedly the inner freedom brought by mastering one’s passions is an 
important part of any early modern discussion of freedom, and is of-
ten connected with the role of education, it is a non sequitur to argue 
that a belief in education necessarily rules out institutional considera-
tions from political thought. The anti-formalist interpretation therefore 
needs to be qualified – especially since Milton did write about republi-
can institutions in The Readie and Easie Way.
To press the point a little bit, my claim is not that The Readie and 
Easie Way proves the anti-formalist argument wrong as such. It is per-
tinent to take into account the difficult situation of the early 1659, 
which arguably made it necessary for Milton to stray from his assumed 
anti-formalism. Yet it is similarly apposite to acknowledge that Oliver 
Cromwell in his time had gained notoriety for being unwilling to settle 
the constitution. More to the point, in The Readie and Easie Way Milton 
explicitly argued that “the form of the Commonwealth should have 
forthwith bin fram’d” when the monarchy was dissolved a decade ear-
lier. (CPW 2:430). It would seem that Milton’s anti-formalist tendencies 
were not so strong as to deter him completely from dabbling in consti-
tutional forms.
Milton’s approach to republican institutions is intimately linked to 
his conception of the public sphere and the participants therein. The 
new approach of institutional arrangements, “for the ground and basis 
of every just and free government” is in “a general Councel of ablest 
men, chosen by the people to consult of publick affairs from time to time 
for the common good” (CPW 7:368, 432). It was in the second edition 
that Milton elaborated on the choosing of the ablest men, which was 
not through direct elections. We shall return to the details shortly, but 
it was still in the first edition that Milton presented some of his reasons 
619 Davis, “Against Formality,” pp. 265-88.
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for disfavouring elections as building blocks for republican institutions. 
In The Readie and Easie Way, Milton appears to have developed a 
fully negative view on tumults in comparison to his earlier works, where 
there were still some elements of ambivalence left. By 1659, Milton re-
fused to see “how we can be advantag’d by successive Parlaments; but 
that they are much likelier continually to unsettle rather then to settle 
a free government, to breed commotions, changes, novelties and un-
certainties” (CPW 7:369, 434). In a novel twist, Milton, despite being 
in complete opposition to Harrington vis-à-vis the necessity of rotation 
of offices, changed his rhetoric to match Harrington’s in the pursuit of 
continuity: a
Commonwealth is held immortal; and therein firmest, safest and most 
above fortune; for that the death of a king, causeth oft-times many dan-
gerous alterations; but the death now and then of a Senatour is not felt; 
the main body of them still continuing unchang’d in greatest and noblest 
Commonwealths, and as it were eternal (CPW 7:370, 436). 
This passage has been noted as the juncture where the balancing act 
of conservatism and democracy is tilted so that the “counterbalancing, 
more democratic element” is left out.620 It has also been argued that, 
despite the differences, The Readie and Easie Way should be seen as less 
democratic, but still as republican as Milton’s earlier works.621 Howev-
er, while analysing Milton’s work through the lens of balancing democ-
racy and conservatism is quite useful, it is not a sufficient explanation 
of Milton’s approach to elections, rotation of offices and other aspects 
of political institutions. Of course, it is possible to dismiss Milton’s ap-
proach simply by arguing that he is not interested in elections, since 
he is an elitist and not a democrat. While undoubtedly accurate, this 
view is unfruitful, due to the fact that as terms elitism and meritocracy 
are quite difficult to distinguish from one another – they have a fairly 
paradiastolic character. As mentioned earlier, in some sense all forms 
of representative democracy aim at elite rule.622 
620 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 412.
621 Smith, Literature and Revolution, p. 193.
622 Manin, The Principles of Representative Government.
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As to why Milton is elitist, or meritocratic, one claim is based on 
psychological differences, in the argument that “it makes perfect sense 
[for Milton to] enthusiastically embrace the classical republican princi-
ple of differential moral and political rationality.”623 But this fits ill with 
Milton, considering that a large part of his work is based on the belief 
in common reason in us all. If people were not capable, in principle, 
of using right reason, what would be the point of education and inner 
liberty? Miltonic elitism does not require varying rationality, but rather 
rests on the possibility of popular enlightenment: the level of education 
– for example, whether you are a mechanic or an academic – counts 
more than class or wealth for one’s status. It is he who has learned to 
use his reason, and is therefore free, that can be a citizen in Milton’s 
society.624
What really is the significant difference between Milton and the 
other republicans is the notion of incorruptibility of the citizens. As we 
saw, the idea that the rotation of offices is necessary to prevent power 
from corrupting its holders does not surface in Milton’s theory. For him 
the well educated ‘fit though few,’ virtuous men are infallible in the 
sense that they should not to be held accountable by the fallible many. 
Obviously the people will revolt if they are astonishingly bad in gov-
ernment, but Milton does not put forward any arguments as to why 
the good and educated would be corrupted: surely they’d know better. 
The question is therefore not about differential rationality, but about 
meritocracy – with the important distinction that other republicans as-
sumed that power may corrupt, which is completely lacking in Milton’s 
works. For him, there are the wise and the less wise, of which the wise 
are, or should be, good men, and from the less wise accordingly less can 
be expected.
As in his earlier works, the way to create such good men was through 
623 Rahe, Against throne and altar, p. 107.
624 The emphasis is on the ‘he,’ as this applies to free adult men only: although 
Rosanna Cox’s forthcoming work on ‘Milton on free citizens and the politics of 
the family’ will elaborate on the topic in detail. Underage children, as well as 
natural slaves are also a different matter: children obviously grow up, but for the 
status of natural slaves see Jablonski, “Ham’s Vicious Race.”
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better breeding and proper education. What is involved in practice is 
reiterated as the “schools and academies,” where “children may be bred 
up” to “all learning and noble education not in grammar only, but in all 
liberal arts and exercises.” Again, the aim was to “soon spread much 
more knowledge and civilitie” (CPW 7:384, 460) – that is, republican 
values and language.625 It should be noted that while the course of study 
is still theoretically applicable universally, these schools were explicitly 
designed for the propertied classes – nobles, gentry, and wealthier citi-
zens – unlike in e.g. The Likeliest Means.626
Milton’s promotion of the power of education influenced directly his 
view of the power of rhetoric. His pamphlet ended with an unremit-
ting emphasis on such power: “few words will save us, well considered” 
(CPW 7:385, 461),627 and for Milton, their utterance is his “dutie, to 
speak in season.” They were professedly directed, not to the chosen 
few that could be expected to benefit from his institutional arrange-
ments, but to the “many wise men in all places and degrees” (CPW 
7:387, 462) Those to whom Milton had “spoken perswasion” were as-
sumed to be an “abundance of sensible and ingenuous men.” Despite 
such abundance of numbers, in opposition remained, nevertheless, the 
“misguided and abus’d multitude” (CPW 7:388, 463).628
In the second edition of The Readie and Easie Ways, Milton added 
much about the problems of the multitude, as concerns the nature of 
elections and the right reason in a popular government. The reasons 
behind the additions were likely to lie in the changing politics: March 
1660 saw the end of the Long Parliament after MPs passed the Act 
of Dissolution and authorised free elections. The Council of State was 
to exercise executive authority until the new Parliament assembled. 
625 Norbrook, Writing the English Republic, p. 413.
626 Lewalski, “Milton and the Hartlib Circle,” p. 215. 
627 Cf. Machiavelli: “To cure the malady of the people words are enough.” Discourses, 
(1.58).
628 There is a change between the definite and indefinite articles in the two editions, 
but as such it does not supply much evidence for drawing definite conclusions 
about Milton’s intentions. 
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Concomitantly, Harrington published A letter unto Mr Stubs,629 where he 
claimed that in ancient Athens the Areopagus had been the counter-
weight of popular remedies. It is unknown whether Harrington meant 
to engage in a theoretical debate with Milton as well, but Milton cer-
tainly did do so in the second edition to his book. 
Against Harrington, Milton added further arguments against “pop-
ular remedies” (CPW 7:437), that is, lower chambers of assembly, argu-
ing from history that “these remedies either little availd the people, or 
brought them to such a licentious and unbridl’d democratie, as in fine 
ruind themselves with thir own excessive power” (CPW 7:438). In a 
similar vein, the argument that “the common sort will be contended 
to maintain thir own libertie, is by experience found false; none be-
ing more immoderat and ambitious to amplifie thir power, then such 
popularities” (CPW 7:438-9). In Harrington’s scheme the lower cham-
ber would not debate, and Milton attacks such voting “without reason 
shown or common deliberation” (CPW 7:441). 
However, Milton’s argument is not due to his positive views on open 
debate. Such debate is meant for the learned, and like Harrington, 
Milton would not suffer at all “the noise and shouting of a rude multi-
tude” (CPW 7:442). Rather, in his Council “only those of them who are 
rightly qualifi’d” would, after many rounds of choosing from those of 
“better breeding,” make up the refined Council of “the worthiest.” The 
key to making this system work lay in mending the “corrupt and faulty 
education,” teaching the people to appreciate the classical virtues and 
“to hate turbulence and ambition” (CPW 7:443). To choose and find 
the “able and worthie men united in counsel to govern us,” will only 
require “diligence and impartiality” (CPW 7:449), and result in a self-
elected, humanist meritocracy.
Milton thus moved slightly towards more popular forms of govern-
ment – but only as a last resort. In the second edition, Milton specifi-
cally addressed the question of popular councils. In theory, such were 
629 Published March 1660, written against: Henry Stubbe, The common-wealth of 
Oceana put into the ballance, and found too light, or, An account of the republick of Sparta: with 
occasional animadversions upon Mr. James Harrington and the Oceanistical mode, London: 
1660.
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acceptable: if there were to be any popular councils in addition to the 
senate, “the ballance.. must be exactly so set, as to preserve and keep 
up due autoritie on either side, as well in the Senat as in the people” 
(CPW 7:440). But in principle, due to the “popularities” being most 
“immoderate and ambitious to amplify their power,” it was therefore 
better to avoid such recourses than risk the “licentious and unbridl’d 
democratie” (CPW 7:438-9). 
On elections and rotation of offices Milton still approached the issue 
with similarly great suspicion, but after long harangues against chang-
ing governments other than through revolutions, Milton suddenly gave 
in: 
Yet if all this avail not to remove the fear or envy of a perpetual sitting, it 
may be easily provided, to change a third part of them yearly, or every two 
or three years, as was above mentioned; or that it be at those times in the 
people’s choice, whether they will change them, or renew their power, as 
they shall find cause (CPW 7:461).
This somewhat pragmatic sop tells more about the state of the repub-
lican discourse than Milton’s own preferences.630 For Milton, consen-
sual authority was practically meaningless to republican government. 
Any notion of majority rule that could put liberty at risk should be 
adamantly opposed: it was clearly better “that a less number compel a 
greater to retain their liberty,” than “a greater number, for the pleasure 
of their own baseness, compel a less most injuriously to be their fellow 
slaves” (CPW 7:455).
Milton’s opposition to majority rule shows his undaunted belief in 
one right reason. In Milton’s senate reason swayed decisions, and not 
the political agenda. There was no numbering or computing, on which 
side were most voices (CPW 7:414). One could not base authority on the 
strength of numbers, like Harrington had done. For Milton, the argu-
ment familiar from Streater that ‘the voice of the people is the voice of 
God’ was simply not correct. It was the voice of reason, and natural law 
that represented the voice of God. For Milton, the critique of not allow-
630 Worden, Literature and Politics, also senses in the additions ‘the air of hasty insertion’, 
p. 350.
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ing people a say in their own matters was not as important as the com-
mon good – common good as seen from the viewpoint of reason and 
natural law. Fundamentally, promoting any system of government, or 
institutions thereof that might through formal arrangements prioritise 
a quiet peace or legitimacy of the majority, in favour of reason, truth 
and natural law, would be quite simply a sin. 
As we have seen, the argument for the power of speech is present 
in The Readie and Easie Way, but there is not much on the usefulness of 
public speech otherwise. The work is nevertheless important in under-
standing Milton’s politics, which ultimately are behind the arguments 
for open debate found in Areopagitica and elsewhere. Namely, those ar-
guments were that consensual authority does not imply right reason, 
and free speech for all does not guarantee freedom for all. In the end, 
freedom is, and should be, a status that is cherished, rather than a mere 
convention to be shed when its usefulness is not immediately obvious.
Besides The Readie and Easie Way, the spring of 1660 saw a few more 
anti-monarchical notes from Milton and Nedham. In late March, 
Nedham, in Newes from Brussels, was still accusing Charles II of cyni-
cally courting priests, even though “this Rebellion first bubbled up in 
Presbyterian Pulpits, yet it’s impollitick to say so much: we also know 
’tis more for fear of the Phanatiques than for love to us; they now are 
loyal.”631 Nedham’s antipathy towards religious demagogues remained 
unabated, but it did little good to his job prospects: in April he was 
relieved of official duties. 
In the beginning of the same month Milton attacked Dr Matthew 
Griffith in Brief notes upon a late sermon, titl’d, The fear of God and the king. 
Milton saw Griffith as being “one of those deceivers” he had warned 
about in The Readie and Easie Way (CPW 7:355, 469). In the Brief notes 
Milton had his last openly republican moment to attack the abuse of 
rhetoric, bad learning and ethos in theology: “O notorious abuse of 
Scripture!,” “Bad Logic, bad Mathematics.. but wors Divinitie,” where-
as Milton’s professed approach was to let the words of Scripture “inter-
631 [Marchamont Nedham], Newes from Brussels: in a letter from a neer attendant on His 
Maiesties person, to a person of honour here: which casually became thus publique, London: 
1660 March 23, p. 4.
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pret themselves.” (CPW 7:476). Griffith’s preaching was mainly “meer 
groundless chat” (CPW 7:477). And as for “preaching open sedition,” 
it was Griffith who had done it from his pulpit “against the present 
Government” (CPW 7:485). However, both Milton and Nedham were 
fighting a losing battle: in May the monarchy was restored to power.
238
PART VI Post-Restoration era 1661-1681
15. Exeunt – Harrington and Streater
The restoration of monarchy put an end to the republican form of gov-
ernment, but not to theories about it. This final chapter aims to show 
that the fates of the republican writers were as varied as their political 
writings. In particular, it will be emphasised that, while the different 
political environment was bound to have an impact, much in their writ-
ings was a continuation, in one way or another, of the ideas proposed by 
the individual authors’ earlier work. 
For a case in point, we may begin with James Harrington. Although 
he did not publish anything in print after the Restoration, it is clear 
from the known manuscripts that he had not moved on from his ear-
lier theories. In A System of Politics, Harrington continued to press in an 
aphoristic form for the need to manage public speech within the institu-
tions of popular government: were the senate to try and promote “any 
distinct interest,” the lower chamber would not be “counsellable, but 
[would] fall into debate among themselves, and so into confusion” (PW 
843). Likewise, the maturity of debate was explicitly defined through 
the interlocutors, since unbiased debate, “to be mature, cannot be man-
aged by a multitude” (PW 843). From a personal perspective, his per-
sistence did him no favours: Harrington was arrested in 28 December 
1661, and apparently had the manuscript of the System with him at the 
time (PW 118). The date of composition is unknown, but the events of 
the past year evidently did not result in the manuscript’s destruction. 
Harrington languished in prison for a while, and for reasons we 
may never certainly know, seemed to have undergone severe mental 
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and physical problems, which were widely considered to be the reason 
why he did not write as before (PW xi, 126). The extent of his mental 
faculties is as unknown as their effect on his next work, The Mechanics 
of Nature, written possibly in 1662. The work is of a different nature to 
most of his other works, but is perfectly compatible with what he wrote 
earlier. This is especially so when concerning the natural character of 
his ideal society, or the ‘cosmology of state.’632 In addition, Harrington’s 
musings on “Animal Spirits” are evocative in their rhetoric of his view 
of demagoguery. In all men there “are good or evil Spirits, according 
to the Matter wherin and wherof they are generated,” and the “stirring, 
working, or provoking of spirits” has effects accordingly.633 
After 1662, Harrington did cease publishing, and the last text attrib-
uted to Harrington is a letter to the Royal Society. The date is assumed 
to be around 1676, the year before his death. In the letter Harrington 
claims to have offered, in March 1675, an experiment “to Mr Boyl, 
Sr William Petty and by the mediation of the latter to Sr Christopher 
Wren (three of our most famous philosophers),” and was now asking 
again in writing about his “cleare and easy experiment.” Harrington, 
“hauing no conveniences” of his own, would have needed “some fit 
place to shew it in,” such as “some open ground or rather some flat 
roofe of any building (such for example as the painted chamber).” In 
addition, he needed “an instrument to shew it by,” the cost of which 
would have not been “aboue six pounds.” As is often the case in grant 
applications, Harrington showed little modesty in his description of the 
benefits from his experiment, “more intimately concerning the good of 
man kinde then any other hetherto contained in the writings or known 
experience of any of the Philsophers.”634 Questions about the nature 
of this experiment, as well as the mental status of its proposer, remain 
unanswered, but it is not implausible that Harrington in his final years 
632 G. Rogers, “Harrington, Locke and Aristotle: the Natural and the Unnatural in 
Commonwealth and Nature,” in James Harrington and the Notion of Commonwealth, 
ed. Luc Borot, Montpellier: 1998, pp. 141-143.
633 Harrington, “The Mechanics of Nature,” James Harrington and the Notion of 
Commonwealth, ed. Luc Borot, Montpellier: 1998, p. 84 (§11, 15).
634 British Library MS Add 72898, Petty Papers vol XLIX, H 21, f 33.
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turned from writing political philosophy to experimenting with it. 
However, any study of political writing of the era must take account 
of the resurgence of censorship, especially through the Licensing of the 
Press Act of 1662, or ‘An Act for preventing the frequent Abuses in 
printing seditious treasonable and unlicensed Bookes and Pamphlets 
and for regulating of Printing and Printing Presses.’ In the explicit view 
of the monarch, the Act was needed due to “the exorbitant Liberty of 
the Press” that had “been a great Occasion of the late Rebellion in the 
Kingdom.”635 As Harrington’s story showed, the law was just making 
official the policy of suppression that had been ongoing since the actual 
restoration. 
In this respect, the fate of John Streater is to some extent counter-
intuitive. He was relieved of his military duties, and returned to print-
ing. He had a few tussles with the law, and was detained several times. 
However, for reasons unknown, he was given a special exemption from 
the Press Act.636 What is certain is that Streater did not return to advo-
cating popular republicanism in print. In fact, the Calendar of State Pa-
pers from 22 March 1663 records Streater claiming “that his sin was in 
ignorance and that he would be loyal, and not pry into matters of state,” 
and a few days later, 25 March, a promise by John Streater to “the 
Bishop of London neither to print nor cause to be printed any works of 
sedition, heresy, or treason,” and ‘he would try to discover the actors 
and contrivers of the same.”637 Whether the promises were made under 
duress need not detain us, as the main point is merely to note that from 
then on Streater was one of the authors whose interests lay elsewhere 
than in straightforward political writing.
635 “House of Commons Journal Volume 8: 10 May 1662,” Journal of the House of 
Commons: volume 8: 1660-1667 (1802), p. 425.
636 Johns, Nature of the Book, pp. 297-9. 
637 Donald McKenzie and Maureen Bell, A Chronolog y and Calendar of Documents 
Relating to the London Book Trade 1641-1700. Volume I: 1641-1670, Oxford: 2005, pp. 
501-2.
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16. Milton – epic and education
Milton did not recede completely from the republican project, but he 
was much more of a marked man due to his politics. His books were 
publicly burned, and he was briefly imprisoned. In the 1660s his main 
contribution to the world of letters at the time, and also to English liter-
ature to this day, was the epic Paradise Lost (PL), published in 1667. The 
status of this work, as well as that of the Paradise Regained and Samson 
Agonistes of 1671, creates a few problems for any study aiming to analyse 
the oeuvre of Milton.638 On the one hand, they cannot simply be left 
aside, but on the other hand, writing in anything other than a cursory 
manner would require the writing of a whole another book. The latter 
option is the one chosen here: I will point out a few items of interest in 
the poems vis-à-vis the study at hand, but a more detailed analysis of 
the texts, and engagement with the massive amounts of scholarly litera-
ture on them, will be a project for the future. Nevertheless, there are 
few passages that are worth drawing attention to from the perspective 
of freedom of speech. 
For purposes of brevity, we can take few things in Paradise Lost as 
given: that it is a work of high rhetoric, and the character of Satan is a 
powerful demagogue.639 The claim in this study is that Paradise Lost is, 
among other things, about Milton’s view of the nature of freedom and 
grounds of authority, against the notion of popular, majoritarian rule, 
along the lines of his earlier works. We may begin with the debate in 
Hell, in book II. Satan’s role in the debate can be compared to the ap-
proach of Tiberius. He opens the consultation by professing openness, 
and freedom of speech:
638 Edition used: John Milton, The Complete Poems, John Leonard (ed.), Penguin 
Classics 1998.
639 Two useful studies, especially for the historiography of the role of rhetoric in 
Paradise Lost: Wood, “That divine spirit of utterance that moves them”; Ryan 
J. Stark, “Cold Styles: On Milton’s Critiques of Frigid Rhetoric in Paradise Lost,” 
Milton Quarterly, vol. 37 (1), 2003, pp. 21-30.
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by what best way, 
Whether of open war or covert guile, 
We now debate; who can advise, may speak
(PL 2:40-2). 
In the ensuing debate, the demonic speakers give various options, but 
uniting them all is that they all claim to be speaking for the common 
good and in morally elevated terms. The descriptions of their speeches 
show that some of them are merely feigned attempts to turn ignoble 
acts into noble ones. This is apparent in the speech of Belial:
all was false and hollow; though his tongue
Dropt Manna, and could make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex and dash
Maturest counsels: for his thoughts were low
(PL 2:112-5).
In the end, the openness of the consultation is shown to be similarly 
feigned. The clinching argument comes from Beelzebub, who
Pleaded his devilish Counsel, first devised
By Satan, and in part proposed
(PL 2:378-9).
After manipulating thus the vote, Beelzebub flatters his audience, on 
how:
Well have ye judged, well ended long debate
(PL 2:390).
With the help of his proxy, Satan’s machinations have resulted in his 
preferred choice for future action. Thus, there is no further need for 
debating about them, as he declares his own word final: 
Thus saying rose
The Monarch, and prevented all reply
(PL 2:466-7).
What the debate in Hell presents is not only the ease of manipulation 
in the deliberative and electoral processes, and the omnipresence of 
demagogic politicians. Furthermore, it is the aforementioned argument 
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by Belial, which shows the nature of freedom in the presence of an al-
mighty God. Beelzebub’s argument is that the devils in Hell can have 
all the popular votes they want, but they are never free from God’s 
omnipotent power:
the popular vote 
Inclines, here to continue, and build up here
A growing Empire; doubtless; while we dream, 
And know not that the King of Heav’n hath doomed
This place our dungeon, not our safe retreat
Beyond his Potent arm, to live exempt
From Heav’ns high jurisdiction, in new League
Banded against his Throne, but to remaine
In strictest bondage, though thus far remov’d,
Under th’ inevitable curb, reserv’d
His captive multitude:
--- for what peace will be given
To us enslaved, but custody severe,
And stripes, and arbitrary punishment
Inflicted
(PL 2:313-323, 332-5).
Understandably the question that raises from Beelzebub’s depiction is 
whether Milton agrees that such arbitrary rule can ever be allowed, 
even by a benevolent God. That debate involves theological issues that 
will not be resolved by this study, what is proposed here is that the 
mockery of political institutions in Hell is related to Milton’s view of the 
grounds of true authority – right reason, nature and, ultimately, God.
In book V, Milton continues to present the folly of voting over mat-
ters that are not questions of opinion but right reason. In an audience 
predisposed to evil ways, it is Satan, as the more powerful demagogue, 
who gets the better of Abdiel. Though his speech is based on reason and 
truth, the delivery fails utterly:
So spake the fervent Angel, but his zeale
None seconded, as out of season judged,
Or singular and rash, whereat rejoiced
Th’ Apostat
(PL 5:849-52).
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Truth will win in an open competition, but not for those who have 
willingly turned their backs to reason. Abdiel is as the Stoic man of the 
Horatian ode,640 who stands by right reason against the false opinions 
of the masses:
Among the faithless, faithful only he;
Among innumerable false, unmoved,
Unshaken, unseduced, unterrified
His loyalty he kept, his love, his zeal;
Nor number, nor example with him wrought
To swerve from truth, or change his constant mind
Though single
(PL 5:897-903).
Abdiel’s actions are firmly shown to be the correct ones by God in book 
VI:
Servant of God, well done, well hast thou fought
The better fight, who single hast maintaind 
Against revolted multitudes the cause
Of truth, in word mightier then they in arms;
And for the testimony of truth hast born
Universal reproach, far worse to beare
Then violence: for this was all thy care
To stand approved in sight of God, though worlds
Judged thee perverse: …
… and to subdue
By force, who reason for their law refuse,
Right reason for their Law
(PL 6:29-37, 40-42).
When Abdiel meets Satan again, he has a chance to elaborate on the 
nature of servitude to Satan. The grounds for governing are to be based 
on right reason, whereas basing it on demagoguery, even in the name 
of liberty, results in everyone being reduced to slavery – the followers 
as well as those who profess to lead, who are merely slaves to their own 
640 “The man who knows what’s right and is tenacious/ In the knowledge of what he 
knows cannot be shaken,/ Not by people righteously impassioned/ in a wrong 
cause.” Horace, The odes of Horace, New York: 1997, iii.3, lines 1-4.
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passions. 
Unjustly thou deprav’st it with the name
Of Servitude to serve whom God ordains, 
Or Nature; God and Nature bid the same,
When he who rules is worthiest, and excells
Them whom he governs. This is servitude,
To serve th’ unwise, or him who hath rebelled
Against his worthier, as thine now serve thee, 
Thy self not free, but to thy self enthralled
(PL 6: 174-181).
In the concluding book of the epic, the nature of true freedom is ex-
plained to the first man as well. Without reason, any hope of liberty is 
lost. For true personal freedom, one unable to control one’s passions, 
is a slave to them and thus unable to have anything reasoned, rational 
and useful to say. Giving power to such men would make government 
to be accordingly devoid of reason, and similarly unfree.
Rational liberty; yet know withal,
Since thy original lapse, true liberty
Is lost, which always with right reason dwells
Twinned, and from her hath no dividual being:
Reason in man obscured, or not obeyed,
Immediately inordinate desires
And upstart passions catch the government
From reason, and to servitude reduce
Man till then free
(PL 12:82-90).
A few years after the publication of Paradise Lost, Milton returned to 
these same themes in Paradise Regained. There, through the character 
of Jesus, Milton continued the promotion of right reason as a way to 
reaching true, inner liberty, against the demagogic slavery to passions, 
entailing loss of freedom for all. In book II, the rule over one’s own self 
is brought forth:
Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules
Passions, desires, and fears, is more a king;
Which every wise and virtuous man attains:
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And who attains not, ill aspires to rule
Cities of men, or head-strong multitudes,
Subject himself to anarchy within,
Or lawless passions in him, which he serves
(Paradise Regained, 2:466-72).
In Paradise Lost the rightful ruler was God, so in the world of men prop-
er government takes place in the spirit of God, by men living according 
to reason and thus free:
But to guide nations in the way of truth
By saving doctrine, and from error lead
To know, and knowing worship God aright,
Is yet more kingly; this attracts the soul,
Governs the inner man, the nobler part
(Paradise Regained, 2:473-8).
What was earlier referred to as ‘head-strong multitudes,’ is developed 
further in the next book, against Satan’s proposal that Jesus could gov-
ern the masses directly, not merely through his teachings. The answer 
is a concise portrayal of Milton’s view of popular politics – a world of 
useless climbing of the greasy pole, wise men trying to gain approval 
through popular assent when none would be needed. 
And what the people but a herd confused,
A miscellaneous rabble, who extol
Things vulgar, and well weighed, scarce worth the praise?
They praise and they admire they know not what;
And know not whom, but as one leads the other;
And what delight to be by such extolled,
To live upon their tongues and be their talk,
Of whom to be dispraised were no small praise?
His lot who dares be singularly good.
Th’ intelligent among them and the wise
Are few, and glory scarce of few is raised
(Paradise Regained, 3:49-59).
Milton’s vision of politics entails free speech for the wise and few, but 
there is very little point or purpose in engaging in public speech. Not 
even for the purposes of education, the task of which is undoubtedly 
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important in creating the intelligent few, but for those who would give 
away their freedom there is little hope of salvation. In the final book of 
the poem Jesus gives as an example of this the Romans:
What wise and valiant man would seek to free
These thus degenerate, by themselves enslaved,
Or could of inward slaves make outward free
(Paradise Regained, 4:143-5).
If Milton in the post-Restoration era still held any hopes that through 
his writings liberty could be promoted, they were certainly deeply bur-
ied from view in his poetry. It was to education that he returned in his 
final works.
During the last years of his life, Milton’s role has been characterised 
as that of an oppositional educator, beginning in his Accedence Commenc’t 
Grammar of 1669, where he inserted subversive examples so as to bring 
in, for example, “the voice of the republican Cicero.”641 Further exam-
ples to the same effect can be found also in the Art of Logic of 1672, where 
having to deal with the terms adverse, counsel and chance, Milton used 
Cicero’s Pro Marcello when arguing how “temerity is never mingled with 
wisdom, nor is chance admitted to counsel” (CPW 8:263). 
The strand of republicanism in this subversion is still very much 
Milton’s own. This can be seen in the example on the testimony, taken 
from Cicero’s De natura deorum: “In disputation one should seek not so 
much authorities as weight of reasons.” This is followed by a caveat: 
“but in civil and human affairs, when an action is the object of in-
quiry, this argument commonly produces special conviction in view of 
the moral character of the person arguing, if prudence, honesty, and 
benevolence are present” (CPW 8:318). Milton kept returning to the 
argument that ethos remains the crucial factor in reasoned political 
rhetoric. For the view from the side of audience, there was also included 
an example on how the basic “cause of the killing of Christ was the 
ignorant zeal of the Jews,” while the “seditious speeches” were merely 
641 Barbara K. Lewalski, “‘To Try, and teach the Erring Soul’: Milton’s Last Seven 
Years,” in Milton and the Terms of Liberty, eds. Graham Parry and Joad Raymond 
Cambridge: 2002, pp. 175-6. 
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the inciting cause (CPW 8:224-5). The cause and effect of the act itself, 
and the predisposition of the audience, are shared in their guilt – dema-
gogues were only as powerful as their audience is willingly erring. 
In Of True Religion of 1673, his only explicitly political tract of the 
post-Restoration era, Milton returned once more to the topic of reli-
gious controversy. He defended “the Authors or late Revivers of all 
these Sects or Opinions” by the argument that they “were Learned, 
Worthy, Zealous, and Religious Men” with “many Eminent and 
Learned followers.” Armed with such ethos, they should be tolerated 
accordingly, allowing them “on all occasions to give account of their 
Faith, either by Arguing, Preaching in their several Assemblies, Publick 
writing, and freedom of Printing” (CPW 8:426). But as in Areopagitica, 
this policy applied only to protestants, as it was the papists whose policy 
remained “perpetually to seduce, corrupt, and pervert as many as they 
can of the People” (CPW 8:430). Against them there was little reason 
to “condescend to dispute,” as they would not submit to proper de-
bate (CPW 8:432). But for the “Learned man” there was much to profit 
“by reading Controversies, his Senses awakt, his Judgement sharpn’d, 
and the truth which he holds more firmly establish’t.” Milton compares 
reading of controversies to an exercise in logic, where “contraries laid 
together more evidently appear: it follows then that all controversies 
being permitted, falshood will appear more false, and truth the more 
true.” This will benefit “the general confirmation of unimplicit truth” 
(CPW 8:437-8). As can be seen, Milton did not retreat from his general 
view of freedom of speech, as an important right for those sages who 
can benefit from it. 
For an acute example of such a sage in the political life, we could 
do worse than to turn to the History of Britain, which also gives us a 
concluding example of the three main aspects that lie behind Milton’s 
right of public speech: the glory of ideal leaders, the dangerous conse-
quences of straying from the true path, and keeping the unworthy and 
uneducated away from the public sphere.642 To begin with Milton’s ac-
count of Agricola, it reflects not just his view of the ideal statesman, but 
642 The work was published in 1670, but the date(s) of its writing are still uncertain: see 
Worden, Literature and Politics, pp. 410-426 for a recent account of the controversy. 
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also, and specifically the skills of one: Agricola allured the people with 
“his gentle demeanour,” gave his time to “worthie actions; teaching 
and promoting like a public Father the institutes and customes of civil 
life.” By persuasion – “praysing,” “quick’ning,” “assisting” – he “turn’d 
the name of necessitie into an emulation.” Also, Agricola’s educational 
views are noteworthy: “he caus’d moreover the Noblemens Sons to be 
bred up in liberal Arts.. brought them to affect the Latine Eloquence.” 
Unfortunately, the worse aspects of Roman life, “vice, and voluptuous 
life” among others, “which the foolisher sort call’d Civilitie,” came also. 
Similarly to his own era, Milton saw the enticement of luxuries and 
false elegance as “a secret Art to prepare” the people “for bondage” 
(CPW 5:85). 
If Agricola brought together wisdom, reason, eloquence and educa-
tion, the History of Britain also included examples of the worst aspects 
of abused rhetoric. In Milton’s account of Gildas’ De Excidio “Evil was 
embrac’d for good, wickedness honour’d and esteem’d as virtue” (CPW 
5:139). The account extends to the clergy: “All things were done contrary 
to public welfare and safety; nor only by secular men, for the Clergy also, 
whose Example should have guided others, were as vitious and corrupt” 
(CPW 5:140). There is undoubtedly a strong similarity to Thucydides’ 
depiction of Corcyra: “Sincerity (whereof there is much in a generous 
nature) was laughed down: and it was far the best course, to stand dif-
fidently against each other, with their thoughts in battle array, which no 
speech was so powerful, nor oath terrible enough to disband.”643 
Finally, in the Digression to the History Milton brought forward the 
problem of non-virtuous and improperly educated people in the coun-
cils of the commonwealth, as shopkeepers and other people “without 
other merit” failed in their duties, “as their breeding was” (CPW 5:444-
5). Antipathy against “Church-men” and the “counterfeit zeal of their 
Pulpits” ran high. It is because “liberty hath a sharp and double edge, 
fit only to be handled by just and vertuous men,” that, when led by 
wrong leaders, the commonwealth is doomed to a “corrupt and de-
generate age” (CPW 5:448-9). Proper education would have been the 
643 Thucydides, Peloponnesian War (3.83), Hobbes tr. 
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key to having “men able to govern justly and prudently in peace” for 
it requires “minds well implanted with solid and elaborate breeding.” 
What such learning consists of is “ripe understanding, and many civil 
vertues.. imported into our minds from forreign writings, and examples 
of best ages” and “in the knowledge of antient and illustrious deeds” 
(CPW 5:450-1).644 Milton’s civic humanism embraced the idea of classi-
cal wisdom, but not republican liberty, for all.
17. Nedham’s last works
During the immediate post-Restoration era, Nedham’s political writ-
ings were much less in demand. An alternative to desisting from writ-
ing altogether was to write on topics that, although not blatantly politi-
cal, would in less contentious ways be still connected to the pursuit of 
ideal society. For the authors with background in teaching, the issue 
of education was a way to put forward some republican ideals in an 
environment otherwise hostile to them. As usual, Nedham survived 
the Restoration of monarchy unscathed, and in 1663 he returned to the 
public sphere with a treatise on schools and education. 
In A discourse concerning schools and school-master, Nedham promoted the 
classical education, and thus the study of rhetoric as essential ingredients 
of proper upbringing. Nedham’s pupils would “practise to talk Latine 
fluently,” and “poure forth Verses and Declamations extempore.” Such 
expertise would come via the thorough study of classical authors, and 
“the Critical parts of Philology,” “the Elegancies of [Latin], and the 
Customs of Antiquity.” His curriculum – “The first Classe, Grounds 
of Grammar, declining Nouns and Verbs. The second, Congruitie of 
Latine. The third, Proprietie and Phrase. The fourth, Oratory and 
Rhetorick. The fifth, Poetry and Verse. The sixth, Greek grounds. The 
644 This could be a later addition from 1670, before the text’s publication: Lewalski, 
“To try, and teach the erring Soul,” p. 176. But Loewenstein, Representing Revolution, 
p. 189 would date the antipathy to clergy to the campaign of 1649.
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seventh, Dialect. The eight, Antiquity and Philology” – is a good repre-
sentative of the seventeenth century humanistic education.645 
However, despite the prevalence of humanistic ideals in education, 
not everyone was educated thus, and Nedham fretted especially over 
the elite. “What hopes may we entertein of posterity,” he asked, “when 
the better sort are sent over to forreign Schools of vice, to learn fash-
ions to court mistresses, dance à la mode and swear with grace.”646 
Thus, the point was not so much in pedagogical innovation, as bring-
ing to the fore the importance of the humanist elite: “How many Eras-
musses, and Melanchtons, and Scaligers, and Puteans, and Vossiusses, 
should we have amongst us in a short time, if Literature were but thus 
encouraged?”647
Instead of creating courtiers, the purpose of Nedham’s discourse 
is to present a “Cycle of Knowledge” that will prepare the youth for 
“publick Service”: their education is “one of the greatest concernments 
of the Nation.” After the Restoration, Nedham still promotes the ideal 
of the vita activa, inherent in rhetoric and other liberal arts. To Nedham, 
the current state of education hinders the creation of active citizens, es-
pecially “in the Universitie, where Colledge-Commons, and the Walks, 
(if not good fellowship) indispose many for the duties of an Active life.” 
To him, the whole point of allocating resources to academics is their 
instrumental role in society: “to say Truth, what have they those Fel-
lowships and Allowances for, but to serve the publick.”648 
Most significantly, Nedham would not abstain from returning to his 
favourite bugbear, the problem of clerical demagogy. Writing about the 
new religious private schools Nedham claimed that despite the dan-
gers of demagogy from the church pulpit, it would have been much 
better to keep the priests in their churches and away from the schools, 
since “they will do ten times more mischief now amongst the Lambs, 
then they could have done amongst the Sheep.” And instead of creat-
645 Marchamont Nedham, A discourse concerning schools and school-masters: offered to publick 
consideration, London: 1663, pp. 10, 13.
646 Cf. Milton’s views of false elegance in the History of Britain (CPW 5:85).
647 Nedham, A discourse concerning schools, pp. 2, 10
648 Nedham, A discourse concerning schools, pp. 1, 9, 11.
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ing humanists out of schoolboys, in the current system of education the 
church “Pulpit is made their ultimate design”: once they would start 
the life of preaching, the students would “lay their studies of Humanity 
aside.”649 
The views presented here lend further support to the argument that 
Nedham’s approach to priests continued to be based more on the ef-
fects of their power through rhetoric, than on any religious function 
the priests might claim to have. It also sheds more light on Nedham’s 
republicanism. For example, it has been argued that Nedham was a 
forebear to the more modern concepts of secular republics and the 
separation of church and state.650 However, castigating the priests for 
abusing rhetoric while opposing values and ideals important to Ned-
ham, is a more plausible explanation considering the historical context, 
than simply stamping him with as a “founding father” avant la lettre. We 
should not try and read in a facile manner any enlightenment values 
into Nedham’s antipathy to religious demagogy. 
For a few years before his death in 1678, Nedham returned to the 
public sphere, aligning himself once more with the side of the mon-
archy. His final works are as important as his earlier, better known 
works in giving us insights on his views on the uses of rhetoric and 
the notion of free speech. Also, they help lay to rest some of the false 
assumptions about interest theory. As mentioned in the introduction, 
it has been argued that interest theory was tainted by its connection 
with royalism. This connection has led some scholars to conclude that 
writers like Nedham defined classical republicanism as being against 
monarchical reason of state, drawing from sixteenth-century Christian 
humanist culture.651 However, this is better explained simply in terms 
of the political climate of the Puritan Commonwealth, considering that 
even after the Restoration writers contrasted self-interest with the ethic 
expected of a citizen in his political relations. This applied also to Ned-
649 Nedham, A discourse concerning schools, pp. 7, 10.
650 Rahe, “An inky wretch.”
651 Scott, “Classical republicanism in seventeenth century England and the Neth-
erlands,” pp. 70-1; Marchamont Nedham, Mercurius Politicus, no. 108, London: 
1652, p. 1693.
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ham, who in 1652 had argued against reason of state as “Kingcraft,” now 
in 1678 wrote in Christianissimus Christianandus on behalf of the mon-
archy against the French: “their only Rule Interest of State; so that the 
Faith of Treaties, the Good of Religion, or the Ties of Blood and Amity cannot 
hold them.”652 As argued before, the crucial factor in the debate about 
reason of state was the old struggle between morals and utility, rather 
than merely the form of government involved.
As with interest theory, Nedham also carried on the approach to 
rhetoric familiar from his earlier political positions. He continued to 
promote rhetorical ideals, and attacked his opponents’ bad use of rheto-
ric. In A pacquet of advices and animadversions, sent from London to the men 
of Shaftsbury, Nedham corrected the Earl of Shaftesbury in his use of 
deliberative rhetoric (“In all Debates about the high Points of Polity”) 
about both the delivery and the decorum: “every Expression ought 
not only to be season’d by the Speaker, cum grano Salis; but to be un-
derstood so also by the Hearers.”653 As for the parliamentary privilege 
of free speech, Nedham was similarly ready to circumscribe it, if the 
greater good required limitations. Thus he could promote an oath of 
allegiance, maintaining that it did not preclude parliamentary delib-
eration, and any possible changes brought about by the oath would not 
cause any loss of liberty in the representatives’ actions. Parliamentar-
ians would not “reckon themselves so bound up by the Oath, as to lose 
their power and liberty to debate and resolve upon such Alterations 
afterward in the Establishment as shall be found needful.”654
Likewise, after the Restoration Nedham made no efforts to promote 
any forms of popular free expression. In A pacquet of advices and animad-
versions, he referred to the parliamentary struggles Shaftesbury partici-
pated in in 1675. Among the reprehensible actions of that year was 
the spreading of prints, where “the Debates and Contestings of Parlia-
652 [Marchamont Nedham], Christianissimus Christianandus: or, Reason for the reduction of 
France to a more Christian state in Europ, London: 1678, p. 62; Gunn, “Interest Will 
Not Lie,” p. 555.
653 [Marchamont Nedham], A pacquet of advices and animadversions, sent from London to the 
men of Shaftsbury, London: 1676, p. 43.
654 Nedham, A pacquet of advices, pp. 11-12.
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ment” were exposed to the “Scorn and Contempt of the Vulgar.” The 
effect of this was “to Poison mens minds, and render the Government 
Ridiculous.”655 Nedham returned to the events of 1675 in Honesty’s best 
policy of 1678, reproaching the “Crafty Tricks, with Loud Popular Clam-
ors, and Long Speeches of their correspondents in Parliament, with 
other Machinations.” That this was done “under the Sacred shelter and 
Claim of Free Speaking, and Priviledge,” was even more reprehensible. 
It was an abuse of granted privileges, and not a “honest English way to 
bring on New Parliaments.”656 
The main abusers of freedom of speech were, as always, the dem-
agogues. In A pacquet of advice, when considering “Seditious (if not 
Treasonous) Speeches,” Nedham’s main accusation remained one of 
“mis-leading people” by political spin, with the purpose of preparing a 
mutiny.657 But whereas earlier this accusation was laid at the Levellers 
door, in 1676 Nedham was writing for the royal side, and his opponent 
was then likened to “the curious Preachers of the Mystery of King-killing 
among the Jesuites” – that is, papist and regicidal.658 Like Hobbes and 
many other writers of the time, Nedham laid the blame for the civil war 
on the demagogues in the parliament. The “Tribunitial Orators” caused a 
“Fiery Faction” (metaphors of fire were, and remain common in respect 
to demagogues: compare firebrands, fanning flames of faction, etc.) and 
the parliamentary process was brought to a halt by “quarrelling Speeches 
and Debates.”659 To deal with the troublemakers, Nedham referred to 
Lord Carlisle as someone who has had to witness “too many Experi-
ments of Malcontented Demagogues, and their little Tricks” and thus has 
the experience on how to deal with them.660
Nedham’s views of the demagoguery of the 1670s bring under dis-
cussion the idea of the public sphere, as propounded by Jürgen Haber-
655 Nedham, A pacquet of advices, p. 56.
656 [Marchamont Nedham], Honesty’s best policy: or, Penitence the sum of prudence, London: 
1678, p. 12.
657 Nedham, A pacquet of advices, pp. 13, 19, 24, 37
658 Nedham, A pacquet of advices, p. 19.
659 Nedham, A pacquet of advices, pp. 58-60.
660 Nedham, A pacquet of advices, p. 46.
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mas. Crudely put, Habermas saw the role of public places of conven-
ing, such as the late-seventeenth-century coffee-shops in England, as 
essential in creating the informed public engaging in rational, politi-
cal debates.661 The notion of a public sphere is largely accepted, even 
though there is a strong demand for a “more nuanced model of popular 
political opinion founded on the realities of seventeenth century discus-
sion, on the nature and languages of debate.”662 The role of the print-
ing revolution has understandably been at the forefront in attempts at 
refining the practicalities of the public sphere, but it is with the specific 
location of the coffeehouse that the study of Nedham will conclude.
Nedham had written critically of the coffeehouses in the past. For 
example, in the first number of The Observator in 1654, Nedham mocked 
“the Three-penny Clubs, those little Academies of the City.” They were 
“so fudled with News, Theologie and Policy, that the Devill of Delphos, 
and Mr Hobbs never thought themselves more wise in oracles of State 
and Divinity.”663 In the 1670s Nedham was more serious in his critique 
about the same places. In Honesty’s best policy he described how during 
the past few years “Clubs and Committees of good Fellowship and Se-
dition were erected.” Such a reprehensible association, “as an Academy 
for inventing Seditious and Treasonable Pamphlets” would then “coyn 
News for the Coffee-houses,” with “Directions how to Print and Spread 
them.”664 In Christianissimus Christianandus he would write against the 
“ominous Birds” of “licentious Liberty,” denoting “News-mongers” in 
various places political activity, among them the “Coffee-Houses.”665
Nedham’s criticism is to a certain extent a vindication of Haber-
mas’ theory, as it pertains to politics as the topic of discussion – even if 
the normative account would be different. However, what is left open 
in Habermas’ theory is the question of how the debates were actually 
661 Jürgen Habermas, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie 
der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, Neuwied: 1969.
662 Raymond, “Newspaper,” p. 129.
663 Nedham, The Observator, no. 1, Oct 24 – 31, 1654, p. 1.
664 Nedham, Honesty’s best policy, p. 11.
665 [Marchamont Nedham], Christianissimus Christianandus: or, Reason for the reduction of 
France to a more Christian state in Europ, London: 1678, p. 73.
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conducted – what was the ‘nature of debate.’ For example, as pertains 
to Milton’s reception in the post-Restoration era, it has been argued 
how “an evolving ‘coffee-house style’ increasingly acknowledged com-
peting interests debated in a public sphere broader than the forum 
Milton prefers” and how “the rhetorical splendour of Milton’s prose 
made him vulnerable to the coffee-house style of his antagonists.”666 
However, splendour aside, the ‘coffee-house style’ was also born from 
the culture of rhetorical learning. This is most clear in Nedham’s nar-
ration, in Christianissimus Christianandus, of an event in “a certain Cabal 
of Coffee-mongers,” where having overheard a political discourse, a per-
son stepped up to the debaters and “said honestly” how he wondered 
at such sudden changes of opinion. The man then inferred how there 
must be “some Secret Intrigue and Reserve in the Heart, when the Tongues 
go at so rolling a rate,” and how “they are a sort of people tutor’d to this Tune, to 
argue Pro and Con by Turns, as their own Occasions alter.”667 The basic foun-
dation of the public sphere of the time was in rhetoric.
18. Epilogue: Henry Neville 
This study has been mainly about five republican authors who wrote 
during the 1640s and 1650s, but since this last chapter has been about 
the later writings of the same authors, it is worthwhile to include by way 
of an epilogue an author who was of the same generation, but wrote his 
most important political work, Plato Redivivus, only after the other five 
had ceased to do so, in 1681. Henry Neville (1620-1694) had a close 
relationship with James Harrington and his work, to such an extent 
that in parts of the scholarly literature he is referred to simply as a 
‘neo-Harringtonian.’668 As this study is less concerned with questions of 
666 Nicholas von Maltzahn, “From pillar to post: Milton and the attack on republican 
humanism at the restoration,” in Soldiers, writers and statesmen of the English revolution, 
eds. Ian Gentles, et al., Cambridge: 1998, pp. 265, 274.
667 Nedham, Christianissimus Christianandus, p. 76.
668 Starting from Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, p. 421; and recently challenged by 
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attributing influence, the focus of the analysis is on what Neville’s own 
work tells us about the topic of public speech.
Before considering his main opus, it is useful to consider, even if 
briefly, some of his earlier works. Neville touched quickly upon the 
topic of societal arrangements in the Isle of Pines (1668), where he as-
serted how “in multitudes disorders will grow.” This was a natural de-
velopment causing problems only if left unchecked: “where the Hedge 
of Government is once broken down, the most vile bear the greatest 
rule.” Similarly, we can see Neville’s preference of institutions over in-
dividual virtue in his ascertainment of legal development: how “bad 
manners produceth good and wholesome Laws for the preservation of 
Humane Society.”669 Also, judging from Neville’s correspondence it 
can be claimed that Neville was aware of the divisions between abuses 
of rhetoric: following the republican tradition, he accused the “two in-
famous factions, the courtiers and the madmen of the people” i.e. flat-
terers and demagogues of trying to bring about in one case “tyranny, 
the other anarchy and confusion.”670
Plato Redivivus (PR)671 was set as three dialogues. In the first one the 
theme of deference was set, or as Neville put it: “after some compli-
ments and conversation of course, they began to talk of political mat-
ters” (PR 72). Accordingly, the participants go through the modalities 
of polite discussion, complimenting the “good conversation,” “this kind 
of civility,” while claiming not to succumb to overt flattery etc. (PR 74-
5). What might seem a needless digression on the importance of man-
ners, in what is presented as an overtly political text, was an attempt by 
Neville at mimesis, to set the stage for a record of conversation. Neville 
purported to avoid having his work seen as a “studied discourse fitted 
Gaby Mahlberg, Henry Neville and English Republican culture in the seventeenth century. 
Dreaming of another game, Manchester: 2009.
669 Henry Neville, The Isle of Pines, or, A late discovery of a fourth island near Terra Australis 
Incognita by Henry Cornelius van Sloetten, London: 1668, pp. 17-18, 26.
670 Anna Maria Crinò, Fatti e figure del seicento anglo-toscano, documenti inediti sui rapporti 
letterari, diplomatici, culturali fra Toscana e Inghilterra, Firenze: 1957, pp. 205-6 (27 
Sept. 1680).
671 Page references are to the version Henry Neville, “Plato Redivivus” [2nd ed., 1681] 
in Two English Republican tracts, Caroline Robbins (ed.), Cambridge: 1969.
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for the press, and not a familiar dialogue” (PR 76).672 
It should also be noted that the conversation Neville has in mind is 
not an aggressive political debate. Although some streams of theory on 
polite conversation argued against politics as a topic, Neville’s dialogue 
can be seen in the Ciceronian tradition of sermo in De Officiis, where 
the topic of discussion can be politics, but the aim is not victory over 
others at any price.673 Neville’s aim is to present an eirenic dialogue of 
good repute, “amongst gentlemen and men of sense,” not one where 
the speakers would – “like sophisters in a college” – “dispute rather 
for victory, than to discover and find out the truth” (PR 77). Neville’s 
attempt at persuasion was through conversation not lecturing: towards 
the end of the dialogue, Neville issued a somewhat ironic demurral how 
he would not presume “to teach our senators wisdom,” and only dares 
to hope that “possibly some of these notions might fall in, at ordinary 
conversation” (PR 195). 
In the printer’s preface, the publisher, S.I.,674 argued along the same 
lines, how the work was not a political harangue but “ordinary conver-
sation amongst private friends.” This claim was supported by the “the 
plainness and easiness of the style” and “the familiarity of the words 
and expressions,” as the rule of decorum demanded (PR 69-70). Simi-
larly, the title of the work was due to the genre, as “Plato ever writ these 
high matters in easy and familiar dialogues.” Thus Neville “did imitate 
672 Blair Worden sees the dialogue form as an option that “allows for a detached 
and exploratory tone that disguises the radicalism of the work”: Blair Worden, 
“Republicanism and the Restoration, 1660-1683,” in Republicanism, Liberty and 
Commercial Society 1649-1776, ed. David Wootton, Stanford: 1994, p. 148.
673 Another topic considered impolite was religion, to which Neville gave similar, if 
somewhat strained credence: “I am sorry that in the prosecution of this argument, 
I shall be forced to say something that may not be very pleasing to this worthy 
gentleman, we being necessitated to discourse with prejudice of that religion 
[Roman Catholic] which he professes; but it shall be with as little ill breeding as I 
can, and altogether without passion or invectives” (PR 153). Neville also asserted 
how “it is never very civil” to discourse of religion (PR 118) – after several pages of 
diatribes against the clergy.
674 Mark Knights has argued convincingly that S.I. refers to John (Iohannes) Starkey, 
initials reversed: Mark Knights, “John Starkey and Ideological Networks in Late 
Seventeenth Century England,” Media History, 11(1/2), 2005, pp. 132-133.
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his way of writing, as to the manner of it, (though not the matter).” 
This unconvincing line is further discredited by the complaint how “al-
though talking of state-affairs in a monarchy must needs be more of-
fensive, than it was in the democracy where Plato lived” (PR 69).
Inevitably, the strategy of demurral hardly being foolproof, Neville’s 
work was attacked for being a political work.675 After the Glorius Revo-
lution of 1688, when the work was republished as Discourses Concerning 
Government (1698), Alan Baldwin did not bother with euphemisms in 
his preface and wrote simply how: “These Discourses were privately 
Printed, and Handed about, in K. Charles the Second’s Reign; but now 
in this Reign, when Truth is better Entertained, I have thought good to 
make them more Publick, for the Benefit of my Country.”676 
To a large extent, Neville presented the customary republican argu-
ments on society, in which he did not diverge from the traditions. He 
followed the Ciceronian argument of society being brought together by 
an orator, a good man skilled in speech, and held together by the subse-
quent agreement of the people. “I think this must be taken for granted, 
that whatsoever the frame or constitution was first, it was made by the 
persuasion and mediation of some wise and virtuous person, and con-
sented to by the whole number” (PR 85).677 
At the same time, Neville brought one part of the tradition to the 
fore: land reform. Neville insisted how “in all times and places,” when-
ever a government had been founded “by gathering people together, to 
build a city,” the founders “did always very maturely deliberate under 
what form or model of government they meant to live; and accordingly 
made the partition of the possessions” (PR 94). This is a, or even the, 
running theme in Plato Redivivus: rhetoric, as well as other aspects of 
675 Thomas Goddard, Plato’s demon, or,The state-physician unmaskt being a discourse in 
answer to a book call’d Plato redivivus, London: 1684; W.W., Antidotum Britannicum, or, 
A counter-pest against the destructive principles of Plato redivivus wherein His Majesties’s royal 
prerogatives are asserted, and the ancient rights of the imperial crown of England are vindicated 
against all innovators, London: 1681.
676 Henry Neville, Discourses Concerning Government, London: 1698, “To the Reader,” 
n.p. 
677 Or as glossed later: “a politician (as well as an orator) ought to be an upright man” 
(PR 167).
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the republican problematic is still present, but the importance of land 
reform rises to the fore consistently. 
Neville presented classical examples of successful persuasion, such as 
the story of Themistocles and Aristides. In this, Themistocles suggested 
to Aristides in secret that the Athenians could destroy their allies’ ships 
in order to rule the seas alone. Keeping the details secret, Aristides 
told the Athenians that Themistocles’ plan was “indeed very advanta-
geous and profitable to the Athenians; but withal, the most wicked and 
villainous attempt that ever was undertaken” (PR 173). Consequently, 
the plan was shelved.678 Aristides managed to persuade people to shy 
away from the immoral action despite its advantages. Neville used this 
story to clear himself of trying to support democracy, claiming that 
“the same judgement do I give” of “democracy, at this time” (PR 173, my 
italics). This ambiguity leaves open whether Neville supported Themis-
tocles’ type of reason of state- thinking or not. 
Neville followed the pre-Hobbesian political tradition, shared by 
both republicans and monarchists, of portraying rhetoric as a posi-
tive weapon of crowd control. For Neville, “the best and most perfect 
commonwealths that ever were” assigned the proper role to the sena-
tors: they “made ready things for the more populous assemblies,” they 
“reduced the people to a calmer state,” and, through this, helped the 
people “to come to themselves” (PR 130).679 This gave some leeway for 
the power of persuasion, yet if we reflect on the classical examples given 
by Neville, the shortcomings of rhetoric were made apparent as well. 
Neville supplied the story of Solon of Athens, who “harangued daily 
to the nobility and people” to pursue land reform. But even as the Athe-
nians “were all sensible of his reasons,” his policy “would not at all be 
digested.” This led to “an uproar” where the people wanted Solon to 
become a monarchical ruler. Instead, Solon, through his personal ex-
ample, led the land reform, which, once successful, led to a “new model 
678 Story is from Plutarch, Life of Themistocles.
679 Neville’s senate would have been unelected, as the qualities expected of the sena-
tors could be supplied by the existing upper house of Parliament. Not without 
reason, Worden sees this as a selling point for Neville’s theory: Worden, “Repub-
licanism and the Restoration,” p. 152.
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of government, and laws suitable to a democracy” and subsequent glory 
(PR 95-6). In Neville’s interpretation, the story of Solon is notable for 
the failure of persuasion to get people to look beyond their personal and 
after the common interest. Neville did not take the Hobbesian way out: 
Solon had his way not by tyranny, but through example. Nevertheless, 
despite the failure of rhetoric in persuading the people, Neville did not 
present uproars or demagogy as the main threats to the Athenian re-
public. Foreign threats, as well as those from tyranny and from failure 
to put public interest ahead of private, were presented as more serious 
problems.
From other instances it can be reasonably inferred that Neville’s 
understanding of interest theory followed classical republican theory. 
Unsurprisingly, it was in “the interest of England” to limit the royal 
prerogative (PR 185), but for the people at large a way to pursue public 
over private interests was traditionally difficult. For republicans like 
Milton the answer lay in education, but Neville acknowledged how 
people could be “corrupted by their own interest” (PR 183), and how 
it is “natural for every man not to do anything against his own interest 
when he can help it” (PR 184). 
To some extent, Neville trusted in the power of persuasion. A cure of 
the current “politic debauch, which is a neglect of all things that concern 
the public welfare, and a setting up our own private interest against it,” 
could involve political rhetoric, but in the end “most of the wise and grave 
men of this kingdom are very silent” (PR 196). The main effort for Nev-
ille was to present the institutional reforms as a method of guiding the 
private interests of individuals towards the common good. With the new 
constitution, “the lords cannot have any interest or temptation to differ 
with the commons in anything wherein the public good is concerned; but 
are obliged by all the ties in the world to run the same course and fortune 
with the commons; their interest being exactly the same.” After the nec-
essary reform, there was room for rhetoric between the upper and lower 
houses: “the lords may as well convince the commons, as be convinced 
by them: and these contests are and ever will be of admirable use and 
benefit to the commonwealth” (PR 194). Neville’s system had room for 
rhetoric when it was tamed and used in restricted setting. 
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For other republicans, demagogues and courtiers represented a seri-
ous danger, so we could expect to see them in Neville’s theory as well. 
Thus, when Neville handled the definitions of government in Aristotle, 
he first gave a redescription of Aristotle’s terminology: “he has not fitly 
called those extremes (for so I will style them) of aristocracy and democ-
racy, corruptions.” For Neville, extremes are more fitting terms, as it is 
“the alteration of property, which is the only corruptor of politics.” In 
“the extreme of democracy,” unsatisfied people could cause “anarchy” 
by “making their orators their leaders.” In democracy the power could 
go to “any great person who could lead the people,” but naturally, ora-
tors as such are powerless without an audience. This, “the major part” 
of the people, “are made the instruments oft-times of the ambition of 
the great ones, and very apt to kindle into faction.” Neville did not show 
much faith in such an audience, which wanted to be pandered to, but 
seems to have had little inclination to be persuaded by “the wisdom of 
the better sort,” as it was “made useless by the fury of the people.” But 
even such “a state so full of confusion” could be long lasting: “many cit-
ies have subsisted hundreds of years in this condition,” as was the case 
in “Athens, and in the modern state of Florence” (PR 101-2).680
In his presentation of the rule of the orators and the masses, Nev-
ille seemed to display a certain amount of ambivalence about its ef-
fects. Blair Worden has argued that even if Neville had “no taste for 
turbulency,” as he “has observed the fruitless bitterness of civil strife 
and has no wish to return to it,” his principles and impulses aim to-
wards a “well-regulated democracy.”681 Put crudely, Neville favoured 
democracy, but not so to say ‘demagocracy.’ Nevertheless, at the same 
time Neville argued that even such a ‘demagocracy’ could survive and 
prosper. My argument is that this ambivalence is influenced by the dif-
ficult political situation in which Neville wrote his work. This led him 
to present rhetorical issues in not as pejorative a light as Hobbes had, 
680 Neville wrote later about the Civil War era “how easily an army of natives is to be 
deluded with the name of liberty; and brought to pull down anything, which their 
ring-leaders tell them tends to enslaving their country” (PR 80). But again, he did 
not qualify explicitly whether those times and methods were truly regrettable.
681 Worden, “Republicanism and the Restoration,” pp. 149-151.
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if not in a completely positive one either. Thus, the seeming indecisive-
ness about the role of rhetoric led in turn to its downgrading as an issue 
when compared to the topic of land reform. 
This tendency is even more prevalent in Neville’s appreciation of the 
other negative political aspect of abused rhetoric: flattery in a tyranny. 
This was obviously an aspect that suffered from little ambiguity in re-
publicanism, and Neville pays due credit to the Tacitean understand-
ing of the change of rhetoric according to the polity. When discussing 
the fame of the Gracchi, Neville attributes the brothers’ later reputa-
tion as suffering from being “branded with the name of sedition.” This 
muckraking was done by those “who prostituted the noble flame of 
poetry (which before had wont to be employed in magnifying heroic ac-
tions) to flatter the lust and ambition of the Roman tyrants” (PR 100).682 
Nevertheless, when discussing the present state of England, Neville was 
adamant that the “evil counsellors” and “the flattering divines,”683 were 
“not the causes of our misfortunes; they are but the effects” of the lack 
of proper land reform (PR 81, also 134).684
We can see how the focus of Neville’s text returns to land reform, 
but why did he concentrate so much on the system? Outside land re-
form, Neville rarely reached similar conclusions as Harrington did – 
sometimes quite the opposite. It has been argued that the book was 
written in “an age devoid of both moral rigour and political or mili-
tary greatness.”685 Yet Neville gives a flattering image of the state of 
682 This poetry could easily be defined as epideictic rhetoric. Cf. also PR 86, for 
Robert Filmer as a flatterer of princes. 
683 Neville was notorious for his negative approach towards the clergy: he could see 
them as flatterers as well as seditious preachers. In both senses it could be seen 
as “a usurpation” of political authority (PR 118). Neville’s rare positive words 
about priests – “something may be said in their behalf” – was that conceivably 
they could instill “ justice, wisdom, and goodness” in a monarch. Yet he would be 
an “imaginary prince,” and when taking account of Neville’s other views, most 
likely this was a highly theoretical supposition (PR 91). Cf. also the earlier note on 
religion.
684 For a similar view as “scapegoating” behind the economic argument, see Worden, 
“Republicanism and the Restoration,” pp. 148-9.
685 Scott, Commonwealth Principles, p. 332.
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England: “one of the most flourishing kingdoms in Europe, full of splen-
did nobility and gentry; the comeliest persons alive, valiant, courteous, 
knowing, and bountiful; and as well stored with commoners, honest, 
industrious, fitted for business, merchandise, arts, or arms; as their sev-
eral educations lead them” (PR 79). The people’s capability for virtue 
was not questioned.
Neville’s point was that society did not require virtuous or educated 
citizens so much as a good system. For Neville, “it is the nature of all 
popular councils” in “turbulent times, to like discourses that heighten 
their passions and blow up their indignation.” This applies even to the 
wisest councils “that ever were,” as witnessed by “the people of Rome 
and Athens,” who were also traditionally praised for their virtues (PR 
198). In the same vein, when the character of English Gentleman at one 
part of a dialogue assumes that Venice “must needs have ever enjoyed 
a succession of wise citizens” that ensured its longevity and prosperity, 
his interlocutor, the Noble Venetian, warns him not to over-value the 
wisdom of Venetians. According to him, their knowledge of and inter-
est in politics, “that great science of the governing and increasing great 
states and cities,” is highly limited (PR 83). For Venice, political wisdom 
and virtue were not the keys to success, but rather their famous system.
Neville does not advocate forgetting about the value of education: 
“the politics, or art of governing, is a science to be learned and stud-
ied by counsellors and statesmen” (PR 111). However, such wisdom as 
well as the quality of the citizens is of secondary value. The defining 
issue is the “corruption of government,” which leads to a “depravation 
in manners.”686 Things might be better at the moment, but the future 
might see a “debauchery of manners” (PR 87).687 Neville generalised 
his insight into a general rule, “infallibly true,” of politics: “when we 
have leisure to examine all the states or policies that ever were, we 
shall find all their changes to have turned upon this hinge of property.” 
686 Worden argues similarly that the “spiritual shortcomings” of the people are not 
the issue. Worden, “Republicanism and the Restoration,” p. 146.
687 Hence, Neville does not refer to contemporary England as a lost and corrupt state, 
but as one with the distinct possiblity: “nothing is more certain than that politic 
defects breed moral ones, as our nation is a pregnant example” (PR 87, my italics).
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Legislation based on this was “the only way to make a commonwealth 
immortal” (PR 100).688
Neville’s analysis brings to the fore an important question: did the 
problems of rhetoric lessen in importance vis-à-vis the question of free 
speech as a right in post-Restoration era? In one way, the answer must 
be no, as the same problems and questions are in some form with us to 
this day. At the same time, Neville’s work does seem to be neglecting 
the issue of rhetoric somewhat, at least in favour of more institutional 
answers to the problems involved. Although this topic is strictly speak-
ing outside the scope of this study, it is worth considering – if for noth-
ing else, then for possible studies in the future.
One approach to the puzzle is to reflect on the context where the 
theories were presented. Unlike in the Civil War conditions, censor-
ship was stronger during the Restoration, the effect of which has to be 
taken into account in the interpretation of both the content and style of 
the political theories presented. And unlike in the Commonwealth era, 
republicans like Neville were arguing as the opposition, which forced 
them to accommodate their theories to the contemporary, monarchical 
situation.689
On this point many scholars agree, and some have argued that 
Neville and other contemporaries actually aimed at loftier republican 
688 Here an important qualification should be made to another republican advocating 
an immortal commonwealth, James Harrington. Although Neville is justifiably 
seen as a neo-Harringtonian, Neville put his trust to much larger extent in the 
system (which also led to his being less hostile to rhetoric). One notable difference 
was in their perception of the system: Harrington saw his as a natural system, 
and objected strongly to it being portrayed as mechanical (The Prerogative of 
Popular Government, PW 430), whereas Neville could write without qualms on the 
“mechanical part of the government” (PR 106).
689 Nicholas von Maltzahn has poignantly put the point about the combination of 
these factors in the Restoration period: “even a republican like Henry Neville 
would present his proposals in a more accomodating language than that of Milton 
in commonwealth”: Nicholas von Maltzahn, “The Whig Milton, 1677-1700,” in 
Milton and Republicanism, eds. David Armitage et al., Cambridge: 1995, p. 234. For 
similar appreciation of Neville as “a negotiator, ready to compromise,” presenting 
“a cautious surface” so his “bold thesis [could] hope to win converts” since it was 
“unsafe to present a bold thesis frontally in Restoration England,” see Worden, 
“Republicanism and the Restoration,” p. 148.
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goals then they wrote about.690 For Neville, this is fairly unproblematic: 
whether from a rhetorical point or deeply felt beliefs, we can say that 
Neville did indeed put his trust in institutions. Seemingly, Neville fo-
cused tightly on the Harringtonian land reform, so that all the previous 
problems would vanish under that. According to this approach, the 
solution is simply that in the circumstances where Neville wrote he had 
to shift the focus away from overtly republican topics, and not empha-
sising the rhetorical issues could be a way of avoiding claims of trying 
to raise, or favouring methods of raising, sedition.
There is much to recommend in this approach, as in the case of 
Neville, the argument that his work in characterised by demurral is 
quite feasible and sensible. Nevertheless, there still remain some un-
answered questions: if Neville was following the tune of the times, why 
did he not attack demagogy unequivocally? Furthermore, there can 
be added questions about other republicans. If Neville abstained from 
being antimonarchical, we can hardly say the same about Algernon 
Sidney.691 Sidney had even less to say about rhetoric, he did not put his 
faith similarly in a political system, or even to education. His theory 
relied mainly on aristocratic virtues and anti-monarchism, for which 
he famously ended up in the gallows. It would seem fair to say that in 
his case omitting the topic of rhetoric in order to avoid repercussions, 
would have been extraordinarily incoherent in view of his other opin-
ions – not to mention ultimately futile.692 
My attempt at finding an explanation involves another aspect taken 
from the context: post-Restoration republicans did not focus on dema-
gogy and deliberation because they were not topical. Crudely put, this 
sounds simple to the point of being trivial, but this is in a manner an 
690 Especially Worden, “Republicanism and the Restoration,” and Scott, Common-
wealth Principles.
691 Reasons of space inhibit me from a more thorough presentation of his theories, 
but his main works can be mentioned here: Court Maxims, eds. Hans Blom et al., 
Cambridge: 1996; Discourses Concerning Government [1698], ed. Thomas G. West, 
Indianapolis: 1996.
692 Worden claims that Sidney “would have known better than to invoke the name of 
Milton or Nedham after the Restoration” – for all the good it did to him. Worden, 
“Republicanism and the Restoration,” p. 153.
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advanced version of the classical Tacitean understanding of the role 
between rhetoric and the polity. For Tacitus, the fall of the Roman re-
public meant that there was no more room or use for political rhetoric, 
as the empire had use only for flattery. At the end of his Dialogus de Ora-
toribus (41.4), Tacitus ironically hails this as an advantage, as instead of 
public oratory and deliberation, the supremely wise emperor considers 
all political issues.693 This interpretation has been a commonplace of re-
publican theories ever since, but it also yields an important insight into 
the republicans’ own writings. Advanced Tacitean argument would be 
that in a state of freedom, rhetoric flourishes but its harmful aspects 
force theorists to find ways of limiting them, while in a state of limited 
freedom there is no room for rhetoric, therefore no reason to contem-
plate things such as how to prevent demagogy. 
In the public sphere of seventeenth-century England, the field for 
rhetoric in all its forms was open at stages during the 1640s and 50s, but 
afterwards dominated by reaction and censorship. There was hardly 
much reason or demand to tackle the issue of demagogy in a republic, 
when there was no republic anymore – or yet. And similarly, speak-
ing about the negative aspects of republican rhetoric would not be the 
optimal marketing tactic. This argument could give one explanation 
as to why the Civil War, the beginning and end of the Commonwealth 
and the period after the Glorious Revolution saw so much theorising 
about the benefits of rhetoric, and about the ways to reduce its harmful 
aspects.694 For those writers it was a topical issue, whereas for writers 
like Neville and Sidney, contemplation on such matters as demagogy 
would have been – and was – of secondary priority, perhaps better left 
neglected than confronted. Their main task at hand was about how to 
get to a state of freedom or to a better society.695 
693 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, p. 70.
694 “Cato’s Letters” are a pertinent example: John Trenchard and Thomas 
Gordon. Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and Other Important Subjects, 2 vols, ed. 
Ronald Hamowy, Indianapolis: 1995.
695 One related concern to this was the highly topical issue of royal succession for 
Neville, who claimed it was “needless to make any provision against a popish 
successor, if you rectify your government” (PR 160). 
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On a final note, we can look into Neville’s view of his own politi-
cal theory. He posed a rhetorical question on “whether I could have 
offered anything that I thought better than this,” to which the answer 
was pragmatically yes, but it “was the best, that the people would or 
could receive” (PR 200). This answer still leaves room for democracy, 
as in the aforementioned lesson from Aristides, but similarly, not under 
the present circumstances. Scott sees this as a “pessimistic note,”696 but 
pessimism can also be seen as pragmatism about the present, optimism 
about the future. 
696 Scott, Commonwealth Principles, p. 334.
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Conclusion
This study has been about the development of political thought con-
cerning rhetoric and republicanism in the writings of five authors. In 
the end we can reflect on how their views relate to each other, and what 
lies behind the differences. There is no need to compare each one to the 
others in turn, but as we have seen, it is reasonable to assert that Har-
rington and Streater were close to each other politically, as were Hall 
and Milton. For the ever-elusive Nedham, a place could be found be-
tween the two pairs, advocating neither completely popular, nor com-
pletely elite, rule. It has not been the purpose of this study to engage in 
taxonomy of republicanism, and no attempt at such categorisation will 
follow. Nevertheless, if, for the sake of argument, we would assume such 
a heuristic axis for republicanism where the two couples were at op-
posite ends, what would explain the discrepancy in their arguments for 
free speech? As we shall see, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, 
arguments for free speech are not necessarily connected with notions of 
democratic government.
If we use Milton and Harrington as representatives of the opposites, 
in one corner there is the writer of Areopagitica, and in the other, a writer 
who seems to have had no interest at all in freedom of speech as a ques-
tion. Much of Harrington’s writings are ripostes to other authors, but 
they are about the argument, and lack the common commentary about 
scandalous publications and whether they should be allowed. Indeed, 
the only instance where Harrington talks of anything resembling free-
dom of expression is in Oceana, when referring to poets and theaters: 
These things among us are sure enough to be censured, but by such only 
as do not know the nature of a commonwealth; for to tell men that they 
are free, and yet to curb the genius of a people in a lawful recreation unto 
which they are naturally inclined, is to tell a tale of a tub (PW 354).
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Certainly, this view of freedom as a lawful recreation, which should 
not be arbitrarily curbed, fits within the framework of republican lib-
erty. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether Harrington meant this to be a 
paean to free speech alone, since the context of poets and theaters has 
more to do with public morals and the role of women – poets and pros-
titutes both engage in what comes naturally, the effects of which are, to 
an extent, a matter for policy, but not the most pressing one (PW 355). 
The perspective of free speech as such gives us little to draw conclusions 
from, but a comparison of the views of Harrington and Milton on the 
duties of an orator could be more fruitful. 
As we have seen, the virtuous orator was a commonplace in classical 
republicanism. He was someone who performs his civic duty by partici-
pating in politics, without regard to his personal interests, as a servant 
to the public. At the same time, the orator also had a duty to educate 
the public about the ideal common good and true public interest. Thus 
the republican orator must both serve and teach the people. This dual 
role entailed the requirements that orators must neither become slaves 
to the whims of the people – a recipe for anarchy – nor shamelessly pur-
sue their own interests, which would equal oligarchy. This difficult bal-
ancing act between these two extremes allowed for the various strands 
of republican theory that have been under analysis.
Based on what has been presented, it would easily seem that when 
it comes to the role of virtue, ideals of citizenship and conceptions of 
duties, Milton and Harrington indeed represent the polar opposites in 
their respective brands of republicanism. It is not unfair to portray Mil-
ton as an undemocratic commonwealthsman, who did not put much 
weight on either constitutionalism or institutions, preferring to empha-
sise the values of learning, personal virtues and the civic duty to partici-
pate in common affairs. Nevertheless, his writings do present a repub-
lican citizen so faithful to the classical Roman ideals of citizen-orator, 
that even Cicero’s description of the ideal citizen in the De Oratore has 
been described as an “almost Miltonic tribute.”697
Despite claims to the contrary, Harrington did have a vision of an 
ideal citizen: he would most likely come from the nobility, but with 
697 Skinner, Reason and rhetoric, p. 88.
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the theoretical possibility for social climbers, and popular oratory as 
means to educate the public about their liberties. In turn, throughout 
his career Milton was unrelenting in his despair of the rabble, and used 
his mastery of rhetoric to the full when denigrating the rude multitude. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that Milton’s antipathy was rather an 
exhortation for the multitude to rise above themselves through educa-
tion, so that everyone could realise their potential and thus gain full 
citizenship.698 Thus Milton would seem to support a wide and inclusive 
view of citizenship. However, it is difficult to see how the multitude 
would be able to realise themselves through education, considering that 
they were not to be given any. The ability to fully benefit from educa-
tion cannot be found in everyone. As there was no explicit way for the 
populace to gain political learning as in Harrington’s system, it is not 
easy to see where the population could get that learning Milton suppos-
edly exhorted them to get – other than from reading, for example, Mil-
ton’s own works, often written in Latin and manifestly not in a popular 
manner. 
In the end, there were no great differences between Milton and Har-
rington when it comes to their views on the content, goal or beneficiar-
ies of education. Accordingly, some of the duties of orators are similar 
to those of the Roman rhetoricians: oratory should be used for political 
deliberation in the assemblies and to defend the commonwealth and 
its actions. But the classical rhetoricians also included dealing with the 
multitude as one of the main duties of oratory, and this is where Milton 
and Harrington part ways. Not because of different views on education 
or the capabilities of the people, but on the question whether the ora-
tor’s duty is deliberation only with councillors and nobles, or whether 
the orator’s chief audience is the multitude.699 The different approaches 
between Milton and Harrington are clear in their explicit statements 
on what kind of results can be expected of oratory to the masses, and 
698 Daniel Shore, “‘Fit though few’: Eikonoklastes and the rhetoric of audience,” Mil-
ton Studies (45), 2005, and works cited therein.
699 Markku Peltonen, “Political rhetoric and citizenship in Coriolanus,” in Shakespeare 
and Early Modern Political Thought, eds. David Armitage et al., Cambridge: 2009, 
pp. 236-8.
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there Milton had a completely opposite view to Harrington. For Mil-
ton, the opinions of the multitude are irrelevant, so accordingly there 
is little need for managing their actions through oratory, or for taking 
their opinions into account in general.
My argument is that there are deeper, and hitherto neglected as-
pects in the political thought of Milton and Harrington that explain 
this discrepancy in the orator’s duties, and which are not merely ques-
tions of faith or personal experience. These reasons are interrelated, 
but for heuristic purposes I have divided them into three. The first is 
the conception of authority. In Milton’s view, authority is a function of 
office. If a man through his education, ethos, dignity, and so forth, was 
qualified to be an office-holder, and would duly follow the duties of the 
office in question, he had authority. If the office is gained through a 
procedure that pays no heed to the aforementioned qualifications, the 
authority invested in the office is lost. Milton thus dismisses the idea of 
elected officials being able to have authority, as being absolutely coun-
ter to the idea of office-holders being rightly qualified. The qualities 
would be lost, along with any authority, if the elections were held by 
majority votes of those not even qualified to vote. 
The loss of authority would even take place if office-holders were 
to start paying more heed to the opinions of others rather than relying 
on their own. We have seen how much of Milton’s prose and poetry 
revolves around characters who stay the course against the crowd. The 
qualification of wisdom and constancy against what others may think, 
gains even further in importance, when combined with duties of high 
office. Different offices required different qualities, but with the com-
mon one being the constancy against popular opinion. Popular oratory 
equals demagogy, and since the duty of keeping one’s authority requires 
precisely ignoring popular opinion, accordingly there is no duty for an 
orator to stoop to the level of demagogues.
Harrington’s view of authority was somewhat of a novelty to his con-
temporaries, although it can also be seen as a part of his lone, system-
atic efforts “to translate the positive features of the Roman system into 
273CONCLUSION
the context of contemporary England.”700 Harrington’s conception of 
authority also entailed the qualities of right reason and learning, and, 
just as for Milton, it meant in practice the upper classes. The crucial 
difference to Milton is that Harrington’s conception does not focus on 
holding office, but to the general quality of having authority. Since both 
power and authority can be had without holding office, Harrington 
ends up with a completely different view of holding office from Milton. 
All of the offices in Harrington’s utopia, Oceana, are filled by election. 
The main idea, that Harrington argues is the key to the succesful gov-
ernance of a republic, is the check of a popular vote. 
Harrington had an argument against the view found in the works of 
Milton, and Nedham as well, that consensual authority through elec-
tions would lead to a race to the bottom, as no-one would care for 
the common good but would choose the worst possible candidates. To 
Harrington, people capable of the oikeiosis-based reflection could be al-
lowed to give their consent through elections, and also, they could, and 
should be addressed and instructed by the means of popular oratory as 
described. The system of checks and balances also explains why there 
is “no procedure for introducing a system of natural rights against the 
rule of parliamentary authority.”701 Since the ‘power’ of the prerogative 
held the parliamentary authority in check, there was no need for an 
explicit taxonomy of rights, which would include a right to free speech.
The second reason for the differences between Milton and Har-
rington has to do with the relationship of law and education. As al-
ready presented, education had an important role for both Milton and 
Harrington, but we must consider education also vis-à-vis its relation 
to the role of laws in a society. The figure of the orator fits between 
these two ideal extremes: in a completely learned environment rhetoric 
would be unnecessary. Similarly so in a republic governed completely 
by law,702 and when formulae and precedent present solutions, there is 
700 Fergus Millar, The Roman republic in political thought, Hanover, NH: 2002, p. 99.
701 Rogers, “Harrington, Locke and Aristotle,” p. 149.
702 Francesco Patrizi in Della retorica, quoted in John Monfasani, “Humanism and 
Rhetoric,” in Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms, and Legacy, vol. 3, ed. Albert 
Rabil, Jr., Philadelphia: 1988, p. 210.
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less need for argumentation from probability.703 It has been argued that 
the republican view of liberty, where “lives are regulated down to the 
tiniest detail, but always in strict accordance with commonly-known, 
non-arbitrary rules and procedures,” would not make for a community 
where most would want to live “and this suggests that we do indeed 
place some independent value on non-interference.”704 However, it is 
precisely this kind of nightmare vision that republicans had in mind 
when they were defending rhetoric against extensive legislation – al-
though licence had its dangers, it was a lesser evil to the alternative of 
its absence through totalitarian control.
It is in this context of the political reality of a republic, that the ora-
tors were needed, either as the necessary evils or counterweights to the 
idea of total legislation. This latter view has been argued recently from 
the perspective that politics should be conducted with trust in the pos-
sibility of beneficial persuasion, and being persuaded while holding on 
to independent judgment. If the alternative is to prefer procedures and 
the force of legislation in every field, the legislation by default is seen to 
gnaw at freedom, since it takes away the possibility to make independ-
ent judgments.705 However, this understanding of law against liberty 
relies on a specific understanding of liberty as opposite to a constraint 
– that is, negative liberty. Thus the argument made against runaway 
legislation is not straightforwardly applicable to republicanism, where 
commonly agreed laws were considered guarantees of liberty rather 
than limitations of it. Yet at the same time, neither should it be assumed 
that the republican conception of liberty sees laws only as necessary 
bondage. The connection was far from being simply a binary opposite 
understanding of the role of laws for liberty. The longstanding recogni-
tion, dating back to Tacitus, was that excessive legislation could result 
in corrupt government, and that the republican aim was for optimal 
laws: laws that would be equal, necessary and as few as possible but not 
any fewer – a tradition to which Harrington belonged. One argument 
703 Kennedy, Classical rhetoric, p. 129.
704 Frank Lovett, “Republicanism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2010 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2010.
705 Bryan Garsten, Saving Persuasion: A Defense of Rhetoric and Judgment, Harvard: 2006. 
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for the scarcity of laws was the fear of excessive litigation, and the more 
insidious claim was that numerous laws were sign of a corrupt form of 
government. Without legitimacy the laws were empty – as in tyrannies 
– or, they were multiplied endlessly in an anarchic democracy.
Milton had only low expectations of public instruction, and his un-
derstanding of the roles of law and education shed further light on his 
views. Milton had much less faith in the capacity of legislation to deal 
with political problems as they rose, and much more faith in the capac-
ity of virtuous, well educated people to deal with such contingencies. 
This is the background to the argument for free speech in Areopagitica, 
where Milton presented his mitigating factors that should give pause to 
over-enthusiastic banning of books – that is, of legislating what should 
be allowed for reading, rather than leaving it to individual judgement. 
An audience of well-learned, good men could see right reason for them-
selves, so not everything needed to be regulated by laws.
Milton took this argument further in the Second Defence of the People 
of England, with the Tacitean claim that “there are often men in the 
state who itch with a kind of lust to promulgate many laws” and “the 
greater the number, the worse in general is the quality of the laws.” 
Numerous laws would forbid “that which should be free for good men” 
and “only those laws that are essential” should be retained. But unlike 
Harrington, Milton presses the division between good and bad people, 
as laws were needed “against the wiles of the wicked,” but they should 
“not forbid actions of themselves licit, merely because of the guilt of 
those who abuse them.” Against the tendency to legislate, Milton ar-
gues that “nothing can so effectively mould and create virtue as liber-
ty.” However, for Milton, the rewards of learning virtue through liberty 
should be kept to those “who have already acquired learning, those 
who already deserve the reward.” The good do not need extra laws, 
and those to whom laws are necessary are beyond the reach of public 
oratory (CPW 4:678-9).
The tendency in Milton’s approach to laws is to advocate strongly 
the good and the virtuous above all. This tendency brings us to the 
third and final reason behind the discrepancy in the orator’s duties – 
the nature of power. Milton’s disdain for legislation in general, and also 
276 CONCLUSION
to any popular remedies, checks and balances, and election to offices, 
relies heavily on the assumption that office-holders will do their duties, 
and nothing else – that is, they would not abuse their offices. Milton 
was not so naive as to assume that learned cannot but be good, and 
that any office-holder could be held accountable. However, in much 
of the republican theory, being in a position of power by itself has a 
corrupting influence, and accordingly there are a number of means to 
try and guarantee that office would not be abused: rotation of offices, 
term limits, and other checks and balances. Milton ruled out any such 
popular remedies, when presenting his sole institutional proposals in 
1659. Not only did that go against the grain of most republican theory, 
but even his own admirers, like John Hall of Durham, who would oth-
erwise agree with Milton’s brand of republicanism, promoted rotation 
of offices in principle. There is obviously a pragmatic edge to the argu-
ment that the alternative would be worse, but the sidestepping of the 
corruptive nature of power is audacious to say the least. For Milton, 
the paramount quality in holding office-holders accountable is simply 
whether they do their duties – any other pre-emptive measures, and 
especially those relying on popular consent, are potentially dangerous 
and redundant at best.
Harrington, on the other hand, did see the possibility of corruption 
– nowhere more clearly than in his recognition that if those who have 
the authority gain the power as well, they will become self-servingly 
corrupt. With checks and balances, rotation of offices, the division of 
power and different responsibilities therein, and without excessive, cor-
rupting wealth, such threat from factions could be avoided. Through 
these measures, parliamentary deliberations would be aligned to the 
shared, common interest, to confine the senate to follow the guidelines 
of virtue, rule of reason and common good in their debates on the com-
monwealth. Duties of office alone would not prevent corruption nor 
guarantee peace. For Harrington, duties were one factor among many, 
whereas for Milton they were the fundamental building blocks of a 
well-working republic. 
However, the conclusion to be drawn from here is counter to the 
views that Milton was the true classical republican and Harrington the 
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harbinger of modernity. It turns out that Harrington is closer to the 
ideas of classical republicanism, where power was something to worry 
about, where duties played a correspondingly important, but not suf-
ficient, role, and where managing the masses was an important duty 
of the orator. In comparison, Milton, who brushed aside worries about 
the corrupting nature of power, asserted so single-mindedly the impor-
tance of duties, and left out the orator’s duty to manage the opinions 
of the multitude, seems to belong to a completely different brand of 
republicanism. 
Finally, we may note how in general, the manner in which the 
seventeenth-century republicans handled rhetorically related topics of 
political theory – persuasion through judgment, decorum, prudence 
and favouring pragmatic approaches – accord well with some of the 
critiques made about deliberative democracy.706 The idea that citizens’ 
votes should reflect their ‘informed decision’ is something we recognise 
from Milton, but if the correct choices are already known by the pro-
posers of the vote, Milton probably would have asked why bother with 
the voting, when citizens could simply be ‘informed about decisions.’ 
Milton’s republicanism might seem odious, but at least it had the virtue 
of honesty.
706 See Fontana et al. Talking Democracy; Garsten, Saving Persuasion, pp. 175-6, 187-91. 
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Appendix
James Harrington, Letter to the Royal Society (1676?)
British Library MS Add 72898, Petty Papers vol XLIX, H 21, f 33.
I James Harrington hauing, to my certaine knowledge, mastered 
a cleare and easy experiment (in my conscience, more intimately con-
cerning the good of man kinde then any other hetherto contained in 
the writings or known experience of any of the Philsophers) did wthin 
the compasse of March 1675 mak according to my duty make offer of 
the sayd experiment to Mr Boyl, Sr William Petty and by the mediation 
of the latter to Sr Christopher Wren (three of our most famous philoso-
phers) upon no harder or more troublesome conditions then thus
That hauing no conveniences of my own they would furnish me 
some fit place to shew it in, as also wth an instrument to shew it by.
For the place I proposed it might be some open ground or rather 
some flat roofe of any building (such for example as the painted cham-
ber), of wch kinde Sr Chr: Wren being his Matys Surveyour generall, hath 
the command of many.
For the instrument I assured them it could not cost them aboue six 
pounds, for wch I offered them security, in case I fayled of shewing them 
undenyably the experiment offerd, to repay double the mony it should 
cost them
Now my offer unto these gentilmen going (wth me) upon case of con-
science; I most humbly desire them that (for my discharge hereafter) I 
may haue their categoricall answare in writing to this present paper
James Harrington
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